In the Matter of L. H. v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )

Opinion issued November 7, 2024
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-24-00366-CV
———————————
IN THE MATTER OF L.H., a Juvenile
On Appeal from the 313th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2021-00856J
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this accelerated appeal,1 appellant, L.H., challenges the juvenile court’s
order, entered after a transfer hearing, waiving its exclusive original jurisdiction over
his case and transferring it to a criminal district court for L.H. to be tried as an adult
1
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 56.01(c)(1)(A), (h) (providing right to immediate
appeal from order “respecting transfer of [a] child for prosecution as an adult” and
instructing that appeal from such order has “precedence over all other cases”); see
also TEX. R. APP. P. 28.1.
for the felony offense of murder.2 In two issues, L.H. contends that the juvenile
court lacked jurisdiction to transfer his case to a criminal district court and the
juvenile court, assuming it had jurisdiction, erred in waiving its exclusive original
jurisdiction and transferring his case to a criminal district court.
We reverse and remand.
Background
On May 25, 2021, the State filed its original petition alleging that L.H., at the
age of sixteen, had engaged in delinquent conduct by “intentionally and knowingly
caus[ing] the death of Matthew Vu, [the complainant], by shooting the complainant
with a firearm.” (Emphasis omitted.) The State further alleged that L.H. had
engaged in delinquent conduct by “intend[ing] to cause serious bodily injury to [the
complainant]” and “caus[ing] the death of the [c]omplainant by intentionally and
knowingly committing an act clearly dangerous to human life, namely shooting the
complainant with a firearm.” (Emphasis omitted.) In its original petition, the State
requested that L.H. “be adjudged a child who ha[d] engaged in delinquent conduct
and be provided for as the law direct[ed].”
On January 14, 2022, the State filed its first amended petition, alleging the
same delinquent conduct and requesting, pursuant to Texas Family Code section
54.02(a), that the juvenile court waive its exclusive original jurisdiction over L.H.’s
2
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02.
2
case and transfer it to a criminal district court for L.H. to stand trial as an adult for
the felony offense of murder.3 The State also filed a motion to waive jurisdiction.
On July 25, 2022, the juvenile court held a transfer hearing on the State’s
request.4 At the conclusion of the transfer hearing, the juvenile court denied the
State’s request to waive its jurisdiction and transfer L.H.’s case to criminal district
court.
On July 27, 2022, the State filed its second amended petition, again alleging
the same delinquent conduct and requesting requested that L.H. “be adjudged a child
who ha[d] engaged in delinquent conduct and be provided for as the law direct[ed].”
The second amended petition was approved by a Harris County grand jury for
determinate sentencing.5 Also, on July 27, 2022, L.H. turned eighteen years old.
Because L.H. had turned eighteen years old, on July 17, 2023, the juvenile
court held a hearing to determine if it could retain jurisdiction over L.H.’s case
3
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(a) (juvenile court may waive its exclusive
original jurisdiction and transfer a child to appropriate district court or criminal
district court if certain conditions are met).
4
See id. § 54.02(c) (juvenile court “shall conduct a hearing without a jury to consider
transfer of the child for criminal proceedings”); see also id. § 54.02(e) (at transfer
hearing, juvenile court may consider “written reports from probation officers,
professional court employees, guardians ad litem . . . or professional consultants in
addition to the testimony of witnesses”).
5
See generally In re X.A., No. 01-19-00227-CV, 2020 WL 237939, at *1 n.2 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 16, 2020, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (explaining
“the determinate sentence system”).
3
pursuant to Texas Family Code section 51.0412.6 At the conclusion of the hearing,
the juvenile court entered a finding that the State had used due diligence in
attempting to complete the proceedings before L.H.’s nineteenth birthday and
concluded that section 51.0412 authorized it to retain jurisdiction over L.H.’s case.
L.H. turned nineteen years old on July 27, 2023.
On January 4, 2024, the State filed its third amended petition, alleging the
same delinquent conduct. In its third amended petition, the State requested, pursuant
to Texas Family Code section 54.02(j), that the juvenile court waive its exclusive
original jurisdiction over L.H.’s case and transfer it to a criminal district court for
L.H. to stand trial as an adult for the felony offense of murder.7 The State also filed
a motion to waive jurisdiction relying on Texas Family Code section 54.02(j).
6
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.0412 (“Jurisdiction Over Incomplete
Proceedings”); see also In re B.R.H., 426 S.W.3d 163, 166–67 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (“A juvenile court has exclusive, original
jurisdiction over all proceedings involving a person who has engaged in delinquent
conduct as a result of acts committed before age seventeen. A juvenile court does
not lose jurisdiction when a juvenile turns eighteen, but its jurisdiction becomes
limited. The juvenile court retains limited jurisdiction to either transfer the case to
an appropriate court or dismiss the case. However, . . . Texas Family Code [section
51.0412] provides an exception to this rule, which applies to incomplete
proceedings.” (internal citations omitted)).
7
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(j) (providing juvenile court “may waive its
exclusive original jurisdiction and transfer a person to [a] . . . criminal district court
for criminal proceedings if: (1) the person is 18 years of age or older; (2) the person
was . . . 10 years of age or older and under 17 years of age at the time the person is
alleged to have committed . . . an offense under” Texas Penal Code section 19.02;
“(3) no adjudication concerning the alleged offense has been made or no
adjudication hearing concerning the offense has been conducted; (4) the juvenile
court finds from a preponderance of the evidence that . . . for a reason beyond the
4
On April 1, 2024, the juvenile court held a transfer hearing on the State’s
request. At the transfer hearing, Houston Police Department (“HPD”) Detective L.
