Inspace 21 LLC v. United States ( 2016 )


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  •       In the United States Court of Federal Claims
    No. 15-364C
    (Filed September 6, 2016)
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
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    INSPACE 21 LLC ,                  *
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    Plaintiff,             *
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    v.                          *
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    THE UNITED STATES,                *
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    Defendant,             *
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    and                         *
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    RANGE GENERATION NEXT             *
    LLC,                              *
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    Defendant-intervenor.  *
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    ORDER
    The Court has reviewed intervenor’s request that certain information be
    redacted from the opinion filed under seal August 4, 2016. The documents filed by
    the parties in this case are subject to a protective order precluding disclosure of
    “information that must be protected to safeguard the competitive process, including
    source selection information, proprietary information, and confidential
    information.” Protective Order ¶ 1. Although there is “a presumption of public
    access to judicial records,” Baystate Techs., Inc. v. Bowers, 283 F. App’x 808, 810
    (Fed. Cir. 2008), which may extend to “materials on which a court relies in
    determining the litigants’ substantive rights,” Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 
    805 F.2d 1
    ,
    13 (1st Cir. 1986), the Supreme Court has recognized that this right “is not
    absolute,” and may not allow access to “business information that might harm a
    litigant’s competitive standing,” Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 
    435 U.S. 589
    , 598
    (1978) (citations omitted); see also In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press,
    
    775 F.2d 1325
    , 1332–33 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing 
    Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597
    –98). Hence,
    protective orders are routinely used in bid protest cases, for which the record
    commonly includes confidential proposals containing proprietary information such
    as non-public prices, business methods, and perhaps even the manner in which
    information is presented.
    This does not mean, however, that all information conveyed in a proposal
    must be redacted from a judicial opinion. A description may be so general, or a
    method so common, that it would be unreasonable to remove it from an opinion,
    particularly if this might render the ruling unintelligible. The common law
    presumption of public access rests, after all, on the notion “that public monitoring of
    the judicial system fosters the important values of quality, honesty and respect for
    our legal system.” Siedle v. Putnam Invs., Inc., 
    147 F.3d 7
    , 9–10 (1st Cir. 1998)
    (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Baystate Techs., 283 F.
    App’x at 810 (same); Madison Servs., Inc. v. United States, 
    92 Fed. Cl. 120
    , 131
    (2010) (same). Moreover, the posture of the procurement at issue must be
    considered, as matters that may have been confidential within a proposal, such as
    staffing levels, may become public through performance of a contract the award of
    which was unsuccessfully protested.
    In this case, the Court finds that the vast majority of the redactions
    requested by intervenor are unwarranted. Intervenor contends that the
    information it seeks to protect concerns its “technical and pricing approaches” and
    cites the ban on agency disclosure of proposals, 10 U.S.C. § 2305(g), in support of its
    requests. Notice Re Proposed Redactions at 2. But none of the requested redactions
    concern pricing, and few pertain to the non-public particulars of intervenor’s
    technical approach.
    Intervenor wants removed from the opinion all references to cross-utilization
    of employees and the use of part-time labor. One problem with this request is that
    intervenor had previously contended that its use of part-time and cross-utilized
    labor has been revealed through its performance of the contract during the
    transition and the start of the first contract period. Def.-Int.’s Cross-Motion for J.
    at 12; 
    id., Ex. A
    ¶¶ 10–11. This was given as a ground for dismissal under the
    doctrine of laches, as plaintiff delayed filing its bid protest until after the transition
    period was completed --- allegedly placing intervenor at a competitive disadvantage
    because its “competitive, proprietary processes and approaches . . . have been
    revealed.” Def.-Int.’s Cross-Motion for J. at 12. Moreover, the Court does not see
    how general references to the cross-utilization of employees can reveal any
    proprietary information, given that all four offerors proposed some form of this
    approach. Nor is the Court persuaded that the mere concept of using part-time
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    employees is proprietary. This is a common practice that is frequently discussed in
    even heavily-redacted bid protest opinions, see FirstLine Transp. Sec., Inc. v. United
    States, 
    119 Fed. Cl. 116
    , 123–24 (2014); Survival Sys. USA, Inc. v. United States,
    
    102 Fed. Cl. 255
    , 265 (2011); Tech Sys., Inc. v. United States, 
    98 Fed. Cl. 228
    , 256
    (2011); Advanced Data Concepts, Inc. v. United States, 
    43 Fed. Cl. 410
    , 420 (1999).
    While the mere use of the terms “part-time” and “cross-utilized” employees
    does not reveal proprietary information in this circumstance, the Court recognizes
    that some specific details about how intervenor employs such personnel might be
    protectable. Two instances of such detail, which might not necessarily be revealed
    through performance of the contract, have been identified and redacted. This
    treatment does not, however, extend to references to the assistance rendered in the
    performance of unspecified critical tasks.
    References to the percentage size of the reduction in labor hours proposed by
    intervenor will remain in the opinion, because the contract award was upheld, the
    contract has been performed for an extended period, and the total labor hours
    performed under the predecessor contracts was revealed to offerors (and would
    presumably be revealed in any follow-on procurements). The percentages of the
    work force that are part-time, and estimates of labor hours saved due to
    intervenor’s implemented efficiencies, remain in the opinion. The Court does not
    see how these can represent particular approaches or solutions, as opposed to the
    expected result of them. The mimicking of such results would be meaningless
    unless accompanied by the specific means of accomplishing them, and their removal
    from the opinion would make it difficult to understand.
    Intervenor also puzzlingly requests redaction of a reference to its having
    proposed to perform several unidentified tasks using one employee for each, and to
    the fact that more than 1000 staff were needed to perform the contract ---
    information which cannot possibly disadvantage intervenor. Its request to redact
    the number of task areas for which intervenor proposed fewer staff than did
    plaintiff is without warrant, as this is a mere artifact of the procurement process
    and not information actually contained in a proposal. On the other hand, the Court
    agrees that the number of employees intervenor identified as “critical” may be
    protected, as well as the number that were not (since the latter could be used to
    calculate the former). An offeror’s appreciation of the volume of tasks that should
    be considered critical could itself be crucial in the evaluation of future proposals to
    perform the contracted work. The opinion will be reissued, reflecting the above-
    discussed redactions.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    s/ Victor J. Wolski
    VICTOR J. WOLSKI
    Judge
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Document Info

Docket Number: 15-364

Judges: Victor J. Wolski

Filed Date: 9/6/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021