Stanwyck v. United States ( 2016 )


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    No.15-28c                      FILED
    (Filed July 5, 2016)
    JUL   - 5 2016
    ************************
    U.S. COURT OF
    *                            FEDERAL CLAIMS
    STEVEN J.    STANWYCK,                 *     Motion to dismiss, RCFC 12(bX1);
    *     bankruptcy trustee bonds, 11 U.S.C.
    Plaintif{           *     S 322; no contract based on statutes
    v.                        *     and regulations; no jurisdiction over
    *     criminal matters; Joshua u. United
    THE UNITED        STATES,              *     States: RICO, 18 U.S.C. S 196I et seq.;
    *     no money-mandating laws identifred.
    Defendant.          *
    *
    ************************
    Steuen J. Stanwych, Santa Monica, CaI., pro se.
    Geoffrey M. Long, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, Department
    of Justice, with whom werc Benjarnin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant
    Attorney General, Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Director, and Franhlin E. Wite, Jr.,
    Assistant Director, aII of Washington, D.C., for defendant.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
    WOLSKI, Judge.
    Pending before the Court is defendant's motion to dismiss this case. For the
    reasons set forth below, the Court frnds that it lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs
    claims. Defendant's motion to dismiss the case is GRANTED.
    I.   BACKGROUND
    Plaintiff Steven J. Stanwyckr was a debtor in three Chapter 7 bankruptcy
    proceedings. Comp. at 2 (citing In re Stanwyck, 2:92-bk-2247 5-SB (Bankr. C.D.
    Cat.2002); In re Stanwych,2:02-bk-25398-SB (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008); In re
    1 Although Mr. Stanwyck is proceeding in this case pro se, he was a member of the
    California bar until his disbarment on February 11,2012. See Attorney Profile,
    Steuen Jay Stanwych - #48728, The State Bar of California,
    http://members.calbar.ca. gov/faVMember/DetaiU 487 28 (last visited July 5, 2016).
    Stanwy ch, 2:07-bk- 19183-PC (Bankr. C.D. CaL 20 13)). Plaintiff's complaintz alle ges
    that the Clerk of the Court of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central
    District of California improperly closed his prior bankruptcy proceedings. Compl. at
    2. The closures were improper, plaintiff contends, because the bankruptcy trustees
    were allegedly acting without proper trustee bonds and, thus, could not lawfully
    discharge the bankruptcy actions. 1d. Upon a close review of plaintiff's complaint
    and its attachment, plaintiff's claim seems to be that aII bankruptcy judges and
    trustees have, since 1992, failed to satisfu the bonding requirements under 11
    U.S.C. S 322(a) and have thus improperly received compensation for their servlces.
    Compl. Ex. 1 at 2. Based on this, Mr. Stanwyck seeks at least $200,000,000 in
    damages and any other equitable relief deemed appropriate by this Court. See
    Compl. at 6; Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss (PI.'s Resp.) at 7'
    In the complaint, plaintiff bases our court's purported jurisdiction to hear the
    matter on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
    the Tucker Act (28 U.S.C. $ 1491); unspecified contracts between plaintiff and the
    United States; various provisions under Chapters 3 and 7 of Title 11 ofthe U.S.
    Code; 28 U.S.C. $S 159, 583, 586, and 1930; the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
    Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. S 1961 e, seq.; and various Federal Rules of
    Bankruptcy Procedure. Compl. at 3-4. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that the
    jurlicial Administrative office of the United states courts has conspired with the
    U.S. Department of Justice's Executive Office for U.S. Trustees (EOUST) to harm
    plaintiff. Compl. at 5. This allegedly constituted a RICO conspiracy that also
    involved violations of 18 U.S.C. $S 1341, 1503, 152, 153, and 157(3). Compl' at 5.
    The government moves to dismiss this case under RuIe 12(b)(1) of the Rules
    of the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC) for lack of subject-matter
    jurisdiction. Def.'s Mot. at 1. The government argues first, that this court lacks
    jurisdiction over plaintiff's criminal and civil RICO claims' Id. at 3-4. Second, the
    government contends that this court Iacks jurisdiction over cases arising under
    bankruptcy laws and cannot review the decisions of a bankruptcy court or any other
    court. 1d. at 5. Third, the government argues that this court lacks jurisdiction over
    plaintiff's claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' Id. at 5-7.