Lange testified that he investigated the shooting of the complainant, which occurred
at the Shabu Zone restaurant in Houston, Harris County, Texas. According to Lange,
the complainant was L.H.’s stepfather.
Detective Lange explained that after the shooting, he arrived at the restaurant,
and other law enforcement officers were already at the scene. Lange was directed
to a private dining area in the back of the restaurant where the complainant was lying
on the ground. The complainant was face up and had a large pool of blood on the
floor around him; he was deceased. The complainant had sustained a gunshot wound
to his head, which was caused by a firearm. Law enforcement officers found a
cartridge casing in the private dining area.8
According to Detective Lange, the complainant’s family, including L.H., were
eating dinner at the restaurant in the private dining area. At some point, L.H. got out
a firearm from his jacket and shot the complainant in the back of the head. L.H. then
control of the [S]tate it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before the
18th birthday of the person”; and “(5) the juvenile court determines that there is
probable cause to believe that the child before the court committed the offense
alleged”).
8
Detective Lange stated that testing confirmed that the cartridge casing was fired
from the firearm that was later found in L.H.’s possession.
5
walked out the front door of the restaurant. L.H. was sixteen years old at the time
of the shooting.
After the shooting, two law enforcement officers who were outside in the
parking lot of the restaurant were “flagged down” by a security guard who gave them
a description of a person who had left the restaurant without paying for his meal.
Those officers were able to locate L.H., who matched the description of the person
given by the security guard. After L.H. was detained, the law enforcement officers
found a “blue handgun” in his waistband.9 The officers asked if the firearm “was
real,” and L.H. confirmed that it was. L.H.’s brother then came outside and spoke
to the law enforcement officers, telling them that L.H. had shot the complainant
inside the restaurant.
Detective Lange further testified that following the shooting, he spoke to
several of L.H.’s family members. L.H.’s sister told him that “prior to leaving to go
to dinner [that day], she heard a clicking . . . noise coming from [L.H.’s] bedroom.”
Looking back, L.H.’s sister believed that she had likely heard “the handgun clicking
inside [L.H.’s] bedroom.” Further, L.H.’s brother told Lange that in the days before
9
According to Detective Lange, DNA testing results showed that it was
“approximately 908 quintillion times more likely that [the DNA found on the
firearm had] originated from [L.H.] and an unknown, unrelated individual than if
[the DNA had] originated from two unknown, unrelated individuals.” Thus, there
was “very strong support that [L.H. was] a contributor to the DNA” found on the
firearm.
6
the shooting, he had seen L.H. with “a weird green colored handgun.” L.H.’s brother
also informed Lange that L.H. had mental health issues.
Additionally, at the scene, Detective Lange spoke with other witnesses,
including Sabrina Aderibigbe, who stated that she was outside the restaurant on the
day of the shooting, and she saw “a male walk out of the front door.” The male had
a “blueish gray” firearm in his right hand, and he “cocked the weapon,” causing a
bullet to discharge and land on the ground. Law enforcement officers later found an
unfired bullet outside the restaurant.
According to Detective Lange, a surveillance videotaped recording was
obtained from the restaurant, and it showed the shooting taking place. On the
videotaped recording, L.H. could be seen walking into the private dining area. It
also showed the complainant’s family, mostly children, then seated at a table. The
complainant and L.H.’s mother, the complainant’s wife, were seated at another table
“kind of facing toward[] the kids.” At one point in the videotaped recording, L.H.
“pulls the handgun out of . . . his right jacket pocket, puts it up behind [the
complainant’s] head. And shortly after th[at], he discharges the firearm into [the
complainant’s] head.” Lange testified that the firearm that was seen in the
videotaped recording appeared to be the same color as the firearm later found in
L.H.’s possession.
7
Michael Abner testified that he worked at the Harris County District
Attorney’s Office. He was previously involved in L.H.’s case as the assigned
prosecutor from April 2022 until October 2023. According to Abner, when he took
over the case in April 2022, a hearing was set for May 2022 on the State’s first
request to transfer L.H.’s case to criminal district court. However, the hearing did
not go forward in May because a “certification evaluation” had not been completed.
The hearing was then reset for June 2022, but it did not go forward because of “a
scheduling matter with the courts.” A transfer hearing ultimately took place on July
25, 2022. Abner noted that there was “an instance where [L.H.’s attorney] had a
scheduling matter” and Abner was agreeable to changing the date for the hearing,
but Abner could not recall when that had occurred.
Abner further testified that the juvenile court, at the transfer hearing,
determined that there was probable cause to believe that L.H. had committed the
alleged offense. But it declined to transfer L.H.’s case to criminal district court, and
the State then “ended up getting a determinate [sentencing] shortly after the [juvenile
court] denied” transfer.
According to Abner, L.H.’s case “could have been resolved” in juvenile court
“before [L.H.’s] 18th birthday.” However, he did not believe that “the State was the
holdup.” Abner stated that the “holdup” was “the [d]efense . . . waiting for the
independent examiner for lack of responsibility.” Yet, Abner noted that the State
8
also chose to move forward with requesting a transfer of L.H.’s case to criminal
district court.
