Courtney Brooks Vann v. the Glades II of Gregory Apartments, LLC, Couric Enterprises, LLC D/B/A Foremost Construction, Eric Solis, Individually and as Representative of Couric Enterprises, LLC, and Gunnen Craig, Individually and as an Employee of Couric Enterprises, LLC ( 2024 )

NUMBER 13-23-00455-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
COURTNEY BROOKS VANN, Appellant,
v.
THE GLADES II OF GREGORY
APARTMENTS, LLC, COURIC
ENTERPRISES, LLC, D/B/A
FOREMOST CONSTRUCTION,
ERIC SOLIS, INDIVIDUALLY AND
AS REPRESENTATIVE OF COURIC
ENTERPRISES, LLC, AND GUNNEN
CRAIG, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS AN
EMPLOYEE OF COURIC
ENTERPRISES, LLC, Appellees.
ON APPEAL FROM THE 343RD DISTRICT COURT
OF SAN PATRICIO COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Tijerina and Peña
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña
Appellant Courtney Brooks Vann appeals the trial court’s order striking her petition
to intervene in a suit filed by appellee the Glades II of Gregory Apartments, LLC (the
Glades) against appellees Couric Enterprises, LLC, d/b/a Foremost Construction; Eric
Solis, individually and as representative of Couric Enterprises, LLC; and Gunnen Craig,
individually and as employee of Couric Enterprises, LLC (collectively Couric). In five
issues, 1 which we construe as one, Vann argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by striking her petition to intervene. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The Glades hired Couric to construct an apartment complex in Gregory, Texas.
On April 5, 2022, the Glades sued Couric asserting various causes of action and alleging
that Couric failed to pay subcontractors and abandoned the project. On September 13,
2023, the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss with prejudice, informing the court that
they resolved the case through mediation. On the same day, Vann filed a petition in
intervention asserting multiple derivative shareholder claims against Couric. Vann alleged
that she was a minority shareholder of Couric and principally complained of the acts of
Solis, her ex-husband and managing member of Couric, regarding his management of
the company.
1 Vann raises several issues regarding the merits of her underlying claims. However, in an appeal
from the denial of a petition to intervene, we may only review the propriety of the trial court’s ruling on the
petition. See Smith v. City of Garland, 523 S.W.3d 234, 239 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, no pet.) (holding that
appellant “cannot appeal the judgment’s resolution of other parties’ disputes” in an appeal from the denial
of a petition in intervention).
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The Glades filed a motion to strike Vann’s petition to intervene, arguing that Vann
has no justiciable interest in the suit, intervention is not essential to protect any interests
in the matter, and intervention would unnecessarily complicate the case. The Glades
maintained that Vann’s complaints regarding Solis should be brought in a separate suit
and that her allegations do not relate to the Glades’ claims regarding the construction of
the apartment complex. Couric also filed a motion to strike Vann’s petition raising similar
arguments, while also asserting that the petition is untimely.
Following a hearing, the trial court signed an order striking Vann’s petition in
intervention. It then signed an agreed order of dismissal with prejudice. This appeal
followed.
II. INTERVENTION
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 60 provides that “[a]ny party may intervene by filing
a pleading, subject to being stricken out by the court for sufficient cause on the motion of
any party.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 60. “The rule authorizes a party with a justiciable interest in a
pending suit to intervene in the suit as a matter of right.” Nghiem v. Sajib, 567 S.W.3d
718, 721 (Tex. 2019) (quoting In re Union Carbide Corp., 273 S.W.3d 152, 154 (Tex.
2008) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)). A party opposing the intervention may file a motion
to strike. Id. If a motion to strike is filed, the intervenor has the burden to show that it
possesses a justiciable interest in the suit. Id.; In re Union Carbide Corp., 273 S.W.3d at
155.
