Michael Knopp and Sandra Rybicki-Knopp v. State Farm Lloyd's ( 2024 )


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  • DISSENTING OPINION Filed October 30, 2024
    In the
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    No. 05-22-00749-CV
    MICHAEL KNOPP AND SANDRA RYBICKI-KNOPP, Appellants
    V.
    STATE FARM LLOYD'S, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 471st Judicial District Court
    Collin County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 471-04386-2021
    DISSENTING OPINION FROM DENIAL OF
    EN BANC RECONSIDERATION
    Opinion by Justice Carlyle
    This case presents facts distinct from Ortiz v. State Farm Lloyds, 
    589 S.W.3d 127
     (Tex. 2019) that may merit a different result than both that case and the panel
    opinion here. At the least, they counsel further guidance from the en banc court or
    further examination by the Supreme Court.
    First, for nearly two years after the loss, the Knopps and State Farm attempted
    to come to an agreeable resolution. The Knopps initiated the appraisal process, and
    the parties’ chosen appraisers settled on a value significantly closer to what the
    Knopps had claimed all along. Some seven months passed after the appraisal award,
    during which State Farm refused on several occasions to pay the full appraisal award.
    State Farm’s refusal to pay compelled the Knopps to file suit. Then, four months and
    another State Farm rejection later, State Farm completely reversed course and
    tendered the appraisal’s balance on the actual cash value amount, its calculation of
    interest, and its calculation of fees.
    In Ortiz, the Supreme Court was considering Ortiz’s argument that “by paying
    him the proper amount only after the appraisal award was issued, State Farm used
    the appraisal provision to ‘excuse [its] failure to comply with its other contractual
    duties to timely pay its policyholders what they are entitled to under the policy.’” 
    Id. at 132
    . Ortiz sued after initial estimates but before State Farm invoked the appraisal
    process. State Farm timely paid the appraisal award to Ortiz. 
    Id. at 130
    . The Supreme
    Court was careful to note that allowing a breach of contract claim past summary
    judgment based solely on an appraisal coming back higher than the original estimate
    would incentivize litigation rather than short-circuiting it “as intended” by the
    appraisal process. 
    Id.
     at 132–33 (cleaned up). This case is different.
    When an insurer claims no error in the appraisal process but refuses to pay
    and disputes the amount of the award, there is a coverage dispute. Litigation is the
    remedy. Here, litigation appears to have gotten the Knopps in four months what they
    were unable to achieve in over two years in dealing with State Farm on the estimate
    and appraisal process. State Farm’s behavior has earned a closer look, particularly
    as Texans continue to face spring storms exactly like the one in this case.
    –2–
    Second, the Knopps have alleged damages outside the amounts they claim
    under the policy: the difference in the cost to repair the roof from the time of the
    award to the time the Knopps filed suit, and the time State Farm paid on the
    appraisal. Cf. Ortiz, 589 S.W.3d at 133–34 (discussing independent injury damages
    available for statutory violations). They allege inflation drove up the repair and
    replacement cost. The Oritz court relied on the lack of damages independent from
    the loss of benefits to affirm summary judgment on Ortiz’s bad faith claim. 
    Id.
     at
    134–35 (citing USAA Texas Lloyds v. Menchaca, 
    545 S.W.3d 479
    , 499–500 (Tex.
    2018)). The panel here ignores the fact that the cost to repair the Knopps’ roof
    increased due in part to State Farm’s significant delay in paying the appraisal award.
    It characterizes these as damages “not separate from or different from benefits under
    the contract,” but does not account for the fact that its opinion means State Farm will
    avoid paying these additional damages.
    Because this case presents circumstances unique from those the Supreme
    Court has faced in the past and because the panel’s opinion creates incentives counter
    to the Supreme Court’s expressed policy considerations, I respectfully dissent.
    /Cory L. Carlyle/
    220749df.p05                                   CORY L. CARLYLE
    JUSTICE
    Molberg, Partida-Kipness, Smith, and
    Garcia J.J., join this dissenting opinion.
    –3–
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-22-00749-CV

Filed Date: 10/30/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/13/2024