Abner further testified that when he became involved in L.H.’s case in April
2022, he believed that there was probable cause to believe that L.H. had committed
the alleged offense, and the juvenile court had “found probable cause” in the case
before L.H. turned eighteen years old. Abner would not have had a hearing about
transferring L.H.’s case to criminal district court if he did not believe that there was
probable cause to believe that L.H. had committed the alleged offense. Abner further
noted that the State had filed L.H.’s case before L.H.’s eighteen birthday, and there
was not a time before L.H. turned eighteen years old that the State was unable to
locate him. L.H. turned eighteen years old several days after the juvenile court’s
July 25, 2022 transfer hearing. Abner believed that the State was ready “for a full
trial on the merits” before L.H. turned eighteen years old. But the State could not
“proceed[] on a trial on the merits” because L.H. was “questioning responsibility.”
According to Abner, there were opportunities for L.H.’s case to be resolved
in juvenile court before L.H. turned eighteen years old, and the July 25, 2022 transfer
hearing was completed before L.H.’s eighteenth birthday. Abner was aware of
L.H.’s age throughout the proceedings in juvenile court.
Aimee Robinson, the Harris County Juvenile Probation Chapter 55 liaison,
testified that she was involved with juveniles who had been “found not fit to
9
proceed” and went “to the state hospital” until they were “restored.” She acted as a
“probation officer during the time [the juvenile was] found not fit.” Robinson was
familiar with L.H.’s case.
According to Robinson, L.H. was “found not fit . . . to proceed with [his]
case” on March 9, 2023, after he had turned eighteen years old. As a result, L.H.
was sent to a treatment facility—North Texas State Hospital—where he stayed from
May 31, 2023 until July 24, 2023. L.H. was diagnosed with schizophrenia and
“psychoactive substance dependence uncomplicated.” The purpose of L.H. staying
at the treatment facility was “[f]or competency[] restoration,” meaning that L.H.’s
competency could be restored so that he could assist his counsel with his defense,
he could understand the nature of the charge against him, he knew the judge and
what the judge’s role was, and he knew his defense counsel and what defense
counsel’s role was. Ultimately, L.H.’s competency “was restored,” and he was able
to move forward with his case.
Following the April 1, 2024, transfer hearing, the juvenile court found that
L.H. was older than eighteen years old, he was “accused by petition of engaging in
delinquent conduct by committing murder, a first-degree felony offense under Texas
Penal Code [s]ection 19.02,” and he was older than ten years old and under seventeen
years old at the time he allegedly committed the offense. Further, the juvenile court
found that there had been “[n]o adjudication concerning the [alleged] offense” and
10
“no adjudication hearing concerning the offense ha[d] been conducted”; L.H. was
sixteen years old at the time he committed the alleged offense; and there was
probable cause to believe that L.H. had committed the alleged offense. Additionally,
the juvenile court found that “from a preponderance of the evidence that for a reason
beyond the control of the State it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court
before [L.H.’s] 18th birthday.” The juvenile court waived its exclusive original
jurisdiction over L.H.’s case and ordered it transferred to a criminal district court for
L.H. to stand trial as an adult.
Juvenile Court Jurisdiction
In his first issue, L.H. argues that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to
transfer his case to a criminal district court because the State did not file its third
amended petition requesting, under Texas Family Code section 54.02(j), that the
juvenile court waive its exclusive original jurisdiction over L.H.’s case and transfer
it to a criminal district court until after L.H. turned nineteen years old and Texas
Family Code section 51.0412 does not allow the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction
over the State’s third amended petition.
Jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review de novo. See Tex. A & M
Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Tex. 2007). To issue a valid and
binding judgment or order, a court must have both subject matter jurisdiction over a
case and personal jurisdiction over the party it purports to bind. Luciano v.
11
SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC, 625 S.W.3d 1, 7–8 (Tex. 2021); see also In re A.M.,
No. 03-03-00703-CV, 2004 WL 2732142, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 2, 2004,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A juvenile court must possess both subject matter jurisdiction
over a case and personal jurisdiction over a party to issue a binding judgment.”).
Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s statutory or constitutional power
to adjudicate a case. In re Guardianship of Fairly, 650 S.W.3d 372, 379 (Tex. 2022).
Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case.
Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993).
Because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred on a court by consent or
waiver, a judgment or order is never considered final if the court that issued it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction. Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tex.
2000).
In contrast to subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction concerns the
court’s power to bind a particular person or party to a judgment or order. Luciano,
625 S.W.3d at 8. Personal jurisdiction is composed of two elements: (1) the
defendant must be amenable to the jurisdiction of the court and (2) the plaintiff must
validly invoke that jurisdiction by valid service of process on the defendant.
Kawasaki Steel Corp. v. Middleton, 699 S.W.2d 199, 200 (Tex. 1985). Unlike
challenges to subject matter jurisdiction, objections to personal jurisdiction
generally can be waived, and a party may consent to the personal jurisdiction of a
12
court. In re Fisher, 433 S.W.3d 523, 532 (Tex. 2014); see also In re N.G.W., 648
S.W.3d 490, 492 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, no pet.) (“Personal jurisdiction is
waived if not raised in the juvenile court.”).
