FLORES, ROBERTO MEDINA v. the State of Texas ( 2023 )


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  •              IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    OF TEXAS
    NO. PD-0562-22
    ROBERTO MEDINA FLORES, Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS
    ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
    FROM THE FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
    GALVESTON COUNTY
    HERVEY, J., delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court.
    OPINION
    Can a trial court expand its jurisdiction and hold a hearing on a motion for new
    trial outside the 75-day plenary period pursuant to the joint order of the Texas Supreme
    Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals, titled First Emergency Order Regarding the
    COVID-19 State of Disaster? No, it cannot. We will affirm the judgment of the court of
    appeals.
    Flores–2
    I.    BACKGROUND
    On February 10, 2020, Appellant, Roberto Medina Flores, was convicted of
    second-degree felony sexual assault and sentenced to 15 years’ confinement and fined.
    He timely moved for a new trial and filed a notice of appeal. The trial court had until
    April 25 to rule on the motion. On March 13, the Texas Supreme Court and Court of
    Criminal Appeals issued a joint First Emergency Order Regarding the COVID-19 State
    of Disaster (“Emergency Order”). The relevant part of the order, which applies here,
    states:
    2. Subject only to constitutional limitations, all courts in Texas may in
    any case, civil or criminal—and must to avoid risk to court staff,
    parties, attorneys, jurors, and the public—without a participant’s
    consent:
    a. Modify or suspend any and all deadlines and procedures,
    whether prescribed by statute, rule, or order, for a stated period
    ending no later than 30 days after the Governor’s state of
    disaster has been lifted . . . .
    First Emergency Order Regarding the COVID-19 State of Disaster, 
    596 S.W.3d 265
    (Tex. 2020) (relying on TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.0035(b)). Seven days later, citing the
    Emergency Order, Appellant moved to extend the 75-day deadline, and the trial court
    granted the motion and issued an order to that effect. On May 8, the trial court held a
    hearing on the motion for new trial. The trial court denied the motion, and Appellant
    appealed.
    The court of appeals concluded the trial court erred because the 75-day plenary
    period is jurisdictional, not procedural, and a trial court cannot “create jurisdiction for
    itself where . . . jurisdiction would otherwise be absent,” even based on an Emergency
    Flores–3
    Order. Flores v. State, No. 01-20-00213-CR, 
    2022 WL 961554
    , at *10 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 31, 2022) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (quoting In
    re State ex rel. Ogg, 
    618 S.W.3d 361
    , 364 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021)). The court of appeals
    also concluded that it could not consider the motion-for-new-trial claims 1 or the record.
    Id. at *11 (relying on State v. Moore, 
    225 S.W.3d 556
    , 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), in
    which the Court of Criminal Appeals held that hearings on motions for new trial
    overruled by operation of law are not authorized). Appellant petitioned for discretionary
    review.
    II.   APPLICABLE LAW
    A defendant must file a motion for new trial within 30 days after “the trial court
    imposes or suspends sentence in open court.” TEX. R. APP. P. 21.4. “The court must rule
    on a motion for new trial within 75 days after imposing or suspending sentence in open
    court.” Id. at 21.8(a). “A motion not timely ruled on by written order will be deemed
    denied when the [75-day] period . . . expires.” Id. at 21.8(c). “[O]nce a motion for new
    trial is overruled by operation of law, the trial court loses jurisdiction to rule upon it.”
    State v. Garza, 
    931 S.W.2d 560
    , 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). “[J]urisdiction over a case
    is an absolute systemic requirement.” State v. Dunbar, 
    297 S.W.3d 777
    , 780 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2009). Actions taken by a court without jurisdiction are void. See Ex parte Lozoya,
    
    666 S.W.3d 618
    , 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (quoting Ex parte Armstrong, 
    8 S.W.2d 674
    , 676 (Tex. Crim. App. 1928)).
    1
    Appellant made four claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
    Flores–4
    III. DISCUSSION
    We agree with the court of appeals. We made clear in Ogg that a trial court cannot
    expand its jurisdiction by relying on an order similar to the Emergency Order authorizing
    the suspension of deadlines and procedures here. Ogg, 618 S.W.3d at 364 (a trial court
    cannot create its own jurisdiction based on an emergency order issued under Section
    22.0035(b) of the Government Code). Here, the trial court tried to do just that. It entered
    an order purporting to expand its jurisdiction by seven days. But the requirement that a
    court must have jurisdiction is not procedural, and the 75-day jurisdictional deadline
    cannot be suspended. Dunbar, 
    297 S.W.3d at 780
     (jurisdiction is a systemic requirement);
    Marin v. State, 
    851 S.W.2d 275
    , 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (“Implementation of . . .
    [systemic] requirements is not optional and cannot, therefore, be waived or forfeited by
    the parties.”). The trial court did not have the authority to preside over the hearing on the
    motion for new trial, and its overruling of the motion is void. Appellant’s motion for new
    trial was overruled by operation of law when the 75-day plenary period expired.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
    Delivered: December 13, 2023
    Publish
    

Document Info

Docket Number: PD-0562-22

Filed Date: 12/13/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/18/2023