Christian, Antoine Leon AKA Christian, Reginald Jerome ( 2024 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
NO. WR-39,987-04
EX PARTE REGINALD JEROME CHRISTIAN
AKA ANTOINE LEON CHRISTIAN, Applicant
ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
CAUSE NO. 1093011-A IN THE 184th DISTRICT COURT
FROM HARRIS COUNTY
NEWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which
KELLER, P.J., HERVEY, RICHARDSON, YEARY, WALKER, SLAUGHTER and
MCCLURE, JJ., joined. KEEL, J., filed a concurring opinion.
Applicant was convicted of possession of more than one but less
than four grams of cocaine and sentenced to two years and nine months’
imprisonment pursuant to a guilty plea in 2009. 1 Former Houston Police
1
Although Applicant’s sentence has run, he alleges he is suffering from collateral
consequences including the use of this conviction as an enhancement for future charges. The
habeas court found that this conviction was used as the underlying conviction in a felon in
Christian — 2
Department Officer Gerald Goines, who has previously been found to
have provided false information and testimony in drug cases, was
involved in Applicant’s arrest. In 2019, the Harris County District
Attorney’s Office notified Applicant that Goines had been relieved of duty
and was under criminal investigation. Thereafter, Applicant filed an
application for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction on four
grounds: (1) actual innocence (2) Brady violation (3) violation of his due
process rights and (4) involuntary plea. 2 Applicant later filed an
amended application abandoning the first three grounds and alleging
only that his guilty plea was involuntary because he did not know that
Officer Goines had engaged in misconduct in other cases and would have
insisted on trial had he known. 3 The habeas court recommends relief
be granted on the claim that Applicant’s guilty plea was involuntary. We
filed and set this case for submission to determine:
(1) Was Gerald Goines’s conduct in this case the type of
misconduct that gives right to an inference of falsity under
Ex parte Mathews, 638 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022)?
possession of a firearm charge for which Applicant is currently serving a twenty-year
sentence.
2
This Court dismissed Applicant’s initial writ application without written order noting
Applicant’s sentence had been discharged.
3
After receiving the supplemental writ record from the district clerk containing Applicant’s
amended writ application and the habeas court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, this
Court reconsidered the dismissal on its own motion.
Christian — 3
(2) Assuming an inference of falsity under Mathews applies, do
the facts of this case rebut that inference of falsity?
(3) Assuming an inference of falsity applies and was not rebutted
by the facts of this case, was the false evidence provided by
Gerald Goines material to Applicant’s guilty plea?
Background
According to Applicant, on November 15, 2006, the night of his
arrest, he did not possess any drugs. 4 Applicant denies that he told
Goines that there were drugs inside of his vehicle as Goines alleged in
his offense report. Applicant maintains there were no drugs inside of
his vehicle and alleges that Goines must have planted the cocaine found
inside of Applicant’s car. Applicant theorizes that the drugs found in his
vehicle must have belonged to Goines who fabricated the events of that
night and falsified his offense report.
On July 30, 2009, Applicant pleaded guilty to possession of a
controlled substance in exchange for time served. In 2019, Applicant
received a letter from the District Attorney’s Office notifying him that
Goines was under criminal investigation. Applicant asserts that had he
been aware of Goines’s misconduct he would not have pleaded guilty,
4
These assertions are taken from Applicant’s unsworn declaration attached to his amended
application for a writ of habeas corpus.
Christian — 4
even upon the offer for time served, and instead would have insisted on
going to trial.
At the outset, we note that the record before the Court as to the
events of November 15, 2006, is not as thoroughly developed as it could
be and lacks clarity. Applicant’s proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law, which were adopted by the habeas court, attach the
offense reports of only two of the officers involved in Applicant’s arrest,
Officers Goines and T.N. Castille. However, those reports both indicate
that other officers were involved in the investigation, search, and arrest
of Applicant. According to the State, for example, an Officer Francis was
the primary officer involved in Applicant’s arrest, but Officer Francis did
not write a report. The State’s briefing also refers to a report authored
by an Officer Cardoza, which is not included in the record before this
Court. 5 Applicant argues that Goines’s version of events cannot be
corroborated.
