In the Interest of S.J.H. v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-22-00357-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF S.J.H.
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On Appeal from the 317th District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. C-241,554
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Theresa Hodges files this pro se appeal from a no-answer default
Final Order to Adjudicate and to Establish the Parent Child Relationship. Hodges
challenges the trial court’s Final Order arguing the order does not comport to an
agreement between her and the child’s father, that she was not given notice of the
hearing to challenge the Final Order, and that she disagrees with some terms of the
Final Order. We affirm the trial court’s order.
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BACKGROUND
Appellee Kyle Sommars filed a Petition to Adjudicate Parentage requesting
the trial court to order genetic testing and to determine conservatorship for the child,
S.J.H. The record shows Hodges was personally served, failed to file an answer, and
failed to appear at the final hearing. We do not have a reporter’s record of the final
hearing on appeal. In the Final Order, the trial court adjudicated Sommars to be the
father of S.J.H., appointed both parties joint managing conservators with Hodges as
the conservator with the exclusive right to designate the child’s primary residence,
awarded Hodges child support in the amount of $600.00 a month, ordered Hodges
to carry health insurance for S.J.H., granted a possession order with graduated
stages, and ordered Hodges to pay Sommars’ attorney’s fees. Hodges filed a pro se
notice of appeal.
In her pro se brief, Hodges complains that she did not receive notice of the
final hearing on October 24, 2022, that the trial court’s Final Order does not comport
with a tentative agreement Hodges claims she had with Sommars, that the Final
Order requires her to carry health insurance for S.J.H., and that the Final Order
requires her to pay Sommars’ attorney’s fees. Without citing any facts in the record,
Hodges claims the parties had reached an agreement with respect to custody, and
that Sommars’ attorney would “write up the agreement and add the standard legal
things that needed to be added[.]” In her brief, Hodges claims that upon receiving
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the draft agreement, she found “several issues with how things were worded, [and]
refused to sign until the proper draft was completed.” According to Hodges, she
received the Final Order while she was still waiting for a meeting with Sommars and
his attorney to be rescheduled during which they would finalize their agreement.
Hodges complains she did not receive notice of the court date, and the Final Order
“with few key exceptions was not the paperwork I was given by Kyle Sommars or
the attorney.” Hodges also complains that the Final Order requires her to provide
health insurance for S.J.H. and pay Sommars’ attorney fees.
ANALYSIS
We liberally construe pleadings and briefs filed by a self-represented litigant.
Giddens v. Brooks, 92 S.W.3d 878, 880-81 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, pet.
denied). Nevertheless, a self-represented litigant “is still required to comply with the
law and rules of procedure.” Id. “There cannot be two sets of procedural rules, one
for litigants with counsel and the other for litigants representing themselves.
Litigants who represent themselves must comply with the applicable procedural
rules, or else they would be given an unfair advantage over litigants represented by
counsel.” Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978).
An appellant’s brief “must contain a clear and concise argument for the
contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” Tex.
R. App. P. 38.1(i); see Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 462 S.W.3d 496, 500
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(Tex. 2015). A brief does not adequately comply with this rule “if we must speculate
or guess about the appellant’s issues.” Golden v. Milstead Towing & Storage, Nos.
09-21-00043-CV, 09-21-00044-CV, 09-21-00045-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS
2988, at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont May 5, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). Waiver may
result from an appellant’s “[f]ailure to provide citations or argument and analysis as
to an appellate issue[.]” Ross, 462 S.W.3d at 500.
Hodges’ brief appears to raise four issues but does not provide citations,
argument or analysis for these issues. Although Hodges complains that she did not
receive notice of the court date, her brief fails to explain why this was error when
the record reveals she failed to answer or otherwise appear after having been served.
See In re K.J.B., No. 09-14-00324-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 6477, at *22 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont June 25, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“After a defendant is served
with the citation and petition, the plaintiff has no legal duty to notify the defendant
who has not answered or otherwise appeared before taking a default judgment.”).
Hodges’ brief also fails to explain how the trial court erred by entering a Final Order
that did not match a draft agreement that her brief concedes was never finalized and
signed by both parties or their counsel. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 11 (“Unless otherwise
provided in these rules, no agreement between attorneys or parties touching any suit
pending will be enforced unless it be in writing, signed and filed with the papers as
part of the record, or unless it be made in open court and entered of record.”).
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Hodges’ brief also fails to demonstrate how it was an abuse of discretion for
the trial court’s Final Order to require her to provide health insurance for S.J.H. and
pay Sommars’ attorney’s fees. See Sink v. Sink, 364 S.W.3d 340, 347 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2012, no pet.) (“A trial court’s order pertaining to health insurance for the
children will not be reversed on appeal unless the complaining party can show a
clear abuse of discretion.”); In the Int. of A.C.J., 146 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 2004, no pet.) (“We will not reverse a trial court’s judgment on attorney’s
fees in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship absent a clear showing of abuse
of discretion.”); In re the Guardianship of Berry, 105 S.W.3d 665, 667 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Where no reporter’s record is filed, we
presume that the evidence adduced at the hearing supported the court’s order.”).
Even construing Hodges’ brief liberally, we conclude that it does not comply
with Rule 38.1, because, although it lodges general complaints about the trial court’s
Final Order, it is supported neither by facts in the record nor with arguments and
authorities demonstrating error on the part of the trial court. As a result, Hodges’
brief presents nothing for our review, and her complaints are waived. See In the Int.
of S.P., No. 09-21-00296-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 810, at *16 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont Feb. 3, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“By providing only bare assertions of
error or allegations, we conclude Appellant’s brief fails to satisfy Rule 38.1, the brief
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presents nothing for our review on appeal, and Appellant waived our review of those
complaints.”).
We overrule all of Hodges’ issues and affirm the trial court’s order.
AFFIRMED.
KENT CHAMBERS
Justice
Submitted on June 25, 2024
Opinion Delivered October 17, 2024
Before Johnson, Wright and Chambers, JJ.
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