Hayes, Michelle Lee ( 2024 )


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  •             IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    OF TEXAS
    NO. WR-94,423-01
    EX PARTE MICHELLE LEE HAYES, Applicant
    ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
    CAUSE NO. 17-0327(A) IN THE 71ST DISTRICT COURT
    FROM HARRISON COUNTY
    KEEL, J. delivered the opinion of the Court in which HERVEY,
    RICHARDSON, WALKER, SLAUGHTER, and MCCLURE, JJ., joined. NEWELL, J.,
    concurred. KELLER, P.J., and YEARY, J., dissented.
    OPINION
    Applicant pled guilty to causing serious bodily injury to a child, and the trial court
    deferred finding her guilty and placed her on community supervision. She was
    adjudicated guilty two months later and sentenced to 15 years in prison.
    Applicant raises two claims in her habeas application. First, she says her guilty
    plea was involuntary because her attorney did not tell her that the victim had suffered no
    serious bodily injury (“SBI”). Second, she says her attorney was ineffective at the
    Hayes–Page 2
    adjudication stage for not offering evidence in support of a conviction for the lesser-
    included offense of causing bodily injury to a child. After our second remand order for
    additional findings, the trial court again recommends denying relief. Because the trial
    court’s findings are faulty, we do not rely on them. See Ex parte Reed, 271 S.w.3d 698,
    727 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Based on our independent review of this peculiar record,
    we grant relief on Applicant’s involuntary plea claim; we do not address her claim of
    ineffective assistance of counsel at the adjudication hearing.
    I. Background
    Before Applicant pled guilty, her attorney hired a medical expert, Dr. Stephen
    Nelson. Dr. Nelson wrote a report summarizing the victim’s medical records and the
    injuries and conditions they documented. His report did not express an opinion about
    SBI. He testified by affidavit at the habeas stage that he had offered no opinion about
    SBI because he had not been asked for it or given its legal definition. After he was given
    the definition by habeas counsel, he concluded that the victim had suffered no SBI. The
    primary issue at habeas was whether Applicant pled guilty without knowing that Dr.
    Nelson believed there was no SBI. She claimed that she did; the trial court found
    otherwise. The secondary issue was whether she would have insisted on trial if she had
    known about the true state of the evidence of SBI. Given its first finding, the trial court
    made no finding on the record regarding the second issue.
    II. Primary Issue: What Applicant Knew Pre-Plea About Evidence of SBI
    After our first, generic remand order, the trial court found that defense attorney
    Hayes–Page 3
    Kobby Warren told Applicant before her plea that Dr. Nelson did not believe the victim
    had suffered SBI. The finding was unsupported; Warren testified that he discussed “Dr.
    Nelson and his conclusions” with Applicant and that she “completely understood and
    agreed with every strategy and method” he used to get deferred, but he did not testify that
    he told Applicant that Dr. Nelson found no SBI.
    Our second remand order was more specific; it asked what Warren told Applicant
    about the evidence of SBI before she pled guilty. This time, Warren testified that he told
    Applicant about Dr. Nelson’s no-SBI opinion, and the trial court credited Warren’s
    testimony. We do not defer to that finding for two reasons.
    First, Dr. Nelson’s testimony about the late formation of his no-SBI opinion is
    supported by the pre-plea report he gave Warren; it did not mention SBI. It summarized
    the medical records and opined, for example, that the victim “suffered a mild traumatic
    brain injury that resulted in a subdural hematoma” with “no evidence of injury to the
    brain” and that there were “residual neurological or physical deficits secondary to the
    above injuries[,]” but it did not say whether these were SBI.
    Second, Warren evaded a related question—why didn’t he ask Dr. Nelson to
    include his no-SBI opinion in his report? Rather than answer, he implied that Dr. Nelson
    did include it: “Dr. Nelson’s report lists out the evidence of injury he reviewed and the
    severity and/or the lack thereof.” “Severity” is not synonymous with the legally defined
    term “serious bodily injury.” See Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(46). The report never
    mentioned SBI, and Warren’s contrary suggestion was wrong.
    Hayes–Page 4
    Warren’s false suggestion raises other questions that further undermine the trial
    court’s credibility finding in his favor. If Warren read the report to mean there was no
    SBI, then why didn’t he show it to the prosecution when he supposedly asked for a
    reduction to causing non-serious bodily injury? And why did he never admit the report
    into evidence? His failure to use Dr. Nelson’s no-SBI opinion suggests that it did not
    exist before Applicant pled guilty.
    We find that Warren did not tell Applicant about Dr. Nelson’s no-SBI opinion.
    III. Secondary Issue: Did That Failure Make A Difference?
    The record supports Applicant’s claim that, but for her attorney’s deficiency, she
    would have insisted on trial; she had a good chance of an acquittal of the SBI element,
    and she would have faced much less punishment without it.
    III.A. SBI Acquittal Likelihood
    Our second remand order asked the trial court to identify the SBI—which it did
    not do—and the evidence supporting the SBI finding. The trial court cited the plea-
    hearing testimony of Dr. Jennifer Chandler, State’s Exhibit 8, and Applicant’s judicial
    confession. They do not support the SBI finding. Considering Applicant’s judicial
    confession to assess its voluntariness would be circular reasoning, so we set that aside.
    And even if we did consider it, it would be unhelpful because it was non-specific; she did
    not testify about what SBI the victim suffered. That leaves Dr. Chandler’s testimony
    and State’s Exhibit 8, and they do not support the SBI finding even in general terms.
    Dr. Chandler, the emergency-room physician, testified that the victim suffered a
    Hayes–Page 5
    “moderate” subdural hematoma, an injury that prompted his transfer to a Dallas hospital
    for a pediatric neuro-surgery evaluation. According to Dr. Chandler, that evaluation
    yielded an overnight observation in the ICU and no surgical intervention, and the victim
    was “neurologically appropriate” during his five-day hospital stay in Dallas. She did not
    testify whether he suffered SBI; she was not asked about it.
    As for State’s Exhibit 8, a collection of medical records, it apparently does not
    address “serious bodily injury”; the trial court found that it included diagnoses of
    “subdural hematoma, right frontal scalp hematoma, and moderate maxillary sinusitis” and
    “extensive subdural hemorrhage located interhemispheric, left tentoria and overlying the
    left frontal temporal convexity.” Assuming these are injuries, their effects are not
    obvious, and we have no expert testimony establishing them as SBI. See Garcia v. State,
    