An intervenor possesses a justiciable interest if the interest is “such that if the
original action had never been commenced, and [the intervenor] had first brought it as the
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sole plaintiff, [the intervenor] would have been entitled to recover in his own name to the
extent at least of a part of the relief sought” in the original suit. In re Union Carbide Corp.,
273 S.W.3d at 155 (quoting King v. Olds, 12 S.W. 65, 65 (Tex. 1888)). Stated otherwise,
an intervenor has a justiciable interest “if the intervenor could have ‘brought the [pending]
action, or any part thereof, in his own name.’” Id. (quoting Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank v.
Horseshoe Operating Co., 793 S.W.2d 652, 657 (Tex. 1990) (op. on reh’g)).
We review the ruling on a motion to strike a plea in intervention for abuse of
discretion. Smith v. City of Garland, 523 S.W.3d 234, 241 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, no
pet.) (citing Brauss v. Triple M Holding GmbH, 411 S.W.3d 614, 630 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2013, pet. denied)). A trial court abuses its discretion by striking a plea in intervention if
(1) the intervenor could have brought the same action, or any part of it, in its own name
or could have defeated recovery, or some part of it, if the action had been brought against
it; (2) the intervention would not complicate the case by excessively multiplying the
issues; and (3) the intervention is almost essential to effectively protect the intervenor’s
interest. J. Fuentes Colleyville, L.P. v. A.S., 501 S.W.3d 239, 243 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2016, no pet.) (citing Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank, 793 S.W.2d at 657). Further, a significant
delay in filing a petition in intervention may also qualify as “sufficient cause” to strike an
intervention. Muller v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 525 S.W.3d 859, 874 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (explaining that a petition in intervention may be considered
“untimely,” even if before final judgment, when “filed so late that it would delay the
proceeding or unjustifiably complicate it”).
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B. Analysis
Vann has not demonstrated a justiciable interest in the litigation. The Glades’ suit
against Couric solely pertains to a construction project agreement, including allegations
that Couric failed to pay subcontractors and that it abandoned work on the project in
violation of the parties’ agreement. On the other hand, Vann wishes to bring a derivative
suit against Couric for violations of the “company agreement.” Vann does not assert that
she could have brought any part of the Glades’ claims in her own name, and the record
does not support such a finding. While there may be a controversy between Vann and
Couric, Vann makes no claim that this controversy will be affected or resolved by
resolution of the current litigation. Accordingly, Vann has failed to demonstrate a
justiciable interest. See In re Union Carbide Corp., 273 S.W.3d at 155; see also In re
Ubican Glob., Inc., Nos. 01-21-00293-CV & 01-21-00356-CV, 2021 WL 4533281, at *6
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 5, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that
intervenor could not demonstrate a justiciable interest because it would “not have been
entitled to recover any part of the relief that [plaintiff] seeks in its petition”).
We further note that Vann’s intervention would require examining corporate
management issues unrelated to the underlying construction project and would thus
complicate the Glades’ suit by excessive multiplication of the issues. See Guar. Fed. Sav.
Bank, 793 S.W.2d at 657. In addition, Vann has not shown that an intervention into this
particular case is “almost essential to effectively protect [her] interest.” See id. There is
nothing preventing Vann from filing a separate action against Couric raising the same
claims that she does in her plea in intervention.
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Further, Vann’s significant delay in filing the plea in intervention provided the trial
court sufficient cause to strike the plea. Despite being aware of the suit since its inception,
Vann did not attempt to intervene until almost a year and a half later and after the parties
had reached a settlement. See Muller, 525 S.W.3d at 874 (finding the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by striking a petition in intervention that was filed twenty months after
plaintiff filed his lawsuit); Westridge Villa Apartments v. Lakewood Bank & Tr. Co., 438
S.W.2d 891, 895 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1969, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (determining that the
intervention was not timely when intervenor had knowledge of the pending suit for at least
eight months but did not intervene until the case had been called to trial).
For the forgoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in striking Vann’s plea in intervention. See City of Garland, 523 S.W.3d at 241.
We overrule Vann’s sole issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
L. ARON PEÑA JR.
Justice
Delivered and filed on the
10th day of October, 2024.
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