Cordova v. United States ( 2015 )


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  •                                 OR\GlNAl
    1fn tbe Wniteb            ~tates ~ourt            of jfeberal ~laitns
    No. 14-1122C                         FILED
    Filed: October 8, 2015
    OCT - s·2ot5
    * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * **                                      U.S. COURT OF
    ROBERT A. CORDOVA, as
    *                        FEDERAL CLAIMS
    Administrator of the Estate of
    *
    General John Sevier,
    *        Pro Se Plaintiff; In Forma
    *        Pauperis Application; Motion to
    Plaintiff,                  *        Dismiss; Lack of Subject-Matter
    *        Jurisdiction; Statute of
    v.                                             *        Limitations
    UNITED STATES,                                 *
    *
    Defendant.                  *
    *
    * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * **
    Robert A. Cordova, San Antonio, TX, pro se.
    James W. Poirier, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,
    United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for the defendant. With him were
    Reginald T. Blades1 Jr., Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Robert E.
    Kirschman, Jr., Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, and Benjamin C. Mizer,
    Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Washington, D.C.
    OPINION
    HORN,J.
    Fl NDINGS OF FACT
    Prose plaintiff Robert A Cordova alleges that he is filing a complaint, followed by
    an amended complaint, on behalf of the estates of General John Sevier and his son, John
    Sevier, Jr., 1 of wh ich, plaintiff asserts, he is "the duly appointed and qua Iified ad min istratix,
    de bonis non."2 Mr. Cordova initially attempted to file his comp laint in the United States
    Court of Federal Claims on November 18, 2014, along with an App lication to Proceed !!J.
    1
    A lthough plaintiff purports in the body of his complaint that he brings his claims on behalf
    of the estate of General Sevier and John Sevier, Jr., the captions of both his initial and
    amended complaints list only the estate of General Sevier.
    2Capitalization, grammar, spelling, punctuation, and other errors are quoted in this Order
    as they appear in plaintiff's submissions.
    Forma Pauperis. This complaint was returned to Mr. Cordova because he had failed to
    sign the pleading in accordance with Rule 11 of the Rules of the United States Court of
    Federal Claims (RCFC) (2015). Plaintiff subsequently amended and refiled his com plaint.
    Plaintiff's amended complaint asserts that "[t]his case is brought on the basis that the U.S.
    has not paid its debt owed to General Sevier, a debt which is valid, legitimized, and
    verified." Plaintiff alleges four separate claims against the United States, for which he
    seeks a total of $8,447,594.00, plus interest in compensation.
    The claims are briefly summarized as follows. Plaintiffs first claim alleges that in
    1783, pursuant to an act of the legislature of North Carolina, "the claimants' descendants
    [sic] purchased 225, more or less, land warrants representing 174,474 acres of land, more
    or less." Plaintiff further alleges that some of this land was subsequently "ceded" by the
    United States to the Cherokee Tribe pursuant to the 1785 Treaty of Hopewell. According
    to plaintiff's complaint, in February 1790, the State of North Carolina ceded a portion of
    its western territory, including some of the land held by General Sevier, to the United
    States, but on the condition that pre-existing property rights in the territory "have the same
    force and effect as if such cession had not been made." Plaintiff claims that, nonetheless,
    the United States, pursuant to the 1791 Treaty of Helson, ceded some of the lands owned
    by General Sevier and John Sevier, Jr. to the Cherokee Nation. Plaintiff also alleges that
    in a Bill, dated May 19, 1796, Congress established punishments for res idents of what
    had by then become the new state of Tennessee "for doing any act of ownership of lands
    represented in this claim [that] were within the Indian boundary." Plaintiff claims that North
    Carolina protested this treaty as "a violation of private rights ," and that Congress, in an
    Act passed April 18, 1806, recognized that the pre-existing property rights of the Sevier
    lands had not been satisfied. Plaintiff claims that General Sevier and John Sevier, Jr.
    were never compensated for the expropriation of this land, and seeks total compensation
    for the first of his claims in the amount of "$8,330,550 with accrued interest thereon at six
    percent (6%) per annum from August 4, 1790, UNTIL PAID." (capitalization in original).
    Plaintiff's second claim relates to a total of approximately 51,000 acres of land in
    in the "Mississippi Valley," 50,000 of which plaintiff claims General Sevier obtained in
    three transactions in 1797, and 1,000 of which were purchased in 1795 by his son James
    Sevier. 3 Plaintiff alleges that an April 7, 1798 Act of Congress authorized the
    establishment of the Mississippi Territory, which, plaintiff claims, included the 51,000
    acres purchased by his alleged ancestors. This Act, according to plaintiff, promised that
    the founding of the Mississippi Territory "should in no respect impair the right of the State
    of Georgia, or of any other persons to the jurisdiction of the soil of said territory," and that
    "the right and claims of . .. all persons interested are thereby declared to be as firm as if
    the Act had never been made." On April 24, 1802, according to plaintiff, the State of
    Georgia ceded certain lands, including the 51 ,000 acres on which plaintiff's second claim
    is based, to the United States for the formation of the Mississippi territory, with a proviso
    that the United States may set aside 5,000,000 acres of land in order to compensate all
    claims by dispossessed owners on that ceded land. Further, according to plaintiffs
    complaint, a March 1803 Act of Congress set aside the 5,000,000 acres, and established
    3Other than being father and sons, plaintiff does not explain the relationship between
    General Sevier, John Sevier, Jr., James Sevier, and George W. Sevier, discussed below.
    2
    a procedure by which cla ims for compensation could be made. Although plaintiff asserts,
    with respect to General Sevier's property, "that the title and right to his purchased lands
    were clearly proven," plaintiffs complaint does not allege that General Sevier or his sons
    ever made a claim pursuant to the 1803 Act. Plaintiff claims, however, that General Sevier
    and James Sevier did timely deposit deeds of release related to this property with the
    Secretary of State on December 31 , 1814, pursuant to the procedure described in a
    March 31 , 1814 Act, wh ich, plaintiff alleges, provided for "the indemnification of certain
    claimants of public lands in the Mississippi Territory." Plaintiffs complaint further states
    that an 1819 treaty between the United States and Cherokee Indians set aside "a 12
    square mile area in the Big Bend of the Tennessee River for the education of said
    Indians," which allegedly included the 51,000 acres on which plaintiffs second claim is
    based. Plaintiff, alleges that neither General Sevier nor James Sevier ever were
    compensated for the dispossession of these lands and seeks compensation in the
    amount of "$102,000 with accrued interest at six percent (6%) per annum, compounded
    interest from March 3, 1803, UNTIL PAID." (capitalization in original).
    Plaintiff's third claim relates to a grant of 5,000 acres allegedly awarded to General
    Sevier as compensation for his service as a commissioner appointed "to examine the
    quantity, quality, etc. of the lands lying in what was called the 'Bend of the Tennessee[.]'"
