Davis v. United States ( 2023 )

In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 20-1071
(Filed: 8 February 2023)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
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DONALD LEWIS DAVIS, *
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Plaintiff, *
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v. *
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THE UNITED STATES, *
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Defendant. *
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Donald Lewis Davis, pro se, of Fairton, NJ.
Sonia W. Murphy, Trial Attorney, with whom were Lisa L. Donahue, Assistant Director,
Patricia M. McCarthy, Director, Brian M. Boynton, Deputy Principal Assistant Attorney
General, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, all of
Washington, DC, for defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
HOLTE, Judge.
Pro se plaintiff, Donald Lewis Davis, a prisoner in a federal correctional institution in
Fairton, New Jersey, filed a complaint alleging illegal exaction and a violation of due process
against the United States Department of the Treasury. Plaintiff and the government filed cross-
motions for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims.
The government additionally filed a declaration and corresponding exhibits. For the following
reasons, the Court grants the government’s cross-motion for summary judgment and denies
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
I. Background
A. Factual History
The following factual history comes from the Court’s 20 May 2022 Opinion and Order
addressing the government’s motion to dismiss:
Plaintiff is an inmate of a federal correctional institution in Fairton, New Jersey.
See Pet. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1491 for the Refund of Money Erroneously Received
(“Compl.”) at 2, ECF No. 1; Appl. to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“Pl.’s IFP
Appl.”), ECF No. 8; Am. Compl. (Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”)
15(a)(1)(B)) (“Am. Compl.”) at 7, ECF No. 10. On 21 December 2019 and 20
January 2020, plaintiff requested the United States Bureau of Prisons (“USBOP”)
withdraw $400.00 “from [his] Prisoner Trust Fund Account, to be sent to” Sheliqua
Fuller. Am. Compl. at 8. After neither “United States Treasury check
for . . . $400.00 . . . reached the aforesaid destination[,]” plaintiff asked “the
USBOP to cancel” both checks. Id. at 8–9. Following plaintiff’s cancellation
request, both $400.00 disbursements were “returned to [plaintiff’s] Prisoner Trust
Fund Account on [10 June 2020].” Id. at 9.
On 16 June 2020 and 23 June 2020, plaintiff “again requested the USBOP to
withdraw $400.00 from [his] Prisoner Trust Fund Account, to be sent to Sheliqua
Fuller at a different address.” Id. “Of the two $400.00 requests that w[ere]
withdrawn from [his] Prisoner Trust Fund Account,” plaintiff states “only
one . . . check for $400.00 [was] received by Sheliqua Fuller.” Id. at 12 n.3.
Plaintiff contends he “was notified that Sheliqua Fuller received a United States
Treasury check for $400.00 . . . , but when she cashed it, the United States Treasury
viewed it as a payment over one of the [21 December 2019 and 20 January 2020]
cancell[ed checks].” Id. at 9–10 (footnote omitted). Plaintiff contends the
“payment over one of the [21 December 2019 and 20 January 2020] cancellations”
resulted in an additional “$400.00 [being] illegally withdrawn [on 28 July 2020]
from [his] Prisoner Trust Fund Account into the pockets of the United States
Treasury”—constituting an “illegal exaction.” Am. Compl. at 10. When plaintiff
“presented this error to the prison officials[,] . . . they said that Sheliqua Fuller
cashed one of the . . . checks that” plaintiff cancelled, “without providing [p]laintiff
Davis any proof.” Id. As remedy, plaintiff seeks “to have the United States
Treasury notify the USBOP of its said error, and to have the $400.00 that was
illegally withdrawn from [his] Prisoner Trust Fund Account . . . returned to [his]
Prisoner Trust Fund Account.” Id.20 May 2022 Op. & Order at 1–2, ECF No. 29 (alterations in original).
