Gauldin v. Dyersburg City Police Department ( 2019 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE EASTERN DIVISION TERRELL LEE GAULDIN, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) VS. ) No. 19-1043-JDT-cgc ) DYERSBURG POLICE DEPARTMENT, ) ET AL., ) ) Defendants. ) ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, CERTIFYING AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH AND NOTIFYING PLAINTIFF OF APPELLATE FILING FEE On March 1, 2019, Plaintiff Terrell Lee Gauldin, who is incarcerated at the Dyer County Jail (Jail) in Dyersburg, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) The Court issued an order on March 6, 2019, granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessing the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) The Clerk shall record the Defendants as the Dyersburg Police Department (DPD), and Dyersburg Police Officers Mason McDowell and Chris Clements. Gauldin alleges that on June 20, 2018, he was at the apartment of a man named Anthony Taylor when police executed a search warrant. (ECF No. 1-1 at PageID 23.) The officers found marijuana in the apartment and charged Gauldin with its possession. (Id.) Because Gauldin had an active arrest warrant, the officers arrested him and took him to a different residence allegedly against his will. (Id.) Gauldin alleges that this residence “was not my parole address or my residence at all.”1 (Id.) Gauldin alleges that he was charged with possessing the marijuana because he was “in proximity of it.” (Id.) Gauldin also alleges that Taylor was “in proximity of” seven shotgun shells allegedly found in a bedroom and should have been charged as a felon in possession of ammunition. (Id.) Gauldin suggests that it “seems like selective prosecution.” (Id.) Gauldin further alleges that, at the second apartment, Officer McDowell “try [sic] and charge me with some kind of drug paraphanelia [sic]” found in Taylor’s apartment. (Id. at PageID 25.) Gauldin asked to be escorted to the police station, where he was taken after officers searched the second apartment. (Id.) Gauldin alleges that no officer asked him what had happened on June 9, 2018, though he does not explain the significance of that date. (Id.) He alleges that he has lost his job because of his incarceration. (Id.) Gauldin also details events that allegedly occurred on March 15, 2007. (Id. at PageID 26.) He alleges that he and two others were in his car at his uncle’s house when Officers Clements and McDowell “hopped out on me and grabbed me” and tried to force Gauldin “down in some mud.” (Id.) When Gauldin refused, the officers started to hit him 1 According to a police report of the incident that Gauldin attached to his complaint, the second apartment was his residence, and he requested to be taken there from Taylor’s apartment. (ECF No. 1-1 at PageID 24.) with “slap sticks” or “[b]atons” until Gauldin “ran off the scene because I was scared for my life.” (Id.) Gauldin alleges that “they didn’t catch with me until another month or two.” (Id.) Gauldin alleges that Officer Clements signed off on “th[e] warrant with out even asking me what [sic] going on!”2 (Id.) Gauldin seeks monetary damages against the officers. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 3.) He also wants the officers to be reprimanded “so they don’t feel it is ok to continue this behavior with other arrestees in the future.” (Id.) The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the complaintC (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be granted, the standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007), are applied. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). The Court accepts the complaint’s “well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines whether the allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin, 2 Gauldin does not specify whether this refers to the search warrant for Taylor’s apartment or the arrest warrant for Gauldin. 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations “are not entitled to the assumption of truth,” and legal conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although a complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), Rule 8 nevertheless requires factual allegations to make a “‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3. “Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants, however, are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’” (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))). Gauldin filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970). Gauldin seeks to sue the DPD, which is not a separate entity subject to suit under § 1983 apart from Dyer County itself. The Court liberally construes his claim as against Dyer County. See Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). A local government such as a municipality or county “cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (emphasis in original); see also Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994). A municipality may be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation only if there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92; Deaton v. Montgomery Co., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir. 1993). To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)). “[T]he touchstone of ‘official policy’ is designed ‘to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible.’” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986) (emphasis in original)). Gauldin does not assert that the alleged violation of his rights was because of a custom or policy of Dyer County. He instead alleges that the two officers violated his rights by their own conduct. He therefore fails to state a claim against Dyer County. Gauldin takes issue with the search of the apartment and his arrest on drug charges and seems to contend he is being held in the Jail in violation of his rights. However, if the prosecution of the drug charges is ongoing in state court, this Court cannot intervene in the proceedings. Under the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, “[a] court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” The Sixth Circuit has explained that “[t]he Act thereby creates ‘an absolute prohibition against enjoining state court proceedings, unless the injunction falls within one of three specifically defined exceptions,’ which are set forth in the statutory language.” Andreano v. City of Westlake, 136 F. App’x 865, 879-80 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970)). Federal injunctions against state criminal proceedings can be issued only “under extraordinary circumstances where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Supreme Court has emphasized that [c]ertain types of injury, in particular, the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution, could not by themselves be considered “irreparable” in the special legal sense of that term. Instead, the threat to the plaintiff’s federally protected rights must be one that cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prosecution. Id. at 46. In this case, Gauldin does not allege the type of extraordinary circumstances that would permit the Court to become involved in his state-court criminal matter. Any issues concerning the search, the decision to prosecute, and the evidence against him must be addressed in his defense against that criminal proceeding. If Gauldin already has been convicted of the drug offense, his claims of false imprisonment or kidnapping, which challenge the validity of his continued confinement, are not cognizable under § 1983. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-90 (1973)) (“[H]abeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement . . . even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983.”). A prisoner may not raise claims in a civil rights action if a judgment on the merits of those claims would affect the validity of his conviction or sentence, unless the conviction or sentence has been set aside. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997); Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. The holdings in these cases, “taken together, indicate that a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005). Gauldin has not alleged that any conviction on the drug charges has been invalidated. His claims are thus barred by Heck. For the foregoing reasons, Gauldin fails to state a claim, and the complaint must be dismissed.3 The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., 511 F. App’x 4, 5 (1st Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some form of notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded.”). Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot be cured. Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This does not mean, of course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to the plaintiff automatically must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that . . . amending the complaint would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”). In this case, the Court concludes that leave to amend is not warranted. 3 To the extent Gauldin seeks relief for the events that allegedly occurred in March 2007, his claims are well beyond the one-year statute of limitations for § 1983 actions arising in Tennessee. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1); Roberson v. Tennessee, 399 F.3d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2005). In conclusion, the Court DISMISSES Gauldin’s complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). Leave to amend is DENIED. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), the Court must also consider whether an appeal by Gauldin in this case would be taken in good faith. The good faith standard is an objective one. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). It would be inconsistent for a district court to determine that a complaint should be dismissed prior to service on the Defendants but has sufficient merit to support an appeal in forma pauperis. See Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983). The same considerations that lead the Court to dismiss this case for failure to state a claim also compel the conclusion that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. The Court must also address the assessment of the $505 appellate filing fee if Gauldin nevertheless appeals the dismissal of this case. A certification that an appeal is not taken in good faith does not affect an indigent prisoner plaintiff’s ability to take advantage of the installment procedures contained in § 1915(b). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 610-11 (6th Cir. 1997), partially overruled on other grounds by LaFountain, 716 F.3d at 951. McGore sets out specific procedures for implementing the PLRA, §§ 1915(a)-(b). Therefore, Gauldin is instructed that if he wishes to take advantage of the installment procedures for paying the appellate filing fee, he must comply with the procedures set out in the PLRA and McGore by filing an updated in forma pauperis affidavit and a current, certified copy of his inmate trust account for the six months immediately preceding the filing of the notice of appeal. For analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) of future filings, if any, by Gauldin, this is the first dismissal of one of his cases as frivolous or for failure to state a claim. This strike shall take effect when judgment is entered. See Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1763-64 (2015). The Clerk is directed to prepare a judgment. IT IS SO ORDERED. s/ James D. Todd JAMES D. TODD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE