Texas Department of Transportation and Vulcan Materials Company v. Kristina Smith, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Jennipher Smith, and as Next Friend of N.J. and B.J. ( 2024 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-23-00076-CV
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
AND VULCAN MATERIALS COMPANY, Appellants
V.
KRISTINA SMITH, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE
OF JENNIPHER SMITH, AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF N.J. AND B.J., Appellees
On Appeal from the 71st District Court
Harrison County, Texas
Trial Court No. 21-0667
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In the early evening of November 3, 2020, Jennipher Smith lost control of her vehicle
when she encountered loose, marble-sized debris on Farm-to-Market Road (FM) 134 between
Jonesville and Waskom. Jennipher’s vehicle slid off the road, down an embankment, and into
several trees. Her daughter, N.J.,1 was also in the vehicle and was injured. Jennipher walked up
to the roadway to try to get help. About that time, another driver, Alexis Smith, encountered the
loose debris, lost control of her vehicle, and slid into Jennipher, killing her.
The debris was on a section of highway that had recently been repaved by the Texas
Department of Transportation (TxDOT) using material supplied by Vulcan Materials Company
(Vulcan). TxDOT had placed warning signs along and ahead of the work zone, including signs
warning of loose gravel.
As a result of this tragic accident, Jennipher’s mother, Kristina Smith, filed wrongful
death and survival actions on behalf of herself and Jennipher’s children, N.J. and B.J., against
TxDOT and Vulcan. The jury found TxDOT negligent regarding a premises defect and found
Vulcan liable for a marketing defect. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Kristina, N.J.,
and B.J. In accordance with the law, the trial court awarded damages on the verdict.2 TxDOT
and Vulcan appealed.
1
To protect their privacy, we refer to any person who was a minor when the underlying suit was filed by their
initials. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.9(a)(3).
2
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.023(a) (limiting “money damages in a maximum amount of
$250,000 for each person and $500,000 for each single occurrence for bodily injury or death”).
2
On appeal, TxDOT asserts that there is no evidence to support the jury’s findings that
(1) TxDOT failed to adequately warn of the danger posed by the condition of the road,
(2) TxDOT had actual knowledge of the danger posed by the condition of the road at the time of
the accident, or (3) Jennipher lacked actual knowledge of the danger posed by the condition of
the road. Because there is no evidence that TxDOT failed to adequately warn of the danger
posed by the condition of the road, we reverse the trial court’s judgment against TxDOT.
In its appeal, Vulcan asserts, among other things,3 that it did not have a duty to warn
TxDOT and its employee end users about using its product beyond its shelf life. Because we
agree that Vulcan did not have a duty to warn TxDOT and its employee end users about using its
product beyond its shelf life, we reverse the trial court’s judgment against Vulcan.
I. TxDOT’s Warning Decisions Here Were Discretionary, and Hence, Immune.
A. Background
In July 2020, TxDOT began a maintenance project to overlay portions of the surface of
FM 134 in Harrison County, between FM 1999 and U.S. Highway 80 (the FM 134 Project).
Prior to beginning the work, TxDOT placed “LOOSE GRAVEL” and “no center line” warning
signs just south of FM 1999 and approximately every two miles thereafter to near U.S. Highway
80. The signs were placed to the right of both the southbound and northbound lanes and faced
3
Vulcan also asserts that there was (1) legally insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that there was a
marketing defect, (2) legally insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that any marketing defect was the
producing cause of the occurrence, (3) legally and factually insufficient evidence to support the jury awards for past
and future mental anguish to Appellees in connection with Jennipher’s death, and (4) legally insufficient evidence to
support the jury awards for physical pain and past or future mental anguish for N.J.’s injuries from the accident. It
also asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony of Appellees’ expert, Dr. Gary
Kronrad, on past and future mental anguish and loss of companionship, loss of inheritance, and loss of pecuniary
support. Finally, Vulcan asserts that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury that a defective warning is not a
producing cause of injuries if the end user knew of the condition allegedly causing the injuries.
3
the traffic traveling in each lane. Between FM 1999 and where Jennipher lost control of her
vehicle, there were five loose gravel signs facing the southbound lane of FM 134. Uncontested
testimony shows that each of those signs was in place on the night of the accident.4
Limestone rock asphalt (LRA) was used for most of the overlays on the FM 134 Project.