    Defendant also claims that plaintiff has not identifred how the provisions in title 28
    create jurisdiction. Id. at 5-6. Fifth, the government states that there exists no
    evidence of "contracts between Stanwvck and the United States." Id'. at 5-7.
    2 Plaintiff purports to sue in his name and in the name of the United States,
    pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure (FRBP) 20100). While FRBP
    2010(b) allows a proceeding to be brought "by any party in interest in the name of
    the United States," such a proceeding on bond is only permitted within bankruptcy
    and district courts. See 28 U.S.C. 5 1334(a); Capelouto u. United Std'tes,99 Fed. CI'
    682, 691 (2011). Accordingly, the plaintiff in this matter is just Mr. Stanwyck and
    not "Steven Jay Stanwyck in the name ofthe United States."
    Alternatively, the government seeks to have this case dismissed under RCFC
    12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Def.'s Mot. at
    7-8. The government argues that plaintiff has failed to provide facts supporting his
    allegations to elevate his claims above the speculative level .Id. at 8.
    Plaintif{ after a series of extensions due to health issues, responded and
    asserts that under 28 U.S.C. $$ 581-589a, he had an express or implied contract
    with the Executive Office for U.S. Trustees. PI.'s Resp. at 3. Plaintiff cites several
    statutes to evidence the contractual obligations the EOUST allegedly owes him. Id.
    at 3-4. Mister Stanwyck clarifies that he is not bringing a claim under Title 11.3
    Id. at 5. Plaintiff argues that the court has jurisdiction to hear his civil RICO
    claims, but seemingly concedes that his constitutional claims are beyond our
    jurisdiction. Id. at6. Plaintiff also requests a variety of additional equitable relief,
    moves for leave to amend his complaint, requests that a conference be held by
    telephone, and, alternatively, moves for the transfer of his case to a U.S. district
    coutt. Id. at 7-8.4
    The governnent replied and argues that no contract existed between the
    government and plaintiff and that while plaintiff listed several statutes, neither his
    complaint nor his response articulated how those statutes created a duty of the
    government. Def.'s Reply at 1-3. Defendant aiso argues that the court does not
    have jurisdiction over any civil RICO claims plaintiff seeks to bring. Id. at 4-5.
    The government also opposes the variety of other reliefplaintiff sought. Id'at5-7.
    II.   DISCUSSION
    A. Legal Standards
    Under RCFC 12(b)(1), this court must dismiss claims that do not fall within
    its subject-matter jurisdiction. When considering a motion to dismiss a case for lack
    of subject-matter jurisdiction, courts will accept as true all factual allegations the
    non-movant made and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
    that party. See Scheuer u. Rhodes,
    416 U.S. 232
    ,236 (1974); Hxton u. B&B Plastics,
    Inc.,29l F.3d 1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (requiring that on a motion to dismiss for
    Iack of subject-matter jurisdiction this court views "the alleged facts in the
    complaint as true, and if the facts reveal any reasonable basis upon which the non-
    3 As a consequence, the Court need not address defendant's arguments regarding
    our jurisdiction over bankruptcy proceedings.
    a The Court has determined that no hearing is necessary in this matter, and thus
    Mr. Stanwyck's request that a hearing be held by telephone is DENIED.
    -3-
    movant may prevail, dismissal is inappropriate"); CBY Design Builders u. United
    States,105 Fed. Cl. 3O3,325 (2012).
    While a pro se plaintiff's frlings are to be liberally construed, see Erickson v.
    Pardus,55l U.S. 89, 94 (2007), this lenient standard cannot save claims which are
    outside this court's jurisdiction from being dismissed. See, e.9., Henhe u. United
    Stotes, 
    60 F.3d 795
    , 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The party invoking a court's jurisdiction
    bears the burden of establishing it and must ultimately do so by a preponderance of
    the evidence. See McNutt u. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,
    298 U.S. 178
    , 189
    (1936); Rocouich v. United States,
    933 F.2d 991
    , 993 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Reynolds u.
