Thomas v. United States , 2015 U.S. Claims LEXIS 814 ( 2015 )


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  •       In the United States Court of Federal Claims
    No. 10-303C
    Filed June 30, 2015
    * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *               *
    JOHN THOMAS,                                *
    *    Summary Judgment; Army Corps of
    Plaintiff,             *    Engineers; Civilian Pay; Living
    v.                             *    Quarters     Allowance;   Overseas
    *    Differentials and Allowances Act, 5
    UNITED STATES,                              *    U.S.C. § 5921 et seq.
    *
    Defendant.             *
    *
    * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *               *
    Lisa A. Kleine, Shaw, Bransford & Roth, P.C., Washington, D.C., for plaintiff. With
    her was Debra L. Roth, Shaw, Bransford & Roth, P.C., Washington, D.C.
    Jane C. Dempsey, Trial Attorney, United States Department of Justice,
    Washington, D.C., for defendant. With her was Benjiman C. Mizer, Principal Deputy
    Assistant Attorney General, Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Director, Steven J. Gillingham,
    Assistant Director, Department of Justice.
    OPINION
    HORN, J.
    FINDINGS OF FACT
    Plaintiff John Thomas, a civilian Army Corps of Engineers (Army Corps)
    employee, alleges he has been wrongfully denied a Living Quarters Allowance (LQA)
    since June 2004, when he began working for the Army Corps, or, alternatively, from
    March 2009, when the Commander of Mr. Thomas’ Army Corps District requested he
    receive LQA, or, as a further alternative, from October 2009, when the Commander
    requested any requirements of the LQA regulation Mr. Thomas did not meet be waived.
    Plaintiff estimates his lost compensation as a result of the denial of LQA to be
    approximately $400,000.00.
    Mr. Thomas currently lives and works in Aviano, Italy, where he has served as a
    construction representative for the Army Corps since June 1, 2004. Prior to his
    employment with the Army Corps, and within one year of his retirement from the United
    States Air Force, Mr. Thomas was employed beginning in October 2003 as a civilian
    United States government contractor with Wireless Communication Technical Services,
    Inc. (Wireless), a United States firm, and was living and working in Italy under a United
    States Forces sponsored visa. Mr. Thomas was recruited by Wireless in the United States
    at his legal residence in Texas. He was hired with the understanding that he would return
    to Texas when his contract ended. Mr. Thomas’ offer of employment with Wireless
    provided that he would be reimbursed for the cost of return transportation to the United
    States if he resigned or if employment was no longer available, “[u]pon completion of 12
    months of employment.”
    On April 17, 2004, Mr. Thomas applied for a position with the Army Corps under
    Vacancy Announcement NEGE04786352. The vacancy announcement requested
    applicants for a permanent, full-time, construction representative position in Aviano, Italy.
    The announcement limited the selection pool to United States Army employees or to
    United States citizens residing in the commuting area who were eligible for a family
    member appointment. The vacancy announcement stated that permanent change of
    station expenses were not authorized, but was silent as to whether LQA was authorized.
    Mr. Thomas was initially notified that he did not meet the eligibility criteria for the position
    and that he was not on the referral list. Subsequently, the Army Corps offered to appoint
    Mr. Thomas, who had previously, honorably retired from the United States Air Force, to
    the construction representative position, using the Veterans Recruitment Appointment
    authority. On May 14, 2004, Mr. Thomas received and accepted the Army Corps’ offer of
    employment via email. On May 17, 2004, he sent his letter of resignation to Wireless,
    and, on May 28, 2004, he resigned from Wireless.
    Even prior to the Army Corps’ formal job offer, there apparently was discussion
    regarding whether Mr. Thomas could receive a LQA. On May 12, 2004, Mr. Lawrence
    Riles, an Army Corps resident engineer, sent an email to Lt. Col. Joseph Gandara
    regarding Mr. Thomas stating, “I need to see if we can get him LQA; supposedly, he
    qualifies since he falls under the regulation requirements: GS-9 or higher, hard to fill
    position, and separated from service less than one year.” On May 14, 2004, Mr. Riles
    sent Mr. Thomas an email stating, “As soon as you are officially chosen, then we need to
    get started on trying to get the LQA.”