Turning to the offense reports included in the record, according to
Officer Castille’s report, at approximately 7:39 p.m. on November 15,
5
The State filed a motion to supplement the record before this Court. That motion was
granted. However, the State failed to file a supplement with this Court or the district court.
The State’s briefing refers to Officer Cardoza’s report and other materials, including, for
example, pro se Affidavits filed by Applicant before his guilty plea, which are not included in
the record.
Christian — 5
2006, he was called out to a liquor store parking lot to assist Officer
Francis with a canine vehicle search. Officer Francis advised Officer
Castille that Applicant was under arrest and that charges had been
accepted by the District Attorney’s Office. Additionally, Officer Castille’s
report sets out that Officer Francis had not searched the vehicle and
Officer Francis wanted Officer Castille to search with the canine. Officer
Castille recites that he searched Applicant’s vehicle with his canine
partner, Gale. According to the report, Gale gave the alert for the odor
of narcotics in the center console of the vehicle. However, it is unclear
from the report if Officer Castille personally recovered any narcotics
from the vehicle. Officer Castille states in his report that he notified
Officer Francis of the alert.
According to Officer Goines’s report, Officer Goines was contacted
on November 15, 2006, regarding a male who was being detained on
suspicion of possession of a crack cocaine in a liquor store parking lot
after officers were flagged down for a disturbance. Goines’s report
states that officers of the patrol division were investigating a nearby
shooting when they were flagged down by Marcus Cook. According to
the report, Cook informed patrol officers that a male, who had walked
into the liquor store, had just pulled a pistol on him during an argument.
Christian — 6
Applicant was detained walking out of the liquor store. According to
Goines, Cook positively identified Applicant.
The record does not definitively establish which officer first
searched Applicant’s car. As the State concedes, it is also unclear at
what point Goines arrived on scene or how many officers searched
Applicant’s vehicle. According to Goines’s report, officers searched
Applicant’s vehicle and observed a clear plastic baggie with a rock like
substance inside in the vehicle’s center console. Officers then called for
assistance from the narcotics division. This suggests, if the report is to
be believed, that an officer other than Goines discovered the contraband
and then requested Officer Castille’s assistance.
Goines’s report states that he arrived on the scene and read
Applicant his Miranda warnings at 7:55 p.m. Applicant allegedly
admitted to Goines that there were narcotics and currency inside of the
vehicle but, according to the offense report, Applicant claimed they did
not belong to him. Goines’s report also states that Goines retrieved a
plastic bag from the center console and conducted a field test on the
contraband. Goines also states that he recovered a large sum of money
Christian — 7
from the console, and, upon searching the trunk, found a pistol in plain
view. 6
The habeas court recommends that relief be granted on Applicant’s
claim that his plea was involuntary. The court also concluded that
Applicant established by a preponderance of the evidence that his
conviction was obtained through the use of false evidence. The court
found that Applicant had proven all five Coty-Mathews factors and thus
established an inference of falsity as to Goines’s version of events
surrounding Applicant’s arrest. 7 The court found the false evidence
material. 8 The habeas court concluded:
under the facts of applicant’s case, if the main investigating
officer’s misconduct in other cases could have been
established at trial, it is reasonable to believe that a jury
might have found reasonable doubt. Whether they would
have or not is not the relevant inquiry. The relevant inquiry
is whether it is reasonable to believe the applicant would
have opted for a trial instead of a guilty plea if he had been
able to reveal Goines’s other misconduct to the jury. This
Court finds that applicant’s assertion in this regard is
credible.
