Goines v. United States ( 2015 )


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  •                                      ORIGINAL
    3Jn tbe Wniteb ~tates QCourt of jfeberal QCiaims
    No. 15-184T
    Filed October 7, 2015
    FILED
    )                            OCT - 7 2015
    KEITH GOINES,                                   )
    )                           U.S . COURT OF
    Plaintiff,               )                          FEDERAL CLAIMS
    )
    v.                                              )      Pro Se; Rule 12(b)(l), Subject-Matter
    )      Jurisdiction; Tax Refund Claim, 26 U.S.C.
    THE UNITED STATES,                              )      § 6532, 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a); In Forma
    )      Pauperis.
    Defendant.                               )
    ``````````````~                                  )
    Keith Goines, Oxon Hill, M.D., plaintiff prose.
    Courtney M Hutson, Trial Attorney, Caroline D. Ciraolo, Acting Assistant Attorney
    General, David l Pincus, Chief, Tax Division, Court of Federal Claims Section, United States
    Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendant.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
    GRIGGSBY, Judge
    I.     INTRODUCTION
    Pro se plaintiff, Keith Goines, brought this action to recover federal income taxes that he
    alleges are due him in connection with his income tax returns for the years 2012 and 2014. The
    government has moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, pursuant
    to Rule 12(b)(l) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims ("RCFC"). In
    addition, plaintiff has filed a motion to proceed in this matter in forma pauper is. For the reasons
    set forth below, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion to dismiss and GRANTS plaintiffs
    motion to proceed in for ma pauper is.
    II.     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1
    A. Factual Background
    Pro se plaintiff, Keith Goines, commenced this federal income tax refund action on
    February 26, 2015. See generally Compl. In his complaint, plaintiff seeks a refund of certain
    federal income taxes that he allegedly paid to the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") during tax
    years 2012 and 2014, as well as other monetary relief. Id.; see also Pl. Opp. at 1-2. 2
    Specifically, plaintiff alleges that "[t]he IRS is keeping [plaintiffs] 2014 taxes for monies owed
    for 2012 no letter of determination was mailed for both years." Compl. at 1. Plaintiff further
    alleges the IRS's decision to retain these funds violates both the United States Constitution and
    the USA PATRIOT Act. 
    Id. 1. Tax
    Year 2012
    Plaintiff filed his 2012 federal income tax return on or about February 18, 2013. Def.
    Ex. 1 at 2 (Plaintiffs 2012 tax return). In his 2012 tax return, plaintiff claimed various child and
    dependent care credits, as well as the standard deduction for a head of household filing status.
    Def. Mot. at 2; Def. Ex. 1 at 2. Plaintiffs 2012 tax return also claimed a tax refund in the
    amount of$5,814.00. Def. Mot. at 3; Def. Ex. 1at2.
    On June 24, 2013, the IRS sent a statutory notice of deficiency for the 2012 tax year to
    plaintiff, via certified mail, to the mailing address shown on plaintiffs 2012 tax return. Def.
    Mot. at 3; Def. Ex. 2 at 2-3. In the notice, the IRS alerted plaintiff to the fact that the IRS had
    1
    The facts recited in this Memorandum Opinion and Order are taken from plaintiffs complaint ("CompL
    at_"); defendant's motion to dismiss ("Def. Mot. at_"); defendant's exhibits attached to the motion to
    dismiss ("Def. Ex. at_"); plaintiffs opposition thereto ("Pl. Opp. at_"); and defendant's reply ("Def.
    Reply at_"). Except where otherwise noted, the facts recited here are undisputed.
    2
    Plaintiffs complaint is handwritten and difficult to discern. In his response to the government's motion
    to dismiss, plaintiff states that he is seeking to recover $16,000.00 from the IRS. Pl. Opp. at 2. It is
    unclear how plaintiff arrives at this figure. But, in his response and opposition to defendant's motion to
    dismiss, plaintiff claims that he is owed a tax refund in the amount of $7,491.00 for the 2012 tax year and
    $5,562.30 for the 2014 tax year. Pl. Opp. at 1. A review of the additional documentation regarding
    plaintiffs tax refund claims provided in the exhibits to the government's motion to dismiss also show that
    plaintiff requested a tax refund of $5,814.00 for the 2012 tax year and a tax refund of $5,328.00 for the
    2014 tax year. Def. Ex. 1at2; Def. Ex. 6 at 2. In addition, plaintiff seeks to recover $3,500.00 for state
    income taxes that he alleges he owes to the State of Maryland, as well as $1,000.00 to satisfy a past due
    balance owed to H & R Block. Pl Opp. at 2-3.
