Halprin, Randy Ethan ( 2024 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
NO. WR-77,175-05
EX PARTE RANDY ETHAN HALPRIN, Applicant
ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
CAUSE NO. W01-00327-T(B) IN THE 283RD DISTRICT COURT
FROM DALLAS COUNTY
RICHARDSON, J., filed a concurring opinion in which NEWELL and WALKER,
JJ., joined.
CONCURRING OPINION
“Because I’m going to get them all the death penalty . . . .” 1 One would imagine this
came from a zealous prosecutor while pursuing justice. But instead, it was the supposedly
neutral trial judge who stated this after being appointed to preside over the capital murder
trials of several defendants. A constitutionally mandated impartial judge did not exist here.
1
(2B RR 64).
1
Among the defendants was Randy Halprin, whom the judge would later refer to in
a derogatory way as “Randy the Jew” and “the Jew Halprin.” 2 While it is true that
statements attributable to the trial judge referred to herein were not made during trial or
known to the defense prior to trial, the testimony at the habeas hearing is at least disturbing.
And because they were not made public until after the conviction, a motion to recuse was
not filed. During the trial, the judge referred to Applicant as “the Jew.” These words were
said outside of the courtroom.
The judge’s antisemitism was of no fleeting moment. “F##king Jew.” “Filthy Jews.”
“Goddamn K#kes.” 3 These are some of the views the judge espoused while a member of
the bar and while being entrusted as a judge. It was only after being convicted, that
Applicant discovered that an antisemitic and racist judge presided over his case. Halprin
brings a federal due process challenge to his conviction, which leads us to the question:
Does the Federal Constitution guarantee of due process tolerate an antisemitic and racist
judge presiding over the death penalty trial of a Jewish defendant?
Today, this Court answers “NO.” According to the Applicant, the habeas judge, 4
and even the Tarrant County District Attorney’s Office representing the State, 5 the trial
2
(2C RR 110-11).
3
(2C RR 58, 59-60).
4
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus, at
*42 (filed Oct. 11, 2021).
5
(10-03-2022 Supp. CR 208-59) (“State’s Post-Hearing Proposed Memorandum, Findings
of Fact, and Conclusions of Law”) [hereinafter State’s Proposed Findings]. The State was
2
judge in this case crossed the line. All parties agree that a new trial is warranted. The
conviction violates the ethos 6 of the Constitution and threatens the legitimacy of our justice
system by undermining impartiality in both appearance and actuality. 7 “[S]uch
discrimination not only violates our Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war
with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government.” 8
Allowing such a conviction to stand would mock the concept of “fundamental fairness,”
destroy the credibility of the judiciary, and delegitimize the justice system. As noted in an
amicus brief received by the Court signed by over 100 Jewish attorneys:
Amici Lawyers are members of the State Bar of Texas. Many of us are
litigators, who regularly appear before the judges of the State. We routinely
tell our clients—a cross section of the culturally diverse population of
Texas—that the judges who decide their cases will do their best to judge
impartially, without regard to race, national origin, gender, or religion. In our
experience, judges overwhelmingly strive to and do just that. But where, as
here, the judge is a bigot (no polite euphemism will do), the judicial system
must purge itself of the resulting vestige of bias that undermines public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of our judiciary. 9
represented by then-Tarrant County District Attorney Sharen Wilson and her office after the Dallas
County District Attorney was recused from the case. (1-29-2024 Supp. CR 136).
6
Professor Philip Bobbitt developed the idea of “modalities” for constitutional argument.
His list consists of text, structure, prudence, history, precent, and ethos. See e.g. Paul Brest, Sanford
Levinson, Jack M. Balkin, Akhil Reed Amar, Reva B. Siegel, Processes of Constitutional
Decisionmaking, 55–62 (7th Edition); Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the
Constitution (1982).
“Racial bias is structural error because it is ‘a familiar and recurring evil that, if left
7
unaddressed, would risk systemic injury to the administration of justice.’” Pena-Rodriguez v.
Colorado, 580 U.S. 206, 224 (2017).
8
Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979) (internal quotes omitted).
9
Br. of Prominent Jewish Members of the State Bar of Texas, et al., as Amici Curiae in
Support of Randy Halprin’s Application, at *3 [hereinafter Amici].
3
Thus, such a violation is constitutionally intolerable.
I. Background
In 2000, Randy Halprin escaped from prison with six other inmates. They came to
be known as the “Texas Seven.” 10 Before they were captured, they murdered Irving Police
Officer Aubrey Hawkins while committing robbery with several customers at a store. The
State charged Halprin with capital murder and sought the death penalty.