The parties dispute whether plaintiff’s consent was required for processing the
withdrawal from plaintiff’s first request. See Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s SJ Mot.”) at 5–6,
ECF 32; Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. and Cross Mot. for Summ. J. (“Gov’t’s SJ
Cross Mot.”) at 2–4, ECF 35; Gov’t’s SJ Cross Mot. Exs. (“Gov’t’s SJ Exs.”), ECF 35–2. On
21 December 2019, plaintiff requested the withdrawal. Pl.’s SJ Mot. at 3; Gov’t’s SJ Cross Mot.
at 2. On 3 January 2020, the government processed plaintiff’s withdrawal request, and on 9
January 2020, the government issued the check. Gov’t’s SJ Cross Mot. at 2; Gov’t’ SJ Exs. at 1–
2 (Ex. A), 3–4 (Ex. B). On 10 June 2020, plaintiff requested the check’s cancellation and the
$400 returned to plaintiff’s account. Pl.’s SJ Mot. at 4; Gov’t’s SJ Cross Mot. at 2. On 15 June
2020, the check was electronically endorsed and on 28 July 2020, the government processed the
payment over cancellation and withdrew the $400 from plaintiff’s account. Pl.’s SJ Mot. at 4;
Gov’t’s SJ Cross Mot. at 2–3; Gov’t’s SJ Exs. at 3–4 (Ex. B). The check in question was dated 9
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January 2020 hereinafter referred to as the “9 January 2020 check.” See Gov’t’s SJ Exs. at 3–4
(Ex. B).
B. Procedural History
The following procedural history comes from the Court’s 20 May 2022 Opinion and
Order on the government’s motion to dismiss:
Plaintiff filed his initial request for relief on 17 August 2020, and on the same day,
he filed a motion for leave to file all papers in written print. See Compl.; Mot. for
Leave to File All Papers in This Action in Written Print, ECF No. 2. Plaintiff later
filed an application to proceed In Forma Pauperis and a form for prisoner
authorization of payment of filing fees. See Pl.’s IFP Appl. The government then
filed its initial motion to dismiss. See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 9. On 10
November 2020, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, to which the government
responded by filing its most recent motion to dismiss on 8 December 2020. See
Am. Compl.; Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s Am. Compl. (“Def.’s MTD”), ECF No.
13. Plaintiff then responded to the government’s motion to dismiss and the
government replied in support of its position. See Pl.’s Reply to Def.’s 12-8-20
Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.’s MTD Resp.”), ECF No. 15; Def.’s Reply in Supp. of its
Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s Am. Compl. (“Def.’s MTD Reply”), ECF No. 16.
On 16 June 2021, the Court issued an Order: (1) ordering supplemental briefing;
(2) denying as moot the government’s first motion to dismiss; and (3) staying the
government’s second motion to dismiss until the conclusion of supplemental
briefing. See Order, ECF No. 17. Plaintiff responded by filing a motion for leave
to obtain a copy of cases to address the Court’s order of supplemental briefing, and
the government responded to plaintiff’s request by providing copies of the cases.
See Pl. Davis’ Mot. for Leave to Obtain a Copy of the Cases that this Court Ordered
Him to Address (“Pl.’s Mot. for Cases”), ECF No. 18; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Mot.
for Leave to Obtain a Copy of the Cases that the Court Ordered Him to Address
(“Def.’s Resp. Supplying Cases”), ECF No. 19. The government filed its
supplemental brief on 21 July 2021, and plaintiff responded on 31 August 2021.
See Def.’s Suppl. Briefing Pursuant to the Court’s Order of June 16, 2021 (ECF
No. 17) (“Def.’s Suppl. Br.”), ECF No. 22; Pl.’s Suppl. Resp. Br., ECF No. 27.
The government replied to plaintiff’s response on 29 September 2021. See Def.’s
Reply to Pl.’s Suppl. Resp. Br., ECF No. 28.
20 May 2022 Op. & Order at 2–3. The Court granted in part and denied in part the government’s
motion to dismiss in its 20 May 2022 Opinion and Order. Id. at 12.
On 27 June 2022, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing the undisputed
factual record shows the withdrawal was in contravention of the USBOP Trust Fund Manual
(“USBOP Manual”) regulations, meeting the illegal exaction standard. See Pl.’s SJ Mot. at 6–7.