    2
    determined that plaintiff was not entitled to claim a head of household filing status, or to claim
    child and dependent care credits. 
    Id. The notice
    also provided that plaintiff could contest the
    IRS's determination regarding his 2012 tax return by filing a petition with the United States Tax
    Court within 90 days of the date of the notice, as prescribed by 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a). 
    Id. The notice
    further provided that the amount of the deficiency for plaintiffs 2012 taxes was
    $7,491 .00. 
    Id. at 4.
    And so, the IRS retained plaintiffs 2012 tax refund in the amount of
    $5,807.00, resulting in a remaining and outstanding balance for unpaid taxes for the 2012 tax
    year in the amount of $1,684.00. 
    Id. at 5.
    Plaintiff did not file a petition in Tax Court contesting the IRS's notice of deficiency
    within 90-days of the issuance of the notice. Def. Ex. 3 at 1-3; Def. Mot. at 3. And so, on
    November 25, 2013, the IRS assessed a tax against plaintiff in the amount of $1,684.00, plus
    interest in the amount of $31.29. 
    Id. Plaintiff filed
    an amended tax return, Form 1040X, for the 2012 tax year on
    November 25, 2013. Def. Ex. 4. In his amended return, plaintiff claimed a tax refund in the
    amount of $5,814.00. 
    Id. On August
    4, 2014, plaintiff filed a petition with the Tax Court regarding his 2012 tax
    refund claim. See Goines v. United States, No. 18198-14, slip. op. at 1. (T.C. Dec. 30, 2014);
    Def. Ex. 5. In that proceeding, plaintiff argued that he did not receive the IRS's notice of
    deficiency for his 2012 tax returns. 
    Id. at 2.
    The Tax Court found, however, that the IRS
    properly mailed the notice to plaintiff's last known address and that the notice of deficiency was,
    therefore, sufficient. 
    Id. And so,
    on December 30, 2014, the Tax Court dismissed plaintiffs
    petition for lack of jurisdiction upon the grounds that the petition was untimely under 26 U.S.C.
    § 6213(a). 
    Id. at 1-3.
    On February 23, 2015, the IRS transferred an overpayment credit in the amount of $81 .00
    from the 2014 tax year to partially satisfy plaintiffs outstanding tax liability for the 2012 tax
    year. Def. Ex. 3 at 2. And so, according to the IRS, plaintiffs remaining outstanding federal
    income tax liability for the 2012 tax year is $1,634.29. 
    Id. at 4.
    3
    2.      Tax Year 2014
    Plaintiff alleges that he filed his 2014 tax return with the IRS on January 27, 2015. 3 Pl.
    Opp. at 2. In his 2014 tax return, plaintiff claimed a tax refund in the amount of$5,328.00. Def.
    Ex. 6 at 2 (Plaintiffs 2014 tax return). As discussed above, the IRS transferred an overpayment
    credit in the amount of $81.00 from plaintiffs 2014 tax refund to partially satisfy plaintiffs
    outstanding tax liability for the 2012 tax year. Def. Ex. 3 at 2; Def. Ex. 7 at 1. The IRS has
    taken no further action with respect to plaintiffs 2014 tax return. 
    Id. 3. Tax
    Year 2015
    Plaintiff does not allege that he has filed a tax return for the 2015 tax year, or that he has
    filed a tax refund claim for the 2015 tax year. See generally Compl. The IRS has no record of a
    tax refund claim by plaintiff for the 2015 tax year. Def. Ex. 8.
    B. Procedural Background
    On February 26, 2015, plaintiff filed a complaint in this matter seeking to recover a
    refund of his federal income taxes for tax years 2012 and 2014 and other monetary relief. See
    generally Compl. On that same date, plaintiff also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis,
    alleging that he lacks the financial means to pay the Court's filing fee. See generally Pl. Mot. to
    Proceed In Forma Pauperis.