LRA is limestone rock with naturally occurring asphalt or bitumen. On November 3, TxDOT
laid an LRA overlay on a section of the southbound lane of FM 134, about one mile southeast of
Jonesville (the November 3 overlay).5 John Robicheaux, a TxDOT employee who testified by
deposition, was on the crew that laid the November 3 overlay. He testified regarding the general
procedure for an LRA overlay and how the LRA is compacted, and to his recollection, the
procedure was followed that day. He also testified that the crew walked the entire overlay before
they left, and he did not see any gravel on the road or anything wrong with the overlay. He
thought they left the job site around 3:00 p.m.
John Hines was the TxDOT crew chief that day and testified by deposition. He also
testified regarding the general procedure for an LRA overlay. He testified that, after the LRA is
compacted, the crew looks at the overlay to make sure it is not “hulling out” and, if there is a
problem, they do not “let it stay down.” Hines also testified that the crew walked the entire
overlay before they left, he did not see anything unusual or any loose aggregate, and the LRA
4
In his opening statement, Appellees’ attorney informed the jury that the loose gravel and no center line “signs ha[d]
been up since the summer through after November 3rd of 2020” and introduced, without limitation, a map made by
TxDOT that showed the location of the signs.
5
Between July and October, TxDOT laid at least nine other LRA overlays on sections of FM 134, including the
northbound lane of the subject section. Neither party introduced any evidence of any accidents related to those
overlays.
4
appeared to compact as it normally would. He thought they left the job site between 3:30 and
4:00 p.m.
Nevertheless, when Jennipher and Alexis encountered the overlay about two hours later,
the LRA had “shell[ed] or ravel[ed],” that is, the aggregate had come out of the mix and formed
a layer of rock on the overlay. When Jennipher encountered the overlay, she lost control of her
vehicle, which slid off the road, slid down an embankment, and hit several trees. Because her
daughter, N.J., was also in the vehicle, Jennipher walked up to the roadway to try to get help.
About that time, Alexis lost control of her vehicle when she encountered the loose gravel, slid in
Jennipher’s direction, and struck and killed Jennipher.
In his crash report concerning Jennipher’s vehicle, Texas Department of Public Safety
(DPS) Trooper Jim Hargett described the layer of rock as “very loose gravel.” At trial, his
recollection of the gravel was that it was like “small ice particles” and “very, very small, about
the size of [his] thumbnail or fingernail.” In his fatality report concerning Jennipher and in his
crash report concerning Alexis’s vehicle, DPS Trooper Richard Matlock also described the layer
of rock as “VERY LOOSE GRAVEL.” At trial, he testified that it was “like a bunch of marbles
laying on the road.” Although he initially testified that the TxDOT crew had left the road “in
horrible shape,” he agreed he did not know what the condition of the road was when TxDOT left
that afternoon, and he did not know whether TxDOT left the road with loose gravel. Both
Hargett and Matlock testified that they had never seen TxDOT leave a roadway with the degree
of loose gravel they saw the night of the accident.
5
Wendy Starkes is a licensed professional engineer in Texas. She was the area engineer
for the Marshall area of TxDOT during the FM 134 Project. She testified that she prepared the
map of the FM 134 Project that showed all the work that was performed, the material used, the
date range, and the location of the loose gravel and no center line signs6 on the project. She
explained that the first step in an overlay process is putting up the loose gravel and no center line
signs.
Starkes testified that TxDOT has a standard for placement of signs in an overlay project
called a traffic control plan, TCP 7-1, which provides that loose gravel and no center line signs
be placed about every two miles.7 She testified that the purpose of the document is to give
“guidance on what type of signage [is] applicable for surfacing operations.” She opined as a
licensed professional engineer that the signs placed in the FM 134 Project were in compliance
with TCP 7-1 and with the Texas Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (TMUTCD). The
TMUTCD directs “what kind of traffic control [should be] use[d] in what situations, . . . when
certain signs are appropriate, what sizes the signs have to be, [and] what colors they have to be.”
6
Based on personally driving a portion of the project the morning after the crash and verification from the
maintenance department, Starkes testified that the map accurately depicted the signs installed on the project prior to
and at the time of the accident. She explained that, although the map showed that one sign was missing, in fact it
was present at the time of the accident, but it was missing the following morning.
