Courtney Brooks Vann v. the Glades II of Gregory Apartments, LLC, Couric Enterprises, LLC D/B/A Foremost Construction, Eric Solis, Individually and as Representative of Couric Enterprises, LLC, and Gunnen Craig, Individually and as an Employee of Couric Enterprises, LLC ( 2024 )


Menu:
  •                 NUMBER 13-23-00455-CV
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
    COURTNEY BROOKS VANN,                         Appellant,
    v.
    THE GLADES II OF GREGORY
    APARTMENTS, LLC, COURIC
    ENTERPRISES, LLC, D/B/A
    FOREMOST CONSTRUCTION,
    ERIC SOLIS, INDIVIDUALLY AND
    AS REPRESENTATIVE OF COURIC
    ENTERPRISES, LLC, AND GUNNEN
    CRAIG, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS AN
    EMPLOYEE OF COURIC
    ENTERPRISES, LLC,                             Appellees.
    ON APPEAL FROM THE 343RD DISTRICT COURT
    OF SAN PATRICIO COUNTY, TEXAS
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Tijerina and Peña
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña
    Appellant Courtney Brooks Vann appeals the trial court’s order striking her petition
    to intervene in a suit filed by appellee the Glades II of Gregory Apartments, LLC (the
    Glades) against appellees Couric Enterprises, LLC, d/b/a Foremost Construction; Eric
    Solis, individually and as representative of Couric Enterprises, LLC; and Gunnen Craig,
    individually and as employee of Couric Enterprises, LLC (collectively Couric). In five
    issues, 1 which we construe as one, Vann argues that the trial court abused its discretion
    by striking her petition to intervene. We affirm.
    I.       BACKGROUND
    The Glades hired Couric to construct an apartment complex in Gregory, Texas.
    On April 5, 2022, the Glades sued Couric asserting various causes of action and alleging
    that Couric failed to pay subcontractors and abandoned the project. On September 13,
    2023, the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss with prejudice, informing the court that
    they resolved the case through mediation. On the same day, Vann filed a petition in
    intervention asserting multiple derivative shareholder claims against Couric. Vann alleged
    that she was a minority shareholder of Couric and principally complained of the acts of
    Solis, her ex-husband and managing member of Couric, regarding his management of
    the company.
    1 Vann raises several issues regarding the merits of her underlying claims. However, in an appeal
    from the denial of a petition to intervene, we may only review the propriety of the trial court’s ruling on the
    petition. See Smith v. City of Garland, 
    523 S.W.3d 234
    , 239 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, no pet.) (holding that
    appellant “cannot appeal the judgment’s resolution of other parties’ disputes” in an appeal from the denial
    of a petition in intervention).
    2
    The Glades filed a motion to strike Vann’s petition to intervene, arguing that Vann
    has no justiciable interest in the suit, intervention is not essential to protect any interests
    in the matter, and intervention would unnecessarily complicate the case. The Glades
    maintained that Vann’s complaints regarding Solis should be brought in a separate suit
    and that her allegations do not relate to the Glades’ claims regarding the construction of
    the apartment complex. Couric also filed a motion to strike Vann’s petition raising similar
    arguments, while also asserting that the petition is untimely.
    Following a hearing, the trial court signed an order striking Vann’s petition in
    intervention. It then signed an agreed order of dismissal with prejudice. This appeal
    followed.
    II.    INTERVENTION
    A.     Standard of Review & Applicable Law
    Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 60 provides that “[a]ny party may intervene by filing
    a pleading, subject to being stricken out by the court for sufficient cause on the motion of
    any party.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 60. “The rule authorizes a party with a justiciable interest in a
    pending suit to intervene in the suit as a matter of right.” Nghiem v. Sajib, 
    567 S.W.3d 718
    , 721 (Tex. 2019) (quoting In re Union Carbide Corp., 
    273 S.W.3d 152
    , 154 (Tex.
    2008) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)). A party opposing the intervention may file a motion
    to strike. 
    Id.
     If a motion to strike is filed, the intervenor has the burden to show that it
    possesses a justiciable interest in the suit. Id.; In re Union Carbide Corp., 273 S.W.3d at
    155.