    On May 20, 2004, a human resources assistant for the Army Corps sent an email
    to Mr. Thomas requesting that he complete certain forms to finish the hiring action. When
    Mr. Thomas responded the same day with an email inquiring about the steps needed to
    apply for LQA, the assistant replied “No LQA nor PCS [Permanent Change of Station
    expenses] authorized.” Mr. Riles, who was copied on this email, then sent Mr. Thomas
    an email advising him not to “bring this [LQA issue] up right now” because it “may
    complicate the hiring action.” Mr. Riles continued: “Next week we will find the form and
    submit the application based upon the regulations . . . . this is not their call if you fall under
    the regs . . . .” (ellipses in original). Both the Army Corps’ Request for Personnel Action
    (Standard Form 52) and the Notification of Personnel Action (Standard Form 50) related
    to Mr. Thomas’ hiring state that he was a “Local hire - not entitled to LQA or transportation
    agreement.” Similarly, the Army Corps’ Checklist for Recruit Actions completed for
    Mr. Thomas states the he was “Locally recruited in Italy” and that a “Completed LQA
    Eligibility Form” was “NA [not applicable].”
    2
    On June 21, 2004, Mr. Thomas submitted a request for LQA to Ms. Karen Lenhardt
    of the Army Corps’ Employee Support Office, arguing that he was eligible under Army in
    Europe Regulation (AER) 690-500.592, issued June 20, 2003. Mr. Thomas never
    received a written response to this request, but, in his November 14, 2005 LQA request
    to the Army Corps’ Employee Support Office discussed below, he indicated that
    Ms. Lenhardt did verbally inform him that he would not be paid LQA because he was a
    local hire and that AER 690-500.592 was inapplicable because he “work[ed] for the
    Corps, not the US Army.”
    The November 14, 2005 request Mr. Thomas submitted to the Army Corps’
    Employee Support Office asked that his LQA request be “properly reviewed.”
    Lt. Col. Angela Lungu, Deputy Commander of the Army Corps, Europe District,
    responded to him with a memorandum indicating that the original decision not to offer him
    LQA would not be reversed for two reasons: “First, as you were already living in the
    overseas area, and, second, this allowance was not being offered to other applicants who
    may have applied through the competitive process for the same position.” Lt. Col. Lungu
    also indicated that Mr. Thomas had failed to provide “any mitigating circumstances that
    would warrant a reversal of the original decision,” and that “[a]lso taken into consideration
    is the fact that you were informed, prior to reporting for duty, that LQA would not be
    authorized, and you still willingly accepted without LQA being authorized.”
    On February 21, 2006, Mr. Thomas submitted a formal grievance to Col. Margaret
    Burcham, Commander of the Army Corps, Europe District, regarding his request for LQA,
    arguing that he was eligible under AER 690-500.592. On March 9, 2006, Col. Burcham,
    responded with a memorandum denying Mr. Thomas’ grievance on the grounds that the
    non-receipt of LQA was not grievable under the Administrative Grievance System.
    Col. Burcham also noted two additional pieces of information: (1) “it was never the intent
    to offer LQA for the position to which you were hired” and (2) AER 690-500.592 did not
    apply to Mr. Thomas’ case because “[w]hile the Army Corps of Engineers are Army
    employees in Europe, we follow a different chain of command, report to a different major
    command (MACOM), and observe our own LQA policies.”
    On March 4, 2007, Mr. Thomas filed a claim for LQA with the United States Office
    of Personnel Management (OPM). On April 18, 2008, OPM issued a decision sustaining
    the Army Corps’ denial of LQA, finding that Mr. Thomas had failed to present clear and
    convincing evidence that AER 690-500.592 should have been applied to his case, that,
    absent such evidence, OPM must accept the Army Corps’ position that it set its own LQA
    policy, and that the evidence supported the Army Corps’ position that it did not intend to
    authorize LQA for Mr. Thomas’ position.
    On September 15, 2008, Mr. Thomas sent a memorandum to Col. John Kem, who
    had replaced Col. Burcham as Commander of the Army Corps, Europe District, asking
    that his request for LQA be re-evaluated. On March 16, 2009, Col. Kem sent a
    memorandum to the Army’s Civilian Personnel Directorate (CPD) requesting that it
    approve LQA for Mr. Thomas on the grounds that Mr. Thomas satisfied the requirements
    of Department of State Standardized Regulation (DSSR) § 031.12b and AER
    690-500.592, that it would be more costly to lose him and have to recruit another
    3
    employee, and that his housing costs were minimal. This request was denied. Explaining
    the reason for this denial, Ms. Brigitte Brown, Chief of the Overseas Services Division of
    the Civilian Human Resources Agency, Northeast/Europe Region, stated that the Living
    Quarters Allowance Policy, dated July 20, 2001, issued by the Army Corps, Europe
    District (the 2001 LQA Policy), was the applicable LQA policy in effect at the time
    Mr. Thomas was hired and that Mr. Thomas failed to meet the requirements of this policy
    because he was a locally hired individual and his Commander had not approved LQA
    prior to his selection. Ms. Brown also stated that she had reviewed paragraph 7a(3) of
    AER 690-500.592 (November 18, 2005), which, she stated, became applicable to
    Mr. Thomas when the Civilian Human Resources Agency began servicing the Army
    Corps after he was hired, and that Mr. Thomas did not meet its requirements. Therefore,
    according to Ms. Brown, her office could not authorize LQA for Mr. Thomas.