7
TxDOT TCP (7-1)-13 provides:
A. When construction begins a LOOSE GRAVEL (CW8-7) sign should be erected at each
end of the work area and repeated in intervals of approximately 2 miles in rural areas and
closer in urban areas.
B. The LOOSE GRAVEL signs are to remain in place until the condition no longer exists.
6
She explained that the signs are placed every two miles to remind the driver that a
condition either exists or could exist. She opined that it is a reasonable distance to remind a
driver of a potential condition. Starkes also testified that the TMUTCD states,
Warning signs call attention to unexpected conditions on or adjacent to a
highway, street, or private roads open to public travel and to situations that might
not be readily apparent to road users.
Warning signs alert road users to conditions that might call for a reduction
of speed or an action in the interest of safety and efficient traffic operations.
She opined that the loose gravel signs both call for a reduction of speed and alert the driver that
the condition may be present. In her opinion, they are appropriate any time there is any kind of
loose gravel on the roadway. Starkes also testified that there are no other signs in the TMUTCD
that are used to warn of loose gravel. In her opinion, based on her engineering judgment, the
sign placement on the FM 134 Project was reasonable, and the signs were adequate warnings for
motorists of loose gravel. As the area engineer and in her engineering judgment, she thought the
signs were placed at appropriate intervals on the FM 134 Project. Further, as TxDOT’s engineer
in charge of the road at the time of the accident, the signs were placed where she wanted them to
be.
Appellees sued TxDOT, the jury found that TxDOT was negligent for a premises defect,
and the trial court entered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict. On appeal, TxDOT
argues, among other things, that the discretionary function exception to the Texas Tort Claims
Act (the Act) precludes the waiver of its sovereign immunity for its decisions on the type and
placement of warning signs and that Appellees provided no evidence that TxDOT failed to
adequately warn Jennipher of the dangerous condition of the road. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
7
CODE ANN. § 101.056; State v. Miguel, 2 S.W.3d 249, 250–51 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam).
Appellees argue that TxDOT remains liable because the “LOOSE GRAVEL” signs were not
close to the overlay, that the signs did not warn of the particular hazard, and that the
discretionary function exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to special
defects. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.060(c).
B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“Generally, the State of Texas and its agencies retain sovereign immunity from suit
unless the Legislature clearly and unambiguously waives it.” Christ v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp.,
664 S.W.3d 82, 86 (Tex. 2023) (citing Univ. of Tex. at Austin v. Hayes, 327 S.W.3d 113, 115
(Tex. 2010) (per curiam)). “[S]overeign immunity implicates a trial court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction . . . .” Id. (citing Sampson v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 500 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex.
2016)). “[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction is never presumed and cannot be waived . . . .” Tex. Dep’t
of Transp. v. Self, 690 S.W.3d 12, 20 (Tex. 2024) (citing Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control
Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443–44 (Tex. 1993)). As a result, “the issue can ‘“be raised for the first
time on appeal by the parties or by the court,” [and] a court is obliged to ascertain that subject
matter jurisdiction exists regardless of whether the parties have questioned it.’” Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dallas v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 358
(Tex. 2004), superseded on other grounds by TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.034). “Whether a
court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law . . . .” Christ, 664 S.W.3d at 86 (quoting
Sampson, 500 S.W.3d at 384).
8
The Act expressly waives the State’s sovereign immunity for tort claims, but only “to the
extent the Act creates liability.” State ex rel. State Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp. v.
Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d 322, 326 (Tex. 2002) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 101.025(a)). As applicable to this appeal, the Act waives sovereign immunity for “personal
injury and death so caused by a condition . . . of . . . real property if the governmental unit would,
were it a private person, be liable to the claimant.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 101.021(2); see State v. Rodriguez, 985 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam), abrogated on
other grounds by Denton Cnty. v. Beynon, 283 S.W.3d 329 (Tex. 2009). Where, as here, “a
plaintiff’s claim arises from a premises defect, then the government’s duty is generally limited to
‘the duty that a private person owes to a licensee on private property.’” Christ, 664 S.W.3d at 86
(quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.022(a), (c)).
Nevertheless, “the Act establishes various exceptions to this general waiver.” Gonzalez,
82 S.W.3d at 326. Under Section 101.056, “[t]he Act’s waiver of immunity ‘does not apply to a
claim based on . . . a governmental unit’s decision not to perform an act or on its failure to make
a decision on the performance or nonperformance of an act if the law leaves the performance or
nonperformance of the act to the discretion of the governmental unit.’” Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v.
