Gaines v. United States ( 2015 )


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    No. 15-225C
    (Filed: July 31, 2015)
    *************************************
    *                     FILED
    ALTON J. GAINES, JR.,                             *
    *                    JUL 3 I 2015
    Plaintiff,              *
    *                  U.S. COURT OF
    FEDERAL CLAIMS
    v.                                                *
    *
    THE UNITED STATES,                                *
    *
    Defendant.              *
    *
    *************************************
    Alton J. Gaines, Jr., Denver, Colorado, pro se Plaintiff.
    Shari A. Rose, with whom were Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
    General, Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Director, and Allison Kidd-Miller, Assistant Director,
    Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington,
    D.C., for Defendant.
    OPINION AND ORDER
    WHEELER, Judge.
    On March 3, 2015, prose Plaintiff, Alton J. Gaines, Jr., filed a document entitled
    "Multi-Purpose Application for Proposal," which was docketed as a complaint.
    Consecutive sections of this document were entitled "Proper Remedial Restorative Action
    Requisition Order," "Request for Proposal," and "Statement of Purpose for Funding." As
    the complaint does not reference a contract between Mr. Gaines and the United States or
    any Federal statute or regulation, it appears from the document filed that Mr. Gaines is
    seeking some sort of financial investment from the Federal Government.
    The Government filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Gaines's complaint on April 5, 2015
    for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and, alternatively, for failure to state a claim upon
    which relief can be granted. Rule 12(b)(l); Rule 12(b)(6). The Government argues that
    Mr. Gaines does not allege any facts which suggest that he is statutorily or contractually
    entitled to monetary relief from the United States, and thus the Court lacks subject matter
    jurisdiction over his claims. In the alternative, the Government contends that Mr. Gaines
    has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the complaint does not
    allege any wrongful conduct by the United States. Mr. Gaines's response to the
    Government's motion, filed on July 14, 2015, provides no further clarity in establishing
    jurisdiction, or providing a source of law that would entitle him to relief in this Court.
    The Court finds it difficult to ascertain what, if any, claims Mr. Gaines has against
    the United States and accordingly must dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
    for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Mr. Gaines has not alleged
    any specific misconduct by the United States, and has not explicitly requested monetary
    damages from the Federal Government. While the Court acknowledges Mr. Gaines's pro
    se status as providing some leeway in pleadings, Mr. Gaines cites to no statute, regulation,
    or constitutional provision that would provide the Court with jurisdiction over his
    complaint and therefore the Court cannot proceed with Mr. Gaines's claim.
    Standard of Review
    When considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
    pursuant to Rule 12(b)(l), which provides that "a party may assert ... by motion" the
    defense of "lack of subject-matter jurisdiction," the Court "accepts as true all
    uncontroverted factual allegations in the complaint, and construes them in the light most
    favorable to the plaintiff." Estes Express Lines v. United States, 
    739 F.3d 689
    , 692 (Fed.
    Cir. 2014 ). While pro se litigants are generally held to a lower standard in their pleadings
    and in establishing subject matter jurisdiction, see Hughes v. Rowe, 
    449 U.S. 5
    , 9 (1980),
    the pro se plaintiff nonetheless must allege facts sufficient to prove subject matter
    jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence, Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch.
    Serv., 
    846 F.2d 746
    , 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Estes Express Lines, 739 F.3d at 692.
    To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, which provides that a party may assert by
    motion a defense of "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted," plaintiffs
    must assert "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is
    plausible on its face."' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic Com. v.
    Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 555-63, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face when "the
    plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
    the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Aschroft, 
    556 U.S. at 678
    . The Court
    may grant a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) "only when it is beyond doubt that the
    plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim [that] would entitle[] him to relief."
    Fireman v. United States, 
    44 Fed. Cl. 528
    , 537 (1999) (quoting Ponder v. United States,
    
    117 F.3d 549
    , 552-53 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
    2
    Discussion
    I.     Lack of Jurisdiction
    Pursuant to the Tucker Act, 
    28 U.S.C. § 1491
    , an action may be maintained in this
    Court only if it is "founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any
    regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the
    United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28
    U.S.C. § 149l(a). The Tucker Act does not, however, create any substantive rights
    enforceable against the United States for money damages. See United States v. Testan,
    
    424 U.S. 392
    , 398 (1976). Thus, Mr. Gaines's complaint must provide some basis, such
    as a statute or contract, which would entitle him to compensation from the Federal
    Government ifhe is to establishjurisdiction in this Court.
    The Government correctly points out that Mr. Gaines has not alleged facts sufficient
    to establish the Court's jurisdiction. He has failed to cite to any statute, regulation, or
    contract with the Federal Government which would entitle him to compensation. Transfer
    of the case to another court would also be inappropriate, as Mr. Gaines's complaint does
    not set forth any cause of action that might be entertained by another court. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1631
     ("the court shall ... transfer [a case over which it lacks jurisdiction] ... to any other
    court in which the [case] could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed.")
    (emphasis added). Because the Court is unable to ascertain any theory of liability within
    the Court's jurisdiction, the claim must necessarily be dismissed.
    II.    Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted
    The Government also argues in the alternative that the Court should dismiss Mr.
    Gaines's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, under
    Rule 12(b)(6). The Government contends that the complaint does not "contain sufficient
    factual matter ... to state a claim to relief' against the United States "that is plausible on
    its face." Ashcroft, 
    556 U.S. at 678
    .
    Mr. Gaines failed to include any clear allegation of wrongful conduct against the
    United States in his complaint that is actionable in court. Because there is no indication of
    any basis upon which Mr. Gaines would be entitled to compensation from the Government,
    dismissal of the claim pursuant to Rule l 2(b )( 6) is appropriate.
    3
    Conclusion
    Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for
    failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and
    12(b)(6).
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    THOMAS C. WHEELER
    Judge
    4