    An intervenor possesses a justiciable interest if the interest is “such that if the
    original action had never been commenced, and [the intervenor] had first brought it as the
    3
    sole plaintiff, [the intervenor] would have been entitled to recover in his own name to the
    extent at least of a part of the relief sought” in the original suit. In re Union Carbide Corp.,
    273 S.W.3d at 155 (quoting King v. Olds, 
    12 S.W. 65
    , 65 (Tex. 1888)). Stated otherwise,
    an intervenor has a justiciable interest “if the intervenor could have ‘brought the [pending]
    action, or any part thereof, in his own name.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank v.
    Horseshoe Operating Co., 
    793 S.W.2d 652
    , 657 (Tex. 1990) (op. on reh’g)).
    We review the ruling on a motion to strike a plea in intervention for abuse of
    discretion. Smith v. City of Garland, 
    523 S.W.3d 234
    , 241 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, no
    pet.) (citing Brauss v. Triple M Holding GmbH, 
    411 S.W.3d 614
    , 630 (Tex. App.—Dallas
    2013, pet. denied)). A trial court abuses its discretion by striking a plea in intervention if
    (1) the intervenor could have brought the same action, or any part of it, in its own name
    or could have defeated recovery, or some part of it, if the action had been brought against
    it; (2) the intervention would not complicate the case by excessively multiplying the
    issues; and (3) the intervention is almost essential to effectively protect the intervenor’s
    interest. J. Fuentes Colleyville, L.P. v. A.S., 
    501 S.W.3d 239
    , 243 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
    2016, no pet.) (citing Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank, 793 S.W.2d at 657). Further, a significant
    delay in filing a petition in intervention may also qualify as “sufficient cause” to strike an
    intervention. Muller v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 
    525 S.W.3d 859
    , 874 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (explaining that a petition in intervention may be considered
    “untimely,” even if before final judgment, when “filed so late that it would delay the
    proceeding or unjustifiably complicate it”).
    4
    B.     Analysis
    Vann has not demonstrated a justiciable interest in the litigation. The Glades’ suit
    against Couric solely pertains to a construction project agreement, including allegations
    that Couric failed to pay subcontractors and that it abandoned work on the project in
    violation of the parties’ agreement. On the other hand, Vann wishes to bring a derivative
    suit against Couric for violations of the “company agreement.” Vann does not assert that
    she could have brought any part of the Glades’ claims in her own name, and the record
    does not support such a finding. While there may be a controversy between Vann and
    Couric, Vann makes no claim that this controversy will be affected or resolved by
    resolution of the current litigation. Accordingly, Vann has failed to demonstrate a
    justiciable interest. See In re Union Carbide Corp., 273 S.W.3d at 155; see also In re
    Ubican Glob., Inc., Nos. 01-21-00293-CV & 01-21-00356-CV, 
    2021 WL 4533281
    , at *6
    (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 5, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that
    intervenor could not demonstrate a justiciable interest because it would “not have been
    entitled to recover any part of the relief that [plaintiff] seeks in its petition”).
    We further note that Vann’s intervention would require examining corporate
    management issues unrelated to the underlying construction project and would thus
    complicate the Glades’ suit by excessive multiplication of the issues. See Guar. Fed. Sav.
    Bank, 793 S.W.2d at 657. In addition, Vann has not shown that an intervention into this
    particular case is “almost essential to effectively protect [her] interest.” See id. There is
    nothing preventing Vann from filing a separate action against Couric raising the same
    claims that she does in her plea in intervention.
    5
    Further, Vann’s significant delay in filing the plea in intervention provided the trial
    court sufficient cause to strike the plea. Despite being aware of the suit since its inception,
    Vann did not attempt to intervene until almost a year and a half later and after the parties
    had reached a settlement. See Muller, 
    525 S.W.3d at 874
     (finding the trial court did not
    abuse its discretion by striking a petition in intervention that was filed twenty months after
    plaintiff filed his lawsuit); Westridge Villa Apartments v. Lakewood Bank & Tr. Co., 
    438 S.W.2d 891
    , 895 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1969, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (determining that the
    intervention was not timely when intervenor had knowledge of the pending suit for at least
    eight months but did not intervene until the case had been called to trial).
    For the forgoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion in striking Vann’s plea in intervention. See City of Garland, 
    523 S.W.3d at 241
    .
    We overrule Vann’s sole issue.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    L. ARON PEÑA JR.
    Justice
    Delivered and filed on the
    10th day of October, 2024.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-23-00455-CV

Filed Date: 10/10/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/12/2024