Burch, Benjamin Knighten ( 2013 )


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  •              IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    OF TEXAS
    NO. PD-0943-12
    BENJAMIN KNIGHTEN BURCH, Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS
    ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
    FROM THE FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS
    DALLAS COUNTY
    K EASLER, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which K ELLER, P.J., and H ERVEY,
    J., joined.
    OPINION
    For the two reasons described below, I join only the Court’s judgment.
    First, the majority misinterprets the State’s argument by characterizing its claims that
    Bullcoming v. New Mexico1 is distinguishable from the present case solely because the
    testifying    witness,    Monica     Lopez—Jennifer     Pinkard’s    (the   testing   analyst)
    1
    
    131 S. Ct. 2705
    (2011).
    BURCH—2
    supervisor—signed the drug analysis report. This was only a small piece of the State’s
    argument. The main thrust of the State’s argument is that in Bullcoming the testifying
    witness “neither observed nor reviewed [the testing analyst’s] analysis,” but in this case, the
    witness did “review” the testing analyst’s analysis.2 In Bullcoming, a state laboratory analyst
    testified about the testing performed by another analyst in the same lab. Despite being
    familiar with the laboratory’s testing procedures, the witness neither participated in nor
    observed the test on Bullcoming’s blood sample, and the lab report was admitted as a
    business record.3 As a result, the Supreme Court concluded Bullcoming’s confrontation
    rights were violated.
    The State highlights Lopez’s testimony to support its claim that Lopez’s connection
    with the drug testing was greater than the testifying witness in Bullcoming. After Pinkard
    performed the testing, Lopez reviewed the report to ensure that the lab’s policies and
    procedures were followed. She further stated that she “double checked everything that was
    done” and signed the report as the “reviewer.” The State asserts in its brief, “As a signer,
    [Lopez] certified the results and correctness of the content of the report.” 4 While Lopez’s
    testimony may not be ideally descriptive about what exactly double-checking another
    analyst’s work entails, the fact that she performed some level of review illustrates the factual
    2
    State’s Brief on the Merits at 15 (citing 
    id. at 2712).
           3
    
    Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2709-10
    , 2712.
    4
    State’s Brief on the Merits at 21.
    BURCH—3
    differences between the present case and Bullcoming. The State acknowledges that Lopez
    did not stand over Pinkard’s shoulder and observe her performing the test. But as the State
    asserts, Bullcoming does not necessarily require this. It appears to leave room within the
    contours of the Confrontation Clause for a “reviewer” to testify in the testing analyst’s stead.5
    The majority gives the State’s argument short shrift.
    Second, the majority’s response to the State’s argument that the admitted report’s lack
    of formality or solemnity rendered it non-testimonial is a gratuitous, ad hominem attack on
    the State. Rebuffing the State’s argument, the majority quotes Justice Thomas’s concurring
    opinion in Williams v. Illinois6 —the authority the State relied upon in advancing its argument
    that the lab report was non-testimonial—in which he stated “the Confrontation Clause
    reaches bad-faith attempts to evade the formalized process.”7 The majority continues: “That
    is precisely our case. The State can not avoid a straightforward application of Bullcoming
    by adding the signature of a reviewer with no personal knowledge and omitting more
    formalized language.”8 A plain reading of these passages suggests that the Court believes
    that the State has somehow influenced the lab’s procedures in a bad-faith attempt to skirt the
    Confrontation Clause’s requirements. No basis is given for this serious accusation. This is
    5
    See 
    Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2709
    , 2715-16. See also 
    id. at 2722
    (Sotomayor,
    J., concurring).
    
    6 Will. v
    . Illinois, 
    132 S. Ct. 2221
    , 2255 (Thomas, J., concurring).
    7
    
    Id. at 2261.
           8
    Ante, op. at 9-10.
    BURCH—4
    wholly unsupported, and as such, has no place in an opinion from this Court. I certainly will
    not affix my name to an opinion containing such a statement.
    DATE DELIVERED: June 26, 2013
    PUBLISH
    

Document Info

Docket Number: PD-0943-12

Filed Date: 6/26/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/16/2015