GREEN, MAXIE D. D/B/A a TO Z BAIL BONDS v. the State of Texas ( 2023 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
NO. PD-0008-22
MAXIE D. GREEN D/B/A A TO Z BAIL BONDS, Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
FROM THE SECOND COURT OF APPEALS
WICHITA COUNTY
SLAUGHTER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which HERVEY,
RICHARDSON, NEWELL, KEEL, and MCCLURE, J.J., joined. YEARY, J., filed a
dissenting opinion. KELLER, P.J., dissented. WALKER, J., did not participate.
OPINION
This case involves the question of whether, for purposes of summary judgment in a
bond forfeiture case, providing conclusive proof that the name of the defendant on bond
was distinctly called at the door of the courtroom establishes the element that “[t]he name
of the defendant shall be called distinctly at the courthouse door[.]” TEX. CODE CRIM.
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PROC. ART. 22.02. We hold that it does. This holding is founded on well-established
precedent from this Court and the courts of appeals recognizing that calling the defendant’s
name at the courtroom door constitutes substantial compliance with the requirements of
Code of Criminal Procedure Article 22.02. 1 We therefore reverse the judgment of the court
0F
of appeals and remand this case to that court for further proceedings.
I. Background
In 2017, after Maria Delcarman Sosa-Esparza was indicted for a felony offense, she
entered into a bail bond agreement with Appellant Maxie D. Green, doing business as A to
Z Bail Bonds. Appellant paid a $25,000 bond so that Sosa-Esparza could be released from
the Wichita County Jail. A condition of the trial court in setting a bond amount was an
assurance that Sosa-Esparza would appear for all of her court settings. But, on March 1,
2019, Sosa-Esparza failed to appear for her pretrial conference.
The trial court then signed a judgment nisi that provisionally forfeited the $25,000
bond. The judgment nisi stated that Sosa-Esparza’s name was “distinctly called at the
courtroom door. The Defendant was given reasonable time to appear after her name was
called, but she did not appear.” The judgment nisi also provided that the judgment would
be made final unless good cause could be shown for why Sosa-Esparza failed to appear.
Appellant filed an answer denying the allegations contained in the judgment nisi. 2 1F
1
See, e.g., Deem v. State, 342 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961) (concluding that “substantial
compliance” is adequate to satisfy Article 22.02’s predecessor, Article 425, and upholding bond-
forfeiture judgment for the State where evidence was conflicting as to whether defendant’s name
was called at the courtroom or courthouse door).
2
Sosa-Esparza did not respond, and the trial court entered a default judgment against her. She is
not a party to the present appeal.
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The State moved for traditional summary judgment to finalize the bond forfeiture.
To prove that Sosa-Esparza’s name was called in compliance with Article 22.02, the State
attached three pieces of evidence: (1) a certified copy of the judgment nisi; (2) a
certification of call, stating that the defendant’s name was called “three times loudly and
distinctly in compliance with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 22.02;” 3 and (3) 2F
two unanswered requests for admission—Request No. 8 and Request No. 9—which asked
Appellant to admit or deny that the defendant’s name “was distinctly called outside the
Wichita County courtroom door for a scheduled hearing on the hearing date” and that she
“was given reasonable time and did not appear in Court for a scheduled hearing on the
hearing date.”
Appellant responded to the State’s motion for summary judgment. He argued that
the State’s evidence raised a genuine issue of material fact on an essential element of its
case, namely, whether Sosa-Esparza’s name was called at the courthouse door in
compliance with Article 22.02. On January 4, 2021, the trial court granted the State’s
motion for summary judgment, and it awarded the State $27,466.18 for the forfeited bond,
accrued interest, and other court costs and fees.
II. On Appeal
3
The certification of call was signed by the court’s administrator and stated in full:
On March 1, 2019, pursuant to the ORDER of the Court, I called the name of the
defendant Maria Sosa, in this case three times loudly and distinctly in compliance
with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 22.02. A reasonable time was given
after the calls were made for the defendant to appear, but the defendant did not
answer or appear and wholly made default.
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Appellant appealed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment for the State.