A juvenile court’s authority to act is conferred by statute. See In re N.J.A.,
997 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. 1999); In re A.S., 875 S.W.2d 402, 403 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1994, no pet.). The Juvenile Justice Code governs
proceedings in all cases involving the delinquent conduct of an individual who was
a child at the time he engaged in the delinquent conduct. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 51.04(a); see also id. §§ 51.02(2) (defining child), 51.03(a) (defining delinquent
conduct). The juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction over allegations by
the State that a child has engaged in delinquent conduct. Id. § 51.04(a); see also In
re A.M., 577 S.W.3d 653, 657 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied)
(“Murder, when committed by a minor, constitutes delinquent conduct.”). The
authority of the juvenile court to hear and decide a case depends on whether the case
involves “delinquent conduct” engaged in by an individual who was a child at the
time the conduct occurred. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.04(a); see also id.
§§ 51.02(2) (defining child), 51.03(a) (defining delinquent conduct). A juvenile
court’s subject matter jurisdiction is invoked by the State filing a petition containing
the requisite jurisdictional facts. See id. § 53.04 (listing required jurisdictional
facts); In re A.M., 2004 WL 2732142, at *1.
13
Unlike the juvenile court’s subject matter jurisdiction, which depends on the
individual’s age at the time he engaged in delinquent conduct, whether the juvenile
court has personal jurisdiction over an individual depends on his age at the time a
proceeding occurs. See In re N.J.A., 997 S.W.2d at 555–57; see also In re A.D.D.,
974 S.W.2d 299, 304 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.). Although a juvenile
court does not lose jurisdiction when an individual turns eighteen years old, the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction over the individual becomes limited. In re A.M., 577
S.W.3d at 658; In re B.R.H., 426 S.W.3d 163, 166 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2012, orig. proceeding). However, under Texas Family Code section 51.0412, if
proceedings cannot be completed in the juvenile court by the time the individual
turns eighteen or nineteen years old, the juvenile court retains “jurisdiction over [the]
person, without regard to the age of the person” if certain conditions are met. TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.0412; see also In re N.G.W., 648 S.W.3d at 492 (“Under
Texas Family Code section 51.0412, the juvenile court may bind the juvenile
defendant if his case began in the court prior to the juvenile turning eighteen or
nineteen years old, if it [was] pending when he turn[ed] eighteen or nineteen, and if
the State exercised due diligence in attempting to complete the proceeding before
the juvenile’s eighteenth or nineteenth birthday.”). Specifically, section 51.0412
provides:
The court retains jurisdiction over a person, without regard to the age
of the person, who is a respondent in an adjudication proceeding, a
14
disposition proceeding, a proceeding to modify disposition, a
proceeding for waiver of jurisdiction and transfer to criminal court
under [Texas Family Code] [s]ection 54.02(a), or a motion for transfer
of determinate sentence probation to an appropriate district court if:
(1) the petition or motion was filed while the respondent was
younger than 18 or 19 years of age, as applicable;
(2) the proceeding is not complete before the respondent
becomes 18 or 19 years of age, as applicable; and
(3) the court enters a finding in the proceeding that the
prosecuting attorney exercised due diligence in an attempt to
complete the proceeding before the respondent became 18 or 19
years of age, as applicable.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.0412.
On May 25, 2021, when L.H. was sixteen years old, the State filed its original
petition alleging that L.H., at the age of sixteen, had engaged in delinquent conduct
by “intentionally and knowingly caus[ing] the death of” the complainant, “by
shooting the complainant with a firearm” and by “intend[ing] to cause serious bodily
injury to [the complainant]” and “caus[ing] the death of the [c]omplainant by
intentionally and knowingly committing an act clearly dangerous to human life,
namely shooting the complainant with a firearm.” (Emphasis omitted.) Appellant,
in his briefing, does not assert that he was not a “child” when he engaged in the
alleged delinquent conduct or that his alleged conduct did not constitute “delinquent
conduct.” See id. § 51.04(a); see also id. §§ 51.02(2) (defining child), 51.03(a)
(defining delinquent conduct). Appellant also does not assert that the State failed to
15
file a petition containing the requisite jurisdictional facts, thereby failing to invoke
the juvenile court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See id. § 53.04 (listing required
jurisdictional facts); In re A.M., 2004 WL 2732142, at *1 (juvenile court’s subject
matter jurisdiction is invoked by State filing petition containing requisite
jurisdictional facts). Thus, we conclude that L.H. has not challenged the subject
matter jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
Instead, L.H. asserts that once he turned nineteen years old, the juvenile court
no longer retained jurisdiction over him, and the juvenile court could not utilize
Texas Family Code section 51.0412 to “retain[] jurisdiction” or extend its
jurisdiction to order L.H.’s case transferred to a criminal district court. L.H.’s
complaint concerns personal jurisdiction rather than subject matter jurisdiction. See
In re N.G.W., 648 S.W.3d at 492 (because Texas Family Code section 51.0412
“deals with the juvenile court’s authority to bind the juvenile defendant when his
case is pending in the court on his eighteenth or nineteenth birthday,” “it pertains to
personal jurisdiction rather than subject matter jurisdiction”).
Personal jurisdiction challenges can be waived. See In re N.G.W., 648 S.W.3d
at 492; In re E.D.C., 88 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002, no pet.); see
also In re Fisher, 433 S.W.3d at 532; Trenz v. Peter Paul Petroleum Co., 388 S.W.3d
796, 800 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.). A party must raise his
objection to personal jurisdiction before the juvenile court to preserve his complaint
16
for appeal. See State v. C.J.F., 183 S.W.3d 841, 852–53 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (holding personal jurisdiction challenge not raised in trial
court could not be raised for first time on appeal); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).