    Plaintiff cl aims General Sevier was appointed to th is position pursuant to a February 20,
    1784 A ct of the Legislature of Georgia, and "that on August 14, 1786, the General
    Assembly of Georgia adopted a resolution allowing each of the comm issioners who
    served 5,000 acres of land in Tennessee as a gratuity and full compensation for their
    'trouble[.]'" According to plaintiff's complaint, General Sevier never received the deed for
    these 5,000 acres, and the parcel was ultimately ceded by Georgia to the United States
    in the same 1803 Act referenced above with respect to Mr. Cordova's second claim.
    Plaintiff claims that, on December 5, 1817, General Sevier's son and the administrator of
    his estate, George W. Sevier, petitioned Congress to fulfill the promise of 5,000 acres to
    General Sevier by granting the land to his heirs. According to plaintiff's complaint,
    Congress responded by granting 5,000 acres to the heirs of General Sevier in an Act
    passed on May 24, 1824, specifying that this grant should come from the 5,000,000 acres
    set aside for the compensation of claims in the 1803 Act discussed above with respect to
    plaintiffs second claim. Plaintiff claims that pursuant to this 1824 Act, "fo)n May 12,
    1828 ... about 20 patents were recorded in the Land Office at Washington, D.C.," but
    that
    native Americans occupied the lands named in said patents . . . and an army
    of the United States was stationed at that locality to prevent citizens of the
    United States from going on said lands , wh ich condition prevailed for many
    years after the death of all the children of General John Sevier ....
    Plaintiff claims there is no record showing that the patents for this 5,000 acres of land
    were ever conveyed to General Sevier's heirs. Plaintiff seeks total compensation for this
    claim in the amount of "$10,000 with six percent (6%) annum compound interest from
    March 3, 1803, UNTIL PAID." (capitalization in original).
    3
    Plaintiffs fourth claim concerns military pay that plaintiff claims General Sevier was
    owed for his service to the United States in the "Ettowa Campaign" from February 22 ,
    1791 to February 22, 1794. Plaintiff claims General Sevier was appointed a Brigadier
    General in the United States Army for the purposes of conducting a campaign against
    certain unspecified Indian tribes, and asserts that General Sevier subsequently made
    "several attempts" to obtain the pay owed to him and the troops he levied for that
    campaign. Plaintiff claims, with respect to the monies owed to General Sevier for his
    military service, he is due "a total of $5,044.00."4 In total, plaintiff claims as compensation
    for his four claims "the sum of $8,447,594 with accrued interest at six percent (6%) per
    annum compound interest from the dates hereinbefore stated respectively, UNTIL
    PAID."5 (capitalization in original).
    The allegations contained in Mr. Cordova's complaint appear to be taken, almost
    verbatim and without attribution, from the descriptions of the claims in the 1910 United
    States Court of Claims Congressional Reference case of Emmetts Humphreys,
    administratrix de bonis non of John Sevier. sr. and John Sevier. jr. v. United States. See
    H.R. Doc. No. 63-131 (1913) (which quotes the Court of Claims' Humphreys decision in
    full). As plaintiff notes in his complaint, apparently quoting from Humphreys, the claims in
    Humphreys were twice referred by the United States Congress to the United States Court
    of Claims, a predecessor court of this court, the United States Court of Federal Claims ,
    for fact-finding pursuant to the Bowman Act, 22 Stat. 485 (1883). The first referral
    occurred on or about February 23, 1905 and the second on February 24, 1908. See H.R.
    Doc. No. 63-131 , at 1-2. Like Mr. Cordova, the Humphreys plaintiff, Ms. Emmets
    Humphreys, claimed that she was "one of the heirs of .. . Gen. John Sevier" and the "duly
    appointed and qualified administratrix de bonis non of the estates of Gen. John Sevier
    and of John Sevier, jr." lit at 2. Ms. Humphreys alleged the same four claims as Mr.
    Cordova does in the case currently before this court, including that General Sevier and
    his heirs allegedly owned the identified lands and that the failure of the United States to
    pay General Sevier the amount due for his services in the Ettowa Campaign is a
    continuing debt. See 
    id. at 2-5.
    Ms. Humphreys also sought the same monetary relief as
    Mr. Cordova does: "the sum of $8,447,594 with accrued interest at 6 per cent per annum,
    compound interest, from the dates hereinbefore stated, respectively, until paid." !!;Lat 5.
    The Court of Claims decided the Congressional Reference case on February 28, 1910
    and its findings of fact were transmitted to the House of Representatives on January 23,
    1913. See 
    id. at 1,
    21. In its findings of fact, the Humphreys court determined that it did
    not appear that the United States had received any benefit from the lands belonging to
    4
    The court notes that although this section of plaintiff's complaint makes passing
    reference to "a balance of $22 ,817, a sum of which has not been paid" with respect to
    General Sevier's services on the "Ettowa Campaign of 1793," plaintiff provides no
    indication of what this sum represents, nor does he appear to be seeking reimbursement
    for this sum from the United States.
    5Plaintiff notes that "[tJh is number in [sic] not reflective of the calcu lation from 191 0 unti I
    present, which will be demonstrated within this document." No such documentation,
    however, appears to have been provided to this court.
    4
    General Sevier. See 
    id. at 8,
    13, 14. Mr. Cordova, apparently contesting this conclusion
    before this court, states, without elaboration, that "[i]t is the contention of the heirs of
    General John Sevier that the United States in fact benefited from lands in the creation,
    formation and cession of the States of Tennessee, Georgia, Mississippi and Alabama, all
    from the lands acquired from what should have been a part of the estate of General John
    Sevier." Mr. Cordova also asserts that, "by provisions of the Tucker Act granting
    jurisdiction of this case to the Un ited States Court of Federal Claims," his claim "shall
    supersede" the Humphreys claim and that "all records and exhibits fi led therein should be
    transferred to and considered in connection therewith."
    In February 1925, the Senate Committee on Claims issued a report stating that it
    had been referred a Bill "making appropriation for payment of claims of John Sevier, sr.,
    and John Sevier, jr., in accordance with report and findings in the Court of Claims."
    S. Rep. No. 68-991, at 1 (1925). Although not mentioned in plaintiffs initial and amended
    complaints, the 1925 Senate Report was identified and quoted in full in an undated
    "Reference Service Report" issued by the General Services Adm inistration , wh ich also
    provided an overview of the various Sevier claims. Plaintiff attached the GSA Report to
    his original complaint filed in this court.6 The Senate Report discussed each of the four
    claims discussed in Humphreys, which, as noted above, are identical to those in Mr.
    Cordova's complaints, and recommended that the appropriation Bill be "unfavorably
    reported and indefinitely postponed." kt at 5.
