Spell, Burton Leon , 2013 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 435 ( 2013 )


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  •            IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    OF TEXAS
    NO. AP-76,962
    BURTON LEON SPELL, Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS
    ON APPEAL FROM DENIAL OF BAIL
    CAUSE NO. 32809 IN THE 1ST DISTRICT COURT
    FROM JASPER COUNTY
    Per curiam.
    OPINION
    This is an appeal from an order denying bail under Article 1, § 11a, of the Texas
    Constitution.1 On January 6, 2013, while free on bail for several offenses, Appellant was
    arrested and jailed for a new offense of burglary of a habitation. On January 8, 2013,
    1
    Article 1, §11a, provides in part:
    Any person . . . accused of a felony less than capital in this State, committed
    while on bail for a prior felony for which he has been indicted, . . .and upon
    evidence substantially showing the guilt of the accused of the offense . . .
    committed while on bail . . . may be denied bail pending trial, by a district
    judge in this State, if said order denying bail pending trial is issued within
    seven calendar days subsequent to the time of incarceration of the accused.
    Ex parte Spell - page 2
    after a hearing on the State’s motion, the trial court denied bail under Article 1, § 11a,
    because Appellant is alleged to have committed a felony (burglary of a habitation) while
    released on bail for a prior felony for which he had been indicted. Appellant appealed,
    contending that the State failed to present evidence “substantially showing” his guilt for
    the burglary of a habitation. He argues that the evidence shows, at most, evidence of a
    criminal trespass.
    At the hearing to deny bail, the State called Deputy William Land to testify about
    the burglary. Land stated that he met and spoke with the owners of a mobile home who
    told him someone had broken into the home and removed copper wiring from the ceiling
    fans. The owners did not live in the home, and told Land they did not know if any other
    property was missing, but they could tell someone had been staying there without
    permission. Land also spoke with people who lived next door to the mobile home. They
    told him Appellant and his girlfriend had been staying at that home the week prior to the
    deputy being there.
    Under Art. 1, § 11a, the State has the burden to present evidence “substantially
    showing” Appellant’s guilt of the burglary. This showing is “far less” than proof beyond
    a reasonable doubt as is necessary at a trial on the merits. Lee v. State, 
    683 S.W.2d 8
    , 9
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1985); Ex parte Moore, 
    594 S.W.2d 449
    , 452 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980).
    But that burden must be considered in light of the general rule that favors the allowance
    of bail.
    In the instant case the evidence does not substantially show Appellant’s guilt of
    burglary of a habitation. Appellant had been staying in the home without permission
    about a week before Deputy Land went out there. But the owners of the home did not
    live in the home and no evidence was presented to show when they had last checked the
    home. There was no showing how long the home had been uninhabited so as to provide a
    time frame in which the theft of the copper wire could be determined. Other than
    Ex parte Spell - page 3
    Appellant’s presence in the home for a week, no evidence connected him to the theft of
    copper wire. See 
    Lee, 683 S.W.2d at 9
    . Given the absence of evidence concerning the
    timing of the theft in the uninhabited home, Appellant’s presence in the home, without
    more, does not substantially show his guilt of burglary. Accordingly, the trial court’s
    order denying bail is set aside and the case is remanded to the trial court to set a
    reasonable bail. No motion for rehearing will be entertained.
    Delivered March 4, 2013
    Publish
    

Document Info

Docket Number: AP-76,962

Citation Numbers: 407 S.W.3d 264, 2013 WL 789222, 2013 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 435

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 3/4/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/14/2024