6
Applicant was initially charged with possession of a controlled substance and felon in
possession of a firearm but the felon in possession of a firearm charge was ultimately
dismissed.
7
Ex parte Mathews, 638 S.W.3d 685, 690-91 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (concluding it is
appropriate to extend Coty to cases involving police officers who have lied to secure drug-
related convictions but reiterating that all five factors must be met to achieve the “inference
of falsity”).
8
Id. at 690 (even if the “State is unable to rebut an achieved inference of falsity, [a court]
may still preserve the integrity of just convictions in which the inference of falsity does not
ultimately prove to be material”).
Christian — 8
Having reviewed the record, such as it is, we determine that it
does not support the habeas court’s conclusion that an inference of
falsity has been established because the conduct at issue is not the type
of misconduct that gives rise to an inference of falsity. Unlike other
cases applying an inference of falsity to Goines’s conduct, here he was
not the only officer involved in Applicant’s arrest and the record before
the Court fails to establish that he was even the first officer to find the
contraband evidence. And because we hold that an inference of falsity
does not apply in this case, there is no need to consider the second or
third question set for submission. Therefore, we remand Applicant’s case
to the habeas court to consider Applicant’s involuntary plea claim
without applying an inference of falsity.
Standard of Review
While the habeas court is the original factfinder, this Court is the
ultimate factfinder on post-conviction review of habeas corpus
applications. 9 Further, while we generally defer to and accept the
habeas court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law when they are
supported by the record, we may exercise our authority to make
9
Ex parte Reed, 271 S.W.3d 698, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
Christian — 9
contrary or alternative findings and conclusions “[w]hen our
independent review of the record reveals that the trial judge’s findings
and conclusions are not supported by the record.” 10
Involuntary Plea
A guilty plea involves the waiver of several constitutional rights
and therefore must be entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences. 11 Guilty pleas induced by threats, improper promises, or
misrepresentations are not voluntarily entered. 12 We have recognized
that false evidence may cause a defendant to be misinformed such that
the defendant’s knowledge of the relevant circumstances was
insufficient for his or her plea to have been entered voluntary. 13 The
“key factor” remains “whether a defendant has ‘sufficient awareness of
the relevant circumstances and likely consequences’ such that his plea
10
Id.11
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
12
Id.13
Ex parte Barnaby, 475 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
Christian — 10
is a knowing, intelligent act.” 14 Voluntariness is determined by
considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding a guilty plea. 15
Coty-Mathews Inference of Falsity
To establish a false-evidence claim, applicants must generally
establish that evidence was false and that the false evidence was
material to the conviction or punishment. 16 In Ex parte Coty, we found
that a claim based on a lab technician’s pattern of misconduct was
“analogous” to a false evidence claim. 17 In that case, the defendant
argued that his guilty plea was obtained through the use of false
evidence but he based that claim on the fact that the state-employed
lab technician involved in his case had been found to have engaged in
“dry labbing” to falsify lab results in other un-related cases. 18 This Court
held that the proof of misconduct in other cases could establish an
inference of falsity as to the evidence in question, if an applicant could
show:
14
Id. at 322-23 (citing Brady, 397 U.S. at 748).
15
Brady, 397 U.S. at 749.
16
Barnaby, 475 S.W.3d at 323 (citing Ex parte Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d 656, 665 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2014)).
17
Ex parte Coty, 418 S.W.3d 597, 605 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
18
Id. at 598.