Dallas District Judge Vickers Cunningham presided over the case. But unknown to
the State and defense at the time, he was demonstrably antisemitic and racist during the
case. The jury convicted Randy Halprin and sentenced him to death in 2003.
In 2018, Judge Cunningham ran for Dallas County Commissioner. The Dallas
Morning News published an article detailing the 2010 creation of an irrevocable living trust
for his children that provided a greater financial reward if the children married a white
Christian of the opposite sex. This information ultimately led Halprin to file the instant
writ.
At the habeas evidentiary hearing, both parties adduced statements and conduct by
the trial judge supporting the claim he was actually biased against Applicant for being
Jewish. Many of these statements and incidents were corroborated by and consistent with
the testimony of other witnesses. Halprin’s trial counsel testified that had he known of these
10
Six of the seven were successfully captured in Colorado. One committed suicide prior
to capture. Four have since been executed.
4
statements, he would have moved to recuse the judge. 11 Only a portion of what was
uncovered and testified to are attached hereto as an exhibit. 12
11
The trial judge in this case failed to adhere to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18b (b)
which applies to all judges overseeing criminal cases:
(b) Grounds for Recusal. A judge must recuse in any proceeding in which:
(1) the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned;
(2) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning the subject matter or
party; . . . .
The trial judge also failed to conform to the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct which
mandates in relevant part:
Canon 1: Upholding the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our
society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining and
enforcing high standards of conduct, and should personally observe those
standards so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary is
preserved. The provisions of this Code are to be construed and applied to
further that objective.
Canon 2: Avoiding Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All of the
Judge’s Activities
A. A judge shall comply with the law and should act at all times in a manner
that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.
***
C. A judge shall not knowingly hold membership in any organization that
practices discrimination prohibited by law.
Canon 3: Performing the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially and Diligently
B. Adjudicative Responsibilities.
(5) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice.
(6) A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words
or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, including but not limited to
bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin,
disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, and shall
not knowingly permit staff, court officials and others subject to the
judge's direction and control to do so.
12
See Exhibit 1.
5
The record further reflects that Judge Cunningham believed it was his “destiny” to
become a judge and sentence the Texas Seven to death on his way to becoming the Dallas
County District Attorney—his long-term goal. 13 After the trials of the Texas Seven, Judge
Cunningham resigned from the bench in 2005 to unsuccessfully run for Dallas District
Attorney. Evidence adduced by the parties in the habeas record shows that Halprin’s trial
judge “took special pride in the death sentences because they included Latinos and a Jew”
and personally viewed them as “his greatest achievement in life.” 14 His campaign tagline
was “I looked each man in the eye as I sentenced him to die.” 15 The evidentiary hearing
also exposed testimony about his stated career plans: “when he was district attorney, he
was gonna bring back Henry Wade-style justice and he was gonna get the n#gg#rs and the
w#tb#cks under control.” 16 The evidentiary hearing adduced evidence including expert
13
Exh. 8; (2C RR 26-27)
14
(10-03-2022 Supp. CR 172).
He just took so much pleasure that six of the seven guys were going to die on death
row in Texas. And, you know, that was the whole tagline for the TV commercial,
and it was just cringe worthy. But to go to events with him and he would, you know,
say, I looked each man in the eye as I sentenced them to die, it was just this cringy,
ridiculous, bragging, grand – I mean, just grandiose and bragging about it, and it
was really off-putting.
(2C RR 115).
15
(2C RR 115).
16
(2B RR 109-10). The record reflects that Cunningham was a “big fan” of former Dallas
County District Attorney Henry Wade because “when Henry Wade was District Attorney . . . all
the n#gg#rs and w#tb#cks knew their place . . . .” (2B RR 109); see also (2C RR 65) (“He had to
save Dallas County from the n#gg#rs and the w#tb#cks and the Jews . . . .”). “[Cunningham]
believes on some level all black people have done something that warrants putting them in jail.”
6
testimony that the trial judge’s life-long hatred against Jews, Blacks, 17 Latinos, 18 and
Catholics 19 were intrinsic to his worldview, and that it would be virtually impossible for
Judge Cunningham to set aside those biases during the trial of a Jew accused of killing a
White Dallas police officer. 20
The habeas court and even the State 21 agree that the trial judge harbored actual bias
against Applicant for being Jewish. Both agree, that Halprin is entitled to a new trial in
(2C RR 113-14) Judge Cunningham’s own mother believed that her son’s “bigotry and racism is
his greatest burden, and it will cause his ruination.” (2C RR 68).
