William H. Scurlock v. John M. Hubbard ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                                ACCEPTED
    06-15-00014-CV
    SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS
    TEXARKANA, TEXAS
    4/6/2015 4:47:26 PM
    DEBBIE AUTREY
    CLERK
    CAUSE NO. 06-15-00014-CV
    __________________________________________________________________
    FILED IN
    6th COURT OF APPEALS
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS           TEXARKANA, TEXAS
    FOR THE SIXTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS, TEXARKANA        4/6/2015DIVISION
    4:47:26 PM
    __________________________________________________________________
    DEBBIE  AUTREY
    Clerk
    WILLIAM H. SCURLOCK            §
    §
    v.                             §
    §
    JOHN M. HUBBARD                §
    __________________________________________________________________
    APPELLANT’S RESPONSE TO
    APPELLEE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
    __________________________________________________________________
    ON APPEAL FROM THE 102nd JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
    CAUSE NO. 14C1653-102
    __________________________________________________________________
    Cory J. Floyd
    Texas Bar No. 24049365
    Cammy R. Kennedy
    Texas Bar No. 24079245
    NORTON & WOOD, L.L.P.
    315 Main Street
    Texarkana, Texas 75501
    Phone: (903) 823-1321
    FAX: (903) 823-1325
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT,
    WILLIAM H. SCURLOCK
    APPELLANT’S RESPONSE TO APPELLEE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
    Appellant asks the Court to deny appellee’s motion to dismiss the
    appeal, and to take and consider this motion with the case because the
    motion to dismiss requires an inquiry into, and involves the merits of
    the appeal. 1
    I. INTRODUCTION
    1.           Appellant is William H. Scurlock; Appellee is John Hubbard.
    2.           On February 20, 2015 Appellant brought this appeal of the trial
    court's Order For Issuance of Temporary Injunction and Appointment of
    Receiver which was signed on February 3, 2015 taking effect
    immediately. See generally [CR 67-73].
    3.           Appellee is unable to obtain the bonds required by the trial court
    as a term of the temporary injunction, and Appellee now asserts that
    his inability to obtain these bonds shelters the trial court's order from
    review.
    4.           Since February 3, 2015, receiver Randy Moore has managed Pecan
    Point Brewing Company, to the exclusion of Appellant, William H.
    Scurlock. See Affidavit of William H. Scurlock (attached hereto as
    1	Appellee's         Motion to Dismiss Fails to Comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 10.1(a)(5).
    1
    Exhibit “A”); and Email Dated Tuesday, February 3, 2015 from receiver
    Randy Moore to Counsel for Appellant (attached hereto as Exhibit
    “B”)(Exhibits “A” and “B” are hereby incorporated by reference as if set
    out in its entirety).
    II.     ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
    5.    Although the Court has the authority under Texas Rule of
    Appellate Procedure 42.3(a) to dismiss an appeal for lack of jurisdiction,
    this is not a case in which the Court should do so.
    The    Order     For     Issuance    of       Temporary       Injunction    and
    Appointment of Receiver is Appealable.
    6.    Section 51.014 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code expressly
    authorizes an appeal from certain interlocutory orders of the trial court,
    including orders appointing a receiver and orders granting or refusing a
    temporary injunction. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §51.014(a)(1) (West
    2011); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §51.014(a)(4) (West 2011).
    7.    The    Order      For   Issuance       of   Temporary    Injunction   and
    Appointment of Receiver clearly appointed a receiver and granted a
    temporary injunction. See generally [CR 67-73].
    2
    The Appeal was Timely Perfected.
    8.    The Court should deny appellee’s motion to dismiss this appeal for
    lack of jurisdiction because appellant timely perfected his appeal. Tex.
    R. App. P. 28.1 (stating appeals from interlocutory orders, when allowed
    by statute, are accelerated and are perfected by filing a notice of appeal
    “within the time allowed by Rule 26.1(b).” The time allowed by Rule
    26.1(b) is twenty days after the order is signed. Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(b).
    9.    On February 3, 2015, the trial court signed its Order For Issuance
    of Temporary Injunction and Appointment of Receiver. [CR 67-73].