    In November 2009, Col. Kem sent a second memorandum to the Army’s CPD
    requesting that it waive the requirements of any portion of AER 690-500.592 that it
    determined Mr. Thomas did not meet. This request was denied in a March 2, 2010
    memorandum by Aleck Hernandez, Chief of the Employment Compensation Branch of
    the CPD. In his memorandum, Mr. Hernandez explained that, when Mr. Thomas was
    hired, the Army Corps itself administered its civilian personnel administration, and, at that
    time, the Army Corps had issued the 2001 LQA Policy, exercising its authority to
    supplement existing DSSR and Department of Defense guidance for overseas benefits
    and allowances. Mr. Hernandez stated that, at the time Mr. Thomas was hired, he was
    determined to be ineligible for LQA under the Army Corps’ 2001 LQA Policy because he
    was a locally hired employee, he was not authorized for LQA, and there was no indication
    of any expressed determination by the commanding officer to authorize LQA for him.
    Mr. Hernandez further stated that, in April 2008, the servicing of civilian Army Corps
    employees, including the administration of LQA, was assumed by the Army’s Civilian
    Human Resources Agency, Europe Region (CHRA-E) and that, from that time forward,
    eligibility for LQA was determined by AER 690-500.592, rather than the Army Corps’ 2001
    LQA Policy. Mr. Hernandez found that Mr. Thomas did not qualify for LQA under
    paragraph 7a(3) of AER 690-500.592 because the assumption of services by CHRA-E
    did not constitute a “transfer” of the employee involved. In addition, Mr. Hernandez stated
    that although the continuing eligibility for LQA provision of AER 690-500.592, paragraph
    9, did not “fully meet Mr. Thomas’s situation,” it provided the “underlying rationale” for the
    Army Corps’ inability to grant him a waiver. In particular, Mr. Hernandez pointed to
    language in paragraph 9 stating that it “[w]ill not extend or reinstate payment of LQA when
    law, regulation, or policy directed termination of payment” (alteration in original).1
    Therefore, according to Mr. Hernandez, the Army Corps was unable to grant Mr. Thomas
    LQA under AER 690-500.592 “since said regulation specifically prohibits to establish an
    eligibility for the allowance when it was previously not authorized by that employee’s
    agency.”
    Mr. Thomas filed his original complaint in this court on May 19, 2010. Initially, the
    case was assigned to, and heard by, Judge Lawrence Baskir, who held that the United
    1 In his memorandum, Mr. Hernandez mistakenly says that this language is in AER
    690-500.592, paragraph 10.
    4
    States Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction to review Mr. Thomas’ case because the
    combination of the statute authorizing LQA grants, the Overseas Differentials and
    Allowances Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5921 et seq., and its implementing regulation, DSSR § 031.12,
    provided money-mandating authority. See Thomas v. United States, No. 10-303C, 
    2011 WL 9976337
    , at *4 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 7, 2011). Judge Baskir awarded summary judgment to
    Mr. Thomas on the issue of liability. See 
    id. Following discussions
    between the parties
    regarding damages, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the government on
    February 6, 2012. Before a decision on the Motion for Reconsideration was issued, on
    October 11, 2012, the above-captioned case was reassigned to Judge George Miller,
    who denied the reconsideration motion on February 8, 2013, determining, “[s]ince
    defendant relies only on its previous arguments and cites no contrary controlling law, the
    Court declines to grant defendant's motion for reconsideration.” Thomas v. United States,
    No. 10-303C, 
    2013 WL 514522
    , at *2 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 8, 2013). After further discussions
    between the parties and the filing of a stipulation regarding damages, Judge Miller
    entered judgment in favor of the Mr. Thomas on June 4, 2013.