Ramirez, 74 S.W.3d 864, 866–67 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam) (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 101.056(2)). “For instance, the ‘[d]esign of any public work, such as a roadway, is
a discretionary function involving many policy decisions, and the governmental entity
responsible may not be sued for such decisions.’” Id. at 867 (alteration in original) (quoting
Rodriguez, 985 S.W.2d at 85). “Likewise, decisions about installing safety features are
9
discretionary decisions for which the State may not be sued.” Id. (citing Miguel, 2 S.W.3d at
251; Maxwell v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 880 S.W.2d 461, 463 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, writ
denied)).
Further, “under section 101.060, the State does not waive its sovereign immunity for
claims arising from ‘the failure of a governmental unit initially to place a traffic or road sign,
signal, or warning device if the failure is a result of discretionary action of the governmental
unit.’” Rodriguez, 985 S.W.2d at 85 (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 101.060(a)(1)). In Rodriguez, the Texas Supreme Court found that, “under Section 101.060[,]
the State retained its immunity for warning sign placement because it also was a discretionary act
and because the detour was not a special defect.”8 Id. at 86 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 101.060).
8
Under Section 101.060(c), “the State waives immunity for ‘the duty to warn of special defects such as excavations
or roadway obstructions.’” Rodriguez, 985 S.W.2d at 85 (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 101.060(c)). “Whether a condition is an ordinary premise defect or a special defect is a question of law.” Id.
(citing State Dep’t of Highways v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 238 (Tex. 1992)). In Denton County v. Beynon, the
Texas Supreme Court explained that “the [Act] speaks of ‘special defects such as excavations or obstructions’ that
impede travel on the roadway.” Denton Cnty., 283 S.W.3d at 332. Consequently, “a court cannot ‘classify as
“special” a defect that is not like an excavation or obstruction on a roadway.’” Id. at 331–32 (quoting Payne, 838
S.W.2d at 239 n.3). The court noted that “the [the Act] does not posit an alternative basis for special-defect liability
when a condition, while not an excavation or obstruction, is out of the ordinary.” Id. at 332. Also, the Texas
Supreme Court has held that loose gravel on a roadway “‘does not form a hole in the road or physically block the
road like an obstruction or excavation,’ nor does it ‘physically impair a car’s ability to travel on the road in the
manner that an excavated road or obstruction blocking the road does.’” Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Gutierrez, 284
S.W.3d 848, 850 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. York, 284 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tex. 2009)
(per curiam)). As a result, loose gravel on a roadway “falls outside the ‘special defect’ class as a matter of law.
Instead, it ‘falls in the same class as ordinary premise defects—those conditions that do not reach the level of an
obstruction or excavation.’” Id. (quoting York, 284 S.W.2d at 847). In York, the court acknowledged that, if “a
sizeable mound of gravel were left on the roadway,” it could fall within the class of special defects. Tex. Dep’t of
Transp. v. York, 284 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam). However, neither the testimonial, nor recorded, nor
photographic evidence in this case showed that a sizeable mound of LRA was left on the highway such that it would
block the roadway in the same manner as an obstruction or excavation. As a result, we find that the loose LRA in
this case was not a special defect.
Appellees argue that four Texas courts of appeals have held that excessive gravel can constitute a special
defect. However, the Texas Supreme Court reversed two of the cited cases on this issue, see York, 284 S.W.2d at
10
C. Analysis
Because Appellees asserted a premises defect claim against TxDOT, TxDOT owed them
“the duty that a private person owes to a licensee on private property.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 101.022(a)). That duty required TxDOT to “use ordinary care either to warn a
licensee of, or to make reasonably safe, a dangerous condition of which the owner [was] aware
and the licensee [was] not.” State Dep’t of Highways v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex.
1992). As a result, to establish TxDOT’s liability, Appellees were required to prove, among
other things, that TxDOT failed to adequately warn Jennipher of the condition of the road.9
Adequacy of warnings regarding road construction, however, raises another aspect of
sovereign immunity: discretionary decisions by the State. In Miguel, TxDOT put barrels in
front of part of an elevated exit ramp’s missing railing to serve as a temporary warning device.
