Stone v. United States ( 2019 )


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    No. 19-1361C
    (Filed September 12, 2019)
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
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    BARBARA STONE,                    *
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    Plaintiff,       *
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    V.                          *
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    THE UNITED STATES,                *
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    Defendant.       *
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    ORDER
    On September 6, 2019, Barbara Stone filed a complaint in this court. The
    complaint is lengthy and not a model of clarity, but it seems to concern a
    bankruptcy proceeding involving Ms. Stone. Plaintiff alleges that both the
    bankruptcy judge overseeing her bankruptcy and one of the lawyers involved are
    engaged in various forms of misconduct. In particular, she claims that the judge
    has failed to file the financial disclosure forms required by the Ethics in
    Government Act, 5 U.S.C. 4 app. § 109 (10). She also claims that one of the lawyers
    participating in her bankruptcy proceeding has filed false claims, sent obscene
    emails, and acted in concert with the judge in a conspiracy in violation of the
    Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 1961
    -
    68.
    Plaintiff's claims do not fall within the limited subject-matter jurisdiction
    Congress has conferred on this court. A number of her claims, such as her RICO
    claims, are based on violations of criminal law, but this court lacks jurisdiction over
    claims based on criminal laws. See Joshua v. United States, 
    17 F.3d 378
    , 379 (Fed.
    Cir. 1994); Stanwycle v. United States, 
    127 Fed. Cl. 308
    , 314 (2016). She also alleges
    various persons have attempted to defraud her, which is a tort claim. See Brown v.
    United States, 
    105 F.3d 621
    , 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Under the Tucker Act, 
    28 U.S.C. § 1491
    , this court's jurisdiction is limited to certain actions against the United
    States seeking money damages and which do not sound in tort. United States v.
    7018 1830 0001 4963 6779
    Mitchell, 
    463 U.S. 206
    , 216 (1983). Accordingly, Ms. Stone's tort claims are not
    within our subject-matter jurisdiction. Additionally, since claims in our court can
    only be against the United States, we lack jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims
    against individual persons, such as the Bivens claims in the complaint. See Bivens
    v. Six Unlmown Narned Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
    403 U.S. 388
     (1971).
    Likewise, we lack jurisdiction over violations of civil rights laws that penalize
    misconduct by state and local governments. See Griffith v. United States, No. 14-
    793C, 
    2015 WL 1383959
    , at *2 (Fed. CL Mar. 20, 2015) (discussing 42 US.C. §§
    1981, 1983.
    Even claims against the United States can only be heard here if they are
    based on a law the violation of which creates a right to the payment of money
    damages. None of plaintiff's federal law claims are based on such laws. First,
    plaintiff bases a claim on the Freedom of Information Act, 
    5 U.S.C. § 552
    , which is
    not money-mandating. See Hicks v. United States, 130 Fed. CL 222, 231 (2017).
    Second, as noted above, plaintiff complains of violations of the Ethics in
    Government Act, which is not a money-mandating statute. Roberson v. United
    States, 
    115 Fed. Cl. 234
    , 240 (2014). Plaintiff also bases claims on various
    provisions of the Constitution --- namely the First Amendment, the Fourth
    Amendment, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. None of these
    provisions are money-mandating. United States v. Connolly, 
    716 F.2d 882
    , 887
    (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that the First Amendment is not money-mandating);
    Brown, 
    105 F.3d at 623
     (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding Fourth Amendment is not money-
    mandating); Collins v. United States, 
    67 F.3d 284
    , 288 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding due
    process clause is not money-mandating); James v. Caldera, 
    159 F.3d 573
    , 581 (Fed.
    Cir. 1998) (same). Plaintiff also appears to base claims upon the Americans with
    Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § §12101-2213, but claims under that Act can only be
    heard in state courts or U.S. District Courts. McCauley v. United States, 38 Fed. CL
    250, 266 (1997), aff'd, 
    152 F.3d 948
     (Fed. Cir. 1998). Finally, to the extent that
    plaintiff is complaining about the conduct of her bankruptcy proceedings, we have
    no jurisdiction to review such matters. Allustiarte v. United States, 
    256 F.3d 1349
    ,
    1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
    Simply put, even assuming everything Ms. Stone says in her complaint is
    true, this court has no jurisdiction to hear her claims or provide her any relief. As
    some of Ms. Stone's claims are not against the United States, others concern torts or
    crimes, and for the rest she has not identified any basis for jurisdiction, her case
    DISMISSED for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3) of the
    Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims. The Clerk shall close the case.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
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