    Army & Air Force Exch. Seru., 
    846 F.2d 746
    ,748 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
    B. Analysis
    Even under a most liberal interpretation of the complaint, it fails to embrace
    matters falling under this court's subject-matter jurisdiction. It appears that
    plaintiff misconstrues the jurisdiction Congress has given our court. Our general
    jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. S 1491(a)(1), requires the presence of either a
    properly-pled contract with the federal government or the identification of a money-
    mandating law which was allegedly violated by the federal government.s See
    United States u. Mitchell, 
    463 U.S. 206
    ,216-17 (1983). Neither predicate for our
    jurisdiction has been properly alleged by Mr. Stanwyck.
    1. The Court Lachs Subject-Matter Jurisdiction    ouer   Plaintiff   's   Purported
    Contract Claims
    Plaintiff is alleging that the trustees in his three closed Chapter 7
    bankruptcies never fiIed the bond required under 11 U.S.C. S 322G). Compl. at 2.
    Because the trustees were not bonded, Mr. Stanwyck contends they had neither
    power nor standing to oversee and close his bankruptcies. /d. As clarified in
    plaintiff's response, Mr. Stanwyck is alleging that he is suing based on a contract
    with the U.S. Department of Justice.G PI.'s Resp. at 5. Plaintiff identifies a variety
    5 Plaintiff's complaint alleges improper action by "unnamed, non-government, co-
    conspirators, such as the fraudulently claiming power and standing 'chapter 7'
    trustees." Compl. at 5. Because the subject-matter jurisdiction ofthis court is
    limited to suits against the United States, claims based upon wrongdoing by private
    actors must be dismissed pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1). Capelouto u. United States,99
    Fed. CL 682,688 (2011) (citing United Statesu. Sherwood,312 U.S.584, 588 (1941)
    (noting our predecessor court was "without jurisdiction of any suit brought against
    private parties")). Any claim directed against individuals is dismissed.
    6 The government correctly notes in its reply that plaintiff's complaint did not
    clearlv indicate such a claim. Def.'s Renlv at 1-2.
    -4-
    of statutes, regulations, provisions, and handbooks that allegedly created duties
    that the government, including the EOUST, owed to him, which it did not fulfiIl.
    Id. at   3.7
    Plaintiff has not identifred an express written contract he has entered into
    with the United States government. As a consequence, in order to properly base a
    cause of action on a contract with the United States government, plaintiff must
    allege (1) the mutual intent to contract; (2) an exchange of consideration; (3) an
    unambiguous offer and acceptance; and (4) the actual authority possessed by the
    government representative who made the contract. See Lewis u. United States,
    70 F.3d 597
    , 600 (Fed. Cir. 1995). When a plaintiff fails to substantially allege the
    existence of an implied-in-fact contract, our court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction
    over the case. Rich's Mushroom Seru., Inc. u. United States, S2L F.3d 1338, 1344
    (Fed. Cir. 2008). Insubstantial allegations concerning the elements ofa contract do
    not establish a contract claim within our jurisdiction. See Twp. of Saddle Brook u.
    United States, 
    104 Fed. Cl. 101
    , 110 (2012) (citing Fisher u. United Slotes, 
    402 F.3d 1167
    ,ll72 (Fed. Cir.2005)). Plaintiff has failed to substantially allege any ofthe
    four elements of an implied-in-fact contract with the government.
    Mister Stanwyck's citations to various statutes and regulations are
    unavailing. The government is correct that there is a presumption that "a law rs
    not intended to create private contractual or vested rights but merely declares a
    policy to be pursued until the legislature shall ordain otherwise." See Nat'l R.R.
    Passenger Corp. u. Atchison Topeha & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 45I, 465-66
    (1985) (quoting Dodge u. Board of Education,
    302 U.S. 74
    ,79 (1937)). Evaluating
    whether a plaintiff has overcome this presumption begins with examining the
    Ianguage ofthe statute. 
    Id.
     Absent an adequate expression of actual intent, a court
    "wi1l not Iightly construe that which is undoubtedly a scheme ofpublic regulation to
    be, in addition, a private contract to which the state is a party." Id. at 466-67. "Tbe
    rule . . . that jurisdiction under the Tucker Act cannot be premised on the asserted
    violation of regulations that specifically do not authorize awards of money damages
    --- cannot be avoided simply by characterizing the applicable statute or regulation
    as creating an implied contract." Baker u. United States,
    50 Fed. Cl. 483
    , 489
    (2001).