    10.   On February 20, 2015, seventeen days later and clearly within the
    twenty day time period prescribed by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure
    26.1, Scurlock filed his Notice of Appeal, therefore perfecting an appeal
    to this Court of the Order For Issuance of Temporary Injunction and
    Appointment of Receiver. [CR 80].
    11.   On March 4, 2015, the Court of Appeals issued a letter notifying
    Scurlock that his appellate brief was due on or before March 24, 2015.
    On March 19, 2015 Scurlock filed his Appellants Brief, clearly prior to
    the Court's deadline. Brief of Appellant, William H. Scurlock v. John
    M. Hubbard, No. 14C-1653-102, appeal docketed, 06-15-00014-CV
    3
    (March 19, 2015). Because Appellant timely perfected his appeal, and
    timely filed his brief, the Court should deny the motion to dismiss.
    Appellant's Right to Appeal the Temporary Injunction Arises on
    the Date the Order is Signed.
    12.   In re Robinson Family Entities explicitly provides that when the
    trial court’s order restrains motion and enforces action, similar to the
    order in this case, the order functions as a temporary injunction, which
    grants the appeals court jurisdiction over the appeal. In re Robinson
    Family Entities, 11-12-00258-CV, 
    2014 WL 4347838
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—
    Eastland Aug. 29, 2014, no pet.)(not designated for publication).
    13.   It is well established that a party loses its right to complain about
    the validity of an injunction if appeal is not perfected within the proper
    time limits after the grant of the injunction. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
    Code Ann. § 51.014(4) (Vernon Supp.1990); Bayoud v. Bayoud, 
    797 S.W.2d 304
    , 312 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990), writ denied (Jan. 30, 1991).
    14.   The proper time to perfect an appeal for the grant of a temporary
    injunction is twenty days from the date the order is signed. Tex. R.
    App. P. 26.1(b) (emphasis added).
    15.   Appellee argues, in his motion to dismiss:
    4
    "Because the required bonds have not been paid, the
    temporary injunction that is the subject of Scurlock's
    interlocutory appeal has not been issued and is not
    effective." Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss, at 4, William
    H. Scurlock v. John M. Hubbard, No. 14C-1653-102,
    appeal docketed, 06-15-00014-CV (March 19, 2015).
    He continues:
    "Because the temporary injunction that is the subject
    of Scurlock's interlocutory appeal is not in effect,
    Scurlock's    interlocutory    appeal     regarding      the
    temporary injunction is premature and must be
    dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of this Court." 
    Id. 16. Appellee
    cites no authority, statutory or common law, in support
    of the proposition that Appellant's timeline for appeal of the grant of a
    temporary injunction, runs from the date of the clerk's issuance of the
    writ of injunction.
    17.   Appellant brought this appeal timely from the date of the signing
    of the order, in compliance with the Civil Practice and Remedies Code
    and the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, calculating all deadlines in
    5
    accordance with those rules, clearly vesting this Court with jurisdiction
    over this matter.    For this reason, the motion to dismiss should be
    denied.
    Denying Review of the Temporary Injunction Would Deprive
    Appellant of any Procedural Mechanism to Appeal.
    18.   Appellee argues that review of the temporary injunction is
    premature, until such time as he elects to, or is able to post the
    requisite bonds. 
    Id. Appellee's argument,
    if it succeeds, allows him to
    shelve the order granting temporary injunction, and shield it from
    review until he elects to enforce it, all the while receiving the benefit of
    the same through the receivership which is in place and effectuating the
    purpose of the injunction.
    19.   If Appellant's deadline runs twenty days from the date the order is
    signed (Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1), but Appellant is not
    allowed to appeal the order, until such time as the Appellee attempts to
    enforce the order (Appellee's unsupported theory), Appellant is deprived
    of a procedural mechanism for review.          Again, this proposition is
    unsupported by statute, rule or case law, and is contrary to Texas Rule
    of Appellate Procedure 26.1.
    6
    20.   If there is no procedural mechanism for a party to be exonerated
    on appeal, and the collateral consequences of the lack of review are
    harsh, the court may decide an issue. See Gen. Land Office of State of
    Tex. v. OXY U.S.A., Inc., 
    789 S.W.2d 569
    , 571 (Tex. 1990); State v.
