Halprin, Randy Ethan ( 2024 )


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  •        In the Court of Criminal
    Appeals of Texas
    ════════════
    No. WR-77,175-05
    ════════════
    EX PARTE RANDY ETHAN HALPRIN,
    Applicant
    ═══════════════════════════════════════
    On Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus
    In Cause No. W01-00327-T(B)
    In the 283rd District Court
    Dallas County
    ═══════════════════════════════════════
    YEARY, J., filed a concurring opinion.
    Today, the Court grants Applicant a new trial because, it says,
    the trial judge was “actually biased” against him. Ultimately, I concur
    with the result reached by the Court. But I write separately to clarify
    what I believe is the controlling standard by which we are required to
    determine whether Applicant is entitled to a new trial.
    HALPRIN – 2
    I. THE PROBLEM WITH LITEKY
    Problematically, the Court’s opinion relies on Liteky v. United
    States to reach the conclusion that the trial judge in this case was
    “actually biased” against Applicant. 
    510 U.S. 540
    , 555–56 (1994).
    Specifically, it “discern[s] no reason that Liteky’s basic reasoning . . .
    should not apply to a judge’s pervasive patterns of speech and behavior
    outside of the courtroom.” Majority Opinion at 6. But it ignores whether
    Liteky’s reasoning should apply at all.
    To that end, I agree with Presiding Judge Keller that Liteky and
    Berger v. United States do not control. See Keller, P.J., Dissenting
    Opinion at 10–11. How could they? Applicant alleges a violation of due
    process, and due process is never mentioned in Liteky or Berger. Instead,
    both cases dealt with federal recusal statutes—not due process, which
    is the issue before this Court today. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 540; United
    States v. Berger, 
    255 U.S. 22
    , 23 (1921). Accordingly, the rationale on
    which the Court grants Applicant relief is misguided.
    II. THE CONTROLLING STANDARD
    As an initial matter, the United States Supreme Court has said
    that “[i]t is axiomatic that ‘[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic
    requirement of due process.’” 1 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.,
    