    With respect to the first claim in plaintiff's complaint, the Senate Report notes that
    there were "several acts of Congress, passed subsequent to 1800, whereby Gen. John
    Sevier or John Sevier, jr., were given every opportunity to establish their claims for said
    land and to obtain compensation as the terms of said Federal acts provided ." ~ at 2. In
    particufar, the Senate Report noted the last of these Acts, 5 Stat. 41 2 (1841), had been
    enacted on February 18, 1841. S. Rep. No. 68-991, at 3. Because no claim appeared to
    have been filed under the 1841 Act by the heirs of General Sevier and John Sevier, Jr.,
    nor in the sixty-plus years prior to the claim made by Ms. Humphreys, the Senate Report
    concluded that "[t]he claim, even if a proper one, seems to have been completely
    abandoned by all possible parties in interest," which meant that "it does not appear to be
    equitable or just that at this late date the Federal Government should be called upon to
    pay out any money upon such a claim," particularly since "the Federal Government never
    received any benefit whi le it did hold the ownersh ip to said lands." kt
    With respect to the second claim, the Senate Report stated:
    In brief, it appears that in substance opportunity was given by legislative
    procedure and otherwise, both Federal and by an act passed by the State
    of Georgia, whereby Gen. John Sevier and John Sevier, jr. , or their heirs or
    legal representatives, could prove and substantiate their claim and receive
    compensation therefor, but that neither Gen . John Sevier or John Sevier,
    6The 1925 Senate Report also was attached to defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs Amended
    Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
    5
    jr., nor their heirs or legal representatives saw fit so to do, and in this case
    a period of time seems to have lapsed between 1822 and 1907, a period of
    over 80 years, during which Gen. John Sevier, John Sevier, jr., their heirs
    or legal representatives, have abandoned all claim.
    l!;l Given the apparent abandonment of this claim, the report concluded that "[y]our
    committee is unable to find any just or equitable reason for any compensation to be
    awarded the claimant under this head. " ill at 4.
    As for the third claim, the Senate Report cited the Court of Claims' findings of fact
    as follows:
    [L]ocations were made by the heirs of John Sevier, through their duly
    authorized attorney, for the number of acres due John Sevier under said act
    of May 24, 1824, and that patents were duly issued to the heirs and legal
    representatives of the said John Sevier between June 12, 1828, and
    February 26, 1834.
    It is further shown that the United States did not at any time receive any
    benefit from the original lands upon which John Sevier based his claim.
    Your committee, therefore, reports that, in its opinion, no just, legal, or
    equitable claim can be sustained in favor of either Gen. John Sevier, John
    Sevier, jr., or their heirs or legal representatives, under claim No. 3.
    l!;l Regarding the fourth claim concerning General Sevier's military pay, the Senate
    Report stated that "General Sevier himself . . . served in the Twelfth and Thirteenth
    Congresses, but the record nowhere discloses the fact that he made application either to
    Congress or to the War Department for the payment of this claim of $5,044." l!;l The
    Senate Report concluded that "no attempt was made by the heirs of General Sevier to
    obtain compensation therefor between the years 1796 and 1907, a period of over 100
    years," and that therefore "this claim is unjust, inequitable, and should be disallowed."~
    Also among the documents attached to plaintiff's original complaint is a letter dated
    November 2, 1950 from the Office of the Clerk of the United States Court of Claims ,
    apparently in response to an inquiry from former United States Representative Paul J.
    Kilday, regarding the status of the claims made by the heirs to General Sevier and John
    Sevier, Jr. The letter confirms that the House Committee on Private Land Claims referred
    these claims to the Court of Claims for findings of fact, that "the Court on February 28,
    1910, filed its findings of fact ... but without recommending any allowance for the
    claimant," and that such findings were certified to Congress and reported on January 23,
    1913. The letter also stated that "as far as the court is concerned, the Sevier case has
    been a closed matter since its certification to Congress in 1913."
    After plaintiff's amended complaint was filed, defendant filed a motion to dismiss
    pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1) (2015), or, in the alternative, RCFC 12(b)(6) (2015), for lack
    6
    of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, respectively. After numerous
    delays by the plaintiff, defendant's motion has been fully briefed.
    DISCUSSION
    The court recognizes that plaintiff is proceeding prose. When determining whether
    a complaint filed by a pro ~ plaintiff is sufficient to invoke review by a court, Q!Q se
    plaintiffs are entitled to liberal construction of their pleadings. See Haines v. Kerner, 
    404 U.S. 519
    , 520-21 (requiring that allegations contained in a pro se complaint be held to
    "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers"), reh'g denied, 
    405 U.S. 948
    (1972); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 
    551 U.S. 89
    , 94 (2007); Hughes v. Rowe,
    
    449 U.S. 5
    , 9- 10 (1980); Estelle v. Gamble, 
    429 U.S. 97
    , 106 (1976), reh'g denied, 
    429 U.S. 1066
    (1977); Matthews v. United States, 
    750 F.3d 1320
    , 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
    Diamond v. United States, 
    115 Fed. Cl. 516
    , 524 (2014), aff'd, 
    603 F. App'x 947
    (Fed.
    Cir.), cert. denied, 
    135 S. Ct. 1909
    (2015). "However, '"(t]here is no duty on the part of the
    trial court to create a claim which {the plaintiff] has not spelled out in his [or her)
    pleading .""' Lengen v. United States, 
    100 Fed. Cl. 317
    , 328 (2011) (alterations in original)
    (quoting Scogin v. United States, 
    33 Fed. Cl. 285
    , 293 (1995) (quoting Clark v. Nat'I
    Travelers Life Ins. Co., 
    518 F.2d 1167
    , 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))); see also Bussie v. United
    States, 
    96 Fed. Cl. 89
    , 94, aff'd, 443 F. App 'x 542 (Fed. Cir. 2011 ); Minehan v. United
    States, 75 Fed . Cl. 249, 253 (2007). "Whi le a pro se plaintiff is held to a less stringent
    standard than that of a plaintiff represented by an attorney, the pro se plaintiff,
    nevertheless, bears the burden of establishing the Court's jurisdiction by a preponderance
    of the evidence." Riles v. United States, 
    93 Fed. Cl. 163
    , 165 (2010) (citing Hughes v.
    
    Rowe, 449 U.S. at 9
    and Taylor v. United States, 
    303 F.3d 1357
    , 1359 (Fed. Cir.) ("Plaintiff
    bears the burden of showing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence."), reh'g and
    reh'g en bane denied (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see also Shelkofsky v. United States, 119 Fed.
    CL 133, 139 (2014) ("[W)hile the court may excuse ambiguities in a pro se plaintiff's
    complaint, the court 'does not excuse [a complaint's] failures ."' (quoting Henke v. United
    States, 
    60 F.3d 795
    , 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995)); Harris v. United States, 
    113 Fed. Cl. 290
    , 292
    (2013) ("Although plaintiff's pleadings are held to a less stringent standard, such leniency
    'with respect to mere formalities does not relieve the burden to meet jurisdictional
    requirements.'" (quoting Minehan v. United 
    States, 75 Fed. Cl. at 253
    )).