17
When asked what he was up to by close relatives, it was typical for Judge Cunningham
to reply: “locking n#gg#rs up” or “TND” which stood for “typical n#gg#r deal.” (2C RR 24, 113-
14); see also (2B RR 58-60) (discussing Cunningham’s regular use of the “’N’ word” in non-
public conversations).
18
(2C RR 117).
19
Cunningham referred to Catholics as “idol-worshippers” and “deviants.” (2C RR 117; 2
Supp. Exh. 7-8).
20
(3 RR 104; 2C RR 68-69, 124-26). “The Court asks not whether a judge harbors an
actual, subjective bias, but instead whether, as an objective matter, ‘the average judge in his
position is “likely” to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional “potential for bias.”’”
Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 8 (2016) (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.,
556 U.S. 868, 881 (2009)); see also Rippo v. Baker, 580 U.S. 285, 287 (2017) (“Recusal is required
when, objectively speaking, ‘the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision
maker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.’” (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47
(1975)). Here, the record demonstrates that Judge Cunningham far exceeded the objective test
looking for the mere “potential” for bias.
21
See (10-03-2022 Supp. CR. 256) (State’s Proposed Findings) (“Applicant's evidence at
the writ hearing supports the inference that Judge Cunningham's state of mind at the time of trial
overcomes the presumption "that the trial court was neutral, detached, and unbiased in all phases
of the trial." Carson v. State, 515 S.W.3d 372, 378-79 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017), rev 'don
other grounds, 559 S.W.3d 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie,
475 U.S. 813, 820 (1986). Applicant's writ hearing evidence establishes by a preponderance of the
evidence the structural error of actual judicial bias.”).
7
front of an impartial judge. As the State asserted in their proposed findings to the habeas
court:
Standing alone, Cunningham's actual bias violates the Due Process Clause
and renders irrelevant whether Applicant received an objectively fair trial.
Such a violation of the right to a fair and impartial tribunal constitutes a
structural defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds,
which defies harmless error analysis. 22
II. Discussion
The Due Process Clause
The Constitution prohibits the government from unfairly or arbitrarily depriving a
person of “life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” 23 Its importance to the
Constitution is emphasized by the fact that it is required more than once in the
Constitution’s very text. First, it is required of the federal government in the Fifth
Amendment of the Bill of Rights. Then, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment explicitly requires it from the States. And finally, the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates these due process rights from the Fifth Amendment and applies them against
the States. And at its heart, it promises every criminal defendant a “fair trial” though not
always a perfect one. 24
22
(10-03-2022 Supp. CR. 237) (State’s Proposed Findings) (internal quotes and citation
omitted).
23
U.S. CONST., amend V, XIV.
24
“As we have repeatedly stated, ‘the Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair
trial, not a perfect one.” Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986).
8
Yet, “[f]or all its consequence, ‘due process’ has never been, and perhaps can never
be, precisely defined.” 25 “Due process is not a mechanical device. It is not a yardstick.” 26
That “feeling of just treatment” “cannot be imprisoned within the treacherous limits of any
formula.” 27 Nor is it a “technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place
and circumstances.” 28 “The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible
procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.” 29
Rather, “it is a delicate process of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of
judgment by those whom the Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of the process.”30
“[T]he phrase expresses the requirement of ‘fundamental fairness,’ a requirement whose
meaning can be as opaque as its importance is lofty.” 31 Accordingly, application of the Due
Process Clause is “an uncertain enterprise which must discover what ‘fundamental
25
Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981).
26
Joint Anti-Fascist Ref. Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
27
Id.28
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 24.
29
Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961).
30
McGrath, 341 U.S. at 163 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
31
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 24; see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963) (“Asserted
denial (of due process) is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case. That
which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal
sense of justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the light of other considerations, fall short of
such a denial.”).
9
fairness’ consists of in a particular situation . . . .” 32 And this idea of “fundamental fairness”
is perhaps best expressed in the words carved into stone at the Supreme Court building in
our nation’s capital: “Equal Justice Under Law.”