Because L.H. did not raise his complaint that the juvenile court lacked personal
jurisdiction over him in the underlying proceeding, we hold that he has waived his
personal jurisdiction complaint for purposes of appellate review.10 See, e.g., In re
N.G.W., 648 S.W.3d at 492; see also In re J.M., No. 03-14-00027-CV, 2015 WL
3393819, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin May 21, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Transfer to Criminal District Court
In his second issue, appellant argues that the juvenile court erred in
transferring his case to criminal district court because “the evidence was legally and
factually insufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that ‘from a
preponderance of the evidence that for a reason beyond the control of the State it
was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before [L.H.’s] 18th birthday.’”
As previously noted, juvenile courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over
cases involving delinquent conduct engaged in by a child. See TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. §§ 51.02(2) (defining child), 51.03(a) (defining delinquent conduct), 51.04(a);
10
In its appellee’s brief, the State argued that this Court could not address L.H.’s first
issue because L.H. had waived his personal jurisdiction complaint by failing to raise
it in the juvenile court. Although L.H. filed a reply brief, he did not respond to the
State’s waiver argument.
17
see also Bell v. State, 649 S.W.3d 867, 885 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022,
pet. ref’d). But the right of a juvenile offender to remain outside the jurisdiction of
the criminal district court is not absolute. Ex parte Arango, 518 S.W.3d 916, 920
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d). A juvenile court may, after an
evidentiary hearing, waive its exclusive original jurisdiction and transfer a child to
an appropriate criminal district court for criminal proceedings if certain conditions
are met. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02; Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 885–86.
We review a juvenile court decision to waive its exclusive original jurisdiction
and transfer a case to criminal district court using two steps. Bell, 649 S.W.3d at
887. First, we review the juvenile court’s findings using the traditional evidentiary
sufficiency review. In re C.C.C., No. 13-21-00371-CV, 2022 WL 710143, at *8
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 10, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re
Z.M., No. 02-21-00213-CV, 2021 WL 4898851, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct.
21, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also In re A.M., 577 S.W.3d at 658–59. In
reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the juvenile court’s findings and disregard contrary evidence
unless a reasonable fact finder could not reject it. In re B.M., No. 01-18-00898-CV,
2019 WL 1388561, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 28, 2019, no pet.)
(mem. op.); see also Faisst v. State, 105 S.W.3d 8, 12 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2003, no
pet.). If there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the findings, then the
18
evidence is legally sufficient. In re B.M., 2019 WL 1388561, at *7; see also Faisst,
105 S.W.3d at 12. Under a factual-sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence
presented to determine if the juvenile court’s findings conflict with the great weight
and preponderance of the evidence so as to be clearly wrong or unjust. In re C.C.C.,
2022 WL 710143, at *8; In re B.M., 2019 WL 1388561, at *7; see also Faisst, 105
S.W.3d at 12.
If the juvenile court’s findings are supported by legally and factually sufficient
evidence, we review the juvenile court’s ultimate waiver decision for an abuse of
discretion. In re C.C.C., 2022 WL 710143, at *8; In re Z.M., 2021 WL 4898851, at
*2; In re A.M., 577 S.W.3d at 659. A juvenile court abuses its discretion if it acts
without reference to any guiding rules and principles. In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins., Co.,
507 S.W.3d 219, 226 (Tex. 2016); In re C.C.C., 2022 WL 710143, at *8. A juvenile
court abuses its discretion when its transfer decision is essentially arbitrary, given
the evidence upon which it was based. In re Z.M., 2021 WL 4898851, at *2. By
contrast, a waiver decision representing “a reasonably principled application of the
legislative criteria” generally will pass muster under the abuse-of-discretion standard
of review. Id. (internal quotations omitted). An abuse of discretion does not occur
when the juvenile court bases its decision on conflicting evidence. In re B.N.F., 120
S.W.3d 873, 877 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).
19
Once an individual turns eighteen years old, Texas Family Code section
54.02(j) allows the juvenile court to waive its exclusive original jurisdiction and
transfer the individual to the appropriate criminal district court for criminal
proceedings if:
(1) the person is 18 years of age or older;
(2) the person was . . . 10 years of age or older and under 17 years of
age at the time the person is alleged to have committed . . . an
offense under [Texas Penal Code] [s]ection 19.02 . . . ;
(3) no adjudication concerning the alleged offense has been made or
no adjudication hearing concerning the offense has been
conducted;
(4) the juvenile court finds from a preponderance of the evidence
that . . . for a reason beyond the control of the [S]tate it was not
practicable to proceed in juvenile court before the 18th birthday
of the person; [and]
(5) the juvenile court determines that there is probable cause to
believe that the child before the court committed the offense
alleged.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(j).
Here, the juvenile court found, among other things, that: (1) L.H. was born on
July 27, 2004 and was “older than 18 years of age”; (2) L.H. was “accused by
petition of engaging in delinquent conduct by committing murder, a first-degree
felony offense under Texas Penal Code [s]ection 19.02, on or about April 28, 2021”;
(3) L.H. was “older than 10 years of age and under 17 years of age at the time he
[was] alleged to have committed the offense”; (4) “[n]o adjudication concerning the
20
offense alleged ha[d] been made and no adjudication hearing concerning the offense
ha[d] been conducted”; (5) L.H. was sixteen years old when he allegedly “committed
the offense”; (6) “[t]here [was] probable cause to believe that [L.H. had] committed
the offense alleged”; and (7) “from a preponderance of the evidence that for a reason
beyond the control of the State it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court
before [L.H.’s] 18th birthday.” See id.