    Even granting the more liberal construction afforded to a complaint filed by a pro
    se plaintiff, plaintiff has not met his burden of showing that this court has jurisdiction to
    hear the claims contained in his complaint. It is well established that '"subject-matter
    jurisdiction, because it involves a court's power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or
    waived."' Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 
    546 U.S. 500
    , 514 (2006} (quoting United States v.
    Cotton, 
    535 U.S. 625
    , 630 (2002)). "[F]ederal courts have an independent obligation to
    ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction, and therefore they must
    raise and decide jurisdictional questions that the parties either overlook or elect not to
    press." Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 
    131 S. Ct. 1197
    , 1202 (2011); see also
    Gonzalez v. Thaler, 
    132 S. Ct. 641
    , 648 (2012) ("When a requirement goes to subject-
    matter jurisdiction, courts are obligated to consider sua sponfe issues that the parties
    have disclaimed or have not presented."); Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 
    559 U.S. 77
    , 94 (2010)
    ("Courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction
    7
    exists, even when no party challenges it." (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H 
    Corp., 546 U.S. at 514
    )); Special Devices. Inc. v. OEA. Inc., 
    269 F.3d 1340
    , 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[A] court
    has a duty to inquire into its jurisdiction to hear and decide a case." (citing Johannsen v.
    Pay Less Drug Stores N.W., Inc., 
    918 F.2d 160
    , 161 (Fed. Cir. 1990)); View Eng'g, Inc.
    v. Robotic Vision Sys., lnQ., 
    115 F.3d 962
    , 963 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[C]ourts must always
    look to their jurisdiction, whether the parties raise the issue or not."). "Objections to a
    tribunal's jurisdiction can be raised at any time, even by a party that once conceded the
    tribunal's subject-matter jurisdiction over the controversy." Sebelius v. Auburn Reg' I Med.
    Ctr., 
    133 S. Ct. 817
    , 824 (2013); see also Arbaugh v. Y & H 
    Corp., 546 U.S. at 506
    (''The
    objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction ... may be raised by a party,
    or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the
    entry of judgment."); Cent. Pines Land Co., L.L.C. v. United States, 
    697 F.3d 1360
    , 1364
    n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("An objection to a court's subject matter jurisdiction can be raised by
    any party or the court at any stage of litigation, including after trial and the entry of
    judgment." (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H 
    Corp., 546 U.S. at 506
    -07)); Rick's Mushroom Serv.,
    Inc. v. United States, 
    521 F.3d 1338
    , 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("[A]ny party may challenge,
    or the court may raise sua sponte, subject matter jurisdiction at any time." (citing Arbaugh
    v. Y & H 
    Corp., 546 U.S. at 506
    ; Folden v. United States, 
    379 F.3d 1344
    , 1354 (Fed. Cir.),
    reh'g and reh'g en bane denied (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 
    545 U.S. 1127
    (2005); and
    Fanning, Phillips & Molnar v. West, 
    160 F.3d 717
    , 720 (Fed. Cir. 1998))); Pikulin v. United
    States, 97 Fed. CL 71, 76, appeal dismissed, 
    425 F. App'x 902
    (Fed. Cir. 2011). In fact,
    "[s]ubject matter jurisdiction is an inquiry that this court must raise sua sponte, even where
    .. . neither party has raised this issue." Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am.
    Holdings, 
    370 F.3d 1354
    , 1369 (Fed. Cir.) (citing Textile Prods., Inc. v. Mead Corp., 
    134 F.3d 1481
    , 1485 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g denied and en bane suggestion declined (Fed. Cir.),
    cert. denied, 
    525 U.S. 826
    (1998)), reh'g and reh'g en bane denied (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert.
    granted in part sub. nom Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 
    546 U.S. 975
    (2005), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 
    548 U.S. 124
    (2006); see also Avid
    Identification Sys., Inc. v. Crystal Import Corp., 
    603 F.3d 967
    , 971 (Fed. Cir.) ("This court
    must always determine for itself whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case before it, even
    when the parties do not raise or contest the issue."), reh'g and reh'g en bane denied, 
    614 F.3d 1330
    (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
    5 U.S. 1169
    (2011).
    Pursuant to the RCFC and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff need
    only state in the complaint "a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's
    jurisdiction," and "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
    entitled to relief." RCFC 8(a)(1), (2) (2015); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), (2) (2015); see also
    Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 677-78 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 555-57, 570 (2007)). "Determination of jurisdiction starts with the complaint, which
    must be well-pleaded in that it must state the necessary elements of the plaintiff's claim,
    independent of any defense that may be interposed." Holley v. United States, 
    124 F.3d 1462
    , 1465 (Fed. Cir.) (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 
    463 U.S. 1
    (1983)), reh'g denied (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Klamath Tribe Claims Comm. v.
    United States, 
    97 Fed. Cl. 203
    , 208 (2011); Gonzalez-Mccaulley Inv. Grp., Inc. v. United
    States, 
    93 Fed. Cl. 710
    , 713 (2010). "Conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted
    inferences of fact do not suffice to support a claim." Bradley v. C.hiron Corp., 
    136 F.3d 8
     1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Mczeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F .3d 1354, 1363
    n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Dyk, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting C. Wright and
    A Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1286 (3d ed. 2004)). "A plaintiff's factual
    allegations must 'raise a right to relief above the speculative level' and cross 'the line from
    conceivable to plausible."' Three S Consulting v. United States, 
    104 Fed. Cl. 510
    , 523
    (2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
    Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
    ), aff'd, 
    562 F. App'x 964
    (Fed.
    Cir.), reh'g denied (Fed. Cir. 2014). As stated in Ashcroft v. Igbal, "[a] pleading that offers
    'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
    not 
    do.' 550 U.S. at 555
    . Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]'
    devoid of 'further factual enhancement."' Ashcroft v. 
    Igbal, 556 U.S. at 678
    (quoting Bell
    Atl. Corp. v. 
    Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
    ).
    The Tucker Act grants jurisdiction to this court as follows :
    The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render
    judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the
    Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive
    department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States,
    or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.
    28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2012). As interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, the
    Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity to allow jurisdiction over claims against the United
    States (1) founded on an express or implied contract with the United States, (2) seeking
    a refund from a prior payment made to the government, or (3) based on federal
    constitutional, statutory, or regulatory law mandating compensation by the federal
    government for damages sustained. See United States v. Navajo Nation, 
    556 U.S. 287
    ,
    289-90 (2009); United States v. Mitchell, 
    463 U.S. 206
    , 216 (1983); see also Greenlee
    Cnty.. Ariz. v. United States, 
    487 F.3d 871
    , 875 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en bane denied
    (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 
    552 U.S. 1142
    (2008); Palmer v. United States, 
    168 F.3d 1310
    , 1314 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
    "Not every claim invoking the Constitution, a federal statute, or a regulation is
    cognizable under the Tucker Act. The claim must be one for money damages against the
    United States ...."United States v. 
    Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216
    ; see also United States v.