On 1 August 2022, the government responded and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment
agreeing to an undisputed factual record but contending the withdrawal was not a contravention
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of the USBOP Manual regulations, and therefore the illegal exaction standard was not met. See
Gov’t’s SJ Cross Mot. at 2–3. In support of the cross-motion, the government filed a declaration
from Mr. Christopher Fritts, a Senior Trust Fund Analyst for the Federal Bureau of Prisons
(“Fritts Decl.”), ECF No. 35-1, and exhibits, including a copy of the endorsed 9 January 2020
check at issue and the other endorsed checks relevant to the transaction record, Gov’t’s SJ Exs. at
3–4 (Ex. B), 11–12 (Ex. F), 15–16 (Ex. H). On 19 August 2022, plaintiff replied, disputing the
authenticity of the copy of the endorsed check in Exhibit B and asserting a genuine issue of
material fact precludes summary judgment. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Cross Mot. for Summ. J.
(“Pl.’s SJ Resp.”) at 6–7, ECF No. 36. On 1 September 2022, the government responded,
contending the disputed authenticity of the check in Exhibit B did not preclude summary
judgment. See Def.’s Reply in Supp. of its Cross Mot. for Summ. J. (“Gov’t’s SJ Reply”) at 2–3,
ECF No. 37.
II. Parties’ Arguments
Plaintiff argues the undisputed facts meet the illegal exaction standard and moves for
summary judgment pursuant to RCFC 56(a). See Pl.’s SJ Mot. at 1, 5–8. Plaintiff asserts no
dispute over the material facts related to the transaction process. See id. at 3–4. Plaintiff quotes
the USBOP Manual, which states “No funds are withdrawn from an inmate’s account without
his/her prior consent.” Pl.’s SJ Mot. at 5 (quoting USBOP Manual, ch. 10, § 10.1 at 87 (revised
March 14, 2018)). Plaintiff argues the $400 withdrawal for payment over cancellation is an
illegal exaction as an improper payment in contravention of the USBOP Manual regulations
because the withdrawal did not have his required consent. Id. at 5–8. Plaintiff argues the facts
meet the illegal exaction standard, making summary judgment appropriate. See id. at 5–8.
The government opposes plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and moves in a cross-
motion for summary judgment in its favor. Govt’s’ SJ Cross Mot. at 1. The government does
not contest the facts of the transaction record or the lack of consent from plaintiff for the $400
withdrawal to cover the payment over cancellation of the 9 January 2020 check. See id. at 1–5.
The government, however, contends the illegal exaction standard is not met because the
withdrawal was not improperly taken in contravention of the USBOP Manual regulations. Id. at
5–6 (citing USBOP Manual at 87; Aerolineas Argentinas v. United States, 77 F.3d 1564, 1572–
73 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting Eastport S. S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1007 (Ct. Cl.
1967))). The government argues the USBOP Manual explicitly authorizes a withdrawal without
an inmate’s prior consent when processing payments over a cancellation. Id. at 6 (citing USBOP
Manual at 87 (“No funds are withdrawn from an inmate’s account without his/her prior consent
except as noted below. The inmate’s prior consent is his/her signature; it is required to authorize
withdrawals, except: . . . processed for payments over cancel.”)). The government asserts the
expressly listed exception to the consent requirement makes the withdrawal for the payment over
cancellation proper and in accordance with USBOP Manual regulations, falling short of an
illegal exaction and warranting summary judgment in the government’s favor. See Gov’t’s SJ
Cross Mot. at 6.
In response, plaintiff disputes the authenticity of the copy of the 9 January 2020 check in
Exhibit B and argues the authenticity is a material fact precluding summary judgment. See Pl.’s
SJ Resp. at 2. The government provided copies of the other endorsed checks in the transaction
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record in Exhibits F and H and plaintiff does not dispute the authenticity of the other endorsed
checks. Id. at 2. Plaintiff contrasts the endorsed checks in Exhibits F and H with the endorsed
check in Exhibit B to argue the 9 January 2020 check in Exhibit B has “suspicious differences”
in its endorsement, such as minor differences in the times stamps and Ms. Fuller’s signatures.
