Martinez, Roger Anthony ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
NO. PD-0324-17
THE STATE OF TEXAS
v.
ROGER ANTHONY MARTINEZ, Appellant
ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
FROM THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
VICTORIA COUNTY
N EWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion in which K ELLER, P.J.,
H ERVEY and R ICHARDSON, JJ., joined.
We initially remanded this case to the trial court because the trial
court did not make factual determinations regarding the dispositive
issues.1 A plurality of the Court also signaled to the trial court that it
1
State v. Martinez, No. PD-1337-15, 2016 W L 7234085, at *7 (Tex. Crim . App. Dec.
14, 2016) (plurality op.) (not designated for publication).
Martinez Concurring – 2
could infer probable cause based upon circumstantial evidence.2 Yet, in
its new findings, the trial court refused to make those inferences. Now,
instead of deferring to the findings we remanded for, we reverse under
the doctrine of collective knowledge. I agree with the holding, and join
the Court’s opinion. I write separately to question why we remanded in
the first place.
When the Court originally remanded this case, I thought it was
inappropriate for the plurality to address the issue of whether probable
cause could be based upon the circumstantial evidence before we had
obtained dispositive findings.3 Now it is clear that addressing the issue
was wrong because it was unnecessary.4 It is equally clear that our
precedent requiring a remand for “necessary” findings provides an
incentive for reviewing courts to micro-manage trial courts rather than
defer to their findings.5 The requirement that trial courts enter findings
2
Id. at *8 n.13.
3
Id. at *8 (Newell, J., concurring).
4
Rather than determ ine whether the arresting officer was aware of circum stantial
evidence supporting a determ ination of intoxication, the Court’s opinion m akes clear that it
doesn’t m atter what the arresting officer was aware of. The collective knowledge of all the
officers involved provided specific facts supporting probable cause to believe that Appellant
was intoxicated. Rather than virtue-signal to the trial court how we wanted it to analyze the
case on rem and, we should have viewed the evidence in a light m ost favorable to the trial
court’s ruling and held in the first instance that there was probable cause to arrest based
upon the collective knowledge of all the officers involved.
5
Id. at *9 (Newell, J., concurring).
Martinez Concurring – 3
and conclusions upon request is self-inflicted.6 So is the requirement that
a reviewing court remand to the trial court for new findings when the
reviewing court determines the existing findings are inadequate.7 This
case is a good example of the trouble that our chosen approach can
cause.
We should reconsider our holding in State v. Elias. 8 Instead of
remanding when a reviewing court determines that existing findings are
inadequate, we should remand for “essential” findings only if there was
some objection in the trial court regarding the inadequacy of the existing
findings. If there wasn’t, we should fall back on our standard in State v.
Ross and simply view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling.9 We already do that when the parties fail to request
findings altogether.10 I see no reason we shouldn’t do so when they fail
6
State v. Cullen, 195 S.W .3d 696, 699 (Tex. Crim . App. 2006).
7
State v. Elias, 339 S.W .3d 667, 676 (Tex. Crim . App. 2011) (holding that the
court of appeals was required to rem and to the trial court for additional, specific findings of
fact to address a dispositive issue not addressed in the existing findings).
8
Id.
9
See State v. Ross, 32 S.W .3d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim . App. 2000).
10
Cullen, 195 S.W .3d at 699 (noting that the standard set out in State v.
Ross controls when the non-prevailing party fails to m ake a request of findings and
conclusions).
Martinez Concurring – 4
to draw the trial court’s attention to problems with the findings it enters.11
With these thoughts, I join the Court’s opinion.
Filed: January 9, 2019
Publish
11
See Elias, 339 S.W.3d at 680 (Keller, P.J., concurring) (“There is nothing unfair or
unusual about requiring a party to object in a tim ely m anner to what it finds
objectionable.”).