In Re Matthew Lee Flowers, Relator v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-24-00322-CR
IN RE MATTHEW LEE FLOWERS, RELATOR
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
November 13, 2024
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.
Pending before the Court is the pro se petition for writ of mandamus filed by relator,
Matthew Lee Flowers. Through it, he seeks a writ of mandamus directing the Honorable
Steven Emmert, presiding judge of the 31st District Court, to rule on relator’s Petition for
Expunction. The trial court’s having set that Petition for hearing on December 23, 2024,
and our finding that relator failed to show himself entitled to extraordinary relief of
mandamus, we deny his petition.
In In re Chavez, we held that a trial court cannot be found to have abused its
discretion for purposes of mandamus until the complainant establishes that it 1) had a
legal duty to perform a non-discretionary act, 2) was asked to perform the act, and 3)
failed or refused to do so. In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d 225, 228 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001,
orig. proceeding). The need to consider and rule upon a motion is not a discretionary act.
Id. Instead, when the motion is properly filed and the court is aware of it, the act of
considering and resolving it is ministerial. Id.However, the trial court has a reasonable time within which to perform. Id.Whether such a period lapsed without action depends upon the circumstances of each
case. Id. Further, no bright line defines the boundaries of a reasonable period. Id. Its
borders depend upon several criteria, including the trial court’s awareness of the motion
and overt refusal to act on it, the state of the court’s docket, and the existence of other
judicial and administrative matters which must be addressed first. Id. at 228-29. So too
must the trial court’s inherent power to control its docket be considered. Id. at 229.
The record before us shows that relator petitioned for expunction on June 7, 2024.
The trial court scheduled December 23, 2024, as the date on which the matter will be
heard. When the trial judge first garnered actual notice of the expunction request is
unknown; while the attachments to his petition for mandamus relief suggest that others
may have known of relator’s request, they do not illustrate that the trial court had such
knowledge. See id. at 228 (stating that one complaining of the trial court’s failure to
convene a hearing and rule upon a motion necessarily requires the petitioner to illustrate
that the trial court was aware of the motion and observing the absence of any rule
mandating that notice of a matter held by the district clerk is imputed to the trial judge).
Nor has relator provided argument or evidence touching upon the tenor of the trial court’s
docket and administrative calendar. We are left to guess at whether relator’s effort to
expunge records is of higher priority than other matters which may pend on either the
docket or calendar. Our hesitation to interfere with the trial court’s power to control its
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docket and administrative duties grows under these circumstances and the meager
record provided us. Nor has relator cited us to authority holding that the time period
between motion, hearing, and eventual disposition at bar is unreasonable, as a matter of
law. Thus, we cannot say relator satisfied the burden imposed by Chavez.
Relator’s petition for a writ of mandamus is denied. The Clerk of this Court is
directed to serve the Honorable Steven Emmert with a copy of this order and the petition
for writ of mandamus in a manner affording Judge Emmert actual notice of same.
Brian Quinn
Chief Justice
Do not publish.
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