    Lodge, 
    608 S.W.2d 910
    , 911 (Tex. 1980).
    Even Assuming the Appeal of the Temporary Injunction is
    Premature, the Receivership is Appealable.
    21.   Hubbard’s motion entirely avoids Scurlock’s appeal of the
    receivership. Accordingly, his Motion to Dismiss must be interpreted to
    seek only the partial dismissal of portions of the order establishing the
    temporary injunction.
    22.   The trial court's order dated February 3, 2015, ordered Scurlock to
    "turn over management of Pecan Point Brewing Company to the
    Receiver as of February 3, 2015 at 3:00 p.m."        [CR 69].    This is
    immediate and appealable error because, instead of conditioning this
    improper jaunt into receivership on the posting of the Applicant’s bond,
    as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 695a, the receivership was
    set to take effect at a certain time and place, specifically, February 3,
    2015, at 3:00 p.m., regardless of whether any of the required bonds were
    7
    in place. Tex. R. Civ. P. 695a. This issue is explained in detail in
    Appellant's brief which is incorporated herein by reference, as if set out
    in its entirety.
    23.   Because the grant of the receivership was timely appealed, the
    Court should deny appellee’s motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of
    jurisdiction.
    Appellee's Motion to Dismiss Concedes Issue Two of Appellant's
    Brief
    24.   The trial court failed to require the necessary bonds for a
    receivership prior to entering its order establishing a receivership, and
    accordingly the Court should grant Appellant the relief sought under
    issue two of Appellant’s appeal brief.
    25.   Appellee's motion to dismiss states that one bond was ordered for
    the receiver, and two were ordered pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil
    Procedure 684 (injunction bonds). Tex. R. Civ. P. 684.
    26.   In order for a receivership to be effective, there must be two bonds
    posted. First, the applicant must post a bond payable to the defendant,
    in an amount fixed by the court sufficient to cover all probable damages
    and costs, “conditioned for the payment of all damages and costs in such
    8
    suit, in case it should be decided that such receiver was wrongfully
    appointed to take charge of such property.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 695a.
    Second, the receiver must post a bond approved by the appointing court,
    in an amount fixed by the court and conditioned on the faithful
    discharge of his duties as receiver. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
    §64.023 (Vernon 1985).
    27.   Because appellee concedes issue two of Appellant's Brief, the
    motion to dismiss should be denied, and the Court should contemplate
    Appellee's concessions in the motion to dismiss, as argument, authority
    and evidence in support of Appellant's appeal of the Order For Issuance
    of Temporary Injunction and Appointment of Receiver.
    III. PRAYER
    WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant asks this
    honorable Court to take this motion with the case because the motion to
    dismiss requires an inquiry into, and involves the merits of the appeal.
    Appellant further asks the Court to deny appellee's motion and
    continue with this appeal. Appellant asks this Court to vacate the trial
    court's Order for Issuance of Temporary Injunction and Appointment of
    Receiver, reverse the trial court's judgment, render judgment denying
    9
    the application for receivership and the application for injunction, and
    award to Appellant, William Scurlock, all costs incurred with the filing
    of this appeal and Response to Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss.
    Respectfully submitted:
    /s/ Cory J. Floyd
    Cory J. Floyd
    Texas Bar No. 24072348
    Cammy R. Kennedy
    Texas Bar No. 24079245
    NORTON & WOOD, L.L.P.
    315 Main Street
    Texarkana, Texas 75501
    Phone: (903) 823-1321
    FAX: (903) 823-1325
    Email: cory@nortonandwood.com
    Email: cammy@nortonandwood.com
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT,
    WILLIAM H. SCURLOCK
    10
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I HEREBY CERTIFY that on April 6, 2015, a true and correct
    copy of the Appellant’s Brief was forwarded to the counsel below:
    Brent M. Langdon
    Kyle B. Davis
    Langdon & Davis
    625 Sam Houston Drive, Suite A
    New Boston, Texas 75570
    Phone: (903) 628-5571
    Fax: (903) 628-5868
    Email: blangdon@ldatty.com
    Email: kdavis@ldatty.com
    11
    AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM H. SCURLOCK
    STATE OF TEXAS                §
    §
    COUNTY OF BOWIE               §
    BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally
    appeared vVilliam H. Scurlock, who under oath stated as follows:
    1.    l\1y name is William H. Scurlock. I am over eighteen (18)
    years of age and am legally competent to make this Affidavit, which is
    true and correct, is based on my personal knowledge, and is made
    voluntarily and not under duress. The information contained herein is
    true and correct.