A van struck the barrels, went over a concrete wall, and fell sixty feet to the ground, resulting in
the death of the driver and two passengers. Miguel, 2 S.W.3d at 250. On appeal of an adverse
jury verdict against TxDOT, the Texas Supreme Court noted that, under Section 101.056, the
847–48, and Gutierrez, 284 S.W.3d at 850, and the other two were decided prior to the Texas Supreme Court
opinions in York and Guiterrez.
9
To find TxDOT liable, the trial court’s charge required the jury to find that:
a. The condition of the premises posed an unreasonable risk of harm; and
b. [TxDOT] had actual knowledge of the danger, if any, presented by said condition; and
c. Jennipher Smith did not have actual knowledge of the danger presented by said condition,
if any; and
d. [TxDOT] failed to exercise ordinary care to protect Jennipher Smith from danger, by both
failing to adequately warn her of any unreasonable risk of harm caused by said condition,
if any, and by failing to make any such condition reasonably safe.
11
State’s immunity is retained for claims based on its discretionary decisions. Id. at 250–51 (citing
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.056). It then determined that “[d]ecisions about
highway design and about what type of safety features to install are discretionary policy
decisions.” Id. at 251 (citing Maxwell, 880 S.W.2d at 463–64). Because “[Tx]DOT policy
guided [its] crew’s decision to use barrels and signs [and t]he barrel and sign warning system the
crew chose complied with [Tx]DOT’s Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices,” the court
held that “the decision to use barrels and signs, as opposed to another warning device, was
discretionary.” Id. As a result, TxDOT retained its sovereign immunity from Miguel’s clams.
Id.
In Rodriguez, a truck driver was killed when his rig failed to complete a ninety-degree
turn on a detour, side-swiped a bridge abutment, and rolled over. His widow sued the State and
alleged that the detour was unreasonably dangerous and that the warning signs were inadequate.
Rodriguez, 985 S.W.2d at 85. On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court noted that, “under section
101.060, the State does not waive its sovereign immunity for claims arising from ‘the failure of a
governmental unit initially to place a traffic or road sign, signal, or warning device if the failure
is a result of discretionary action of the governmental unit.’” Id. (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 101.060(a)(1)). The court held that, because “[t]he State’s traffic engineers
decided, in their discretion, where to place the warning signs,” the State’s immunity was retained
for warning sign placement under Section 101.060. Id. at 86. In addition, the court held that,
based on evidence that the State’s area engineer’s “office had designed the existing warning
12
signs according to [its] best engineering judgment[,] . . . the State did not waive its immunity for
warning signage.” Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.060(a)(1)).
In this case, Starkes, TxDOT’s area engineer, testified that the warning signs used and
where they were placed, complied with TxDOT policy and with the TMUTCD. In her
professional opinion, the “LOOSE GRAVEL” signs were appropriate and adequate to warn of
the loose gravel. She also testified that the signs were placed where she, as the engineer in
charge, wanted them to be. Appellees did not provide any evidence that the warning signs or
their placement did not conform with TxDOT policy or with the TMUTCD. Further, they
offered no testimony rebutting Starkes’s testimony that the warning signs were appropriate and
adequate to warn of the loose gravel.10
Under this record, and in accordance with Miguel and Rodriguez, we hold that TxDOT
retained its sovereign immunity for its discretionary decisions regarding what warning signs to
use and where they should be placed. Miguel, 2 S.W.3d at 251; Rodriguez, 985 S.W.2d at 85–
86; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.056(a)(1). Because “decisions about
installing safety features are discretionary decisions for which the State may not be sued,”
Ramirez, 74 S.W.3d at 867, and because an essential element of Appellees’ claim is based on
these discretionary decisions, under this record, Appellees’ claim is barred by TxDOT’s
10
In their brief, Appellees asserted that Starkes admitted that the warning signs were inadequate, but failed to cite to
any place in the record where she did so.
13
sovereign immunity. Therefore, we sustain this issue, and we reverse the trial court’s judgment
against TxDOT.11
II. Vulcan Did Not Have a Duty to Warn About Using LRA Beyond Its Shelf Life
On appeal, Vulcan asserts, as it did in the trial court,12 that it did not have a duty to warn
TxDOT and its employees about using LRA beyond its shelf life. It argues that the evidence
conclusively showed that TxDOT knew that LRA had a shelf life and that the TxDOT employees
who made the decision to use the LRA were aware of the characteristics of LRA when it was
beyond its shelf life. We agree.