See id. at 3–6. Plaintiff contends the check’s suspicious differences bring the authenticity of the
check in Exhibit B into question under Rule 901 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, creating a
disputed material fact precluding summary judgment in the government’s favor. Id. Plaintiff
states “the authenticity of said Exhibit B is questionable, and the said suspicious differences
‘[establish] the . . . presence of a genuine dispute.’” Id. at 6 (quoting RCFC 56(c)(1)(B)).
The government argues the authenticity of the check in Exhibit B cannot be a genuinely
disputed material fact because Mr. Fritts testified in his declaration to the check’s authenticity
and the minor differences are insignificant. See Gov’t’s SJ Reply at 3. This is “sufficient to
support a finding they are what the Government claims them to be.” See id. (citing Marine
Indus. Constr., LLC v. United States, 151 Fed. Cl. 349, 359–60 (2020) (Holte, J.)). The
government restates its argument: there are no genuinely disputed material fact, so the illegal
exaction standard is not met, and summary judgment is appropriate. See id.III. Legal Standards Regarding Summary Judgment
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” RCFC
56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). In evaluating a motion for
summary judgment, a court draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The movant must
show the “absence of any genuine issues of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986). When the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant
who must present sufficient evidence to show a dispute over a material fact allowing a
reasonable factfinder to rule in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255–56. The evidence does not
need to be admissible, but mere denials, conclusory statements, or evidence not significantly
probative will not defeat summary judgment. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324.
Under the summary judgment standard, a fact is material when it may significantly affect
the outcome of the case under the relevant substantive law. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The
applicable substantive law here is the illegal exaction standard. An illegal exaction is “when ‘the
plaintiff has paid money over to the [g]overnment directly or in effect, and seeks return of all or
part of that sum’ that ‘was improperly paid, exacted, or taken from the claimant in contravention
of the Constitution, a statute, or a regulation.’” Aerolineas Argentinas v. United States, 77 F.3d
1564, 1572–73 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting Eastport S. S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002,
1007 (Ct. Cl. 1967)).
IV. Analysis
While neither plaintiff nor the government disagree regarding the transaction record, the
parties disagree on whether the $400 withdrawal to cover the payment over cancellation of the 9
January 2020 check is an illegal exaction from plaintiff’s account and whether the check is
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authentic. See Pl.’s SJ Mot. at 3–4; Pl.’s SJ Resp. at 5; Gov’t’s SJ Cross Mot. at 4. The Court
first considers whether the $400 withdrawal to cover the payment over cancellation of the 9
January 2020 check was an illegal exaction—an improper payment in contravention of the
USBOP Manual regulations. The Court then considers whether plaintiff’s concerns over the
authenticity of the copy of the endorsed 9 January 2020 check in Exhibit B raises an issue of
material fact that precludes summary judgment.
A. Whether the Withdrawal from Plaintiff’s Account Properly Followed the
USBOP Manual Regulations
The parties dispute whether the $400 withdrawal from plaintiff’s account to cover the
payment over cancellation required plaintiff’s consent. Plaintiff and the government agree as to
the transaction record and plaintiff’s lack of consent for the $400 withdrawal for the payment
over cancellation of the 9 January 2020 check to Ms. Fuller which was endorsed and deposited
on 15 June 2020. See id. at 3–4; Gov’t’s SJ Cross Mot. at 2–5; Fritts Decl. ⁋⁋ 1–10; Gov’t’s
Exs. at 3–4 (Ex. B). Plaintiff does not dispute he authorized the 9 January 2020 check for $400
on 21 December 2019, requested its cancellation on 10 June 2020, yet had the $400 withdrawn
from his account on 28 July 2020. See Pl.’s SJ Mot. at 3–4. Plaintiff asserts the withdrawal after
his requested cancellation was an illegal exaction—an improper payment against the USBOP
Manual regulations—because he did not consent to the withdrawal after the cancellation request.
