Samuel Wayne Watts v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 10, 2024.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-23-00194-CR
SAMUEL WAYNE WATTS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 180th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1684286
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Samuel Wayne Watts seeks reversal of his murder conviction
following a plea bargain carrying a twenty-five year prison sentence. The sole
issue on appeal relates to the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress custodial
statements made while he was incarcerated on another matter. He argues his
statements were secured by an improper two-step interrogation process in violation
of protections against self-incrimination. Concluding that the trial court could have
reasonably determined that the officer did not deliberately employ the two-step
interrogation process and that appellant’s post-Miranda statements were made
voluntarily, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant admitted in a jailhouse interrogation that he had assaulted Charles
Ross. Ross subsequently died and the State charged appellant with Ross’s murder.
Appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress his statements made during the
interrogation. The evidence at the hearing was comprised of the testimony of the
officer investigating appellant’s case, Detective Justin Russell, and the audio
recording of the interrogation.
Hearing on Motion to Suppress
At the hearing, Russell testified that he was assigned to investigate the
assault of Charles Ross in August 2019. He confirmed that prior to speaking with
appellant one witness reported that he saw appellant assault Ross but the witness
later recanted that report. Additionally, a shovel police had discovered that was
believed to have been the assault weapon had been tested for DNA; that test
excluded appellant as a contributor.
Russell explained that he discovered that appellant was custody in the Harris
County jail for another alleged assault, and that he requested to meet with appellant
to interview him as a witness.
Russell testified about the circumstances and substance of his meeting with
appellant. Russell was unarmed, in plain clothes, and met appellant at a table in a
room used for both interviews and interrogations. Russell recalled appellant had
been in jail on charges related to assaulting his brother, and explained it was his
intention to interview appellant about the matter pertaining to Ross. Russell
testified that he did not believe appellant to be “in-custody” for purposes of his
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interview.
Appellant was escorted to the room, remained in shackles, and spoke to
Russell in the room while the door remained open. Most of the interview was
recorded, but Russell testified that before beginning the audio recording, he
engaged in “some small talk beforehand that was unrelated.” Russell recalled that
appellant appeared “very relaxed, laid back.” Russell compared his own demeanor
on the day of the meeting to how he presented himself in court at the hearing, “just
engaged and looking to obtain the story about an event.” And though he does not
recall telling appellant he was free to leave, he denied ever raising his voice or
telling appellant he had to answer questions, and described the tone of the
discussion as “conversational.”
While Russell testified, the court admitted the audio recording, which was
played at the hearing. The recording indicates that the entire interview lasted less
than six minutes. In the recording, almost immediately after Russell introduces
himself and explains to appellant that his reason for questioning appellant
concerned the July assault of Ross, appellant stated, “I’m guilty.” The trial court
identified this portion, leading up to and including the statement, “I’m guilty,” as
“0:00 - 1:04” of the audio recording.
Russell acknowledged, and the audio recording reflects, that he continued to
ask appellant a series of questions about details related to the assault—questions
aimed to reinforce appellant’s motive to protect or avenge his nephew, gain
clarification about the assault, and confirm details on the location. Russell
admitted that he deliberately asked these questions prior to giving him a Miranda
warning:
Q. So all 16 of those questions were deliberately asked specifically
about . . . the allegations that you were investigating the moment you
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sat down and spoke to Mr. Watts, correct?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Then it was at that point after you essentially have a full confession
that you decided to read Mr. Watts his warnings; is that accurate?
A. Yes.
This portion of the recording, the point immediately after appellant uttered,
“I’m guilty,” to the point that Russell read appellant his Miranda warnings, was
identified by the trial court as “l:05 until 2:00” of the audio recording.
Russell testified (and the recording indicates) that Russell read appellant his
Miranda warnings and that appellant waived his rights through assenting,
nonverbal nods before the discussion continued.1
Russell conceded that his post-Miranda interrogation began by reference to
the subject of appellant’s nephew, who appellant mentioned in the pre-Miranda
confession.2 Notwithstanding, in the audio recording (consistent with appellant’s
transcription of it in his Brief), Russell’s post-Miranda interrogation carried on
independently without reference to appellant’s previous confession.
