In the Interest of B.B., C.B., and J.B., Children v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-24-00047-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF B.B., C.B., AND J.B., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the County Court at Law
Bowie County, Texas
Trial Court No. 23C0250-CCL
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The Department of Family and Protective Services filed a petition to terminate Mother’s
and Father’s parental rights as to their three children, B.B., C.B., and J.B.1 Following a bench
trial, the trial court terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights after finding that (1) they
“knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child[ren] to remain in conditions or surroundings
which endanger[ed] the[ir] physical or emotional well-being,” (2) they “engaged in conduct or
knowingly placed the child[ren] with persons who engaged in conduct that endanger[ed] the[ir]
physical or emotional well-being,” and (3) termination of their parental rights was in the
children’s best interests. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (b)(2) (Supp.).
On appeal, Mother and Father both argue that the evidence is legally and factually
insufficient to support a ground of termination and that the evidence is legally and factually
insufficient to support a finding that the termination of their parental rights was in the best
interests of their children. Upon review, we find that sufficient evidence supported the trial
court’s finding that Mother’s and Father’s parental rights should be terminated under ground E
and that doing so was in the children’s best interests.
As an initial matter, the underlying case in this appeal and a companion case, appealed as
In the Interest of F.S., cause number 06-24-00048-CV, were consolidated at the trial court level.
In our opinion in cause number 06-24-00048-CV, we addressed the issues Father raised in this
appeal. This is because, in assessing termination as to F.S., we considered not only Father’s
conduct regarding F.S., but also his conduct regarding B.B., C.B., and J.B. We adopt those
1
We use initials or pseudonyms to protect the identities of the children, including parents and other family members.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b).
2
findings for the purposes of Father’s appeal in this case. For the reasons stated when affirming
termination as to F.S., we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights as to B.B., C.B., and
J.B., finding that there is legally and factually sufficient evidence under Section 161.001(b)(1)(E)
of the Texas Family Code and that termination is in the best interests of B.B., C.B., and J.B.
We turn now to the issues Mother2 has raised.
I. A Statutory Ground for Termination of Parental Rights is Supported by Legally
and Factually Sufficient Evidence
In her first point of error, Mother asserts that the evidence is legally and factually
insufficient to support the trial court’s findings that statutory grounds existed to support the
termination of her parental rights.
A. Standard of Review
“The natural right existing between parents and their children is of constitutional
dimensions.” In re E.J.Z., 547 S.W.3d 339, 343 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, no pet.) (quoting
Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985)). “Indeed, parents have a fundamental right to
make decisions concerning ‘the care, custody, and control of their children.’” Id. (quoting Troxel
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). “Because the termination of parental rights implicates
fundamental interests, a higher standard of proof—clear and convincing evidence—is required at
trial.” Id. (quoting In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Tex. 2014)). “This Court is . . . required to
‘engage in an exacting review of the entire record to determine if the evidence is . . . sufficient to
support the termination of parental rights.’” Id. (quoting In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 500).
2
Consistent with our opinion in In the Interest of F.S., cause number 06-24-00048-CV, “Bonnie” in that case is
referred to as Mother in this case.
3
“[I]nvoluntary termination statutes are strictly construed in favor of the parent.” Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting In re S.K.A., 236 S.W.3d 875, 900 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, pet. denied)).
“In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the parent has engaged in at least one statutory ground for termination and that
termination is in the child[ren]’s best interest.” Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001;
In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 798 (Tex. 2012)). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is that
‘degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to
the truth of the allegations sought to be established.’” Id. (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 101.007) (citing In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. 2009)). “This standard of proof
necessarily affects our review of the evidence.” Id.“In our legal sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable
to the findings to determine whether the fact-finder reasonably could have formed a firm belief
or conviction that the grounds for termination were proven.” In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d 915, 920
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (citing In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005)
(per curiam); In re J.L.B., 349 S.W.3d 836, 846 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.)). “We
assume the trial court, acting as fact-finder, resolved disputed facts in favor of the finding, if a
reasonable fact-finder could do so, and disregarded evidence that the fact-finder could have
reasonably disbelieved or the credibility of which reasonably could be doubted.” Id. (citing In re
J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573).
“In our review of factual sufficiency, we give due consideration to evidence the trial
court could have reasonably found to be clear and convincing.” Id. (citing In re H.R.M., 209
4
S.W.3d 105, 109 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam)). “We consider only that evidence the fact-finder
reasonably could have found to be clear and convincing and determine ‘whether the evidence is
such that a fact[-]finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of
the . . . allegations.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108); see
In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264, 266 (Tex. 2002). “If, in light of the entire record, the disputed
evidence that a reasonable fact[-]finder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so
significant that a fact[-]finder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then
the evidence is factually insufficient.” In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d at 920 (quoting In re J.F.C., 96
S.W.3d at 266). “‘[I]n making this determination,’ we must undertake ‘“an exacting review of
the entire record with a healthy regard for the constitutional interests at stake.”’” Id. (alteration
in original) (quoting In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014)). “We also recognize that the
trial court, as the fact-finder, is the sole arbiter of a witness’ demeanor and credibility, and it may
believe all, part, or none of a witness’ testimony.” In re A.M., No. 06-18-00012-CV, 2018 WL
3077784, at *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana June 22, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing In re
H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 109). When, as in this case, “findings of fact and conclusions of law are
not properly requested and none are filed, the trial court’s judgment implies all findings of fact
necessary to support it.” In re Z.E., No. 05-22-01337-CV, 2023 WL 3595627, at *5 (Tex.
App.—Dallas May 23, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Shields Ltd. P’ship v. Bradberry,
526 S.W.3d 471, 480 (Tex. 2017)).
“Despite the profound constitutional interests at stake in a proceeding to terminate
parental rights, ‘“the rights of natural parents are not absolute; protection of the child[ren] is
5
paramount.”’” In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d at 920 (quoting In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex.
2003)). “A child’s emotional and physical interests must not be sacrificed merely to preserve
parental rights.” Id. (quoting In re C.A.J., 459 S.W.3d 175, 179 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015,
no pet.)).
B. The Evidence at Trial
In our opinion in In the Interest of F.S., cause number 06-24-00048-CV, we provided a
detailed analysis of the facts relevant to Mother. We adopt those findings here.
C. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Ground E Findings
“Only one predicate finding under Section 161.001[b](1) is necessary to support a
judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child[ren]’s best
interest.” Id. at 923 (quoting In re O.R.F., 417 S.W.3d 24, 37 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet.
denied)). “Even so, when the trial court’s findings under grounds D or E are challenged on
appeal, due process demands that we review the evidence supporting the findings under at least
one of those grounds.” In re A.B., No. 06-22-00020-CV, 2023 WL 7475743, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana Nov. 13, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex.
2019) (per curiam) (“We hold that due process and due course of law requirements mandate that
an appellate court detail its analysis for an appeal of termination of parental rights under
[S]ection 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E) of the Family Code.”). “This is because termination of
parental rights under these grounds may implicate the parent’s parental rights to other children.”
Id. (citing In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 234; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(M) (Supp.)
(providing as a ground for termination of parental rights that the parent “had his or her parent-
6
child relationship terminated with respect to another child based on a finding that the parent’s
conduct was in violation of Paragraph (D) or (E)”).
Ground E permits the termination of a parent’s parental rights “if the court finds by clear
and convincing evidence . . . that the parent has . . . engaged in conduct . . . which endangers the
physical or emotional well-being of the child[ren].” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).
“‘[E]ndanger’ means more than a threat of metaphysical injury or potential ill effects of a less-
than-ideal family environment . . . .” In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. 2012).
“‘[E]ndanger’ means to expose to loss or injury; to jeopardize.” Tex. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v.
Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987); In re N.S.G., 235 S.W.3d 358, 367 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2007, no pet.); In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d at 923. “It is not necessary that the conduct
be directed at the child[ren] or that the child[ren] actually suffer injury.” In re L.E.S., 471
S.W.3d at 923. “Under [ground] (E), it is sufficient that the child[ren]’s well-being is
jeopardized or exposed to loss or injury.” Id. (citing Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; In re N.S.G., 235
S.W.3d at 367). “Further, termination under [ground] (E) must be based on more than a single
act or omission. Instead, a ‘voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent
is required.’” Id. (quoting Perez v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 148 S.W.3d 427,
436 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.)); see Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; In re N.S.G., 235 S.W.3d
at 366–67.
Ground E “refers only to the parent’s conduct, as evidenced not only by the parent’s acts,
but also by the parent’s omissions or failures to act.” In re S.K., 198 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied); In re N.S.G., 235 S.W.3d at 366–67. The endangering conduct
7
may also occur “either before or after the child[ren]’s removal by the Department.” In re Z.J.,
No. 02-19-00118-CV, 2019 WL 6205252, at *11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 21, 2019, pet.
denied) (mem. op.) (citing Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 312 S.W.3d 608,
617 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied)).
As stated in further detail in In the Interest of F.S., cause number 06-24-00048-CV, the
Department demonstrated that Mother was aware B.B., C.B., and J.B. were having sex under her
trailer.3 Mother was not stopping that behavior, and she was not taking that behavior seriously.
