Lauren Flodquist v. Christon Griffin ( 2024 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-24-00047-CV
___________________________
LAUREN FLODQUIST, Appellant
V.
CHRISTON GRIFFIN, Appellee
On Appeal from the 442nd District Court
Denton County, Texas
Trial Court No. 21-11362-442
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Wallach and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Lauren Flodquist (Wife) appeals from a divorce decree dissolving her
marriage to Appellee Christon Griffin (Husband). In a single issue, Wife argues that
the trial court erred by classifying the $38,306 judgment for attorney’s fees awarded to
Husband’s attorney under the divorce decree as a “domestic support obligation” for
purposes of the United States Bankruptcy Code. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532.
We will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Husband and Wife were married in September 2021. Wife filed a petition for
divorce in December 2021. Husband filed a counterpetition in November 2023. In
his counterpetition, Husband alleged that Wife had committed adultery and requested
a judgment against her for attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs. He further requested
that the judgment for attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs be considered a domestic
support obligation for bankruptcy purposes.
Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the divorce based on Wife’s
adultery. As part of its division of the community estate, the trial court awarded
Husband $38,306 in attorney’s fees. The divorce decree granted Husband’s individual
attorney and his law firm a judgment against Wife in this amount and specifically
provided that the award of attorney’s fees was to be “considered a domestic support
obligation as defined in the United States Bankruptcy Code.” This appeal followed.
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II. DISCUSSION
In a single issue, Wife argues that the trial court erred by classifying the
judgment awarded to Husband’s counsel for attorney’s fees as a domestic support
obligation for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.1 We disagree.
The Bankruptcy Code exempts from discharge “any debt . . . for a domestic
support obligation.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5). In addition, allowed unsecured claims for
domestic support obligations are entitled to priority treatment. Id. § 507(a)(1). As
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Presumably to sidestep the question of error preservation, Wife frames her
sole issue as a complaint regarding the legal sufficiency of the evidence. See Tex. R.
App. P. 33.1(d) (“In a civil nonjury case, a complaint regarding the
legal . . . insufficiency of the evidence . . . may be made for the first time on appeal.”).
But Husband contends that Wife’s sole issue is really a statutory-construction
argument that she failed to preserve. Because Wife’s appellate argument is based
solely on the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of the term domestic support obligation,
we agree with Husband that it is, in substance, one of statutory construction, not
evidentiary sufficiency, and we will treat it as such. See In re Commitment of West,
No. 05-20-00604-CV, 2022 WL 2071789 at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 9, 2022, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (recognizing that appellant’s legal-insufficiency complaint was really a
“statutory construction argument” and treating it accordingly); see also Williams v. Hous.
Firemen’s Relief & Ret. Fund, 121 S.W.3d 415, 442 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2003, no pet.) (op. on reh’g) (Taft, J., concurring and dissenting) (concluding that
because retirement fund’s personal-service-credit determination “involved a statutory
construction that was applied to undisputed material facts,” the appellant’s purported
legal-insufficiency complaint was really one of statutory construction); cf. Yates v. State,
No. 05-09-01214-CR, 2011 WL 2176654, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 6, 2011, pet.
ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that appellant’s purported
legal-insufficiency argument was actually an unpreserved statutory-construction issue).
But because we overrule Wife’s sole issue on the merits, we need not decide whether
she properly preserved her complaint. See In re A.A., 670 S.W.3d 520, 525 n.13 (Tex.
2023); cf. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Rogers, 538 S.W.3d 637, 644–45 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2017, pet. denied) (overruling appellant’s legal-insufficiency argument on the
merits even though it appeared that appellant had failed to preserve the issue).
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defined in the Code, a domestic support obligation includes a debt owed to a former
spouse that is in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support. Id. § 101(14A).
Relying on Loe, Warren, Rosenfield, Katcher, Hibbs, & Windsor, P.C. v. Brooks (In re
Brooks), 371 B.R. 761 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007), Wife asserts that because the judgment
for attorney’s fees is payable to Husband’s attorney, not Husband, it cannot be
classified as a domestic support obligation under the Bankruptcy Code. But since
Brooks was decided, the majority of courts addressing this issue have held that an
award directly to an attorney in a divorce decree can qualify as a domestic support
obligation. See In re H.D.V., No. 05-15-00421-CV, 2016 WL 4492702, at *9 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Aug. 26, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing In re Tepera,
No. 11-80477-G3-13, 2012 WL 439257, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2012)); see also Morris
v. Allen (In re Morris), 454 B.R. 660, 663 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2011) (declining to follow
Brooks because in determining whether a debt qualifies as a domestic support
obligation, “the true focus . . . is on the nature of the debt and not to whom the debt
is owed” and pointing out that “[t]he majority of cases since Brooks have rejected the
literal interpretation of section 523(a)(5) . . . and have expanded the statutory language
to cover the attorneys of the former spouse” (citing In re Koscielski, No. 10-A-96056,
2011 WL 338634, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2011))).
Wife also argues that the award of attorney’s fees cannot be classified as a
domestic support obligation because it “has nothing to do with child custody (or
alimony).” But attorney’s fees need not be directly tied to a child-custody dispute or
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an alimony award to qualify as a nondischargeable domestic support obligation. See
Hutton v. Ferguson (In re Hutton), 463 B.R. 819, 828 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2011) (holding
that an award of attorney’s fees qualifies as a nondischargeable domestic support
obligation if it “reflects a balancing of the parties’ financial needs” (quoting Joseph v.
O’Toole (In re Joseph), 16 F.3d 86, 88 (5th Cir. 1994))). Rather, whether an award of
attorney’s fees constitutes a domestic support obligation “depends on the court’s
intent in making the award.” See id. (first citing Morel v. Morel (In re Morel), 983 F.2d
104, 105 n.3 (8th Cir. 1992); and then citing Pino v. Pino (In re Pino), 268 B.R. 483, 489
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2001)).
Here, by explicitly providing in the divorce decree that the award of attorney’s
fees constituted a domestic support obligation as defined by the Bankruptcy Code, the
trial court made its intent clear. And given the authorities cited above, we cannot
conclude that the trial court erred by declaring the attorney’s fees to be a domestic
support obligation. See H.D.V., 2016 WL 4492702, at *9.
We overrule Wife’s sole issue.
III. CONCLUSION
Having overruled Wife’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/s/ Brian Walker
Brian Walker
Justice
Delivered: October 10, 2024
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