    556 U.S. 868
    , 876 (2009) (quoting In re Murchison 
    349 U.S. 133
    , 136
    (1995)). And while “most matters relating to judicial disqualification
    [do] not rise to a constitutional level,” FTC v. Cement Institute, 
    333 U.S. 683
    , 702 (1948), “[d]ue process guarantees ‘an absence of actual bias’ on
    1 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (requiring that no “State deprive any
    person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
    HALPRIN – 3
    the part of a judge.” Williams v. Pennsylvania, 
    579 U.S. 1
    , 8 (2016)
    (quoting Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136).
    But, of course, “[b]ias is easy to attribute to others and difficult to
    discern in oneself.” Id. Knowing this, the United States Supreme Court
    established “an objective standard that, in the usual case, avoids having
    to determine whether actual bias is [actually] present.” Id. Specifically,
    that Court has said that a judge is required to recuse under
    circumstances where “experience teaches that the probability of actual
    bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be
    constitutionally tolerable.” Caperton, 
    556 U.S. at 877
     (quoting Withrow
    v. Larkin, 
    421 U.S. 35
    , 47 (1975)). The Supreme Court explained that
    the question is “not whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased,
    but whether the average judge in [the challenged judge’s] position is
    ‘likely’ to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential
    for bias.’” 2 Id. at 881. And the Supreme Court has consistently stood by
    2 Presiding Judge Keller seems to argue that, pursuant to Caperton,
    relief is only appropriate in “two instances.” See Keller, P.J., Dissenting
    Opinion at 5–6 (“Critically, the Supreme Court has identified only two types of
    interest that can establish inferred bias: financial interest and conflict of
    interest.”). But this reading of Caperton seems mistaken to me; it appears to
    align more with the views espoused in a dissenting opinion in that case. See
    Caperton, 
    556 U.S. at 890
     (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Until today, we have
    recognized exactly two situations in which the Federal Due Process Clause
    requires disqualification of a judge: when the judge has a financial interest in
    the outcome of the case, and when the judge is trying a defendant for certain
    criminal contempts.”) (emphasis added). Indeed, Caperton’s only limiting
    principle was that the decision addressed “an extraordinary situation” and that
    the standard would be “confined to rare instances.” 
    Id. at 887, 890
    ; see 
    id. at 891
     (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The Court’s new ‘rule’ provides no guidance to
    judges and litigants about when recusal will be constitutionally required.”).
    HALPRIN – 4
    that standard. 3 See Williams, 579 U.S. at 9–11 (explaining that, under
    the [14th Amendment] Due Process Clause, there was an impermissible
    risk of actual bias when a judge had previous significant, personal
    involvement as a prosecutor); Rippo v. Baker, 
    580 U.S. 285
    , 287 (2017)
    (per curiam) (reversing the Nevada Supreme Court because it did not
    apply       the   controlling   standard—“whether,    considering    all   the
    circumstances alleged, the risk of bias was too high to be constitutionally
    tolerable”).
    III. APPLYING THE CONTROLLING STANDARD
    Having identified the controlling standard, I turn next to the
    specific circumstances and allegations of this case to determine
    “whether the risk of bias was too high to be constitutionally tolerable.”
    Rippo, 580 U.S. at 287.
    In the present case, as pointed out by this Court’s per curiam
    opinion, uncontradicted evidence exists that, after the trial judge
    learned that he would preside over the trial of five of the Texas Seven
    members, he expressed that his appointment was significant “because
    [he was] going to get them all the death penalty, even the driver because
    3I am sympathetic to the views espoused by Chief Justice Roberts,
    Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, and the late Justice Scalia, arguing that the
    Supreme Court deviated from what due process requires. See Caperton, 
    556 U.S. at 890
     (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); 
    id. at 902
     (Scalia, J., dissenting);
    Williams, 579 at 17 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 24 (Thomas, J.,
    dissenting). But the Supreme Court’s majority opinion pronouncements about
    federal constitutional law are binding on this Court. See Ex parte Evans, 
    537 S.W.3d 109
    , 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“The ultimate authority on federal
    constitutional law is the U.S. Supreme Court.”). So—while the majority of the
    Supreme Court might have departed from the original understanding of due
    process in the context of judicial disqualification—we are bound to follow its
    decisions, at least until its own subsequent decisions dictate otherwise. 
    Id.
    HALPRIN – 5
    he’s guilty.” Majority Opinion at 7. Further, before and during his time
    as a judge, he repeatedly used derogatory language regarding Jewish
    people generally. And even worse, albeit outside of the courtroom, 4 both
    during and after Applicant’s trial, the judge also made anti-Semitic
    remarks specifically about Applicant, who is Jewish.
    Here, the trial judge’s predisposition to “get them all the death
    penalty” suggests a likelihood of bias. In Williams, the Supreme Court
    explained that a judge’s impression acquired through having formerly