We note that “[c]hildren ordinarily are not subject to criminal proceedings like
adults.” In re S.G.R., 496 S.W.3d 235, 238 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016,
no pet.). And “[g]enerally, the transfer of a juvenile offender from a juvenile court
to a criminal district court for prosecution as an adult should be regarded as the
exception, not the rule.” In re J.W.W., 507 S.W.3d 408, 414 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.). In a transfer proceeding under Texas Family Code section
54.02(j), the State has the burden of producing evidence that persuades the juvenile
court, by a preponderance of the evidence, that waiver of its exclusive original
jurisdiction is appropriate. In re A.M., 577 S.W.3d at 658. If the State does not meet
its burden of establishing the requirements of Texas Family Code section 54.02(j)
by a preponderance of the evidence, then the juvenile court may not transfer a case
to criminal district court. See id.L.H. challenges the juvenile court’s finding that transfer of his case was
appropriate because “from a preponderance of the evidence that for a reason beyond
21
the control of the State it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before
[L.H.’s] 18th birthday.” Stated differently, L.H. argues that the juvenile court erred
in transferring his case to a criminal district court because the State did not meet its
burden under Texas Family Code section 54.02(j)(4)(A) to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that “for a reason beyond [its] control . . . it was not
practicable to proceed in juvenile court before” L.H.’s eighteenth birthday. See TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(j)(4)(A). On appeal, the State and L.H. disagree as to the
meaning of “it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court” before L.H.’s
eighteenth birthday, as the phrase is used in section 54.02(j)(4)(A). See id.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has explained that in general Texas
Family Code section 54.02(j)(4) “is meant to limit the prosecution of an adult for an
act he committed as a juvenile if his case could reasonably have been dealt with
when he was still a juvenile.” Moore v. State, 532 S.W.3d 400, 405 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2017). The goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the
Legislature’s intended meaning. Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d
278, 284 (Tex. 1999). In doing so, we start with the plain and ordinary meaning of
the statute’s words. City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 25 (Tex.
2003); see also Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407, 411 (Tex. 2011) (“The plain
meaning of the text is the best expression of legislative intent unless . . . the plain
meaning [would] lead[] to absurd or nonsensical results.”).
22
Texas Family Code section 54.02(j)(4)(A) does not define “practicable” or
“proceed.” See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(j)(4)(A); see also In re E.B., No.
12-22-00162-CV, 2022 WL 17074849, at *4 (Tex. App.—Tyler Nov. 17, 2022, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (explaining Texas Family Code section 54.02(j) does not define
“practicable” (internal quotations omitted)). Thus, we must give those terms their
plain meaning. See Thompson v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Regul., 455 S.W.3d 569,
570 (Tex. 2014); State v. Holcombe, 187 S.W.3d 496, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
“In determining the plain meaning of a word, we initially look to dictionary
definitions.” Holcombe, 187 S.W.3d at 500; see also In re E.B., 2022 WL 17074849,
at *4.
Other Texas appellate courts have examined the meaning of “practicable” as
it is used in Texas Family Code section 54.02(j)(4)(A), explaining that “Black’s Law
Dictionary defines ‘practicable’ as ‘reasonably capable of being accomplished;
feasible.’” In re E.B., 2022 WL 17074849, at *4 (quoting Practicable, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1210 (8th ed. 2004)); see also In re M.A.C.S.-C., No.
04-23-00139-CV, 2024 WL 697095, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb 21, 2024,
pet. denied) (mem. op.). And “Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines
‘practicable’ as ‘capable of . . . being done or accomplished: Feasible.’” In re E.B.,
2022 WL 17074849, at *4 (alteration in original) (quoting Practicable,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 974 (11th ed. 2011)).
23
However, it does not appear that any Texas appellate court has directly
considered the meaning of “proceed” as it is used in Texas Family Code section
54.02(j)(4)(A). Nevertheless, Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines “proceed” to
mean “to begin and carry on an action, process, or movement.” Proceed, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER.COM DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/proceed (last visited Nov. 1, 2024). Similarly other dictionaries have
defined “proceed” to mean “to go on and do something.” See Jones v. State, 175
S.W.3d 927, 932 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) (quoting Proceed, XII OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 544 (2d. 1989)). Thus, based on these definitions, we
conclude that in order for the transfer of L.H.’s case to criminal district court to have
been appropriate under Texas Family Code section 54.02(j), the State was required
to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that for a reason beyond its control, it
was not reasonably feasible “to begin and carry on an action” or “go on and do
something” in juvenile court before L.H.’s eighteenth birthday.