During the post-Miranda interrogation, appellant explained that while
1
The audio recording of the interview was not transcribed in the record. However, appellant, in
his brief, provides an un-certified transcription of the audio recording, uncontested by the State,
consistent with our review of the exhibit in the record. It shows that at the conclusion of his
Miranda warnings and responses, appellant verbally responded:
Russell: Can you say it out loud just so the recording can hear it?
Appellant: What do I need to say?
Russell: I understand what the rights are.
Appellant: I understand what the rights are.
2
Although there is no indication in the audio recording (or appellant’s transcription of it in his
Brief), that in the Post-Miranda discussion, Russell ever refers directly to the assault previously
confessed to; however, Russell also admits that he did. ([Attorney]: [Starting the Post-Miranda
interrogation] “you were. . . also referring to the assault that [appellant] just talked about,
correct? [Russell]: Yes.)”
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appellant was standing outside Ross appeared calling his nephew for “two Oreo
cookies” at which time appellant admitted he physically beat Ross; “I scared the
shit out of him and started beating him, started whooping him.” During the post-
Miranda interrogation, despite Russell’s questions about whether he used anything
else to beat Ross, appellant insisted he only had used his fists, though he admitted
his fists could be a “deadly weapon.”
The audio recording (consistent with appellant’s transcription of it in his
brief) reflects that at the conclusion of the post-Miranda interrogation Russell
asked appellant if he had any questions for him, and appellant responded that he
did not.
After the hearing concluded, the court granted appellant’s motion to
suppress in part. The court the court struck everything from the question leading
up to “I’m guilty” to the Miranda warning. The remainder of the interview was
deemed admissible against appellant. Appellant subsequently entered a plea
agreement and the State agreed to a sentence of twenty-five years confinement.
Trial Court’s Findings and Conclusions
Post-appeal, on this court’s request, the trial court supplied the record with
its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court determined that the
statements at issue were made while appellant was in custody, but noted several
reasons the question whether the statements were made while appellant was “in
custody” was an “arguable” issue.
The court’s findings indicate that it struck only the pre-Miranda portions
following appellant’s original confession. The court held appellant’s pre-
confession, pre-Miranda statements occurring from “0:00 - 1:04” of the audio
record, which it concluded were statements “derived from a distinct, separate
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criminal charge,” were admissible, but held the un-mirandized portion after the
defendant indicated his guilt to the investigator, from “l:05 until 2:00,” was
inadmissible. Finding the evidence did not imply that Russell deliberately
employed a two-step interrogation and that appellant waived his Miranda rights
and “continue[d] [to] willingly discuss his criminal activity without any signs of
hesitancy or duress,” the trial court found appellant’s post-Miranda statements,
“2:01 - 5:55,” complied with Article 38.22 and were admissible.
II. ISSUE AND ANALYSIS
In his sole issue, appellant complains that the trial court erred when it denied
his motion to suppress his recorded statement which appellant contends was
obtained through an impermissible two-step interrogation technique.
A. Reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a Motion to Suppress
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a
bifurcated standard of review. See Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 189–90 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2018). At a motion-to-suppress hearing, the trial court is the sole trier
of fact and judge of credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their
testimony. See id. at 190. Therefore, we afford almost complete deference to the
trial court in determining historical facts. See id.; State v. Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d
270, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). When, as here, the trial court has made express
findings of fact, an appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to
those findings and determines whether the evidence supports the fact findings. See
State v. Rodriguez, 521 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). A trial court’s ruling
will be sustained if it is reasonably supported by the record and correct under any
theory of law applicable to the case. Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 857 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2003). However, we review de novo mixed questions of law and fact
that do not rely on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. See id.6
B. Law applicable to the two-step (“question first, warn later”) strategy or
midstream Miranda warnings.
When a defendant receives midstream Miranda warnings in the course of
making custodial statements and then later moves to suppress his post-Miranda
statements, the threshold question for the trial court to decide is whether the
interrogator deliberately employed a two-step “question first, warn later” strategy.
See Carter v. State, 309 S.W.3d 31, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (adopting Justice
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct.