    Plaintiff has not identified any language contained in any ofthe statutes,
    regulations, or other materials that he cites that even suggests that a contract is
    formed between the government and debtors in bankruptcy. Nor does a review of
    the statutes Iisted by Mr. Stanwyck, see Pl.'s Resp. at 3, reveal any language that
    supports the creation ofsuch a contract. Plaintiff's theory seems to be that the
    ? These include 28 U.S.C. SS 583, 586, 589a, 589b, 1737, and 1930. PI.'s Resp. at   3.
    The Court has reviewed these statutes and finds that none ofthem are monev-
    mandating.
    regulation of the conduct of bankruptcy trustees amounts to a contractual duty
    promised to debtors in return for the payment of bankruptcy fees. But there is no
    textual support for such a notion, as the cited statutes and regulations do not make
    reference to any contractual intentions and do not mandate payment of money for
    any purported violations.8 Plaintiff has failed to identifu a substantial basis to
    support any element of an implied-in-fact contract, much less all of them. Thus, the
    complaint does not contain a breach of contract claim against the United States
    falling within our subject-matter jurisdiction.
    2.   The Court Lachs Subject-Matter Jurisdiction ouer Ciuil RICO Claims or
    Criminal Charaes
    Plaintiff alleges that the United States and Chapter 7 trustees are jointly
    Iiable under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), see
    Compl. at 5 (citing 18 U.S.C. SS 1961(1XC), 1961(4), 1961(5), and 1962(d)), and
    other provisions of the criminal code, 
    id.
     (citing 18 U.S.C. SS 152, I53, 157(3), 1341,
    and 1503)), for harming Mr. Stanwyck in his business affairs. The government
    moved to dismiss this claim as our court cannot "adjudicate any claims whatsoever
    under the federal criminal code." Def.'s Mot. at 4 (citing Meschhow u. United States,
    109 Fed. CI. 637, 646 (2013) (citing Joshua u. United States, 
    17 F.3d 378
    , 379 (Fed.
    Cir. 1994))).
    In his response, plaintiff asserts that our court has jurisdiction over his civil
    RICO claims and argues that Joshua u. United States, a Federal Circuit decision
    relied upon by our court in the opinion cited by the government, Iacks any
    supporting authority for its proposition that our court cannot hear criminal matters.
    Pl.'s Resp. at 6. To be sure, the only discussion about criminal code matters in
    Joshua is contained in a quotation from the order issued by our court, see 
    17 F.3d at 379
    , and the corresponding holding ofthe Federal Circuit was merely that the
    "complaint did not identify any substantive right, founded upon either a money
    mandating statute or the Constitution, which might form the basis for his claim,"
    
    id. at 380
    . But the principle that we do not exercise jurisdiction over criminal
    claims has been universally and thoroughly well-established by decisions of our
    court, never once disturbed on appeal. See, e.9., Allen u. United States,
    125 Fed. Cl. 138
    , 141 (2016); Emerson u. United States,
    123 Fed. Cl. 126
    ,129-30 (2075); Houer u.
    United States, 113 Fed. CL.295,296 (2013); Cooper u. United States, 104 Fed. CI.
    306, 312 (2072); Mendes u. United Srores, 88 Fed. CI. 759,762 (2009); Dumont u.
    United States, 
    85 Fed. Cl. 425
    ,430 (2009), aff 'd., 3a5 F. App'x 586, 593 (Fed. Crr.
    8 Indeed, it appears that the proper response to the failure ofa panel trustee or
    standing trustee to be properly bonded is that the United States trustee would
    suspend or terminate the assignment of future cases to the trustee. 28 C.F.R.
    S 58.6(aX9). Ifthat happens, the creditors may elect a person to fill that vacancy,
    and while that election is pending, the United States trustee may appoint an
    interim trustee. 11 U.S.C. $ 703(a)-@); 11 U.S.C. $ 1104(d).
    -6-
    2009); McCullough u. United States,
    76 Fed. Cl. 1
    , 4 (2006); see also Kania u. United
    Srores, 650 F.2d264,268 (Cl. Ct. 1981) ("[T]he role of the judiciary in the high
    function of enforcing and policing the criminal law is assigned to the courts of
    general jurisdiction and not to this court."). This persuasive authority includes
    criminal claims arising under RICO. See Matthews u. United States,
    72 Fed. Cl. 274
    ,282 (2006) ("Claims under . . . RICO are criminal claims. This court lacks
    jurisdiction to adjudicate criminal claims."); Hufford, u. United States,
    87 Fed. Cl. 696
    ,702 (2O09): Dumon, 85 Fed. Cl. at 430.