    White Mountain Apache Tribe, 
    537 U.S. 465
    , 472 (2003); Smith v. United States, 
    709 F.3d 1114
    , 1116 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 
    134 S. Ct. 259
    (2013); RadioShack Corp. v.
    United States, 
    566 F.3d 1358
    , 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Rick's Mushroom Serv.. Inc. v.
    United 
    States, 521 F.3d at 1343
    ("[P]laintiff must ... identify a substantive source of law
    that creates the right to recovery of money damages against the United States."); Golden
    v. United States, 
    118 Fed. Cl. 764
    , 768 (2014). In Ontario Power Generation. Inc. v.
    United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit identified three
    types of monetary claims for which jurisdiction is lodged in the United States Court of
    Federal Claims. The court wrote:
    The underlying monetary claims are of three types .... First, claims alleging
    the existence of a contract between the plaintiff and the government fall
    9
    within the Tucker Act's waiver. . . . Second, the Tucker Act's waiver
    encompasses claims where "the plaintiff has paid money over to the
    Government, directly or in effect, and seeks return of all or part of that sum."
    Eastport S.S. [Corp. v. United States, 
    178 Ct. Cl. 599
    , 605-06,] 372 F.2d
    [1002,] 1007-08 [(1967)] (describing illegal exaction claims as claims "in
    which 'the Government has the citizen's money in its pocket"' (quoting
    Clapp v. United States, 
    127 Ct. Cl. 505
    , 
    117 F. Supp. 576
    , 580 (1954)) ... .
    Third, the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over those claims where
    "money has not been paid but the plaintiff asserts that he is nevertheless
    entitled to a payment from the treasury." Eastport 
    S.S., 372 F.2d at 1007
    .
    Claims in this third category, where no payment has been made to the
    government, either directly or in effect, require that the "particular provision
    of law relied upon grants the claimant, expressly or by implication, a right to
    be paid a certain sum." .!!;L; see also [United States v. JTestan, 424 U.S.
    [392,] 401-02 [1976] ("Where the United States is the defendant and the
    plaintiff is not suing for money improperly exacted or retained, the basis of
    the federal claim-whether it be the Constitution, a statute, or a regulation-
    does not create a cause of action for money damages unless, as the Court
    of Claims has stated, that basis 'in itself ... can fairly be interpreted as
    mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage
    sustained."' (quoting Eastport 
    S.S., 372 F.2d at 1009
    )). This category is
    commonly referred to as claims brought under a "money-mandating"
    statute.
    Ontario Power Generation, Inc. v. United States, 
    369 F.3d 1298
    , 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
    see also Twp. of Saddle Brook v. United States, 
    104 Fed. Cl. 101
    , 106 (2012).
    To prove that a statute or regulation is money-mandating, a plaintiff must
    demonstrate that an independent source of substantive law relied upon "'can fairly be
    interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government."' United States v.
    Navajo 
    Nation, 556 U.S. at 290
    (quoting United States v. Testan, 
    424 U.S. 392
    , 400
    (1976)); see also United States v. White Mountain Apache 
    Tribe, 537 U.S. at 472
    ; United
    States v. 
    Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 217
    ; Blueport Co., LLC v. United States, 
    533 F.3d 1374
    ,
    1383 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 
    555 U.S. 1153
    (2009). The source of law granting
    monetary relief must be distinct from the Tucker Act itself. See United States v. Navajo
    
    Nation, 556 U.S. at 290
    (The Tucker Act does not create "substantive rights; [it is simply
    a] jurisdictional provision[] that operate[s] to waive sovereign immunity for claims
    premised on other sources of law (e.g., statutes or contracts)."). '"If the statute is not
    money-mandating, the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction, and the dismissal
    should be for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."' Jan's Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. Fed.
    Aviation Admin., 
    525 F.3d 1299
    , 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Greenlee Cnty .. Ariz. v.
    United 
    States, 487 F.3d at 876
    ); Fisher v. United States, 
    402 F.3d 1167
    , 1173 (Fed. Cir.
    2005) (The absence of a money-mandating source is "fatal to the court's jurisdiction under
    the Tucker Act."); Peoples v. United States, 
    87 Fed. Cl. 553
    , 565-66 (2009).
    Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2012), suits against the United States are subject
    to a six-year statute of limitations. According to 28 U.S.C. § 2501:
    10
    Every claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims has
    jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years
    after such claim first accrues . ... A petition on the cla im of a person under
    legal disability or beyond the seas at the time the claim accrues may be filed
    within three years after the disability ceases.
    lit. 'The six-year statute of limitations set forth in section 2501 is a jurisdictional
    requirement for a suit in the Court of Federal Claims." John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v.
    United States, 
    457 F.3d 1345
    , 1354 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g en bane denied (Fed. Cir. 2006),
    affd, 
    552 U.S. 130
    (2008); Banks v. United States, 
    102 Fed. Cl. 115
    , 127 (2011) (citing
    U.S.C. § 2501 ). The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has indicated
    that a claim accrues '""when all events have occurred to fix the Government's alleged
    liability, entitling the claimant to demand payment and sue here for his money.""' San
    Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 
    639 F.3d 1346
    , 1358-59 (Fed. Cir.) (quoting
    Samish Indian Nation v. United States, 
    419 F.3d 1355
    , 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting
    Martinez v. United States, 
    333 F.3d 1295
    , 1303 (Fed . Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 
    540 U.S. 1177
    (2004))), reh'g en bane denied (Fed. Cir. 2011 ); see also FloorPro, Inc. v. United
    States, 
    680 F.3d 1377
    , 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Martinez v. United 
    States, 333 F.3d at 1303
    ) ("A cause of action cognizable in a Tucker Act suit accrues as soon as all events
    have occurred that are necessary to enable the plaintiff to bring suit, i.e., when 'all events
    have occurred to fix the Government's alleged liability, entitling the cla imant to demand
    payment and sue here for his money."' (quoting Nager Elec. Co. v. United States, 177 Ct.
    CL 234, 240, 
    368 F.2d 847
    , 851 (1966), motion denied, 
    184 Ct. Cl. 390
    , 
    396 F.2d 977
    (1968)); Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 
    855 F.2d 1573
    , 1577 (Fed. Cir.
    1988); see also Brizuela v. United States, 
    103 Fed. Cl. 635
    , 639, aff'd, 
    492 F. App'x 97
    (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. denied 
    133 S. Ct. 1645
    (2013). A Judge of the United States Court
    of Federal Claims has noted that:
    Jt is well-established that a claim accrues under section 2501 "when 'all
    events have occurred to fix the Government's alleged liability, entitling the
    claimant to demand payment and sue here for his money.'" Martinez v.