To address the children’s behavior, the Department directed Mother to seek counseling for the
children in January 2023, but she did not pursue that counseling until late February 2023. Even
then, their counselor was not initially informed about any allegations of sexual abuse. The
counselor was instead told the reason the children needed counseling was “because they
witnessed law enforcement coming in and arresting [Father] for the sexual assault of [another
child] and they were traumatized.”
Mother was also directed to install cameras to watch the children and protect them from
sexual behavior. In her brief, Mother claims she installed those cameras and was actively
protecting the children. Mother claims “[t]he record contains a specific incident of inappropriate
behavior by one child,” which she claims she “saw on the cameras and immediately addressed.”
Upon review, we find Mother is correct that, in one instance, J.W., the father of one of Mother’s
other children, testified that Mother stopped C.B. from “pull[ing] out his penis in front of his
little brother” after she caught C.B. doing so on camera. However, J.W. is a truck driver who
3
At the time, the children were between the ages of five and eight years old.
8
spends a great deal of time on the road, and “he was not aware” of all of the sexual behavior that
was ongoing.4
Other trial testimony also demonstrated that the cameras were not always functioning.
Judie Townsend, a special investigator with the Department, testified that Mother was “supposed
to have put up some cameras, but [Mother and Father] claimed that the kids kept on turning the
cameras off.”
In her brief, Mother also argues that she took preventative steps to protect the children
from each other and from sexual contact. For example, Mother claims that, to avoid having one
child, C.B., go out and have sexual relations with another child, either Mother or Father slept
with C.B. Despite her claim, however, the trial testimony demonstrates “that did not last.”
Further, as to any abuse by Father against the children, Mother argues in her brief that the
“new outcries of sexual abuse by all three children” were against Father and were not against
her. Mother argues, “The record is void of any indication that the child, C.B., informed his
mother . . . of this abuse.” The trial testimony does not, however, bear out that claim and instead
demonstrates Mother was aware of Father’s abuse and did not stop it.
Rhonda Synder with CASA testified that the children claimed “they were touched
sexually by their father” and that “their mother basically did nothing, told him not to do it again.”
In one example, the trial testimony demonstrated that one of the children, J.B., reported, “My
mom knew about dad doing sex” with B.B., J.B., and C.B. J.B. also drew pictures of her and
Mother and stated, “Mom, dad touched me wrong” to which Mother replied, “Don’t tell.”
4
Even so, when J.W. was notified that his daughter, D.B., may have been involved in sexual activity and that Father
had been arrested for alleged sexual misconduct towards the children, he still requested that D.B. stay with Mother.
9
Maureen Fletcher with the Texarkana Children’s Advocacy Center also testified that J.B. told
Mother about the abuse and that J.B. was punished for reporting the abuse to Mother. Fletcher
testified that there were “three different occasions that [J.B.] told [her] that she told [Mother].”
Based on the testimony at trial, the trial court could find, by clear and convincing
evidence, that Mother engaged in a course of conduct that endangered the children’s physical
well-being. Mother endangered B.B., C.B., and J.B. by being aware of and yet not protecting
them from sexual abuse by each other and by Father. See In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d 494, 502
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) (recognizing “child[ren are] endangered when the
environment creates a potential for danger that the parent is aware of but disregards”). Since
there is sufficient evidence supporting the trial court’s finding under ground E, we need not
review its findings under ground D. See J.T. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-
21-00070-CV, 2021 WL 2672055, at *9 (Tex. App.—Austin June 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.);
In re M.F., No. 14-19-00964-CV, 2020 WL 2832166, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
May 28, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.). We overrule Mother’s first point of error.
II. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Best-Interest Finding
Next, Mother argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the
trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests.
After reviewing the record, we disagree.
A. Standard of Review
“There is a strong presumption that keeping a child with a parent is in the child’s best
interest.” In re R.W., 627 S.W.3d 501, 516 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021, no pet.) (quoting In re
10
J.A.S., Jr., No. 13-12-00612-CV, 2013 WL 782692, at *7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg
Feb. 28, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.)). “Termination ‘“can never be justified without the most
solid and substantial reasons.”’” In re N.L.D., 412 S.W.3d 810, 822 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2013, no pet.) (quoting Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. 1976)).
“In determining the best interests of the child[ren],” courts consider the following Holley
factors:
(1) the desires of the child[ren], (2) the emotional and physical needs of the
child[ren] now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to the
child[ren] now and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals
seeking custody, (5) the programs available to assist these individuals, (6) the
plans for the child[ren] by these individuals, (7) the stability of the home, (8) the
acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child
relationship is not a proper one, and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of
the parent.