2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004) (plurality)); Foster v. State, 579 S.W.3d 606, 612
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (applying Carter). If the two-step
strategy was deliberate, then the trial court must suppress any post-Miranda
statements that were related to the substance of the pre-Miranda statements unless
curative measures were taken before the defendant made his post-Miranda
statements. Carter v. State, 309 S.W.3d at 37. If the two-step strategy was not
deliberate, then the post-Miranda statements may be admitted if the defendant
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights after the initial Miranda violation. Id. at 41
(citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 310 (1985)).
C. Did the investigator deliberately employ a two-step “question, first, warn
later” strategy?
We first consider the trial court’s conclusion that that Russell did not
deliberately employ the two-step interrogation strategy. Whether the two-step
strategy was deliberate depends on the interrogator’s subjective intent. Id. at 39.
That determination often turns on the credibility of the interrogator in light of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation. Id. Because the trial court is in a
unique position to gauge the interrogator’s credibility, we, as the reviewing court,
apply a highly deferential standard of review, reversing the trial court’s ruling only
if it amounts to a clear abuse of discretion. Id. at 40.
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Russell’s testimony at the hearing, as well as the audio recording, provided
the trial court with several circumstances to consider when evaluating whether he
deliberately employed a two-step “question first, warn later” strategy and
ultimately supports its conclusion that Russell did not.
First, the court could consider, that despite its conclusion that appellant’s
statements were made pursuant to an “in-custody” interrogation, that Russell set
out only to interview appellant as a witness and that Russell reasonably believed
that appellant was not “in-custody” until he incriminated himself. Indeed, when
asked whether he intended to “interrogate” appellant (i.e., as a suspect) or
“interview” appellant (i.e., as a witness), Russell testified that his intention was to
“interview” appellant. Consistently, the trial court recognized that appellant was
“arguably” not in custody. The trial court’s findings reflect this conclusion as to
Russell’s intention as the court refers to the meeting—as Russell did at the
hearing—as an “interview” rather than an “interrogation.”
Appellant disagrees and insists that Russell’s motivation for the meeting and
its manner were strategic based on the status of the investigation. Appellant points
out that Russell conceded that the sole eyewitness who had once supplied police
information that appellant killed Ross had recanted and the DNA tests conducted
on a shovel found near Ross’s body, believed to be the murder weapon, excluded
appellant as a contributor. Appellant contends these facts suggest that Russell
“believed appellant was his suspect,” and his aim was to revive his case against
him by meeting with appellant to “deliberately obtain inculpatory admissions prior
to advising Appellant of his Miranda warning.” This argument based on the
diminishing certainty of the suspect in the Ross investigation is speculative, and
from the same facts, one could just as easily conclude Russell only approached
appellant as an eye-witness. Nothing in the record favors either competing
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suppositions. In short, appellant asks that more be implied by these background
facts than the record indicates.
Second, the record indicates that throughout the entire exchange the tone
between Russell and appellant was conversational, lacking any indicia of coercion.
In reviewing the audio, one could reasonably concluded the tone was
conversational and appellant was eager to speak; there is even indicia that Russell
is surprised or caught off guard by appellant’s early interjections and sudden
confession. The excluded pre-Miranda questions that followed were brief, lasted
approximately one minute. Though Russell agreed at the hearing that he
deliberately asked each of the follow-up questions prior to providing the Miranda
warnings, he did not state it was his intent employ a two-step interrogation and
denied that it was his intent to circumvent appellant’s Miranda protections. The
trial court could also reasonably conclude that the record of appellant’s statements
following the Miranda warning supported Russell’s stated intentions, as Russell
did not refer to the pre-Miranda questions or content in any significant manner.
On this record and under the highly deferential standard applied, we cannot find
that the trial court clearly abused its discretion. See Carter, 309 S.W.3d at 40–41
(upholding a finding that a two-step strategy was not deliberate because the
exchange was conversational, lacked evidence that interrogator was hostile,
aggressive or threatening or otherwise intended to create a hostile environment,
and the accused was calm and cooperative).