    United States, 
    333 F.3d 1295
    , 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en bane), cert. denied,
    
    540 U.S. 1177
    (2004) (quoting Nager Elec. Co. v. United States, 
    368 F.2d 847
    , 851 (Ct. Cl. 1966)); see also Samish [Indian Nation v. United States),
    419 F.3d [1355,] 1369 [(2005)). Because, as noted, this requirement is
    jurisdictional, plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that its claims were
    timely. See Alder Terrace. Inc. v. United States, 
    161 F.3d 1372
    , 1377 (Fed .
    Cir. 1998); Entines v. United States , 39 Fed . Cl. 673, 678 (1997) , affd , 
    185 F.3d 881
    (Fed. Cir.) , cert. denied , 
    526 U.S. 111
    7 (1999); see also John R.
    Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 
    457 F.3d 1345
    , 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
    (Newman, J., dissenting); Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 
    846 F.2d 746
    , 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
    Parkwood Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. United States, 
    97 Fed. Cl. 809
    , 813-14 (2011), aff'd, 
    465 F. App'x 952
    (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Klamath Tribe Claims Comm. v. United 
    States, 97 Fed. Cl. at 209
    (2011) (citing Alder Terrace. Inc. v. United States, 161F.3d1372, 1377
    (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Accrual of a claim is "'determined under an objective standard"' and
    11
    plaintiff does not have to possess actual knowledge of all the relevant facts in order for a
    cause of action to accrue. FloorPro. Inc. v. United 
    States, 680 F.3d at 1381
    (quoting Fallini
    v. United States, 
    56 F.3d 1378
    , 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied , 
    517 U.S. 1243
    (1996)).
    Like other claims brought under the Tucker Act, takings claims typically accrue
    "'only when all the events which fix the government's alleged liability have occurred and
    the plaintiff was or should have been aware of their existence."' Casitas Mun. Water Dist.
    v. United States, 
    708 F.3d 1340
    , 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original) (quoting
    Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v. United 
    States, 855 F.2d at 1577
    ); see also Navajo
    Nation v. United States, 
    631 F.3d 1368
    , 1273-74 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("In general, a takings
    'claim first accrues when all the events have occurred which fix the alleged liability of the
    [government] and entitle the plaintiff to institute an action."' (quoting Hopland Band of
    Pomo Indians v. United 
    States, 855 F.2d at 1577
    (citing Fallini v. United 
    States, 56 F.3d at 1380
    ); John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United 
    States, 457 F.3d at 1355-56
    . '"Therefore,
    a claim under the Fifth Amendment accrues when [the] taking action occurs."' Navajo
    Nation v. United 
    States, 631 F.3d at 1273-74
    (brackets in original) (quoting Goodrich v .
    United States, 
    434 F.3d 1329
    , 1333 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g denied (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citations
    and internal quotation marks omitted)). For a physical taking , the act that causes the
    taking also causes the accrual of a takings claim. See Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United
    
    States, 708 F.3d at 1359
    (citing Ingrum v. United States, 
    560 F.3d 1311
    , 1314 (Fed . Cir.)
    ("[A] claim alleging a Fifth Amendment taking accrues when the act that constitutes the
    taking occurs. "), cert. denied, 
    558 U.S. 878
    (2009)).
    Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint pursuant to RCFC
    12(b)( 1) for lack of jurisdiction and, in the alternative, RC FC 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
    claim for which relief may be granted. Defendant argues that plaintiffs first claim accrued
    no later than 1806, when Congress allegedly passed a statute acknowledging pre-existing
    property rights in the newly-created State of Tennessee, including, by implication, the
    property rights of General Sevier at issue in plaintiff's first claim. Defendant contends that
    plaintiffs second claim accrued no later than 1814, when Congress allegedly passed an
    Act providing for the indemnification of property owners in the Mississippi Territory
    dispossessed by the cession of land by the State of Georgia to the United States.
    Defendant argues that plaintiff's third claim accrued no later than 1824, when Congress
    allegedly passed an Act confirming the Georgia legislature's 1786 grant of 5,000 acres to
    General Sevier, with the proviso that the claim be satisfied from a trust established in
    1803. Defendant argues plaintiffs fourth cla im accrued no later than 1793 because plaintiff
    alleges General Sevier "was owed military pay in the amount of $22 ,817 for services
    provided in 1793." Finally, defendant construes the referen ce in plaintiffs appendix to an
    1841 bill, under which claims for compensation allegedly cou Id have been brought by the
    heirs of General Sevier or John Sevier, Jr., as a fifth claim, which, defendant asserts,
    accrued no later than 1841 . Citing 28 U.S.C. § 2501 , defendant argues that "Congress
    has requ ired persons seeking to recover under the Tucker Act to file suit in th is Court
    within six years of the date when the claim accrued," and that because none of plaintiff's
    claims accrued later than 1841, they are untimely and must be dismissed for lack of
    jurisdiction. Further, according to defendant, even if plaintiff's complaint were not
    dismissed for its jurisdictional defects, it must be dismissed under RCFC 12(b)(6) for
    12
    failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted, because plaintiff's complaint
    "contains no allegations to support a finding that the estate of General Sevier has
    remained open for the 200 years since General Sevier's death" and it "also contains no
    allegations to support a finding that Mr. Cordova has been properly appointed the
    administrator of such an estate."
    Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss asserts, although without
    support, that "28 U.S.C. 2501 does not apply in this matter as the U.S. Congress has
    referred the matter and that a ruling was made adversely against the Defendant. It is
    contended that the case was appropriated for payment, yet merely indefinitely postponed
    by this Court." Therefore, plaintiff argues, he "has already met the provisions of the Tucker
    Act and previously of the Bowman Act of 1883." Plaintiff further asserts that "[t]he United
    States Congress, on several occasions over that last 200 years, has made appropriations
    for payment to the Sevier Estate," including, plaintiff alleges, the Deficiency Appropriation
    Act of 1964, ch. XI, 78 Stat. 204, which, he claims, "did not recognize the amounts or
    terms of the individual settlements and judgments funded but rather made a bulk
    appropriation," in the amount of $12,831,443.00, '"[t]or payment of claims as settled and
    determined by departments and agencies in accord with law, and judgments rendered
    against the United States by the United States Court of Claims and United States district
    courts . . . ."' There is no indication in the record, however, that any appropriation
    regarding the Sevier claims was ever passed by Congress following the Congressional
    Reference Report by the Court of Claims, and plaintiff has provided none.
    With respect to defendant's allegation that Mr. Cordova has failed to establish that
    the estates of General Sevier and John Sevier, Jr. remain open, or that he is the duly-
    appointed administrator thereof, plaintiff asserts that "Mr. Cordova, a direct descendant
    of Gen. Sevier, made application [to] the Sevier County Court in Tennessee in 2012 to
    become the Estate's Administrator, which Mr. Cordova can document." The court notes,
    however, that plaintiff has not provided the referenced documentation, nor did he provide
    any information regarding the status of his 2012 application, including whether or not the
    application ever was acted upon. Plaintiff further states in his conclusion that "the
    Complainant believes that it has proven and can submit additional evidence that this court
    has jurisdiction," but that "the Complainant has requested additional documents pertinent
    to this case from agencies of the Defendant, which have not yet been received." Since
    the filing of the plaintiff's complaint in this court, however, plaintiff has had ample time to
    produce additional documents and has not done so.
