Apland, Dustin Michael ( 2014 )


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  •               IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    OF TEXAS
    NO. WR-82,070-01
    EX PARTE DUSTIN MICHAEL APLAND, Applicant
    ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
    CAUSE NO. 42,377-B-H-1 IN THE 124TH DISTRICT COURT
    FROM GREGG COUNTY
    Per curiam. KEASLER , J., filed a dissenting opinion in which KELLER , P.J., and HERVEY ,
    J., joined.
    OPINION
    Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the
    clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte
    Young, 
    418 S.W.2d 824
    , 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of unauthorized use
    of a motor vehicle. He waived appeal.
    The trial court sentenced Applicant to seven years in prison for this Gregg County UUMV
    conviction. The trial court cumulated (i.e., “stacked”) the seven-year sentence with a sentence that
    was yet to be imposed in Upsher County in a different UUMV prosecution. See TEX . CODE CRIM .
    PROC. art. 42.08(a). Applicant was later sentenced to one year in the State Jail for that Upsher County
    case, and Texas prison officials are cumulating the two sentences. Applicant complains that such
    -2-
    cumulation is not authorized by the Code of Criminal Procedure, however, “because a sentence
    cannot be cumulated to a sentence to be imposed in a future case.” The State agrees, writing in its
    answer as follows:
    The State concedes that the order for consecutive sentences in this case was wrong.
    Article 42.08 (a) states, “[I]n the discretion of the court, the judgment in the second
    and subsequent convictions may either be” run consecutively or concurrently.
    [Emphasis in original.] Because [Applicant] had yet to be convicted in Upshur
    County at the time of this [Gregg County conviction], the Upshur County cases could
    not form the basis of the order for this case to run consecutively to the Upshur
    County case.
    The trial court recommends granting relief by reforming the judgment to eliminate the order
    requiring consecutive sentences.
    The State’s concession and the trial court’s recommendation are supported by the habeas
    record and applicable law. See TEX . CODE CRIM . PROC. art. 42.08(a); see also Licon v. State, No. 13-
    11-00651-CR (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Jul. 12, 2012); Davis v. State, Nos. 09-11-00173-CR and
    09-11-00174-CR (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 5, 2011); Bollman v. State, 02-08-00061-CR (Tex.
    App.—Fort Worth Jan. 22, 2009). Relief is granted. This Court holds that the judgment in Cause
    No. 42,377-B in the 124th District Court of Gregg County is reformed by eliminating the trial court’s
    order requiring consecutive sentences.
    Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Correctional
    Institutions Division and Pardons and Paroles Division.
    Delivered: December 10, 2014
    Do not publish
    

Document Info

Docket Number: WR-82,070-01

Filed Date: 12/10/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/16/2015