We note that the State, in its briefing, asserts that Texas Family Code section
54.02(j)(4)(A) “permits [the] discretionary transfer” of a case to criminal district
court so long as the State proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the case
could not “be resolved in juvenile court [before the child’s eighteenth birthday] for
reasons beyond the State’s control.” But section 54.02(j)(4)(A) does not contain the
word “resolve” or the word “complete.” And section 54.02(j)(4)(A) does not state
24
that the juvenile court may waive its exclusive original jurisdiction and transfer a
case to criminal district court if it finds “from a preponderance of the evidence
that . . . for a reason beyond the control of the [S]tate it was not practicable [for the
case to be resolved or completed] in juvenile court before the [person’s] 18th
birthday.” Cf. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(j)(4)(A). Courts may not insert words
into a statute except to give effect to legislative intent. Laidlaw Waste Sys. (Dallas),
Inc. v. City of Wilmer, 904 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. 1995). And we must presume
that every word excluded from a statute was excluded for a purpose. Id.; AMX
Enters., Inc. v. Bank One, N.A., 196 S.W.3d 202, 208 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). Thus, we conclude that Texas Family Code section
54.02(j)(4)(A) does not allow the State to merely prove that it could not “resolve” or
“complete” a case in juvenile court before a person’s eighteenth birthday. Being
unable to “proceed” with a case in juvenile court is not the same as being unable to
“resolve” a case in juvenile court before a person’s eighteenth birthday. Instead, for
the juvenile court to waive its exclusive original jurisdiction under Texas Family
Code section 54.02(j)(4)(A), the State must have established, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that, for a reason beyond its control, it was not practicable, i.e.,
reasonably feasible, to proceed, i.e., “begin and carry on an action” or “go on and do
something,” in juvenile court before L.H.’s eighteenth birthday. See TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 54.02(j)(4)(A).
25
The parties do not dispute that L.H. was born on July 27, 2004. On May 25,
2021, when L.H. was sixteen years old, the State filed its original petition in juvenile
court alleging that L.H., at the age of sixteen, had engaged in delinquent conduct. 11
In its original petition, the State requested that L.H. “be adjudged a child who ha[d]
engaged in delinquent conduct and be provided for as the law direct[ed].” On
January 14, 2022, when L.H. was seventeen years old, the State chose to amend its
original petition. In its first amended petition, the State alleged the same delinquent
conduct, but rather than requesting that L.H. “be adjudged a child who ha[d] engaged
in delinquent conduct,” the State requested, pursuant to Texas Family Code section
54.02(a), that the juvenile court waive its exclusive original jurisdiction over L.H.’s
case and transfer it to a criminal district court for L.H. to stand trial as an adult for
the felony offense of murder. The State also filed a motion to waive jurisdiction.
L.H. was served with the first amended petition on January 19, 2022, and his mother
was served with it on April 4, 2022. At the time, L.H. was still seventeen years old.
Cf. In re A.M., 577 S.W.3d at 672 (asking whether State proved that it was
impracticable for State for reasons beyond its control, “to file a petition and obtain
a transfer ruling from juvenile court before the child’s eighteenth birthday”).
11
At the April 1, 2024 transfer hearing, which took place after L.H.’s eighteenth
birthday, the juvenile court took judicial notice of its file. See, e.g., In re M.A.C.S.-
C., No. 04-23-00139-CV, 2024 WL 697095, at *4 n.4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
Feb. 21, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re B.C., No. 02-21-00444-CV, 2022 WL
1420533, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 5, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).
26
On June 6, 2022, a “Certification Evaluation” was completed, which was
required before the juvenile court could hold a hearing on the State’s request that it
waive its exclusive original jurisdiction over L.H.’s case and transfer it to a criminal
district court. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(d) (“Prior to the [transfer] hearing,
the juvenile court shall order and obtain a complete diagnostic study, social
evaluation, and full investigation of the child, his circumstances, and the
circumstances of the alleged offense.”). And on July 25, 2022, the juvenile court
held a transfer hearing before L.H.’s eighteenth birthday to consider the State’s
request that it waive its exclusive original jurisdiction pursuant to Texas Family
Code section 54.02(a). At the hearing, the State tendered exhibits,12 which the
juvenile court admitted into evidence, and called an HPD Sergeant to testify about
the shooting of the complainant. The State also cross-examined L.H.’s mother who
testified at the hearing, and it presented argument as to why the juvenile court should
waive its exclusive original jurisdiction pursuant to Texas Family Code section
54.02(a). At the conclusion of the July 25, 2022 transfer hearing, the juvenile court
denied the State’s request to waive its jurisdiction and transfer L.H.’s case to
criminal district court. Cf. In re A.M., 577 S.W.3d at 672. (asking whether State
proved that it was impracticable for State for reasons beyond its control, “to file a
12
One of the exhibits admitted into evidence was a surveillance videotaped recording
from the restaurant where the complainant was shot. The videotaped recording
showed L.H. shooting the complainant.
27
petition and obtain a transfer ruling from juvenile court before the child’s eighteenth
birthday”).
Subsequently, on July 27, 2022—L.H.’s eighteenth birthday—the State filed
its second amended petition, alleging the same delinquent conduct and requesting
that L.H. “be adjudged a child who ha[d] engaged in delinquent conduct and be
provided for as the law direct[ed].” The second amended petition was signed by the
State on July 25, 2022 and approved by a Harris County grand jury for determinate
sentencing on July 26, 2022—the day before L.H. turned eighteen years old.
At the April 1, 2024 transfer hearing, which took place when L.H. was
nineteen years old, Abner testified that he had previously served as the prosecutor
assigned to L.H.’s case from April 2022 until October 2023. Abner explained that
the State had filed its petition alleging delinquent conduct in L.H.’s case before
L.H.’s eighteenth birthday, and there was not a time before L.H. turned eighteen
years old that the State was not able to locate him. When Abner became involved
in L.H.’s case in April 2022, L.H. was seventeen years old, and Abner believed that
there was probable cause to believe that L.H. had committed the alleged offense.