Christian — 11
(1) the technician in question is a state actor, (2) the
technician has committed multiple instances of intentional
misconduct in another case or cases, (3) the technician is the
same technician that worked on the applicant’s case, (4) the
misconduct is the type of misconduct that would have
affected the evidence in the applicant’s case, and (5) the
technician handled and processed the evidence in the
applicant’s case within roughly the same period of time as
the other misconduct. 19
Once an inference of falsity has been established, the burden shifts
to the State to offer evidence establishing that the technician at issue
did not commit intentional misconduct in the case in question. 20 Even
if the State cannot rebut the inference of falsity, the burden still remains
on the applicant to show that the evidence was material to his or her
conviction. 21 In the context of a guilty plea, the burden of materiality is
established by showing that the applicant would not have pleaded guilty
but for the falsified evidence against him. 22
In Ex parte Mathews, we considered whether the framework
established in Coty in response to a state lab-technician’s pattern of
misconduct should apply to a police officer with a proven history of
19
Id. at 605 (the Court “note[d] that the initial burden on applicants to establish an inference
of falsity is also onerous”).
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Barnaby, 475 S.W.3d at 327 (“[T]he materiality of false evidence is measured by what
impact that false evidence had on the defendant’s decision to plead guilty.”).
Christian — 12
falsifying evidence in drug cases. 23 In that case, Mathews challenged
his drug conviction and argued, based on Coty, that this Court should
infer that Goines’s testimony against him was false because of Goines’s
history of misconduct in drug cases. 24 We agreed that Coty should
extend to situations in which “a police officer has demonstrably lied in
multiple instances in order to convict individuals of drug-related
offenses.” 25
Goines’s Conduct is Not the Type of Misconduct that
Gives Rise to an Inference of Falsity
In both Coty and Mathews, the state actor shown to have engaged
in malfeasance in other cases was the only witness against the
defendant. In Coty, the lab technician with a pattern of “dry labbing” in
other cases was in sole possession of the evidence against the
defendant, and he was responsible for the test results gleaned from that
evidence used to implicate the defendant. 26 In Mathews, Goines was
23
Mathews, 638 S.W.3d at 690
24
Id. at 687-88.
25
Id. at 692 (remanding for the habeas court to make an initial determination as to whether
applicant established all five Coty requirements).
26
Coty, 418 S.W.3d at 605 (“we hold that an applicant can establish that a laboratory
technician’s sole possession of a substance and testing results derived from that possession
are unreliable, and we will infer that the evidence in question is false, if the applicant shows
[the five-Coty factors]”).
Christian — 13
the “sole witness” to the crime allegedly committed by the defendant. 27
Goines alleged the defendant sold him a substance that later tested
positive for cocaine but there was “no other evidence in the record to
identify [the defendant] as the seller because the uniformed officers did
not witness the [undercover] sale.” 28 Goines was solely responsible for
the alleged undercover drug bust that resulted in the collection of
evidence and the defendant’s subsequent arrest. 29
The Court concluded in Mathews that it was appropriate to extend
the requirements established in Coty to establish an inference of falsity
to the circumstances presented. 30 The Court reasoned that the same
considerations that justified the adoption of the inference of falsity in
Coty “apply with as much force to cases involving police officers who
display a pattern of mendacity in obtaining drug arrests and convictions
as it does for cases involving laboratory technicians who routinely falsify
forensic test results and documentation.” 31 Those justifications were,
27
Mathews, 638 S.W.3d at 687.
28
Mathews, 638 S.W.3d at 691.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 692.
31
Id. at 690-91.
Christian — 14
first, that the malfeasance by the state actors was egregious. 32 Second,
we reasoned that it would be unduly “onerous” for a defendant to have
to prove the bad state actor’s actual misconduct in his or her own case
given the cost and time that such investigations would require and the
possibility that “even then, evidence of misconduct may not come to
light, even if it occurred.” 33 This makes sense given that the
investigation at issue in Mathews was instigated entirely by a state
actor, Goines, who was later shown to have propensity for falsifying
information in drug cases.
Considering the Coty factors, in Mathews, the Court found Goines
is clearly a state actor that “has a proven history” of providing false
testimony and falsifying government documents in at least one drug-
related set of cases (the Mallet cases in 2008). 34 In the Mallet cases,
Goines testified that, while working in an undercover capacity, he paid
Steven Mallet for drugs that Steven then obtained from his brother, Otis
Mallet. 35 In both of those cases, this Court determined that the
32
Id. at 690 (citing Coty, 418 S.W.3d at 605).