He argued, among other things, that because the judgment nisi stated that the defendant’s
name was called at the courtroom door, the State’s evidence failed to conclusively establish
that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether her name was properly
called at the courthouse door. 4 The court of appeals agreed and reversed the trial court’s
3F
grant of summary judgment. Green v. State, No. 02-21-00013-CV, 2021 WL 5747148, at
*1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 2, 2021) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
In reaching this decision, the court of appeals first determined that the certification
of call was incompetent summary judgment evidence because it was conclusory. Id. at *3
(reasoning that, while the certification of call “provides some factual basis to support how
[the defendant’s] name was called (‘three times, loudly and distinctly’), it fails to provide
any factual basis for where [her] name was called”). Specifically, by merely providing that
the call was made “in compliance with” Article 22.02, the certification of call stated a mere
legal conclusion and thus was “incompetent evidence to support summary judgment on the
fact issue of whether [the defendant’s] name was called at the courthouse door.” Id.
Therefore, the court of appeals proceeded to consider, based solely on the judgment
nisi and the deemed admissions, “whether the State established conclusively that Sosa’s
name was called at the courthouse door.” Id. In finding that such a showing had not been
4
Appellant additionally argued that there were genuine issues of material fact on two other
elements: (1) whether Appellant received proper notice of the pretrial hearing, and (2) whether the
defendant was properly identified. Because the court of appeals was persuaded by Appellant’s
argument regarding the calling of Sosa-Esparza’s name at the courthouse door, it did not address
the remaining points of error. Green, 2021 WL 5747148, at *1. We similarly do not address
Appellant’s other arguments in this opinion.
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made, the court reasoned that “[b]oth the judgment nisi and the deemed admissions provide
only that Sosa’s name was called at the courtroom door.” Id. The court of appeals
acknowledged that courts have “repeatedly held that calling a defendant’s name at the
courtroom door substantially complies with the directive to call the name at the courthouse
door[.]” Id. at *4 (citing Deem v. State, 342 S.W.2d 758, 758–59 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961);
Caldwell v. State, 126 S.W.2d 654, 654 (Tex. Crim. App. 1939); Aspilla v. State, 952
S.W.2d 610, 611–12 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.)). But it observed that
“these cases were almost exclusively decided at trial on the merits rather than at the
summary judgment stage.” Id. The court then reasoned that “the distinction between proof
at trial and proof at the summary judgment stage is important” here because “the
presumptions and burdens of proof at trial are ‘immaterial to the burden that a movant for
summary judgment must bear.’” Id. (quoting Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R.R. v. City of Dallas, 623
S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. 1981)). Specifically, the court observed that a summary judgment
movant “‘may not use a presumption to shift to the non[ ] movant the burden of raising a
fact issue of rebuttal.’” Id. (quoting Chavez v. Kan. City S. Ry., 520 S.W.3d 898, 900 (Tex.
2017)). Given this fact, the court determined that upholding the grant of summary judgment
here would improperly afford the State a “presumption of substantial compliance
regardless of any genuine issues of material fact that arise on the face of its own evidence.”
Id. at *5. Thus, because the summary judgment evidence “wholly fail[ed] to address
whether Sosa’s name was called at the courthouse door, and because [the court of appeals
was] precluded from inferring facts in the State’s favor, the summary judgment evidence
creates doubt about where Sosa’s name was called.” Id. at *4. Accordingly, the court of
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appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling granting summary judgment and remanded the case
for further proceedings. Id. at *5. 5
4F
We granted the State’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether the
court of appeals erred by holding that the State may not rely on evidence of substantial
compliance with Article 22.02, based on the calling of the defendant’s name at the
courtroom door, for purposes of showing entitlement to summary judgment in bond-
forfeiture proceedings.
III. Analysis
As the court of appeals recognized, courts have repeatedly held that calling the
defendant’s name at the courtroom door constitutes substantial compliance with Article
22.02’s requirement of distinctly calling the defendant’s name at the “courthouse door.”
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 22.02. But the court of appeals effectively concluded
that such a rule of substantial compliance cannot apply at the summary-judgment stage
because doing so would improperly afford the State a “presumption” of facts in its favor.
We disagree. Contrary to the court of appeals’ reasoning, a showing of substantial
compliance with the requirements of Article 22.02 based on the calling of the defendant’s
name at the courtroom door is based on actual facts, not any presumption of facts.