    On May 27, 2015, defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint for lack of
    subject-matter jurisdiction, pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(l). See generally Def. Mot. On June 29,
    2015, plaintiff filed a response and opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss. See generally
    Pl. Opp. Defendant subsequently filed a reply in support of its motion to dismiss on July 16,
    2015; See generally Def. Reply. The matter having been fully briefed, the Court addresses
    defendant's pending motion to dismiss.
    III.      LEGAL ST AND ARDS
    A. Pro Se Litigants
    Plaintiff is proceeding in this matter pro se. The Court recognizes that parties proceeding
    pro se are granted greater leeway than litigants represented by counsel. See Haines v. Kerner,
    3
    The government maintains that plaintiff filed his 2014 tax return on February 16, 2015. Def. Mot. at 4.
    4
    
    404 U.S. 519
    , 520-21 (1972) (holding that prose complaints are held to "less stringent standards
    than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers"). Nonetheless, "[w]hile a court should be receptive to
    pro se plaintiffs and assist them, justice is ill-served when a jurist crosses the line from finder of
    fact to advocate." Demes v. United States, 
    52 Fed. Cl. 365
    , 369 (2002). And so, while the Court
    may excuse ambiguities in plaintiffs complaint, the Court does not excuse the complaint's
    failures . See Henke v. United States, 
    60 F.3d 795
    , 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
    In addition, this Court has long recognized that "the leniency afforded to a pro se litigant
    with respect to mere formalities does not relieve the burden to meet jurisdictional requirements."
    Minehan v. United States, 
    75 Fed. Cl. 249
    , 253 (2007). For this reason, the prose plaintiff-like
    any other plaintiff-must establish the Court's jurisdiction to consider his claim by a
    preponderance of the evidence. Riles v. United States, 
    93 Fed. Cl. 163
    , 165 (2010).
    B. Rule 12(b )(1)
    When deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, this Court must
    assume that all undisputed facts alleged in the complaint are true and must draw all reasonable
    inferences in the non-movant's favor. See Erickson v. Pardus, 
    551 U.S. 89
    , 94 (2007); RCFC
    12(b)(l). Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction, and must do so by
    a preponderance of the evidence. Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 
    846 F.2d 746
    , 748
    (Fed. Cir. 1988). And so, should the Court determine that "it lacks jurisdiction over the subject
    matter, it must dismiss the claim." Matthews v. United States, 
    72 Fed. Cl. 274
    , 278 (2006).
    In this regard, the United States Court of Federal Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction
    and "possess[ es] only that power authorized by Constitution and statute .... " Kokkonen v.
    Guardian Life Ins. Co. ofAm., 
    511 U.S. 375
    , 377 (1994). In particular, the Tucker Act grants
    the Court jurisdiction over:
    [A]ny claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or
    any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any
    express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or
    unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.
    28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(l) (2012). The Tucker Act, however, is "a jurisdictional statute; it does not
    create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages .... [T]he
    Act merely confers jurisdiction upon [the United States Court of Federal Claims] whenever the
    5
    substantive right exists." United States v. Testan, 
    424 U.S. 392
    , 398 (1976). And so, to pursue a
    substantive right against the United States under the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identify and
    plead a money-mandating constitutional provision, statute or regulation, or an express or implied
    contract with the United States. Cabral v. United States, 
    317 F. App'x 979
    , 981 (Fed. Cir.
    2008).
    C. Jurisdiction In Tax Refund Cases
    With respect to tax refund cases, the Tucker Act authorizes the United States Court of
    Federal Claims to adjudicate tax refund claims. Ledford v. United States, 
    297 F.3d 1378
    , 1382
    (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Ont. Power Generation v. United States, 
    369 F.3d 1298
    , 1301 (Fed.
    Cir. 2004); Shore v. United States, 
    9 F.3d 1524
    , 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1993). But, the Court's
    jurisdiction to entertain tax refund cases is limited to those situations where the taxpayer has
    complied with the relevant provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. United States v. Clintwood
    Elkhorn Mining Co., 
    553 U.S. 1
    , 4 (2008). In this regard, the applicable requirements in the
    Internal Revenue Code in this matter are set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a), which provides as
    follows:
    No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any
    internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or
    collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or
    of any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected,
    until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary, according
    to the provisions of law in that regard, and the regulations of the Secretary
    established in pursuance thereof.
