Metcalf, Lydia ( 2020 )


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  •              IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    OF TEXAS
    NO. PD-1246-18
    LYDIA METCALF, Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS
    ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
    FROM THE SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS
    PANOLA COUNTY
    K EEL, J., filed a concurring opinion.
    CONCURRING OPINION
    I concur in the majority’s judgment; the evidence was legally insufficient to
    convict Appellant as a party to her husband’s sexual assault of her daughter. Viewed in
    the light most favorable to the conviction, the evidence would not have authorized a
    rational jury to find that Appellant acted with the intent to promote or assist the
    commission of an offense against her daughter. See T EX. P ENAL C ODE § 7.02(a). But I
    disagree with the majority’s suggestion that the State had to prove that Appellant intended
    Metcalf concurrence–Page 2
    to promote or assist the specific offense committed by her husband. The State did not
    bear that burden because of the law of transferred intent.
    A person is criminally responsible for causing a result if the only difference
    between what happened and what she desired, contemplated, or risked is that a different
    offense was committed. T EX. P ENAL C ODE § 6.04(b)(1). Thus, if a defendant intends to
    promote or assist the commission of one crime, but her co-defendant commits a different
    crime, that difference does not shield her from party liability.
    So, in this case if the evidence had shown that Appellant acted with the intent to
    promote or assist her husband’s commission of one type of sexual assault, but he actually
    committed a different type of sexual assault, the difference between what she intended to
    promote or assist and what he actually did would not have shielded her from liability; she
    still would have been guilty of sexual assault, provided that the other elements of party
    liability were met. See T EX. P ENAL C ODE §§ 6.04(b)(1), 7.02(a).
    To the extent that the majority opinion suggests that Appellant had to act with the
    intent to promote or assist a particular sexual assault, I disagree. Consequently, I concur
    only in the majority’s judgment.
    Filed: April 1, 2020
    Publish
    

Document Info

Docket Number: PD-1246-18

Filed Date: 4/1/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/2/2020