    Perhaps this point has been considered too obvious to explain. But Congress,
    through the Tucker Act, has not placed every violation of federal law within our
    jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. $ 1a91(a). As the Supreme Court has explained:
    Not every claim invoking the Constitution, a federal statute, or a
    regulation is cognizable under the Tucker Act. The claim must be one
    for money damages against the United States, see United States u.
    King,
    395 U.S. 1
    , 2-3 (1969), and the claimant must demonstrate that
    the source of substantive law he relies upon "'can fairly be interpreted
    as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the
    damage sustained."' United States u. Testan, 1424U.5.392, 400
    (1976)1, quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. u. United States, 
    178 Ct. Cl. 599
    ,
    607,
    372 F.2d 1002
    , 1009 (1967).
    Mitchell,
    463 U.S. at 216-17
     (footnotes omitted). A money-mandating law or
    regulation is one "that either entitles the plaintiff to a payment of money from the
    government, or places a duty upon the government, the breach of which gives the
    plaintiff a money damages remedy." Contreras u. United States, 64 Fed. CL 583,
    588 (2005), aff 'd, 
    163 F. App'x 938
     (Fed. Cir. 2006). A further limitation on our
    jurisdiction is that the cases we have power to hear must be ones "not sounding in
    tort."   28 U.S.C. S 1491(a).
    Thus, for a statutory violation to be the basis for a claim in our court, the
    statute must require that the United States government pay money to an individual
    for non-tortious conduct. The prosecution ofa federal crime satisfies none ofthese
    conditions. Violations do not result in money being paid by the government, but
    rather in fines being paid to the government. See, e.9.,18 U.S.C. 5$ 152, 153(a),
    157,I34L,1503, 1963(a). The United States is not the defendant, but instead is the
    only party that may bring the action. See Coh u. Cosentino, 876 F.zd I,2 (1st Cir.
    1989) ("Generally, a private citizen has no authority to initiate a federal criminal
    prosecution."); 28 U.S.C. S 54?(1) (requiring the U.S. Attorney to "prosecute for all
    offenses against the United States"). And criminal conduct, such as the fraud and
    conspiracy alleged by plaintiff, is tyaically tortious in nature. See Hornbach u.
    United States,56 Fed. CI. 359, 365 (2003), aff'd,9I F. App'x 679, 683 (Fed. Cir.
    -7   -
    2004); Cottrell u. United States, 42 Fed. CI. I44, 1.49 (1998).e Accordingly, criminal
    laws would not be the source of claims that may be brought in our court.
    It is theoretically possible, one supposes, that Congress could place in Title 18
    a civil law provision mandating money payments by the United States government
    to a party, specifying that a violation would not be considered a tort for purposes of
    the Tucker Act. Perhaps plaintiff suggests this is the case with his RICO claims,
    which he now recasts as civil claims. The problem is that, far from creating a
    money-mandate that is payable in our court, RICO instead provides for a civil
    action within the exclusive federal jurisdiction of U.S. district courts, and not this
    court. See 18 U.S.C. S 196a(c); Tempelman u. United Srores, No. 06-414T,
    2007 U.S. Claims LEXIS 452
    , at*Il-12 (Jan.9,2007;.to
    Our court lacks jurisdiction over violations of criminal law, and plaintiff has
    not identified any civil statutes mandating the payment of money by the federal
    government. Accordingly, plaintiff's claims based on RICO and other criminal code
    provisions are not within our subject-matter jurisdiction.
    3. The Constitutional Claims
    In the complaint, Mr. Stanwyck alleges that our jurisdiction over his claims
    may be based on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Compl. at 3. After the
    government, in moving to dismiss the case, correctly noted that the Federal Circuit
    has held that our court lacks jurisdiction over due process or equal protection claims
    brought under these provisions, see Def.'s Mot. at 5 (citing LeBlanc u. United States,
    
    50 F.3d 1025
    , 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995)), plaintiffsensibly recognized that these claims
    "are well objected to." Pl.'s Resp. at 6. It is clearly established that the Fifth
    Amendment's Due Process Clause (including any equal protection component) is not
    money-mandating. See Smith u. United States,
    709 F.3d 1114
    , 1116 (Fed. Cir.