    26 U.S.C. § 7422(a). And so, pursuant to section 7422(a), this Court does not possess
    jurisdiction to consider a claim to recover any internal revenue tax, unless the taxpayer first files
    a claim for a tax refund with the IRS pursuant to the agency's regulations. Strategic Haus. Fin.
    Corp. of Travis Cnty. v. United States, 
    608 F.3d 1317
    , 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
    In addition, under 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a), a taxpayer must wait six months from the date on
    which the taxpayer filed a tax refund claim with the IRS before filing suit in this Court. See 26
    U.S.C. § 6532(a)(l). The only exception to this rule, is that the taxpayer may immediately
    commence suit in this Court if the IRS rejects the taxpayer's tax refund claim. 
    Id. And so,
    the
    Court must dismiss a complaint seeking a tax refund, if the complaint is filed less than six
    6
    months after the taxpayer filed a tax refund claim with the IRS, unless the IRS already rejected
    the claim. Dumont v. United States, 
    345 F. App'x 586
    , 590 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
    Finally, a plaintiff must also abide by the "full payment rule," which requires that a
    taxpayer fully pay the taxes at issue prior to bringing a suit for a tax refund in this Court.
    Flora v. United States, 
    357 U.S. 63
    , 75 (1958); accord 
    Shore, 9 F.3d at 1527
    ("The Flora full
    payment rule requires that taxpayers prepay the tax principal before the Court of Federal Claims
    will have subject matter jurisdiction over their tax refund action .... "). And so, the Court does
    not possess jurisdiction to consider a tax refund claim if a tax deficiency exists. 
    Id. IV. DISCUSSION
    A. The Court Does Not Possess Jurisdiction To Consider Plaintiff's Claim
    The government has moved to dismiss plaintiffs complaint for four reasons: First, the
    government argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs 2012 tax refund claim,
    because plaintiff has not satisfied his tax liability for the 2012 tax year. Def. Mot. at 6-7.
    Second, the government argues that plaintiff's tax refund claim for 2014 is also jurisdictionally
    barred, because plaintiff filed this claim less than six months after filing his 2014 tax return.
    
    Id. at 7-8.
    The government further contends that plaintiffs tax refund claim for the 2015 tax
    year is jurisdictionally barred, because plaintiff did not file a tax refund claim with the IRS
    before bringing this action. 
    Id. at 8.
    Lastly, the government contends that the Court also lacks
    subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the remainder of plaintiff's claims for monetary relief,
    because plaintiff has not identified a money-mandating statute or other source of law to invoke
    the Court's jurisdiction with respect to these claims. 
    Id. at 9.
    For the reasons discussed below, the Court agrees. And so, the Court must dismiss
    plaintiffs complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. RCFC 12(b)(l).
    1.      Plaintiff's 2012 Tax Refund Claim Is Jurisdictionally Barred
    As an initial matter, plaintiff's tax refund claim for the 2012 tax year is jurisdictionally
    barred because he has not satisfied the outstanding tax liability for that tax year. It is well
    established that a taxpayer must pay all outstanding tax liabilities for a particular tax year before
    bringing a claim to recover a tax refund. 
    Flora, 357 U.S. at 72-73
    . A Certificate of Assessments
    and Payments is sufficient evidence to indicate whether a plaintiff has satisfied this jurisdictional
    7
    requirement. Rocovich v. United States, 
    933 F.2d 991
    , 994 (Fed. Cir. 1991). And so, the Court
    does not have jurisdiction over a tax refund claim if a Certificate of Assessments and Payments
    shows that full payment of the assessed tax has not been made by the date plaintiff filed the
    complaint. 
    Id. In this
    case, the Certificate of Assessments and Payments for plaintiff's 2012 tax returns
    shows that plaintiff has an outstanding balance of $1,634.29 in taxes owed for the 2012 tax year.
    Def. Ex. 3 at 4. Plaintiff does not dispute that he has not satisfied this outstanding balance. See
    generally Comp!.; Pl. Opp. And so, plaintiff has not established that the Court has jurisdiction to
    consider his 2012 tax refund claim. 4 
    Flora, 357 U.S. at 72-73
    .