Id. at 818–19 (citing Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex. 1976)); see In re E.N.C., 384
S.W.3d at 807; see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b) (providing thirteen factors for the
court and Department to consider in a best interest of a child determination).
The Department is not required to present proof of each Holley factor. In re M.C., 482
S.W.3d 675, 688 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, pet. denied) (citing In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27
(Tex. 2002)). “When considering the child[ren]’s best interest[s], we may take into account that
a parent is unable to provide adequate care for a child, lacks parenting skills, or exercises poor
judgment.” Id. (citing In re C.A.J., 122 S.W.3d 888, 893 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no
pet.)). “Parental drug abuse, which reflects poor judgment, is also a factor that may be
considered when determining the child[ren]’s best interest[s].” Id. (citing In re M.R., 243
S.W.3d 807, 820 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.)). “[T]he parent’s . . . past performance
11
as a parent [is] . . . relevant in determining the child[ren]’s best interest[s].” Id. (citing In re
C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28). Further, we may consider evidence used to support the grounds for
termination of parental rights in the best-interest analysis. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex.
2002).
B. Analysis of the Holley Factors
With the first Holley factor, we must consider the desires of the children. Although
Mother did not testify at the trial, the children’s caretaker, Melissa Smith,5 testified that, after the
children were removed, they did not want to go back to Mother: “Well, after the intake, it was
really, really bad after - - during the visitation after they were removed. Before that, we had
issues with the girls crying that they didn’t want to go home.” Smith also testified that the
children were scared of Mother during supervised visitations. J.B. also reported to her counselor
that she liked where she lived, which was “[Smith’s] house,” and J.B.’s preference was to stay
with Smith. Accordingly, based upon the trial testimony, we find the first Holley factor weighs
in favor of termination.
As to the second factor, “the emotional and physical needs of the child[ren] now and in
the future,” Mother argues the Department recognized in its family plan that Mother had “the
basic needs and resources as it relate[d] to her being able to meet the basic needs of her
children.” Mother also argues that she successfully completed her parenting classes, sought out
additional parenting resources, and completed courses through For the Sake of One.
5
To protect the identities of the children, although not a family member, we use a pseudonym here because of
Smith’s continued relationship with the children.
12
Upon review, we have considered this factor. While the record does support Mother’s
claim that she was attending counseling, was engaging in her case, and was seeking out
resources up until she was incarcerated, those facts do not necessarily demonstrate that she can
care for the emotional and physical needs of her children now and in the future. Indeed, as
recognized above, in caring for their emotional needs, Mother waited over a month to place the
children in counseling after she was aware of the sexual abuse; and, even then, she did not
disclose to the counselor that they needed counseling for sexual abuse. As a result, the second
Holley factor weighs in favor of termination.
Mother also argues the third Holley factor, “the emotional and physical danger to the
child[ren] now and in the future,” supports her argument against termination. Mother argues
that, in her psychological evaluation, she was found to “not have characteristics like those
know[n] to physically abuse children and her expressed parenting attitudes were generally
acceptable.” Mother also argues that her counselor found that she appeared “sincere in her desire
to make needed changes that [would] positively impact her life and the lives of her children.”
While Mother is correct as to those claims, those reports still found her prognosis was “fair to
guarded” in part due to her “clinically significant emotional difficulties and personality
impairment,” her childhood trauma, and “a past history of cannabis use.” Considering those
facts and those counseling records, we find this factor weighs in favor of termination.
As for the fourth Holley factor, the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody,
we can consider Mother’s past ability to care for her children as an indicator of future actions.
See In re A.T., No. 06-14-00091-CV, 2015 WL 733275, at *5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Feb. 18,
13
2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). Here, the trial testimony demonstrates that Mother was not able to
properly care for her children. Smith testified at trial that the children “were thirsty and hungry
every time” they came into her care. Smith also testified that the children were dirty and wore
“inappropriate weather clothing.” Smith testified as follows:
They were in one bedroom originally in the old house. There were times we went
in to help them clean up the bedroom. It would be dirty. There was food, cups
with rotten milk in it, stuff like that. We would help clean all that out. It was
dirty a lot.
Smith also testified that she treated the females for head lice “every time [they] got them.” She
was aware that B.B. “had been sleeping on a filthy mattress with no sheet,” so she sent one home
with her, and “[i]t never got put on.” Consequently, we find the fourth Holley factor weighs in
favor of termination.
Mother argues that the fifth Holley factor, “the programs available to assist these
individuals,” supports her claim against termination. She argues, “[T]he record reflects through
the facts stated above that [Mother] utilized every resource available to her through the
Department and sought out additional resources.” Upon review, we find Mother did utilize
parental resources, and this factor does weigh against termination.