Thus, under our constitutional scheme, the Due Process Clause requires the trial
judge to be impartial, neutral, and detached because “[d]ue process guarantees ‘an absence
of actual bias’ on the part of a judge.” 33 Not only does the “process” of fundamental
fairness require it, our constitutional scheme entrusts only impartial judges with the
authority to “exercise their judgment” in the “unfolding of the process.” 34 This is especially
the case in a criminal trial where the government seeks to deprive a defendant of something
so fundamental such as a person’s Life—as in this case. 35 Fundamental fairness demands
that the defendant is able to “present his case with assurance that the arbiter is not
predisposed to find against him.” 36
32
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 24-25.
33
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009); Williams v.
Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 8 (2016) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). “[A]
‘fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.’” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35,
47 (1975).
34
McGrath, 341 U.S. at 163 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
35
“Because ‘the imposition of death by public authority is . . . profoundly different from
all other penalties,’ ‘the [Supreme] Court has been particularly sensitive to ensure that every
safeguard is observed.’ In no proceeding is the need for an impartial judge more acute than one
that may end in death.” In re Al-Nashiri, 921 F.3d 224, 239 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (first quoting Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 5862, 605 (1978) (plurality); and then quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
187 (1976) (plurality)).
36
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
10
Hence, when the judge presiding over a trial is found to be actually biased, the
violation is structural in nature. 37 First, the defendant is denied a “jealously guarded”
constitutional right and requirement. 38 Second, the confidence in the fundamental fairness
of the trial is forever stained with doubt—especially if an execution has been carried out.
This is because the biased judge may have made numerous exercises of discretionary
authority to produce rulings, all based on “erroneous or distorted conceptions of the facts
or the law.” 39 Like other structural errors, a defect in the judge presiding over the matter
affects the framework so as to defy our ability to identify, analyze, and isolate the harm. 40
A fundamentally fair process does not and should not distinguish where the
demonstration of bias comes from so long as it is a credible one—especially in a case such
as this. Whether a judge is biased or not does not change based on whether the judge spoke
his virulent antisemitic or racist remarks inside the courtroom in front of the jury. 41 The
37
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999); see Liteky, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)
(finding actual bias to exist when a judge possesses “such a high degree of favoritism or
antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.”).
38
Marshall, 446 U.S. at 242.
39
Id. “A criminal defendant tried by a partial judge is entitled to have his conviction set
aside, no matter how strong the evidence against him.” Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 647
(1997).
40
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991) (“Without these basic protections,
a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or
innocence, and no criminal conviction may be regarded as fundamentally fair.” (quoting Rose v.
Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986)).
41
Any “possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof
required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and
true between the state and the accused denies the latter due process of law.” Caperton, 556 U.S. at
878 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)).
11
remarks, not where they were said or who heard them, is what matters. It is the antisemitic
racist attitude and statements themselves that demonstrate the fact that the judge harbored
actual bias against the defendant. Requiring the bias to be demonstrated within the confines
of the trial record would effectively create a harm-analysis for something that, by its nature,
defies analysis. 42 We would risk tolerating a Roland Freisler (President of the Third
Reich’s “People’s Court”) presiding over the case of a Jewish defendant so long as Freisler
keeps his virulent antisemitism to himself. As the Supreme Court warns us about racism,
“Some toxins [are] deadly in small doses.” 43
Neither should a fundamentally fair process be tethered too strictly to previous
precedent nor demand hypertechnical requirements. Judicial minimalism for the sake of
itself transforms the Due Process Clause into something unfair. 44 And as our Supreme
Court precedent suggests, doing so would be imprisoning Due Process within the
42
“Harmless-error analysis thus presupposes a trial, at which the defendant, represented by
counsel, may present evidence and argue before an impartial judge and jury.” Rose v. Clark, 478
U.S. 570, 578 (1986).
43
Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 122 (2017). Because the vileness of the statements is not
exaggerated, the moral outrage is not hyperbolic.
44
Although the Supreme Court has found recusal to be constitutionally required in several
specific scenarios, that does not mean those are all the scenarios where recusal is required.
Especially in cases where a violation is so outrageous so as to shock the conscience, focusing too
much on hypertechnicality generally fails to fulfill what the Rule of Law seeks to promote.
12
“treacherous limits” of a formula and defining that which “can never be precisely
defined.” 45 Common sense is required.