    2.      Plaintiff's 2014 Tax Refund Claim Is Jurisdictionally Barred
    The Court also does not possess jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's tax refund claim for
    the 2014 tax year because this claim is premature. In this regard, title 26, United States Code,
    section 6532(a)(l) provides that a taxpayer cannot bring a tax refund suit in this Court less than
    six months after the date on which the taxpayer filed a tax refund claim with the IRS. 26 U.S.C.
    § 6532(a)(l) (2012). This statutory six-month waiting period is only waived ifthe IRS rejects
    the taxpayer's tax refund claim, in which case the taxpayer may commence suit in this Court
    without waiting the full six months. Id.; Cherbanaeff v. United States, 
    77 Fed. Cl. 490
    , 498
    (2007), aff'd, 
    300 F. App'x 933
    (Fed. Cir. 2008). And so, this Court does not have jurisdiction
    to consider a tax refund claim that has been filed with the IRS less than six months before the
    filing of the complaint, unless the IRS has previously rendered a decision on that claim.
    Pacetti v. United States, 
    50 Fed. Cl. 239
    , 249-50 (2001).
    In this matter, plaintiff alleges that he filed his 2014 tax return on January 27, 2015. Pl.
    Opp. at 2. For purposes of resolving the government's motion to dismiss, the Court accepts that
    plaintiff's 2014 tax return also serves as his claim for a tax refund for the 2014 tax year.
    4
    It also appears that the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs 2012 tax refund claim because
    plaintiff did not file a tax refund claim with the IRS, before commencing this action. 26 U.S.C. § 7422;
    Strategic 
    Haus., 608 F.3d at 1324
    . Plaintiffs complaint does not allege that plaintiff filed a tax refund
    claim with the IRS for the 2012 tax year. See generally Comp!. Rather, it appears that plaintiff is relying
    upon his 2012 amended tax return to serve as his tax refund claim for the 2012 tax year. See generally
    Comp!. For the purpose ofresolving the government' motion to dismiss, the Court deems plaintiffs 2012
    amended tax return to be plaintiffs tax refund claim for the 2012 tax year.
    8
    Plaintiff commenced this action on February 26, 2015, less than six months after filing his 2014
    tax return. See generally Compl.; 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)(l). In addition, the IRS has not rendered
    a decision on plaintiffs claim for a tax refund for the 2014 tax year. Def. Mot. at 8; Def. Ex. 7 at
    1. Given this, plaintiff has filed his 2014 tax refund claim too soon. And so, the Court does not
    possess jurisdiction to consider this claim. 5 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)(l); 
    Pacetti, 50 Fed. Cl. at 249-50
    .
    3.      Plaintiff's 2015 Tax Refund Claim Is Jurisdictionally Barred
    Plaintiffs 2015 tax refund claim is also jurisdictionally precluded. As established above,
    a taxpayer must file a tax refund claim with the IRS before bringing a claim for a tax refund in
    this Court. 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a). In this case, it is without dispute that plaintiff has not yet filed
    his tax return for the 2015 tax year. See generally Compl.; Def. Ex. 8. And so, plaintiff could
    not have filed a tax refund claim for the 2015 tax year. Def. Mot. at 8. Given this, plaintiff has
    not satisfied the requirement to file a tax refund claim with the IRS before commencing this
    action. 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a). And so, the Court does not possess jurisdiction to consider
    plaintiffs tax refund claim.
    4.   The Court Also Does Not Have Jurisdiction To Consider Plaintiff's
    Remaining Claims
    To the extent that plaintiff is seeking to recover funds from the government that have not
    been requested in either his 2012 or 2014 tax returns, his claims are also jurisdictionally barred
    under the Tucker Act. 6 In his opposition to the government's motion to dismiss, plaintiff alleges
    that he is seeking $3,500.00 for taxes owed to the State of Maryland. Pl. Opp. at 3. In addition,
    plaintiff seeks $1,000.00 for funds that he apparently owes to H & R Block for tax services. 
    Id. 5 Defendant
    alleges that plaintiff filed his 2014 tax return on February 16, 2015, a date that is also less
    than six months before plaintiff commenced this action. Def. Mot. at 4. In addition, it appears that
    plaintiff has not filed a tax refund claim with the IRS for the 2014 tax year. See generally Comp!. As
    discussed above, filing such a claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite for bringing a tax refund claim in this
    Court. 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a). For the purpose of resolving the government' motion to dismiss, the Court
    deems plaintiffs 2014 tax return to be plaintiffs tax refund claim for the 2014 tax year.