    prosecuted a case prior to presiding over it as a judge was problematic.
    This case is similar, and in some respects even worse. The trial judge
    seems to have made comments—while serving as the judge on the case,
    but again, not in the courtroom—suggesting that he would work to
    secure a judgment in this case consistent with his own personal
    impression of the proper outcome. Beyond having a mere personal view
    regarding the proper outcome of this case, the trial judge here explicitly
    expressed an interest in this very case’s outcome—that he would “get
    them all [including Applicant] the death penalty.” If a prosecutor’s prior
    involvement in a case—as in Williams, for example, where the judge
    previously participated in litigating the case himself—suggests a
    likelihood of bias, surely a judge’s prior statement regarding a result of
    the case he intended to secure also suggests a likelihood of bias. See
    Williams, 579 U.S. at 16 (quoting Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 
    446 U.S. 238
    ,
    4 It matters not whether the statements were made inside or outside of
    the courtroom. To the extent that considering out-of-court statements “breaks
    new ground,” Keller, P.J., Dissenting Opinion at 12, no precedent precludes it.
    To the contrary, recent precedent might even require it. See Rippo, 580 U.S. at
    287 (requiring consideration of “all the circumstances alleged”) (emphasis
    added).
    HALPRIN – 6
    242 (1980)) (explaining that due process entitled the party to “a
    proceeding in which he may present his case with assurance” that a
    judge is not “predisposed to find against him”).
    Further, here, the trial judge made anti-Semitic remarks
    specifically about Applicant, outside the courtroom, but both during and
    after the time period in which he presided over Applicant’s trial. This
    case is not like Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, where the Supreme Court
    suggested that more general allegations of bias and prejudice were
    insufficient to establish a constitutional violation. 
    475 U.S. 813
    , 822
    (1986) (explaining that “Appellant concedes that nothing in the record
    even suggests that these justices [other than Justice Lavoie] had any
    knowledge of the [specific] class action before the court issued a decision
    on the merits” and that “[a]ny interest that they might have had when
    they passed on the rehearing motion was clearly highly speculative and
    contingent”). Instead, the trial judge made specific, derogatory remarks
    about Applicant. Those kinds of targeted comments about Applicant
    suggest a high likelihood of bias toward Applicant as a party.
    And the fact that, here, the trial judge’s comments were clearly
    directed at Applicant as a party might serve as a limiting principle for
    similar claims. By this opinion, I do not mean to suggest that any time
    evidence shows that a trial judge has—in the past—used off-color or
    even somewhat bigoted language, in a more general sense, any judgment
    signed by that judge must necessarily be reversed. But the trial judge’s
    statements in this case suggested that he held a personal animus toward
    this Applicant, both because he thought he was guilty and should be
    sentenced to death, and because he held specifically prejudicial views
    HALPRIN – 7
    toward Applicant’s status as a Jewish person. Surely, it seems to me,
    this is an example of “an extraordinary situation where the Constitution
    require[d] recusal.” Caperton, 
    556 U.S. at 887
    .
    In this case, the trial judge made statements that expressed a
    predisposition toward a particular outcome in Applicant’s case. He also
    made direct, derogatory and demeaning statements about Applicant as
    a member of a constitutionally protected class. These were not merely
    speculative and contingent suggestions of possible bias harbored
    generally by the trial judge, which the judge might have been able to set
    aside during the course of the trial itself. The judge’s statements
    specifically targeted Applicant because of the judge’s belief that
    Applicant deserved a death sentence and because of the judge’s clearly
    stated prejudice against Applicant as a Jewish person. Accordingly, I
    can only conclude that Applicant was subjected to a likelihood of bias
    that was “too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” Caperton, 
    556 U.S. at 877
     (quoting Withrow, 
    421 U.S. at 47
    ).
    IV. CONCLUSION
    There is no need in this case to be guided by excess emotion over
    the trial judge’s statements and behavior. There is also no need to rely
    on an abundance of hyperbole. The required result in this case can be
    reached simply by applying the controlling precedent as announced by
    the United State Supreme Court, even as recently as in 2017, in Rippo.
    580 U.S. at 287. Given the trial judge’s specific preconceived notion
    about—and apparent interest in—the result of the Applicant’s own trial,
    considered along with the trial judge’s specific expressions of bias and
    prejudice against Applicant because of Applicant’s constitutionally
    HALPRIN – 8
    protected status as a Jewish person, the risk of bias in this case was
    simply too high to be constitutionally tolerable. Reversal is therefore
    required.
    Because the Court’s per curiam opinion applies the wrong
    standard before ultimately arriving at the correct result, I concur only
    with the Court’s decision to grant relief.
    FILED:                                       November 6, 2024
    PUBLISH
    

Document Info

Docket Number: WR-77,175-05

Filed Date: 11/6/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/18/2024