    In its reply brief, defendant asserts that "[i]n his response, Mr. Cordova does not
    challenge (or mention) the accrual date for any of these five claims" identified in
    defendant's motion to dismiss, which, defendant alleges, means that "our calculations of
    the accrual dates are uncontested." Defendant alleges that plaintiff's reliance on the
    findings of fact issued by the United States Court of Claims in 1910 "lends no support to
    Mr. Cordova's arguments for jurisdiction to consider the claims in the complaint" because,
    although defendant concedes that "Congress created special jurisdiction for the Court of
    Claims" to consider the claims of General Sevier's heirs, "by the express terms of that
    grant of jurisdiction ... jurisdiction expired with the issuance of the Court of Claims report
    in 1910, and the elapsed time permitted for appeal." As for plaintiff's assertion that he
    13
    applied in 2012 to be appointed as the administrator of General Sevier's estate, defendant
    argues that "this does not prove that General John Sevier's estate was established there,
    or that such estate has remained open for 200 years, or that Mr. Cordova has been
    appointed as the Estate Administrator of such an open estate." (emphasis in original).
    With respect to plaintiffs apparent claim that the Court of Claims issued a judgment in
    favor of the heirs of General Sevier's estate in 1910, defendant retorts that, "[w]ith all due
    respect, Mr. Cordova misunderstands the report issued by the Court of Claims in 1910."
    Defendant concludes after discussing the 1910 fact-finding report, "the Court of Claims
    did not award, or recommend the award, of any money to the heirs of General Sevier or
    his son," meaning "ft]here is no judgment for Mr. Cordova to seek to enforce."
    Plaintiffs argument that the statute of limitations contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2501
    does not apply to the present case because it was referred to the court by Congress and
    then "indefinitely postponed" also is incorrect. "Any bill, except a bill for a pension, may
    be referred by either House of Congress to the chief judge of the United States Court of
    Federal Claims for a report in conformity with [28 U.S.C. §] 2509." 28 U.S.C. § 1492
    (2012). After a bill is referred, the Court of Federal Claims makes findings offact regarding
    the referred bill along with "conclusions sufficient to inform Congress whether the demand
    is a legal or equitable claim or a gratuity, and the amount, if any, legally or equitably due
    from the United States to the claimant." 28 U.S.C. § 2509(c) (2012). These findings and
    conclusions are then submitted in a report to the appropriate House of Congress. 
    Id. § 2509(e).
    Essentially the same process was followed by the Court of Claims in 1910. See
    Tucker Act of 1887, ch. 359, § 13-14, 24 Stat. 505, 507-08 (1887). None of the
    conclusions drawn in such reports are subject to judicial review. See 
    id. § 2509(b).
    "Inasmuch as the conclusions are recommendations, as distinguished from judicial
    decisions, the court-made rules of stare decisis and res judicata do not apply.
    Congressional reference cases have no binding value as precedent." Paul v. United
    States, 20 Cl. Ct 236, 266, affd, 
    21 Cl. Ct. 758
    (1990). As noted above, the Humphreys
    claims were twice referred to the Court of Claims, first in 1905 and then in 1908. S. Rep.
    68-991 at 1-2 (quoting H.R. 18921, 58th Cong. (1905); H.R. 17355, 60th Cong. (1908)).
    After the Court of Claims made its findings in Humphreys and submitted them to the
    House of Representatives in 1913, see H.R. Doc. No. 63-131 at 1, the role of the Court
    of Claims was complete and the court's jurisdiction to hearthe Humphreys claims referred
    by Congress expired. The court's findings were only recommendations, and the ultimate
    decision of Congress about whether to award the Humphreys plaintiff compensation
    rested with Congress alone. Congress' decision in 1925 not to do so did not toll the
    running of the statute of limitations for the claims involved. Moreover, as noted above,
    there is no evidence in the record that Congress ever appropriated any money directed
    to compensate for plaintiff's claims.
    For plaintiffs claims to be timely, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2501, each claim must
    have accrued no earlier than November 18, 2008, or six years prior to November 18,
    2014, the date on which Mr. Cordova filed his initial complaint in this court. As defendant
    argues, each of Mr. Cordova's four claims accrued considerably earlier than that date.
    Plaintiff's first claim involves lands allegedly belonging to General Sevier and John Sevier,
    Jr. in Tennessee that were allegedly "ceded" by the federal government to the Cherokee
    Nation in 1785 and/or 1791. Construed liberally, plaintiff alleges a physical taking of
    14
    General Sevier and John Sevier Jr.'s lands by the United States. The statute of limitations,
    therefore, began running the moment the land was taken, that is in 1791, at the latest.
    See Navajo Nation v. United 
    States, 631 F.3d at 1273-74
    ('"[A] claim under the Fifth
    Amendment accrues when [the] taking action occurs."' (brackets in original) (quoting
    Goodrich v. United 
    States, 434 F.3d at 1333
    ). Plaintiff's first takings claim, thus, is
    untimely by at least 217 years. The 1925 Senate Report included in the appendix to
    plaintiff's complaint also alleged that several federal statutes, the last of which was
    enacted in 1841, provided General Sevier's heirs the opportunity to receive compensation
    for the lands allegedly taken from General Sevier and John Sevier, Jr. See S. Report 68-
    991, at 2-3. These are the statutes defendant construed as constituting a fifth claim by
    defendant. There is, however, no indication in plaintiff's pleadings or the exhibits in the
    record before the court that the claims of General Sevier and his heirs would not have
    accrued immediately after the enactment of such statutes. Any claims plaintiff might have
    had under such statutes are, therefore, untimely by at least 167 years.
    Plaintiff's second claim alleges that two federal statutes, passed in 1803 and 1814,
    were intended to compensate landowners, such as General Sevier and James Sevier,
    whose land had been ceded by the State of Georgia to the United States in order to
    establish the Mississippi Territory. The 1803 statute allegedly established a procedure by
    which claims for compensation could be made, while the 1814 statute allegedly provided
    for "indemnification of certain claimants of public lands in the Mississippi Territory." The
    statute of limitations for claims based on such money-mandating statutes, however,
    begins running "'when "all events have occurred to fix the Government's alleged liability,
    entitling the claimant to demand payment and sue here for [its] money.""' Klamath Tribe
    Claims Comm. v. United 
    States, 97 Fed. Cl. at 209
    (brackets in original) (quoting Martinez
    v. United 
    States, 333 F.3d at 1303
    (quoting Nager Elec. Co. v. United 
    States, 368 F.2d at 851
    )). In the above-captioned case, plaintiff has not pied any facts showing why General
    Sevier would not have been entitled to seek compensation or indemnification pursuant to
    the 1803 and 1814 statutes, even if eligible, suggesting that the statute of limitations
    began to run when these acts were passed. As such, plaintiff's claims under the two
    statutes would be untimely by 205 and 194 years, respectively.