5
Justice Walker filed a concurring opinion elaborating further on the majority’s reasoning. Green,
2021 WL 5747148, at *5–6 (Walker, J., concurring) (“The State did not establish this element [that
the defendant’s name was called at the courthouse door] as a matter of law, and any inquiry into
substantial compliance would prematurely shift the summary-judgment burden away from the
State[.]”).
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Therefore, the rule of substantial compliance is applicable at the summary-judgment stage,
and the court of appeals erred in holding otherwise.
A. Bond Forfeiture Under Article 22.02 and “Substantial Compliance”
The relevant provisions in Article 22.02 governing bond forfeiture provide as
follows:
Bail bonds and personal bonds are forfeited in the following manner: The
name of the defendant shall be called distinctly at the courthouse door, and
if the defendant does not appear within a reasonable time after such call is
made, judgment shall be entered that the State of Texas recover of the
defendant the amount of money in which he is bound, and of his sureties, if
any, the amount of money in which they are respectively bound, which
judgment shall state that the same will be made final, unless good cause be
shown why the defendant did not appear.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 22.02 (emphasis added).
When moving for summary judgment on a bond forfeiture, the State must
conclusively prove: “(1) a valid bond; (2) that the defendant’s name was distinctly called
at the courthouse door; and (3) the defendant failed to appear within a reasonable time of
that call.” Alvarez v. State, 861 S.W.2d 878, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (op. on reh’g).
The burden then shifts to the respondent to show good cause as to why the defendant did
not appear. Id. Only the second element is at issue in this case, and we limit our analysis
accordingly.
As we have already noted, this Court’s decades-old precedent holds that calling the
name of the defendant at the courtroom door substantially complies with the requirements
of Article 22.02. For example, in the 1961 case of Deem v. State, after the trial court entered
final judgment for the State in a bond forfeiture proceeding, the sureties appealed on the
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basis that the evidence failed to show the defendant’s name was called distinctly at the
courthouse door before the forfeiture. 342 S.W.2d at 759. In resolving this issue, this Court
observed that the deputy clerk of the court “testified that the name of the principal was
called distinctly three times outside the court room door, but that he did not know if it was
called at the main door of the court house.” Id. The judgment nisi reflected, in potential
conflict with this testimony, that the defendant’s name was called at the courthouse door.
Id. Nevertheless, the Court did not find this potential conflict problematic, instead
concluding that these facts demonstrated “there was a substantial compliance with the
requirement that the name of the principal be called distinctly at the court house door[.]”
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Caldwell, 126 S.W.2d at 654). Accordingly, it upheld the
judgment of forfeiture. Id.This Court reaffirmed its endorsement of substantial compliance in this context
several years later in Bennett v. State, 394 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965). There,
again following entry of final judgment against the sureties in a bond forfeiture proceeding,
this Court upheld the trial court’s judgment over the sureties’ complaint that “the record
show[ed] that the defendant’s name was not called at the courthouse door[.]” Id. As was
the case in Deem, the judgment nisi recited that the defendant’s name was “distinctly called
at the door of the courthouse and that he did not appear.” Id. The Court observed that,
“[w]hile there is testimony in the record that the trial judge directed the bailiff to go outside
in the hallway of the courtroom on the fourth floor of the courthouse and call the
defendant’s name, there is no showing that the bailiff did not go to the main door of the
courthouse on the first floor and call his name.” Id. But the Court ultimately concluded that
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any such uncertainty or lack of clarity in the record was immaterial, stating, “Be that as it
may, under the recent decision of this court in Deem, the record shows a substantial
compliance with the requirement . . . that the name of the principal be called, distinctly, at
the courthouse door.” Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, this Court upheld the trial court’s
judgment on the forfeiture based on facts showing that the defendant’s name had been
called outside the courtroom door under a theory of substantial compliance. Id.In our subsequent decision in Tocher v. State, this Court cited Bennett for the
proposition that the “calling of the principal’s name outside in the hallway on the fourth
floor of the courthouse is in substantial compliance with the requirement in Art. 22.02 [ ]
that the name be ‘called distinctly at the courthouse door.’” 517 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1975). Though the Court in Tocher ultimately concluded that substantial
compliance was “not an issue” in that case because the defendant’s name was not called at
all, this Court nevertheless reaffirmed the validity and meaning of Bennett. Id. 6 We also 5F
6
The dissenting opinion contends that we have misread our precedent and that the cases in question
do not actually mean that calling the defendant’s name at the courtroom door will always constitute
substantial compliance under Article 22.02. See Dissenting Op., at 5–8. We disagree with the
dissent’s competing interpretation of the caselaw. Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, the
aforementioned cases do not condition a finding of substantial compliance on the “specific facts”
showing that the courtroom door was in close enough proximity to the courthouse door so as to
constitute the “functional equivalent” of calling the defendant’s name at the courthouse door. Id.