    6
    The government argues in its motion to dismiss that plaintiffs tax refund claims, as well as plaintiffs
    claims for other monetary relief are jurisdictionally barred because plaintiff has not pointed to a money-
    mandating source of law to support these claims. Def. Mot. at 8-9. But, the government acknowledges
    that plaintiff may rely upon 26 U.S.C. § 7422 to bring his tax refund claim, if the Court deems plaintiffs
    2012 and 2014 tax returns to be plaintiffs tax refund claims for these tax years. Def. Mot. at 1-2, 9.
    9
    Plaintiff also seeks to recover funds for federal income taxes that he has not yet paid for the 2015
    tax year. Pl. Comp!. at 1.
    Plaintiff points to no money-mandating statute or other source of law to confer
    jurisdiction on this Court to consider these claims. See generally Comp!.; Pl. Opp. Rather,
    plaintiff cites generally to the United States Constitution and to the USA PATRIOT Act. But,
    neither of these legal provisions provide the Court with jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff's claims.
    In fact, it is well established that a citation to the Constitution, without any reference to a
    particular money-mandating provision in the Constitution, is insufficient to establish this Court's
    jurisdiction. 
    Fisher, 402 F.3d at 1173
    ; Russell v. United States, 
    78 Fed. Cl. 281
    , 285 (2007)
    ("plaintiff must establish more than the mere existence of a statute or constitutional provision to
    bring himself within the jurisdiction of this court"). In addition, the USA PATRIOT Act is not
    money-mandating statute that confers jurisdiction to this Court and that law does not provide the
    Court with jurisdiction to consider tax refund claims. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2712 (provision
    of the USA PA TRI OT Act dealing with recovery for violations). And so, plaintiff simply fails to
    meet his burden to show that the Court has jurisdiction to consider his claims for other monetary
    relief. 
    Minehan, 75 Fed. Cl. at 253
    .
    B. Plaintifrs Motion For Leave To Proceed In Forma Pauperis Satisfies The
    Statutory Requirements
    Lastly, plaintiff has filed a motion to proceed informa pauperis in which he requests a
    waiver of the Court's filing fee because he lacks the financial resources to pay the fee. See
    generally Pl. Mot. to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. This Court may authorize commencement of
    a suit without prepayment of fees when a person submits an affidavit including a statement of all
    assets, a declaration that he or she is unable to pay the fees, and a statement of the nature of the
    action and a belief that he or she is entitled to redress. See 28 U.S.C. § 1951 (a); see also
    28 U.S.C. § 2503(d). Due to the Court's summary disposition of this case and plaintiff's prose
    status, the Court finds that plaintiff satisfies the requirements to proceed in forma pauperis for
    the purpose ofresolving the government's motion to dismiss. And so, the Court grants
    plaintiff's motion to proceed informa pauperis for the limited purpose ofresolving the
    government's motion to dismiss.
    10
    V.     CONCLUSION
    In sum, the facts in this case show that plaintiff has simply not met his burden to show
    that the Court possesses jurisdiction to consider his tax refund and other monetary claims. The
    Court does not possess jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs 2012 tax refund claim, because plaintiff
    has not satisfied his tax liability for the 2012 tax year. In addition, the Court cannot entertain
    plaintiffs 2014 tax refund claim, because plaintiff filed this claim less than six months after
    filing his 2014 tax return. Furthermore, the Court does not possess jurisdiction to consider
    plaintiffs 2015 tax refund claim, because plaintiff has not yet filed a claim for a tax refund for
    the 2015 tax year with the IRS. The remainder of plaintiffs claims for monetary relief are also
    jurisdictionally barred, because plaintiff has not identified a money-mandating statute or other
    source of law to invoke the Court's jurisdiction with respect to these claims.
    And so, for the foregoing reasons, the Court:
    (1) GRANTS the government's motion to dismiss; and
    (2) GRANTS plaintiffs motion to proceed informa pauperis.
    The Clerk's Office is directed to ENTER final judgment in favor of defendant,
    DISMISSING the complaint. No costs.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    11