Appellant complains that the trial court’s finding that the beginning of the
discussion concerned an “unrelated” aggravated assault is not supported in the
record. This reference can be reasonably understood to relate to the fact that
appellant was in jail on an “unrelated” aggravated assault charge. He also
complains that Russell lied about the content a brief discussion before the
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recording began, which Russell had described as “. . .some small talk. . .that was
unrelated probably,” but he provided no evidence, much less indisputable evidence
establish that Russell lied in such a manner. State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 573
(Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (stating that to reverse a trial court’s finding, there must be
“indisputable…evidence” that contradicts the finding)
Because the record supports the trial court’s finding that the two-step
strategy was not deliberate, we need not consider appellant’s arguments about the
effectiveness of any curative measures. See Foster v. State, 579 S.W.3d at 614.
We consider instead whether appellant voluntarily waived his rights in his
subsequent interrogation after being warned of those rights by the detective. See id.D. Did appellant voluntarily waive his Miranda rights?
Once a determination has been made that the pre-warning questioning was
not part of a deliberate plan to undermine a suspect’s Miranda protections, it is still
necessary to determine if appellant’s post-warning statements were voluntarily
made. Carter v. State, 309 S.W.3d at 41 citing Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310. Thus, the
factfinder must examine all of the circumstances and the course of police conduct
in evaluating the voluntariness of those post-Miranda statements. Id. Appellant
makes no argument concerning the trial court’s implied finding that he voluntarily
waived his Miranda protections. 3 Nevertheless, we review the record to determine
3
Appellant advances no general or specific complaint that his post-Miranda statements were involuntary,
including the complaint raised in Foster, that the statement was involuntary for being a continuation of
pre-Miranda statements. In Foster we addressed that specific challenge with focus on particular Elstad
factors. Foster v. State, 579 S.W.3d 606, 615 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.)(“The
factors to be considered in this examination are ‘the time that passes between confessions, the change in
place of interrogations, and the change in identity of the interrogators.’”). Our voluntariness holding in
Foster was based in part on the absence of facts showing such continuity between the pre- and post-
Miranda statements. Id. Notably, the facts of this case are significantly different with respect to those
considerations—the record shows the excluded pre-Miranda statement and the admitted post-Miranda
statement were not separated in time and location in any material way—both occurred together within a
six-minute time-span and in the same room, both conducted by Russell. However, because these facts do
not overshadow other relevant countervailing considerations demonstrating the voluntariness of the
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if the court abused its discretion with respect to the finding.
Although the trial court made no explicit finding or conclusion as to the
“voluntariness” of appellant’s waiver, it described appellant’s conduct throughout
as “eager” to speak with Russell and found “[a]fter waiving his rights to counsel,
[appellant] freely goes into greater detail as to why he assaulted the complainant on
July 27, 2019.” During the hearing, Russell was questioned about his confidence in
appellant’s Miranda waiver:
Q. Okay. Did -- after you give him his rights, did he continue to be
engaged in that conversation?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he give a voluntary statement?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you observe any behavior from this defendant that would alert
to you that he did not give a voluntary statement?
A. No.
Q. Did you coerce him in order to give this statement?
A. No.
Q. Did you physically put your hands on him in order for him to give
his statement?
A. No.
Q. Did you repeatedly ask him the same question in order for him to
give his statement?
A. No.
Q. So in that interview this defendant, he actually was talking to you
without you even asking questions; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And that further -- how did you take him talking to you in this
way?
waiver, these facts would not be determinative even had appellant raised the argument.
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A. I felt like he wanted to speak about the incident and give an
explanation for why he did what he did.
Q. Further indicating to you that this was a voluntary statement?
A. Correct.
The record shows Russell testified that after waiving his Miranda warnings,
appellant’s demeanor remained the same and that appellant was eager to tell his
side of the story. The audio record reflects that appellant remained calm and
cooperative, that the post-Miranda interrogation remained conversational, that
Russell never sounded hostile, aggressive, or threatening towards appellant. Based
on the totality of the circumstances, the record supports the trial court’s finding
that appellant voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda. See Gutierrez v. State,
221 S.W.3d 680, 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (finding post-Miranda statement
admissible where (1) defendant was cooperative, (2) the interaction was never
confrontational, and (3) no threats were ever made).
III. CONCLUSION
Having overruled appellant’s sole issue, the trial court’s judgment is
affirmed.
/s/ Randy Wilson
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Zimmerer and Wilson.
Do not publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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