A. Background
The evidence at trial relevant to this issue shows that Vulcan delivered a load of LRA to
the Marshall Division of TxDOT (TxDOT Marshall) in October 2019 (the October load) and
another load of LRA in February 2020 (the February load). It is unclear from the record whether
LRA from the October load or LRA from the February load was used on the November 3
overlay.13
Because this issue is dispositive of TxDOT’s appeal, we need not consider its other issues, such as TxDOT’s
11
awareness of the condition of the road at the time of the accident.
12
Vulcan filed a timely motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in which it asserted, among other things,
that there was legally insufficient evidence that it owed a duty to warn TxDOT and its employees.
13
Michael Smith, who was the assistant supervisor of the maintenance department at TxDOT Marshall on
November 3, testified that, based on his knowledge, the October load was used on the November 3 overlay.
However, the testing report produced by TxDOT of the October load before it was shipped showed that the October
load was “Type II-DS Fine Surface” LRA. The testing report produced by TxDOT of the February load before it
was shipped showed that the February load was “Type I-D Fine Surface” LRA. After the accident, Starkes sent a
sample of the load used on the November 3 overlay to TxDOT that was tested on November 23, 2020. The testing
report of that sample showed that it was “Type I-D Fine Surface” LRA. Both Starkes and Appellees’ expert testified
that this indicated that the October load was not used on the November 3 overlay. Also, the daily activity report for
the November 3 overlay recited that the LRA used for the overlay was “TYPE I, GRADE D (CUY).”
14
Tim Thompson, Vulcan’s sales representative, testified that he tried to go by TxDOT
Marshall quarterly and that he called on the maintenance supervisor. Sometimes when he called
on TxDOT Marshall, he would leave Vulcan’s sales brochure in TxDOT’s office. The brochure
states that, for both Type I and Type II LRA, “[t]ypical shelf life is 3–6 months depending on
weather conditions.” Thompson agreed that LRA has a six-month shelf life, “because it’s in the
brochure.” It is undisputed that he never told anyone at TxDOT that LRA had a six-month shelf
life. Smith testified that he never saw the brochures and that, if he had known LRA had a six-
month shelf life, he would not have used it after six months. Hines testified that he did not know
anything about LRA having a shelf life. Matt Burns, who was the maintenance supervisor at
TxDOT Marshall on November 3, testified that he knew that LRA had a shelf life and that he
believed it was six to twelve months.
Starkes testified that TxDOT’s DMS-9210,14 titled “Limestone Rock Asphalt,” sets out
the requirements a supplier must meet to supply LRA to TxDOT. She agreed that section 2.4 of
DMS-9210 requires supplies to “[u]se fluxing material in the paving mixture to provide materials
that remain workable in a stockpile for at least six months” and that it requires the LRA to be
workable for six months. She also agreed that a TxDOT’s publication titled “Asphalt Materials
and Uses” provides, under the heading “Limestone Rock Asphalt,” that “LRA can be stockpiled
for use and can remain workable in the stockpile for six months or more.” She had not seen any
TxDOT publication that stated that LRA cannot be used after six months. Starkes interpreted
“workable” to mean “that you can get the material out of the stockpile and still use it to pave
14
DMS is an acronym for Department Material Specification.
15
with, so that[ it]’s still workable on the roadway.” Starkes did not take the reference to a shelf
life in the Vulcan brochure to be a specification or a warning but, rather, part of the sales
brochure.
Jill Shackelford, Appellees’ expert witness, testified that, in her opinion, “shelf life of six
months” is the same as being “workable for six months.” She opined that TxDOT used LRA
“outside of its recommended stockpile shelf life that’s within the specification required by
[TxDOT].” She based her opinion on TxDOT’s DMS-9210 that requires “a six month stockpile
workability life.” She explained that, when LRA is no longer workable, it becomes dry or brittle
and loses its bonding capacity. She agreed that, if it dries out, it becomes difficult or impossible
to be installed correctly. She testified that the LRA shown on recordings from the officer’s body
camera looked dry and brittle. Shackelford also testified that she was surprised that no one at
TxDOT Marshall, even at the supervisor level, knew about a shelf life because it was TxDOT’s
own specification and was incorporated in the guidance document.
The evidence also shows that, around January 2020, Smith15 and Burns16 noticed that the
October load of LRA looked too dry, and Smith explained that “[i]t was more of a gray color . . .
instead of the blackish brown color when [they] first received it.” They picked some up and
squeezed it to see if it stayed squeezed, and it did not feel right. They also rubbed some around
in their hands, and it was “like powder.” Smith explained that, normally, if he rolled it in his
hand, he would “have black sticky oil marks.” Afterwards, they talked with Thompson, and
15
At the time, Smith had worked in TxDOT Marshall’s maintenance department for over fifteen years.
At the time, Burns had worked in TxDOT Marshall’s maintenance department for about twenty-four years, had
16
been an assistant maintenance supervisor for ten years, and had been maintenance supervisor for two years.
16
TxDOT decided to have it repugged, or rejuvenated by adding oil, to make it more usable on the
roadway. The October load was repugged in February by a third-party company. That LRA was
used for the FM 134 Overlay Project in August, September, and October without incident.
Smith agreed that, on November 3, there were three loads of LRA at the TxDOT
Marshall yard: the October load, the February load, and a load that was delivered in October
2020. He testified that the maintenance supervisor or the assistant maintenance supervisor
makes the decision on what load to use. He maintained that, on November 3, nothing looked out
of place with the October load before it was used. He also testified that, if he, the crew leader, or
the crew had noticed something was wrong with it, they would not have used it that day. Crew
member Robicheaux testified that the crew walked the entire overlay on November 3 before they
left and that he did not see any gravel on the road or anything wrong with the overlay. Crew
leader Hines17 testified that, after the LRA is compacted, the crew looks at the overlay to make
sure it is not “hulling out” and that, if there is a problem, they would not let it stay down. Hines
also testified that the crew walked the entire overlay on November 3 before they left, that he did
not see anything unusual or any loose aggregate, and that the LRA appeared to compact as it
normally would. When shown a photograph that depicted what the November 3 overlay looked
like after the accident, Hines testified that, if the overlay had looked like that before they left, he
would not have allowed the road to be open to traffic because it would be a hazard. According to
Hines, they would have worked late and fixed it.
At the time, Hines had worked in TxDOT’s maintenance department for about twenty-five years and had done
17
over 500 limestone jobs.
17
B. Duty to Warn and Standard of Review
A manufacturer has a duty to warn of dangers or instruct as to the proper use of a product
“if it knows or should know of the potential harm to a user because of the nature of its product.”
Am. Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 426 (Tex. 1997) (citing Bristol-Myers Co. v.
Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex. 1978)). “The existence of a duty to warn of dangers or
instruct as to the proper use of a product is a question of law.” Id. (citing Firestone Steel Prods.
Co. v. Barajas, 927 S.W.2d 608, 613 (Tex. 1996)). However, there is no duty “to warn of
obvious risks,” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Tex. 1995), or “to warn of risks
involved in a product’s use that are commonly known to foreseeable users, even if some users
are not aware of them,” Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Gomez, 146 S.W.3d 170, 183 (Tex.
2004) (citing Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. McGuire, 814 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tex. 1991)).
We determine whether a product’s risks are obvious, or whether the risks are commonly known
to foreseeable users, as a matter of law using an objective standard. Caterpillar, 911 S.W.2d at
383. Further, “[w]hen the foreseeable users of a product have special training, a supplier has no
duty to warn of risks that should be obvious to them, even if persons without such training would
not appreciate the risks.” Humble Sand & Gravel, 146 S.W.3d at 183; see Sauder Custom
Fabrication, Inc. v. Boyd, 967 S.W.2d 349, 351 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam). “What level of
appreciation amounts to common knowledge is to be determined by the court as a matter of law
unless there are factual issues that must be resolved.” Id. (citing Caterpillar, 911 S.W.2d at
383).
18
C. Analysis
Appellees argue that Vulcan had a duty to warn the TxDOT employees who moved the
LRA and spread it on FM 134 that LRA had a shelf life of six months. However, as noted
above, “[w]hen the foreseeable users of a product have special training, a supplier has no duty to
warn of risks that should be obvious to them, even if persons without such training would not
appreciate the risks.” Id.
In Hanna v. Impact Recovery Systems, Inc., the Beaumont Court of Appeals applied this
principle in a case involving a traffic fatality. Hanna v. Impact Recovery Sys., Inc., 295 S.W.3d
380 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009, pet. denied). In that case, Cassandra Humble was fatally
injured while riding as a passenger on a motorcycle operated by Gerry Hernandez. Id. at 384.