The sixth Holley factor includes a consideration of Mother’s plans for the children. At
the time of trial, Mother was incarcerated. As a result, she could not testify as to her future
plans, if any, for the children. See In re K.C., No. 07-18-00282-CV, 2018 WL 6729944, at *5
(Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 21, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (where the appellant gave no
information through testimony, the court was not informed on matters critical to the best-interest
14
determination such as the appellant’s plans for the family). Because Mother did not provide any
evidence as to her future plans, we find this factor weighs in favor of termination.
The seventh Holley factor is the stability of the home. Again, Mother could not testify to
the stability of her home. Smith, however, testified that she was the primary caregiver for the
children for a significant period of their lives. Even before the children were removed from
Mother, they were in Smith’s care.6 Smith testified that J.B. and B.B. began living with her
when they were very young, and C.B. came into her care when he was repeating kindergarten
because Mother had stopped providing an education for him. Smith also testified that B.B. and
J.B. were in her care “almost full time” for close to six years. In accordance with Smith’s
testimony, while Smith had provided a stable home for the children through those years, Mother
had not cared for them during that time. We find this factor favors termination.
The eighth and ninth Holley factors include a consideration of the acts or omissions of the
parent that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one and a
consideration of whether there is any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. As outlined
in greater detail above, Mother neglected the children by allowing them to be sexually abused
both by each other and by Father. Notably, the evidence at trial demonstrates that, while Mother
was charged with taking care of her children, the “children were having sex with each other.”
After being made aware of that abuse, Mother was directed to install cameras and place the
children in counseling.
6
Snyder also described Smith’s home as very well organized with space for each of the children. Smith also
confirmed that a home study was performed on her home, and it was approved.
15
Mother did not comply with those directives, Mother allowed the children to turn the
cameras off, and Mother specifically denied to the counselor that the children had been sexually
abused. Further, the trial testimony demonstrated that Mother was aware of Father’s abuse and
did not protect the children from it. Smith testified that Mother was aware of the abuse:
Q [(By the State)] Was there ever a time that the kids notified
[Mother] of the sexual abuse by [Father]?
A [(By Smith)] Yes. The girls both said they told her. [J.B.] said she
told her, and she told her don’t tell anybody. They weren’t supposed to tell me
either. And [J.B.] even drew a picture saying, no, mom, and [Mother] told her no,
ma’am. [B.B.] later had said her dad was on top of her and she screamed, and her
mom walked in and looked at him. Would you like to do that with a grownup
instead? And she said they left her there and went to the bedroom.
Despite being aware of the abuse, however, Mother did nothing to prevent it. Such “[e]vidence
of past misconduct or neglect can be used to measure a parent’s future conduct.” In re Z.M., 456
S.W.3d 677, 689 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (citing In re I.R.K.-N., No. 10-13-00455-
CV, 2014 WL 2069281, at *7 (Tex. App.—Waco May 15, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.)).
Further, Mother has offered no excuse for those acts or omissions. Those two factors weigh
heavily in favor of termination.
C. Section 263.307(b) Factors
Mother also argues that several of the factors in Section 263.307(b) of the Texas Family
Code support her claim that termination was not in her children’s best interests. See TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 263.307(b). Mother specifically claims that factors ten, eleven, and twelve support
her claim:
(10) the willingness and ability of the child[ren]’s family to seek out, accept, and
complete counseling services and to cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate
16
agency’s close supervision; (11) the willingness and ability of the child[ren]’s
family to effect positive environmental and personal changes within a reasonable
period of time; [and] (12) whether the child[ren]’s family demonstrates adequate
parenting skills.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(10)–(12).
Again, upon review, while Mother did seek out and engage in the services available to
her, which supports her claim against termination under Section 263.307(b)(10) of the Texas
Family Code, we find factors eleven and twelve weigh in favor of termination. As outlined in
greater detail above, Mother’s failure to protect her children from the sexual behavior of her
other children and of Father demonstrates that she has neither a “willingness” nor an “ability” “to
effect positive environment and personal changes within a reasonable period of time” nor has she
demonstrated “adequate parenting skills.”
As a result, upon review and after weighing all of the Holley factors and the relevant
factors from Section 263.307(b) of the Texas Family Code, we conclude there is legally and
factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s best-interests finding against Mother.
We find the trial court’s determination that termination was in the best interests of the children is
supported by clear and convincing evidence, and we overrule Mother’s second point of error.
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III. Disposition
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Jeff Rambin
Justice
Date Submitted: September 9, 2024
Date Decided: October 9, 2024
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