See id. at 5–8. The government does not contest the transaction record timeline; the government
asserts plaintiff’s consent was not required for the withdrawal from his account to cover the
payment of the 9 January 2020 check. See Gov’t’s SJ Cross Mot. at 1–2. The government cites
an exception within the USBOP Manual requiring consent for a withdrawal—which authorizes
the withdrawal to cover a payment without consent—to show no illegal exaction occurred. See
id. at 5–6. The government asserts the withdrawal was not improperly taken from plaintiff in
contravention of the USBOP Manual regulations. See id. (citing Aerolineas Argentinas v. United
States, 77 F.3d 1564, 1572–73 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
As stated in the Court’s 20 May 2022 Opinion and Order on the government’s motion to
dismiss:
An illegal exaction occurs “when ‘the plaintiff has paid money over to the
[g]overnment, directly or in effect, and seeks return of all or part of that sum’ that
‘was improperly paid, exacted, or taken from the claimant in contravention of the
Constitution, a statute, or a regulation.’” Aerolineas Argentinas v. United States,
77 F.3d 1564, 1572–73 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting Eastport S. S. Corp. v. United
States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1007 (Ct. Cl. 1967)) (finding plaintiffs could maintain an
illegal exaction suit under the Tucker Act when the government compelled airlines
to shoulder costs which the government had a legal duty to bear); see also id. at
1573 (quoting Clapp v. United States, 117 F. Supp. 576, 580 (Ct. Cl. 1954)) (“[A]n
illegal exaction has occurred when ‘the [g]overnment has the citizen’s money in its
pocket.’”), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 834.
20 May 2022 Op. & Order at 6 (emphasis added). In the context of these facts, if plaintiff’s
consent was needed by law, the withdrawal would be an improper payment for its contravention
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of USBOP Manual regulations requiring consent. See Aerolineas Argentinas, 77 F.3d at 1572–
73 (quoting Eastport S. S. Corp., 372 F.2d at 1007). The USBOP Manual Chapter 10, Section 1
discusses the authority to withdraw inmate funds and states:
No funds are withdrawn from an inmate’s account without his/her prior consent
except as noted below. The inmate’s prior consent is his/her signature; it is required
to authorize withdrawals, except: . . . Processed for payments over cancel.”
USBOP Manual at 87 (emphasis added). The USBOP Manual separately authorizes payments
over cancel in Chapter 10, Section 5, Subsection x:
x. Withdrawals for Processing Payments Over Cancel. Upon notification by
the U.S. Treasury that a previously cancelled disbursement has been negotiated, a
withdrawal is processed. This notification, via the cancelled check report from the
automated accounting system, serves as the source document for the withdrawal
transaction.
[Trust Fund Accounting and Commissary System (‘TRUFACS’)] places the inmate
account into a negative balance if sufficient funds are unavailable when processing
a withdrawal type of payment over cancel. The staff member processing the
withdrawal ensures that adequate documentation is available.
Id. at 97 (emphasis added).
Plaintiff requested the 9 January 2020 check’s cancellation on 10 June 2020. Gov’t’s SJ
Cross Mot. at 2. The 9 January 2020 check was endorsed and deposited on 15 June 2020.
Gov’t’s SJ Cross Mot. at 2; Gov’t’s SJ Cross Mot. Exs. at 3–4 (Ex. B). The USBOP Manual
provides for the processing of payment and the corresponding withdrawal even after a
cancellation was requested. USBOP Manual at 97 (“Upon notification by the U.S. Treasury that
a previously cancelled disbursement has been negotiated, a withdrawal is processed. This
notification, via the cancelled check report from the automated accounting system, serves as the
source document for the withdrawal transaction.”). As stated in the USBOP Manual, payment
over cancellation is an express exception to the requirement of consent for withdrawal, and
payments over cancellation are processed after a requested-cancelled check is endorsed and
deposited. See id. at 87. The proper withdrawal procedures according to the USBOP Manual
were followed when plaintiff made the initial withdrawal request for the 9 January 2020 check,
requested a cancel, yet still had the $400 withdrawn for a payment over cancellation when the
check was later endorsed and deposited. See id. The $400 withdrawal for the payment over
cancellation does not meet the illegal exaction standard because it was a proper withdrawal in
accordance with the USBOP Manual, not a “contravention of . . . a regulation.” Aerolineas
Argentinas, 77 F.3d at 1572–73 (quoting Eastport S. S. Corp., 372 F.2d at 1007).
