Reeder, Clayton Dean ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
NO. PD-0601-14
CLAYTON DEAN REEDER, Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
FROM THE SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS
RUSK COUNTY
H ERVEY, J., delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court.
OPINION
After losing control of his vehicle, Clayton Dean Reeder (Appellant), skidded off
the road and hit a tree. During the ensuing investigation, police began to suspect that
Appellant was intoxicated while operating his vehicle, and they took a blood specimen
(over Appellant’s objections) pursuant to Section 724.012(b)(3)(B) of the Texas
Transportation Code. Because the police concluded that Appellant was driving while
intoxicated and had twice before been convicted of DWI, he was charged with felony
DWI. Appellant filed a motion to suppress, which the trial court denied. He then pled
Reeder–2
guilty and was sentenced to six years’ confinement.
On appeal, Appellant argued that his conviction should be reversed in light of the
United States Supreme Court decision in Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013).
On January 8, 2014, the court of appeals issued an opinion affirming the judgment of the
trial court and concluding that McNeely did not render Section 724.012(b)(3)(B) of the
Texas Transportation Code unconstitutional. However, on February 4, 2014, the court
granted the State’s motion for rehearing and substituted its opinion with a new one
granting relief and finding Section 724.012(b) unconstitutional as applied to Appellant.
See Reeder v. State, 428 S.W.3d 924, 929, 930 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014) (op. on
reh’g). The State Prosecuting Attorney subsequently filed a timely petition for
discretionary review that we granted on August 20, 2014, arguing that the mandatory
blood-draw provision in this case did not violate the Fourth Amendment despite the
Supreme Court’s ruling in McNeely.
Before we could resolve the petition filed by the SPA, we issued an opinion in
another case, State v. Villarreal, No. PD-0306-14, 2014 WL 6734178 (Tex. Crim. App.
Nov. 26, 2014), in which we resolved the same issue against the State. Although we
subsequently granted rehearing in Villarreal, we later concluded that the State’s motion
was improvidently granted and denied the State’s motion for rehearing. Therefore, in light
of our decision in Villarreal and the reasoning therein, we overrule the State’s single
ground for review and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Reeder–3
Hervey, J.
Delivered: January 27, 2016
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