    Plaintiff's third claim involves lands that were allegedly granted to the heirs of
    General Sevier by Congress in 1824. Plaintiff alleges that "about 20 patents" apparently
    covering this land were recorded in 1828, but that they were occupied by Native
    Americans and that United States citizens were prevented from going on the lands by the
    United States Army. Plaintiff also alleges that "there is no record in the Land Office at
    Washington, D.C., Huntsville, Alabama, or Jackson, Mississippi to show that any patents
    were delivered to any of the heirs of General John Sevier or to his administrators." The
    legal basis for plaintiff's third claim is unclear. When construed liberally, however, plaintiff
    appears to allege that the lands given to General Sevier in 1824 were subsequently taken
    by the United States and given to the certain Native Americans beginning at least in 1828.
    Again, because plaintiff's claim involves a taking, the statute of limitations began to run
    when the taking occurred in 1828. Plaintiff's third claim is, therefore, untimely by
    approximately 180 years.
    15
    Plaintiffs fourth claim involves the alleged payments owed General Sevier for his
    military service: "the salary of General John Sevier of $94 per month from February 22,
    1791 to February 22, 1794, and the sum due him for raising levies for the Northwestern
    campaign." Plaintiff does not cite to the appropriate money-mandating regulation, statute,
    or constitutional provision that would have entitled General Sevier or any of his heirs to
    such payments. Nonetheless, plaintiff's claims would have accrued, at the latest, when
    General Sevier's military service ended in 1794. Therefore, plaintiffs fourth claim is
    untimely by at least 214 years. Given that each of plaintiff's four claims began to accrue
    hundreds of years ago, they all must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to
    RCFC 12{b)(1). The court, therefore, does not need to reach defendant's RCFC 12(b)(6)
    arguments, or address why plaintiff has the legal right to bring claims on behalf of General
    Sevier, his sons, or their estates, of which there is no evidence in the record.
    Along with his original complaint, Mr. Cordova submitted an Application to Proceed
    !D. Forma Pauperis, asserting that he is unable to pay the required filing fees, and
    requesting waiver of court costs and fees. In his application, plaintiff states that he is
    presently unemployed, and that his only source of income in the last twelve months has
    been "VA DISABILITY," but he did not specify the amount received from this source,
    despite the form's instruction to "describe each source of money and state the amount
    received from each during the past twelve months." {capitalization in original). Plaintiff
    further states that he does not own any cash, and has no money in checking, savings, or
    any other accounts. Plaintiff responded "Yes" in response to the query "Do you own any
    real estate, stocks, bonds, notes, automobiles or other valuable property (excluding
    ordinary household furnishings and clothing)?" and estimated the value of his property in
    San Antonio, Texas as $40,000.00. Finally, plaintiff indicates that he has no dependents
    and is not currently a prisoner.
    In order to provide access to this court to those who cannot pay the filing fees
    mandated by RCFC 77.1 (c) (2015), the statute at 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2012) permits a court
    to allow plaintiffs to file a complaint without payment of fees or security under certain
    circumstances.7 The standard in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) for in forma pauperis eligibility is
    7
    A number of courts have reviewed the words of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), regarding in
    forma pauperis applications by non-prisoner litigants in federal courts, and have
    concluded that Congress did not intend for non-prisoners to be barred from being able to
    proceed in forma pauperis in federal court. See, tl,, Floyd v. United States Postal Serv.,
    
    105 F.3d 274
    , 275-76 (6th Cir.), reh'g denied (6th Cir. 1997); Schagene v. United States,
    
    37 Fed. Cl. 661
    , 663 ( 1997) (finding that it was not the intent of Congress to eliminate the
    in forma pauperis right of access to federal courts of eligible, indigent, non-prisoners),
    appeal dismissed, 
    152 F.3d 947
    (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also In re Prison Litigation Reform
    Act, 
    105 F.3d 1131
    , 1134 (6th Cir. 1997) (discussing how to administer in forma pauperis
    rights to a non-prisoner, thereby acknowledging the rights of non-prisoners to apply for in
    forma pauperi~ status); Leonard v. Lacy, 
    88 F.3d 181
    , 183 (2d Cir. 1996) (using "sic"
    following the word "prisoner" in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) seemingly to indicate that the use
    of that word was too narrow); Smith v. United States, 
    113 Fed. Cl. 241
    , 243 (2013); Powell
    v. Hoover, 
    956 F. Supp. 564
    , 566 (M.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that a "fair reading of the entire
    section [28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)] is that it is not limited to prisoner suits."). Moreover, 28
    16
    "unable to pay such fees or give security therefor." Determination of what constitutes
    "unable to pay" or unable to "give security therefor," and, therefore, whether to allow a
    plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis, is left to the discretion of the presiding judge, based
    on the information submitted by the plaintiff or plaintiffs. See,~. Rowland v. Cal. Men's
    Colony, Unit II Men's Advisory Council, 
    506 U.S. 194
    , 217-18 (1993); Fuentes v. United
    States, 
    100 Fed. Cl. 85
    , 92 (2011). In Fiebelkorn v. United States, the United States Court
    of Federal Claims indicated:
    [T]he threshold for a motion to proceed in forma pauperis is not high: The
    statute requires that the applicant be "unable to pay such fees." 28 U.S.C.
    § 1915(a)(1). To be "unable to pay such fees" means that paying such fees
    would constitute a serious hardship on the plaintiff, not that such payment
    would render plaintiff destitute.
    Fiebelkorn v. United States, 77 Fed. CL 59, 62 (2007); see also Hayes v. United States,
    
    71 Fed. Cl. 366
    , 369 (2006). Although Mr. Cordova's self-reported income and holdings
    might qualify him for in forma pauperis relief, his complaint is being dismissed for lack of
    jurisdiction for the reasons discussed above.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED. The allegations in
    this claim, have been repeatedly reasserted by different individuals in General Sevier's
    lineage. The claims were resolved by the 1910 Congressional Reference Report and the
    Senate Report based on the same facts. Even if Mr. Cordova could demonstrate a legal
    right to act on behalf of the Sevier estates, the issues raised by plaintiff's complaint should
    not be revisited again in this court. The Clerk of the Court shall enter JUDGMENT
    consistent with this Order dismissing plaintiff's complaint.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    .A a-&i~
    __....MARIAN BLANK HORN
    Judge
    U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) refers to both "person" and "prisoner." The word "person" is used
    three times in the subsection, while the word "prisoner" is used only once. This court,
    therefore, finds that the single use of the word "prisoner" in the language of 28 U.S.C. §
    1915(a)( 1) was not intended to eliminate a non-prisoner from proceeding in federal court
    in forma pauperis, provided that the civil litigant can demonstrate appropriate need. Any
    other interpretation is inconsistent with the statutory scheme of 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
    17