B. No Material Fact is Disputed
The parties dispute whether the authenticity of the endorsed 9 January 2020 check is a
genuine issue of material fact. See Pl.’s SJ Resp. at 3–6; Gov’t’s SJ Reply at 1–3. Plaintiff
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contends the “suspicious differences” of the 9 January 2020 check to the 19 June 2020 and 2 July
2020 checks raise a genuine issue of material fact. Pl.’s SJ Resp. at 6–7. Plaintiff further alleges
the suspicious differences are “evidence of forgery” and “sounds an alarm of potential
misconduct from the United States employee responsible for” producing the check in Exhibit B.
Id. at 5, 7. The government claims “The minor differences Mr. Davis raises between the checks
do[] not rise to the level of significance to support a finding that [E]xhibit B should be treated
differently” than Exhibits F and H. See Gov’t’s SJ Reply at 3; Gov’t’s SJ Exs. at 3–4 (Ex. B),
11–12 (Ex. F), 15–16 (Ex. H).
As discussed supra, illegal exaction occurs when withdrawals are improper. Plaintiff
alleges “Exhibit B has . . . suspicious difference[s] of appearance from [the other checks] . . . and
is evidence of forgery”; plaintiff, however, does not allege the signature was forged nor does he
provide evidence supporting his conclusion. Pl.’s SJ Resp. at 5, 7. Moreover, plaintiff does not
dispute the withdrawal from plaintiff’s account properly followed the USBOP’s payment over
cancellation withdrawal procedures. See Pl.’s SJ Mot. at 3–4; USBOP Manual at 87, 97. The
USBOP Manual allows for the “notification, via the cancelled check report from the automated
accounting system, [to] serve[] as the source document for the withdrawal transaction.” 1
USBOP Manual at 87. Mr. Fritts’s declaration explains the proper procedure was followed
according to the USBOP Manual to process the withdrawal for payment. See Fritts Decl. ⁋⁋ 1–
10. “The notification, via the cancelled check report . . . serves as the source document” and
authenticates all procedures were properly followed as Mr. Fitts attests. See USBOP Manual at
87. While plaintiff appears to argue about the procedures of payment, the Court cannot speculate
how the procedures are issued. See Aerolineas Argentinas, 77 F.3d at 1572–73. Having
followed proper procedure, the withdrawal was not improperly taken from plaintiff in
contravention of the USBOP Manual regulations. See Aerolineas Argentinas, 77 F.3d at 1572–
73 (quoting Eastport S. S. Corp., 372 F.2d at 1007) (stating illegal exaction is an improper taking
in contravention of regulations); USBOP Manual at 87; Fritts Decl. ⁋⁋ 1–10. The facts alleged
here fall short of detailing any illegal exaction; the check-authenticity allegations regarding the
deposit signature before the USBOP processing procedures were correctly followed do not
“affect the outcome of the suit,” so summary judgment is appropriate. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
247–48 (holding a fact is material when it may significantly affect conclusion of substantive
legal analysis); see RCFC 56(a); Aerolineas Argentinas, 77 F.3d at 1572–73 (quoting Eastport S.
S. Corp., 372 F.2d at 1007).
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court: (1) GRANTS the government’s motion for
summary judgment, ECF No. 35; and (2) DENIES plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment,
ECF No. 32. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly.
1
The language of the USBOP Manual also contemplates a potential negative balance caused by payment over
cancellation. USBOP Manual at 97 (“TRUFACS places the inmate account into a negative balance if sufficient
funds are unavailable when processing a withdrawal type of payment over cancel. The staff member processing the
withdrawal ensures that adequate documentation is available. See Chapter 8.5 for processing negative account
balances.”).
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Ryan T. Holte
RYAN T. HOLTE
Judge
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