at 5. Indeed, in Deem there was no such mention of any proximity or “functional equivalence”
considerations. See Deem, 342 S.W.2d at 759. And in Bennett, the Court expressly noted that the
courtroom door was on the fourth floor of the courthouse, which by definition would seem to
preclude a finding that it was in close proximity to the exterior courthouse door. Bennett, 394
S.W.2d at 807. It is true, as the dissent notes, that in this Court’s earlier 1939 decision in Caldwell,
the Court looked to the particular facts in determining whether substantial compliance was shown.
See 126 S.W.2d at 655–56. But in our subsequent decisions in Deem and Bennett, we did not
follow that approach. Therefore, this aspect of Caldwell was abrogated by our later decisions in
Deem and Bennett.
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observe that, in reliance on the foregoing cases, numerous courts of appeals have held that
calling the defendant’s name at the courtroom door constitutes substantial compliance with
Article 22.02. 7
6F
To be clear, the scope of our review in this case does not require us to fully revisit
our prior holdings with respect to the appropriateness of permitting a showing of substantial
compliance under Article 22.02. Indeed, we agree with the State that the aforementioned
holdings are well-settled, and we will not disturb them here. 8 Moreover, we do not
7F
Further, while it is true, as the dissent notes, that Deem and Bennett are distinguishable from this
case because the judgment nisi in those cases stated that the defendants’ names were called at the
courthouse door, that distinction is not material here. As in this case, the actual evidence presented
in Deem and Bennett indicated that the defendants’ names were called outside the courtroom door,
and those facts were the basis for this Court finding “substantial compliance” in each case. We
observe that, had the holdings in Deem and Bennett been based on a prima facie showing of
compliance with Article 22.02 pursuant to the judgment nisi, it would have been unnecessary for
this Court to rely on the concept of substantial compliance because the judgment nisi reflecting
that the defendant’s name was called at the courthouse door would have afforded a presumption
of actual compliance with Article 22.02. For these reasons, we disagree with the dissent’s critique
of our reading of the caselaw.
7
See Lara v. State, No. 11-18-00286-CR, 2020 WL 6373241, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Oct. 30,
2020, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting that calling defendant’s name
in the hallway outside the courtroom substantially complied with the requirements of Article
22.02); Guiles v. State, No. 02-09-00146-CV, 2010 WL 851421, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Mar. 11, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same); Quintero v. State, No.
14-96-00587-CR, 1998 WL 104960, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 12, 1998, pet.
dism’d w.o.j.) (not designated for publication) (same); Aspilla v. State, 952 S.W.2d 610, 612–613
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.) (same); Burns v. State, 814 S.W.2d 768, 772
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991) (same; “where the State puts on evidence of substantial
compliance by showing that the principal’s name was called in the hallway outside the courtroom
door, proof that the principal’s name was not called at the courthouse door does not defeat the
State’s showing of substantial compliance. To hold otherwise, would render the term ‘substantial
compliance’ meaningless.”) rev’d sub nom. on other grounds, Alvarez v. State, 861 S.W.2d 878(Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
8
To the extent that the dissent generally calls into question the legitimacy of applying substantial
compliance in this context, we simply note that the concept of substantial compliance is
“‘ubiquitous . . . throughout Texas law’” and has been frequently recognized as satisfying various
civil statutory requirements, with the exception of deadlines. Sorrell v. Estate of Carlton, 593
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understand the court of appeals’ opinion to have rejected the applicability of substantial
compliance generally, only to hold that a showing of substantial compliance in the form of
calling the defendant’s name at the courtroom door could not satisfy the State’s burden at
the summary-judgment stage. See Green, 2021 WL 5747148, at *4 (accepting that courts
have “repeatedly held that calling a defendant’s name at the courtroom door substantially
complies with the directive to call the name at the courthouse door,” but declining to apply
that principle on summary judgment). Recognizing that the cases discussed above were all
the result of trials and thus did not directly address whether the aforementioned rule of
substantial compliance under Article 22.02 could properly be applied on summary
judgment, we now turn to consider that issue.
B. Summary-judgment posture does not preclude applicability of
substantial compliance.
Although criminal in nature, bond-forfeiture proceedings are governed by the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ARTS. 22.10, 44.44. Pursuant to the
civil rules, in a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the burden to establish
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). When evaluating the evidence presented on a
S.W.3d 167, 173 (Tex. 2019) (quoting BankDirect Capital Fin., LLC v. Plasma Fab, LLC, 519
S.W.3d 76, 81 (Tex. 2017)). We recognize that there is some inherent tension between this
principle and our approach to construing penal statutes, where we generally adhere to the statute’s
plain language and do not deviate from it absent some compelling reason for doing so. See, e.g.,
Baird v. State, 398 S.W.3d 220, 228 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (if statutory language is plain on its
face, we are “ordinarily constrained to adhere to the plain import of that statutory language,
regarding it as the definitive indicium of the legislative intent”). But, because the issue here does
not involve a penal statute that would demand a strict construction and instead involves a quasi-
civil bond-forfeiture statute, we adhere to civil principles that support a rule of substantial
compliance in this context.
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motion for summary judgment, “we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant,
and we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s
favor.” Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). If,
under this standard, the movant meets his burden, “the burden then shifts to the non-movant
to disprove or raise an issue of fact as to at least one of” the elements. Amedisys, Inc. v.
Kingwood Home Health Care, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 507, 511 (Tex. 2014). However, if the
movant does not meet this burden, “the burden does not shift and the non-movant need not
respond or present any evidence.” Id. On appeal, a trial court’s ruling on summary
judgment is reviewed de novo. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661
(Tex. 2005).
Here, contrary to the court of appeals’ reasoning, nothing about applying the
aforementioned rule of substantial compliance under Article 22.02 at the summary-
judgment stage conflicts with these general summary-judgment principles. Importantly, the
court of appeals believed that applying a rule of substantial compliance in this context
would amount to an improper “presumption” of facts in the State’s favor. See Green, 2021
WL 5747148, at *4–5. In support, it cited the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Chavez
for the proposition that a summary judgment movant “‘may not use a presumption to shift
to the non[ ] movant the burden of raising a fact issue of rebuttal.’” Id. at *4 (quoting
Chavez, 520 S.W.3d at 900). But Chavez simply stands for the proposition that a
presumption cannot establish a fact in a summary-judgment proceeding in the same manner
that it would at trial; on summary judgment, evidence is required to satisfy the movant’s
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burden of proof. See Chavez, 520 S.W.3d at 900–01. 9 Chavez is inapplicable here because
8F
the rule of substantial compliance with Article 22.02 is not a factual presumption at all.
Instead, the facts and evidence before the court are evaluated to determine whether they
actually establish substantial compliance with Article 22.02’s requirements by showing
that the defendant’s name was called outside the courtroom door. No facts establishing
substantial compliance are “presumed” in the State’s favor. In short, the court of appeals
erred here by conflating the concepts of presumptions and substantial compliance. 10 We 9F
conclude that the latter may be appropriately applied on summary judgment where the
actual facts before the court conclusively establish substantial compliance with Article
22.02’s requirements. 1110F
9
Specifically, Chavez dealt with whether the presumption that an attorney retained for litigation
has the express authority to enter into a settlement agreement may be relied on in summary-
judgment proceedings when the underlying dispute concerned the attorney’s ability to bind the
client to the agreement. Chavez, 520 S.W.3d at 900–01. The Court ultimately held that, even
assuming such a presumption would be proper, it could not apply at the summary-judgment stage
because at that stage actual evidence was required to satisfy the moving party’s burden of proof.