    2013;.tt And the Fourteenth Amendment is neither money-mandating nor a
    e There are, ofcourse, the additional difficulties of construing federal officials'
    criminal offenses against the United States as somehow constituting authorized
    action that may be imputed to the United States, and implying a private cause of
    action in the face ofthe specified remedies of imprisonment and fine, see Alexander
    u. Sandoual,
    532 U.S. 275
    ,290 (200I).
    r0 An additional problem is the notion that the United States government can be
    civilly liablc for allegedly having committed a crime against itself. See WoIf u.
    United States, 
    127 F. App'x 499
    , 500-01 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
    1r Only in the limited circumstances of an alleged illegal exaction may a due
    process violation come within the jurisdiction of this court. See Aerolineas
    Argentinas u. United States,
    77 F.3d 1564
    , 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Coleman u. United
    Srores, No. 13-431C, 2074WL 949984, at "3 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 7,2Ol4).
    -d-
    Iimitation on the federal government. See id.: Coleman u. United,Stores, No. 13-
    43IC, 
    2014 WL 949984
    , at *3 (Fed. CI. Mar. 7 , 2014); U.S. Const. amend. XIV, S 1.
    Insofar as plaintiff is attempting to state a claim under the Takings Clause of
    the Fifth Amendment, the government accurately identified Federal Circuit
    precedent that places scrutiny ofthe actions ofbankruptcy courts beyond our
    jurisdiction. Def.'s Mot. at 6 (citing.4ll ustiarte u. United States, 
    256 F.3d 1349
    ,
    1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). Because plaintiff maintains that the actions ofthe
    relevant individuals were illegal, even criminal, the jurisdictional requirement that,
    to be the basis of a takings claim, these actions must be authorized and not ultra
    uires, would also require their dismissal. See 
    id.
     at 7 (citing Tabb Lahes, Ltd. u.
    United States, 
    10 F.3d 796
    ,802 (Fed. Cir. 1993)); see also Bailey u. United States,
    78 Fed. Cl. 239
    , 253-56 (2007) (explaining the doctrine). On this point, Mr. Stanwyck
    concedes that he "has not ple[d] that the taking was valid," but adds that "after
    discovery, he may be able to properly plead this claim." PI.'s Resp. at 6. But there
    will be no discovery, as plaintiff has not alleged a claim that comes within our
    court's subject-matter jurisdiction.
    4. Other Motions
    Plaintiff also requests leave to amend his complaint based on his health
    problems that had already resulted in several extensions ofthe time in which to frle
    his response. Pl.'s Resp. at 8. Mister Stanwyck, however, does not identifu any
    additional factual allegations or legal authority that would place his matter within
    our court's jurisdiction. Even though amendments of complaints are "freely''
    permitted "when justice so requires," RCFC 15(a)(2), plaintiff has given the Court
    no reason to believe that his contemplated amendments would not be futile. Thus,
    plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint is DENIED. See Foman u. Dauis,371
    u.s. 178, r82 (1962).
    Mister Stanwyck also requests a 28 U.S.C. $ 1631 transfer of his case to the
    United States District Court for the Central District of California. PI.'s Resp. at 8.
    Under this provision, should the "court find[] that there is a want ofjurisdiction,
    the court shall, if it is in the interest ofjustice, transfer such action. . . to any other
    such court in which the action . . . could have been brought." 28 U.S.C. $ 1631. The
    Court does not find that plaintiff could have brought his claims in the Central
    District of California. Plaintiff has failed to allege a contract claim. Plaintiff cannot
    prosecute his claims of criminal law violations, See 28 U.S.C. S 547. And both the
    district court and the Ninth Circuit have ruled that civil RICO claims cannot be
    brought against the government. See Pedrina u. Chun,
    97 F.3d 1296
    , 1300 (9th Cir.
    L996); Graf v. Peoples, No. CV 07-473I-VAP (E), 
    2008 WL 4189657
    , at *4 (C.D. Cal.,
    Sept. 4, 2008). Thus, plaintiff's motion to transfer the case is DENIED. See
    Spencer u, United States,
    98 Fed. Cl. 349
    , 359 (2011).
    -9-
    III.   CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion to diemies
    this case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC f2O)(1). The
    Clerk shall close the case.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    -10-