Abner was always aware of L.H.’s age throughout the underlying proceedings in
juvenile court.
Abner further explained that prior to L.H.’s eighteenth birthday, the juvenile
court held a hearing to address the State’s request that the juvenile court waive its
28
exclusive original jurisdiction and transfer L.H.’s case to criminal district court
pursuant to Texas Family Code section 54.02(a). At that transfer hearing, the
juvenile court determined that there was probable cause to believe that L.H. had
committed the alleged offense. Abner explained that it was the State’s choice to
move forward with requesting a transfer of L.H.’s case to criminal district court
pursuant to Texas Family Code section 54.02(a) before L.H.’s eighteenth birthday,
and Abner believed that L.H.’s case “could have been resolved” in juvenile court
“before [L.H.’s] eighteenth birthday.”
Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that there is more than a scintilla of
evidence to support a finding that the State proved, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that for a reason beyond its control, it was not reasonably feasible “to begin
and carry on” L.H.’s case or “to go on and do something” in juvenile court before
L.H.’s eighteenth birthday.13 In fact, the record indicates that the State was able to
proceed in juvenile court before L.H.’s eighteenth birthday. See TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 54.02(j)(4)(A). Thus, we hold that the evidence is legally insufficient to
13
To the extent that the State suggests that we rely on events that occurred after L.H.’s
eighteenth birthday to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support the
juvenile court’s finding “that for a reason beyond the control of the State it was not
practicable to proceed in juvenile court before [L.H.’s] 18th birthday,” we decline
to do so. See In re A.M.H., No. 12-19-00284-CV, 2020 WL 2078412, at *7 (Tex.
App.—Tyler Apr. 30, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding “facts explaining
delays occurring after the defendant turned eighteen [were] not relevant in th[e]
analysis”); Collins v. State, 516 S.W.3d 504, 520–21 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2017,
pet. ref’d).
29
support the trial court’s finding that “from a preponderance of the evidence that for
a reason beyond the control of the State it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile
court before [L.H.’s] 18th birthday.”14 See id. Because we have held that the
juvenile court’s finding, under Texas Family Code section 54.02(j)(4)(A), is not
supported by legally sufficient evidence, we further hold that the juvenile court
abused its discretion in waiving its exclusive original jurisdiction and transferring
L.H.’s case to criminal district court for L.H. to stand trial as an adult. See, e.g., In
re A.M.H., No. 12-19-00284-CV, 2020 WL 2078412, at *7 (Tex. App.—Tyler Apr.
30, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
We sustain L.H.’s second issue.
Conclusion
We reverse the order of the juvenile court waiving its exclusive original
jurisdiction and transferring the case to criminal district court. We note that
generally, once a child turns eighteen years old the juvenile court’s jurisdiction is
limited to either dismissing a case or transferring the case to a criminal district court.
However, under Texas Family Code section 51.0412, if proceedings cannot be
completed in the juvenile court by the time a person turns eighteen or nineteen years
old, the juvenile court may retain “jurisdiction over [the] person, without regard to
14
Because of our holding, we need not address L.H.’s assertion that the evidence was
also factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding. See TEX. R. APP. P.
47.1.
30
the age of the person” if his case began in the court prior to the person turning
eighteen or nineteen years old, if it was pending when he turned eighteen or nineteen,
and if the State exercised due diligence in attempting to complete the proceeding
before the person’s eighteenth or nineteenth birthday. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 51.0412; see also In re N.G.W., 648 S.W.3d at 492. In this case, the juvenile court,
on July 17, 2023, held a hearing to determine if it could retain jurisdiction over
L.H.’s case pursuant to Texas Family Code 51.0412. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the juvenile court entered a finding that the State had used due diligence in
attempting to complete the proceedings before L.H.’s nineteenth birthday and
concluded that section 51.0412 authorized it to retain jurisdiction over L.H.’s case.
See In re C.C.C., 2022 WL 710143, at *12 n.12 (if section 51.0412 “is not satisfied,
then the [juvenile] court must dismiss the case, but if it is satisfied, then the court
retains jurisdiction”). We have held that L.H. waived his complaint about the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction under Texas Family Code section 51.0412.
Accordingly, because we have found that the juvenile court erred in transferring
L.H.’s case to criminal district court, but the juvenile court has held that it has
continuing jurisdiction over L.H.’s case, irrespective of his age, under Texas Family
Code section 51.0412, we remand the case to the juvenile court for further
proceedings rather than dismiss it. See, e.g., Powell v. State, No. 05-07-01078-CR,
05-07-01079-CR 2009 WL 866194, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 1, 2009, pet.
31
ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (finding juvenile court erred by
transferring to criminal district court under Texas Family Code section 54.02, but
remanding case to juvenile court for further proceedings); In re M.A.V., 954 S.W.2d
117, 119 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, pet. denied) (reversing juvenile court’s
transfer order and remanding case to juvenile court for proceedings consistent with
appellate court’s opinion); see also In re C.C.C., 2022 WL 710143, at *12 n.12; In
re T.A.W., 234 S.W.3d 704, 705 n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet.
denied) (noting nothing demonstrated that juvenile court did not retain jurisdiction
over juvenile under Texas Family Code section 51.0412).
Julie Countiss
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Hightower and Countiss
32