Id. at 901 (concluding that summary judgment was improper because the moving party “was
required to provide evidence that Chavez actually authorized her counsel to enter into a settlement
agreement on her behalf” and could not rely on presumption to establish that fact).
10
Compare Beck v. Sheppard, 566 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex. 1978) (defining presumption as “a rule
which draws a particular inference as to the existence of one fact, not actually known, arising from
its usual connection with other particular facts which are known or proved”), with Endeavor
Energy Res., LP v. Trudy Jane Anderson Testamentary Trust, 644 S.W.3d 212, 220 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2022, pet. denied) (substantial compliance generally “means that one has performed the
essential requirements of a statute, and it excuses deviations which do not seriously hinder the
legislature’s purpose in imposing such requirements”) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
11
Indeed, we are aware of numerous decisions from the intermediate appellate courts upholding
grants of summary judgment when the facts conclusively demonstrated substantial compliance
with the pertinent statute. See, e.g., United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Boring & Tunneling Co. of Am., 321
S.W.3d 24, 29 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (affirming grant of summary
judgment upon showing that party substantially complied with the notice requirements of
Government Code Section 2253.041; although statute plainly required that notice “must be
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C. The calling of the defendant’s name at the courtroom door
substantially complied with the requirements of Article 22.02, and
there remained no genuine issue of material fact on that element.
Applying this holding here, the judgment nisi stated that the defendant’s name was
“distinctly called at the courtroom door.” The certification of call, signed by the court
administrator, further stated that the defendant’s name was called “three times loudly and
distinctly in compliance with [article] 22.02.” And, pursuant to the deemed admissions,
Appellant admitted that the defendant’s name “was distinctly called outside the Wichita
County courtroom door for a scheduled hearing on the hearing date” and that she “was
given reasonable time and did not appear in Court for a scheduled hearing on the hearing
date.” As a matter of law, such evidence conclusively establishes substantial compliance
with the requirements of Code of Criminal Procedure Article 22.02. See, e.g., Bennett, 394
S.W.2d at 807. Upon such a showing, the burden then shifted to Appellant to disprove or
raise an issue of fact with respect to the calling of the defendant’s name. Amedisys, Inc.,
accompanied by a sworn statement of account” and the notice here did not include any notary seal
or signature, the sworn statement nevertheless “met the essential requirements of the statute” and
thus substantially complied with statutory requirements); Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Kirby Rest.
Equip. & Chem. Supply Co., 170 S.W.3d 144, 147–48 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, pet. denied)
(same; “The statute establishing the procedure for presenting a claim against a payment bond on a
public contract is remedial in nature and should therefore be construed liberally to accomplish its
purposes.”); McBeath v. Estrada Oaks Apartments, 135 S.W.3d 694, 696–97 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2003, no pet.) (granting summary judgment based on showing of substantial compliance with
Property Code Section 92.202; “Because McBeath’s letters serve as substantial compliance for
conditions precedent to recovery under section 92.202(a)(2), we [ ] conclude McBeath established,
as a matter of law, she was entitled to summary judgment.”); Richardson v. Mid-Cities Drywall,
Inc., 968 S.W.2d 512, 514–15 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1998, no pet.) (observing that Property
Code Section 53.054, governing mechanic’s, contractor’s, or materialman’s liens, should be
“liberally construed for the purpose of protecting laborers and materialmen,” and upholding grant
of summary judgment based on showing that affidavit supporting lien substantially complied with
Property Code Section 53.054).
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437 S.W.3d at 511. Appellant presented no new evidence or argument other than his
assertion that the defendant’s name was not called at the courthouse door, and thus there is
no genuine issue of material fact regarding this element. Therefore, the court of appeals
erred by reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on this basis.
IV. Conclusion
Evidence that a defendant’s name was called at the courtroom door constitutes
substantial compliance with the requirements of Code of Criminal Procedure Article 22.02
for purposes of a bond-forfeiture proceeding. Such is the case regardless of whether the
case is resolved at the summary-judgment stage or proceeds to a trial. The court of appeals
erred by holding otherwise. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and
remand the case for consideration of Appellant’s remaining arguments on appeal.
Delivered: June 28, 2023
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