Chase, Ryan Francis ( 2014 )


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  •             IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    OF TEXAS
    NO. PD-1768-13
    RYAN FRANCIS CHASE, Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS
    ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
    FROM THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
    BELL COUNTY
    M EYERS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
    DISSENTING OPINION
    I disagree with the majority that T EX. H EALTH & S AFETY C ODE § 822.013(a) provides
    a defense to criminal prosecution. The goal of this statute was to protect farmers and ranchers
    against the loss of their livelihood by allowing them to protect their livestock from attacking
    dogs without fear of liability to the dog’s owner. House Research Organization, Bill
    Analysis, Tex. H.B. 151, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003). This was never intended to allow
    individuals in residential neighborhoods to murder a neighbor’s dog after an attack with
    Chase dissent - Page 2
    criminal impunity. If we allow this to be used as a criminal defense, what are its limits? Can
    an individual murder a dog for a single bite, or does it take multiple bites to constitute an
    “attack”? Is it still a valid defense if there was no actual harm done to the individual’s pet?
    If an individual is able to get his pet away from the attacking dog, as in this case, how long
    can he wait before going back to murder the attacking dog and still employ this defense? Can
    the individual trespass on the attacking dog owner’s property to carry out the murder of the
    dog? What if the attacking dog’s owner is present and chooses to physically defend his dog
    from the individual? Must the murder be humane or can any technique be used? These
    questions illustrate that the provision is too broad to be applied as a criminal defense, and
    permitting it to be used as such will enable defendants to escape conviction for the
    unjustified murders of dogs.
    Allowing for this defense encourages individuals to take (what they perceive as)
    justice into their own hands. I do not believe this provision was ever intended to be a defense
    to criminal liability and I disagree with the determination that it is such a defense. I would
    reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and therefore, I respectfully dissent.
    Meyers, J.
    Filed: November 19, 2014
    Publish
    

Document Info

Docket Number: PD-1768-13

Filed Date: 11/19/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/16/2015