    667 S.W.3d 756
    , 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). On the contrary, every medical expert
    who was asked about SBI testified that no such injury was shown in these records.
    III.B. Harsher Punishment with SBI
    Applicant pled guilty to an aggravated, first-degree felony but would have faced a
    non-aggravated, third-degree felony in the absence of SBI. See Tex. Penal Code §
    22.04(a), (e)-(f) (defining injury-to-a-child offenses and their degrees); Tex. Code Crim.
    P. art. 42A.054(a)(10) (listing first-degree injury to a child); and Tex. Gov’t Code §
    508.145(d)(1) and (2), (f) (specifying parole eligibility for injury to a child). The
    punishment-range and parole-eligibility differences between what she pled to and what
    she likely would have faced after a trial support her claim—she would not have pled
    Hayes–Page 6
    guilty if she had known about Dr. Nelson’s no-SBI opinion.
    IV. Conclusion
    We grant relief. The judgment in Cause Number 17-0327X in the 71st District
    Court of Harrison County is set aside, and Applicant is remanded to the custody of the
    Sheriff of Harrison County to face the charges against her. Copies of this opinion shall
    be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Correctional Institutions Division
    and the Board of Pardons and Paroles.
    Delivered: June 26, 2024
    Do Not Publish
    

Document Info

Docket Number: WR-94,423-01

Filed Date: 6/26/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/1/2024