Hernandez attempted to change lanes from a service lane to a lane used by traffic that exited
from a freeway when he struck a mountable curb system installed by TxDOT “to discourage
motorists from going from one lane to the other.” Id. at 385. Although vertical panels
manufactured by the supplier of the curb system were available to attach to the curb system, the
representative of the supplier told the TxDOT engineer in charge of the maintenance and design
of roadways in the district that the vertical panels were not required to be used. The TxDOT
engineer purchased the curb system and had it installed without the vertical panels. Id. at 385–
86.
The parents and children of Humble sued TxDOT and the supplier and the manufacturer
of the curb system. Id. at 384. In their suit against the supplier, they alleged the supplier was
liable for defective marketing because it represented that the curb system could be used without
19
the vertical panels. Id. at 394–95. The supplier contended that it did not have a duty to warn or
instruct TxDOT on the safe use of the curb system. Id. at 395.
In affirming the summary judgment in favor of the supplier, the court of appeals
explained that “[t]he TxDOT employees making the decision to use the [curb system] had special
training and also prior experience with different types of lane separators at” the site of the
accident. Id. at 396. The court of appeals concluded that “[t]he possible risk of using the
product without delineators would have been known and obvious to TxDOT.” Id. (citing
Humble Sand & Gravel, 146 S.W.3d at 183). Under those circumstances, the court of appeals
concluded that the supplier “had no duty to warn or instruct TxDOT regarding the selection and
application of the traffic control system at [that] location.” Id. (citing Humble Sand & Gravel,
146 S.W.3d at 183).
Similarly, in this case, the TxDOT employees making the decision to use the LRA had
the training needed to determine whether the LRA was suitable to use, and the risk of using it if
it was unsuitable would have been known and obvious to them. TxDOT required its LRA18
suppliers, such as Vulcan, to supply LRA that would remain workable in a stockpile for six
months. Appellees’ expert, Shackelford, characterized that as a shelf life and opined that a “shelf
life of six months” was the same as “workable for six months.” She went on to explain the
importance of LRA being workable: when it is no longer workable, it becomes dry or brittle and
loses its bonding capacity. As a result, the risk of using the LRA on an overlay when it is no
As we have noted, LRA “ha[s] been used by TxDOT since [at least] ‘1964.’” Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ingram, 412
18
S.W.3d 129, 139 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.).
20
longer workable is that it will no longer bind together, thereby causing the overlay to be
hazardous to traffic traversing over it.
But as the evidence shows, one load of LRA may become unworkable within three or
four months, while another may remain workable several months beyond six months. It also
shows that, although they may have heard that LRA had a “shelf life,” the TxDOT employees
who made the determination of whether to use a particular load of LRA, i.e., its maintenance
supervisor Burns and its assistant supervisor Smith, knew when a particular load was no longer
workable. As Smith described the October load three months after its delivery, it looked dry,
was grayish rather than blackish brown, did not feel right when squeezed, and became powder
when rubbed in his hands rather than leaving black sticky oil marks on his fingers. Rather than
use the October load in that condition, the decision was made to rejuvenate it so it would be
usable on the roadway.
That evidence shows that the TxDOT employees who determined whether to use a load
of LRA understood that it should not be used when it was unworkable because it had lost its
bonding capacity and that they knew how the LRA appeared when it became unworkable. So,
the risk to the traveling public of using LRA when it is no longer workable, or past its “shelf
life,” would be obvious to them. Because they are the ones who determine whether to use any
load of LRA, it is their understanding that is pertinent to whether Vulcan had a duty to warn of
those risks. See Hanna, 295 S.W.3d at 396. Under these circumstances, we conclude that
Vulcan had no duty to warn of the risk of using LRA beyond its “shelf life.” See Humble Sand
21
& Gravel, 146 S.W.3d at 183. As a result, we sustain this issue and reverse the trial court’s
judgment against Vulcan.19
III. Disposition
For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court’s judgment, and render judgment for the
Texas Department of Transportation and Vulcan Materials Company.
Jeff Rambin
Justice
Date Submitted: September 12, 2024
Date Decided: October 31, 2024
19
Because this issue is dispositive of Vulcan’s appeal, we need not address its other issues.
22