    2.    On Tuesday, February 3, 2015 Randy Moore, acting as a
    court appointed receiver, assumed control of Pecan Point Brewing
    Company, Inc.
    3.    l\1y only access to, and rights in, Pecan Point Brewing
    Company, Inc. are based on his consent.
    ~$;~
    WILLIAM H. SCURLOCK
    EXHIBIT
    ````````-'
    Affidavit ofW"illiam H. Scurlock
    A
    William H. Scurlock v. John M. Hubbard, No. 14C-1653-102,
    appeal docketed, 06-15-00014-CV (March 19, 2015).                  Page 1
    SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME on this                Ji!!!   day
    of April, 2015, to certify which witness my hand and official seal.
    Affidavit of~Tilliam H. Scurlock
    William H. Scurlock v. John M. Hubbard, No. 14C-1653-102,
    appeal docketed, 06-15-00014-CV (March 19, 2015).                     Page2
    Cory Floyd
    From:                                      rmtexarkana@aol.com
    Sent:                                      Tuesday, February 03, 2015 7:42 PM
    To:                                        Cory Floyd
    Subject:                                   Re:
    Mr. Floyd, Thanks for sending the signed order. On Monday, Feb 2, 2105, I met with Bill and Linda at PPB. I did a
    general walk thru. Today Tuesday Feb 3rd, I met with the Scurlock's, GM Jason Williams and Becky Williams during their
    "staff management meeting". I briefly met the exec chef Justin. I now have a better understanding of the operations at
    PPB.
    I have completed my initial assessment of PPB. I have no immediate concerns. I will review the accounts payable and
    payroll process. I'm considering changes in the accounts payable and payroll process.
    Linda Scurlock was very helpful. I will continue working with her. I've asked her to work Monday thru Friday 1 PM until 7
    PM. She will perform the same general duties with my over site.
    William Scurlock,( per the order) is restrained from PPB, without my consent or request for help.
    Mr. Scurlock has good knowledge of the PPB physical plant. As repairs, modifications and improvements are needed,
    I've instructed Mr. Scurlock to notify me via text or telephone before completing these jobs. I will allow Mr. Scurlock to
    continue working with Jan Orr in brewing operations. This includes revisions currently in process and restarting the
    brewing process. I must be present during the time Mrs. Orr is doing her work.
    I understand our need to notify TACB and the insurer of my appointment as receiver. I will prepare documents to be
    presented to Judge Carlow for his approval. I request we send the order signed by Judge Lockhart along with the
    approval from Judge Carlow in the same correspondence to TACB and the insurer. I hope you are agreeable.
    I have applied for the $10K bond. Should have approval shortly.
    Thanks again, Randy Moore
    ---Original Message--
    From: Cory Floyd 
    To: rmtexarkana 
    Cc: Candace Carathers 
    Sent: Tue, Feb 3, 2015 5:11 pm
    Mr. Moore,
    The attached order was signed today.
    Please confirm in writing, again, that you wish for Mr. Scurlock to continue as stated in your email dated Monday,
    February 2, 2015.
    I'm forwarding the order to the insurer, as well as the TABC. I'll copy you on my correspondence, for your file, when I
    send it. If you wish to discuss my actions before I send these, please let me know.
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    Cory J. Floyd
    315 Main Street• Texarkana, Texas 75501-5604
    Telephone: 903.823.1321 •Facsimile: 903.823.1325
    Web: www.nortonandwood.com                                      EXHIBIT
    1                                     I
    2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-15-00014-CV

Filed Date: 4/6/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/28/2016