33
Id.
34
Id. at 691.
35
Ex parte Steven Mallet, 620 S.W.3d 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (Richardson, J.,
concurring); see also Ex parte Otis Mallet, Nos. WR-90,980-01 & 02, 2020 WL 3582438 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2020) (not designated for publication); Ex parte Otis Mallet, 602 S.W.3d 922 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2020) (Richardson, J., concurring).
Christian — 15
defendants were actually innocent of the charges brought against them
by Goines. 36 Goines was the sole witness against the Mallet brothers,
and expense reports belied Goines’s allegation that he had used police
money for the alleged undercover transaction. 37 The Court noted that
Goines’s previous misconduct was of a kind that would affect the
evidence in Mathews, another case in which Goines was the sole witness
against the defendant . 38 The type of misconduct that has given rise to
an inference of falsity in cases involving Goines has generally been
understood to involve Goines acting as the sole fact witness or as a but-
for cause of the defendant’s arrest.
Here, while the record is not entirely clear, it is indisputable that
there were multiple officers involved in Applicant’s arrest. The record
does not establish that Goines was the only, or even the primary, officer
involved in Applicant’s arrest. Unlike Mathews, Goines was not the sole
source of the allegations against Applicant. Officer Castille reported that
36
Mallet, 620 S.W.3d at 798; Mallet, 2020 WL 3582438 at *1.
37
Mallet, 602 S.W.3d at 925 (Richardson, J., concurring) (“Applicant has proven that the sole
witness to the crime is a police officer who willfully and knowingly perjured himself in order
to secure Applicant’s conviction”); Mallet, 620 S.W.3d at 800 (Richardson, J., concurring)
(noting Goines was “the State’s sole fact witness at trial and the only witness who said he
saw a drug deal”).
38
Mathews, 638 S.W.3d at 691-692 (ultimately the Court remanded to the convicting court
to determine whether all five Coty requirements had been established).
Christian — 16
he was called to the scene by Officer Francis who informed him that
Applicant was already under arrest. Officer Castille performed a search
of the vehicle and his K9 unit alerted to the vehicle’s center console
where the drugs were found. 39 Officer Goines was not the reason
Applicant was detained nor did he instigate the investigation. Applicant
was detained by other officers for his suspected involvement in a
disturbance in the parking lot and possibly a nearby shooting. Unlike
the Mallet and Mathews cases, Applicant was not arrested on the sole
word of Goines acting alone in an undercover capacity.
Admittedly, the record is unclear about whether Goines was the
first officer to find the contraband in the center console, although, a
reasonable inference could be drawn to the contrary. But to the extent
Applicant now asserts that Goines alone had the opportunity to plant
the drugs recovered in his vehicle, he has not met his burden to
establish the same. 40 Given the involvement of other officers both in
the origination of the investigation involving Applicant and his
subsequent arrest, this is not the type of case in which it would be
39
While we only have Goines’s report in the record in this case to suggest that Officer Castille
discovered the narcotics first, it was incumbent upon Applicant to establish the actual
sequence of events.
40
See Mathews, 638 S.W.3d at 689 (noting under Coty the Applicant has the burden to
establish the necessary predicate facts to apply an inference of falsity).
Christian — 17
appropriate to apply an inference of falsity. Therefore, we conclude that
Applicant’s involuntary plea claim should be reviewed without the
consideration of an inference of falsity.
Conclusion
Applicant has failed to establish the applicability of the inference
of falsity under Mathews because Applicant’s case does not involve the
type of misconduct that gives rise to an inference of falsity. Therefore,
we remand to the habeas court to consider Applicant’s involuntary plea
claim without reference to an inference of falsity regarding Goines’s
conduct in Applicant’s case.
Delivered: September 25, 2024
Publish