McDonald, Richard ( 2016 )


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  •         IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    OF TEXAS
    NO. WR-82,533-03
    EX PARTE RICHARD McDONALD, Applicant
    ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
    CAUSE NO. 12F0409-005A IN THE 5TH DISTRICT COURT
    BOWIE COUNTY
    R ICHARDSON, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in
    which J OHNSON AND A LCALA, JJ., joined.
    CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
    I agree with the Court’s decision to grant Applicant relief. However, instead of
    remanding Applicant to the custody of the Sheriff of Bowie County to answer the allegations
    in the motion to proceed to adjudication, I would remand Applicant to the custody of the
    Sheriff of Bowie County to answer to the information charging Applicant with forgery.
    Therefore, respectfully, I concur in part and dissent in part.
    On or about June 18, 2012, Applicant pled guilty pursuant “a package deal” to the
    offenses of forgery and assault. He received ten years deferred adjudication community
    supervision in both cases. Nine months later, the trial court held a hearing on the State’s
    McDonald Concurring and Dissenting Opinion — 2
    motion to revoke community supervision and adjudicate.            Applicant pled true to the
    violations and was convicted and sentenced to ten years for forgery and twelve years for
    assault.
    Applicant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus on the assault case, asserting
    that his original plea to assault with serious bodily injury was involuntary because a critical
    term of the plea agreement, that he be convicted of a crime that does not exist under Texas
    law, is impossible to perform. This Court granted relief and remanded Applicant to the
    custody of the Sheriff of Bowie County to answer the charges as set out in the indictment in
    that case. Ex Parte Richard McDonald, No. WR-82,533-01, 
    2015 WL 1407315
    *1 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2015).
    Applicant has now filed this application for writ of habeas corpus in the forgery case,
    asserting that his plea was involuntary because it was part of the same plea agreement.
    Today, this Court grants relief, but remands Applicant to the custody of the Sheriff of Bowie
    County to answer the allegations in the motion to proceed to adjudication. I concur in the
    decision to grant relief, but I think Applicant should be returned to answer to the original
    charge of forgery.
    Applicant’s allegations of involuntariness refer not only to his plea at the adjudication
    proceedings, but also to his original plea agreement. In Ground Four, Applicant claims that
    “[t]he assault was always used to outweigh or overshadow the forgery . . . When I agreed to
    McDonald Concurring and Dissenting Opinion — 3
    probation it was as if all terms and conditions were set for the assault and the forgery was just
    to ‘run-concurrent.’” In Ground Five, Applicant asserts that “[t]he original agreement of one
    ten year term of probation for assault and forgery was all one ‘plea bargain.’ The guilty plea
    for the assault was found to be involuntary so does that not violate the terms of the ‘plea-
    bargain’ which also included the forgery? . . . The assault was always used to influence the
    plea bargain. Without it, everything would have been different.”
    If the prosecution does not live up to its part of the plea bargain and such bargain was
    used as an inducement for the guilty plea, doubt is raised as to whether a guilty plea under
    such circumstance is truly voluntary. Ex parte Austin, 
    746 S.W.2d 226
    , 227 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1988). The original plea bargain was a “package deal” that included both this forgery
    case and the assault case. Ex parte Cox, 
    482 S.W.3d 112
    , 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
    Applicant was granted relief in the assault case and was returned to answer to that charge.
    Because part of the plea bargain was not able to be fulfilled, the entire original plea bargain,
    which included the forgery case, is unenforceable. 
    Id. Thus, the
    parties should be returned
    to their original positions. 
    Id. Instead of
    returning Applicant to the point where he must
    answer to the motion to adjudicate, I would return him to the point where he must answer to
    the charge of forgery.
    FILED:        June 22, 2016
    PUBLISH
    

Document Info

Docket Number: NO. WR-82,533-03

Judges: Richardson, Johnson, Alcala

Filed Date: 6/22/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/14/2024