It is commonsensical that no reasonable person would be willing to be judged by a
person who harbored a public and vigorous hatred based solely on his protected class. 46 No
reasonable person could trust that the outcome of such an adjudication would be fair and
just—even at the guarantee that the judge stayed within his discretionary authority. Finally,
if one were to tell them that their very life was to be left in the hands of such a hateful
person, no reasonable person would accept such an offer. And these answers would not be
a surprise to anyone because a simple commonsense notion of fundamental fairness tells
us that such a trial would not be fair, nor would it fulfill the Supreme Court’s motto. Thus,
if a reasonable person cannot “entrust” a judge biased against that person’s protected class
to administer a fair trial over him, why would the Constitution? 47 “[J]ustice must satisfy
the appearance of justice.” 48
IV. Conclusion
45
McGrath, 341 U.S. at 163 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 24.
46
“[E]xperience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or
decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47.
47
See McGrath, 341 U.S. at 163 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
48
Offut v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 13 (1954). “Not only is a biased decisionmaker
constitutionally unacceptable but our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the
probability of unfairness.” Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47 (emphasis added; internal citations omitted).
13
This is not a case in which the action of a trial judge may just “look bad.” This is
not a case in which there is merely the “appearance of impropriety.” This is a case where
a person’s lifelong hatred and prejudice against Jews made him unfit to preside over this
case. And that toxic viewpoint runs counter to our concept of the Rule of Law because
“[o]ur law punishes people for what they do, not who they are.” 49
Thus, no precedent, rule, technicality, or excuse can justify allowing such a
demonstrably biased person to constitutionally stand in judgment over a member of a class
of people the judge espouses to hate. It violates our fundamental sense of fair play and the
Supreme Court’s motto “Equal Justice Under Law” beneath which our precedent arises.
For the temptation of a momentary convenience, it betrays that to which we bear
allegiance. 50 To allow otherwise would essentially enable members of the judiciary—those
persons we envision to be enlightened by reason and a deep knowledge of the law—to give
justice for only some favored few but not for all. 51
Filed: November 6, 2024.
Publish
49
Buck, 580 U.S. at 123.
50
“I, ___________, do solemnly swear (or affirm), that I will faithfully execute the
duties of the office of _____________ of the State of Texas, and will to the best of
my ability preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution and laws of the United
States and of this State, so help me God.”
TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 1 (emphasis added) (requiring all elected and appointed officials to swear
or affirm the above “Official Oath of Office”).
51
See Pledge of Allegiance, 4 U.S.C. 4 (“. . . with liberty and justice for all.”).
14
EXHIBIT 1
15
While serving as a lawyer and a judge:
• “Godd#mn Jews” 52
• “Filthy Jews” 53
• “F##king Jew” 54
• “K#ke” 55
• “Godd#mn k#ke” 56
After being appointed as presiding judge over the Texas Seven:
• “Because I’m going to get them all the death penalty, even the driver because he’s
guilty.” 57
While the Texas Seven trials were ongoing:
• “[T]he Mexican, the qu##r[,] and the Jew.” 58
• “[T]he god#mn k#ke.” 59
After Halprin’s trial at a Super Bowl party:
52
(2C RR 58, 59-60).
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
(2C RR 60).
56
Id.
57
(2B RR 64).
58
(2C RR 24); see also (2C RR 62-63).
59
(2C RR 60).
16
• “Everyone of them knew when they stepped foot in my courtroom, from the Jew to
the w#tb#ck, they were going down, that it was his sandbox and his playground and
they all knew it.” 60
• “[A] n#gg#r, w#tb#cks[,] . . . and a Jew” (Describing the Texas Seven)
• Dressing up for the casino-themed event and claiming to look like “the greedy Jew
banker for the day.”
After the trial:
• That the State appointed him to get convictions, and he got the convictions.
• That he had to “save Dallas County from the n#gg#rs and the w#tb#cks and the
Jews, … [as well as] red heads.” (While campaigning for Dallas District
Attorney). 61
• He would gleefully say, “well, look at this, you know, greedy or filthy Jew writing
me a check.” (When he received a campaign contribution from a Jewish donor). 62
• “the scum of the earth;” “pieces of sh#t;” “w#tb#cks;” “sp#cks;” “white n#gg#rs.”
(How he referred to the Texas Seven) 63
• “Randy the Jew” and “the Jew Halprin” (How he referred to Applicant) 64
• “Barry the Jew”; “the Jew Scheck”; “filthy Jew”; “lying Jew”; “greedy Jew”
(Referring to Barry Scheck of the Innocence Project). 65
60
(2C RR 61).
61
(2C RR 65).
62
(2C RR 111-12).
63
(2C RR 111).
64
(2C RR 110-11).
65
(2C RR 112).
17