    The government timely filed a notice of appeal on August 2, 2013. On April 16,
    2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the judgment of
    the United States Court of Federal Claims and remanded the case back to the trial court
    “to examine its [the Court of Federal Claims’] decision in light of Roberts[ v. United States,
    
    745 F.3d 1158
    (Fed. Cir. 2014)],” which had been issued prior to the decision in the
    Thomas appeal, but after Judge Miller’s decision.
    Once remanded, the case, again, was reassigned, this time to the undersigned
    judge for further proceedings. An amended complaint was filed on January 7, 2015, and
    the issues were fully briefed on renewed Motions for Judgment on the Administrative
    Record, or, in the alternative, Motions for Summary Judgment. Oral argument was held
    on June 17, 2015, at which Mr. Thomas’ current attorney of record appeared for the first
    time.
    DISCUSSION
    I.      Jurisdiction
    In general, the Tucker Act grants jurisdiction to this court as follows:
    The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render
    judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the
    Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive
    department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States,
    or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.
    28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2012). As interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, the
    Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity to allow jurisdiction over claims against the United
    States (1) founded on an express or implied contract with the United States, (2) seeking
    a refund from a prior payment made to the government, or (3) based on federal
    constitutional, statutory, or regulatory law mandating compensation by the federal
    5
    government for damages sustained. See United States v. Navajo Nation, 
    556 U.S. 287
    ,
    290 (2009); United States v. Testan, 
    424 U.S. 392
    , 400 (1976); see also Chattler v. United
    States, 
    632 F.3d 1324
    , 1130 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2011); Greenlee
    Cnty., Ariz. v. United States, 
    487 F.3d 871
    , 875 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied
    (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 
    552 U.S. 1142
    (2008); Palmer v. United States, 
    168 F.3d 1310
    , 1314 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
    “Not every claim invoking the Constitution, a federal statute, or a regulation is
    cognizable under the Tucker Act. The claim must be one for money damages against the
    United States . . . .” United States v. Mitchell, 
    463 U.S. 206
    , 216 (1983); see also United
    States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 
    537 U.S. 465
    , 472 (2003); RadioShack Corp. v.
    United States, 
    566 F.3d 1358
    , 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Rick’s Mushroom Serv., Inc. v.
    United States, 
    521 F.3d 1338
    , 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[P]laintiff must . . . identify a
    substantive source of law that creates the right to recovery of money damages against
    the United States.”). In Ontario Power Generation, Inc. v. United States, 
    369 F.3d 1298
    (Fed. Cir. 2004), the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit identified three
    types of monetary claims for which jurisdiction is lodged in the United States Court of
    Federal Claims. The court wrote:
    The underlying monetary claims are of three types. . . . First, claims alleging
    the existence of a contract between the plaintiff and the government fall
    within the Tucker Act's waiver. . . . Second, the Tucker Act’s waiver
    encompasses claims where “the plaintiff has paid money over to the
    Government, directly or in effect, and seeks return of all or part of that sum.”
    Eastport S.S. [Corp. v. United States, 
    178 Ct. Cl. 599
    ,] 372 F.2d [1002,]
    1007-08 [(1967)] (describing illegal exaction claims as claims “in which ‘the
    Government has the citizen's money in its pocket’” (quoting Clapp v. United
    States, 
    127 Ct. Cl. 505
    , 
    117 F. Supp. 576
    , 580 (1954))) . . . . Third, the Court
    of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over those claims where “money has not
    been paid but the plaintiff asserts that he is nevertheless entitled to a
    payment from the treasury.” Eastport S.S. [Corp. v. United 
    States], 372 F.2d at 1007
    . Claims in this third category, where no payment has been made to
    the government, either directly or in effect, require that the “particular
    provision of law relied upon grants the claimant, expressly or by implication,
    a right to be paid a certain sum.” Id.; see also [United States v.] 
    Testan, 424 U.S. at 401-02
    (“Where the United States is the defendant and the plaintiff
    is not suing for money improperly exacted or retained, the basis of the
    federal claim-whether it be the Constitution, a statute, or a regulation-does
    not create a cause of action for money damages unless, as the Court of
    Claims has stated, that basis ‘in itself . . . can fairly be interpreted as
    mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage
    sustained.’” (quoting Eastport S.S. [Corp. v. United 
    States], 372 F.2d at 1009
    )). This category is commonly referred to as claims brought under a
    “money-mandating” statute.
    Ontario Power Generation, Inc. v. United 
    States, 369 F.3d at 1301
    .
    6
    To prove that a statute or regulation is money-mandating, a plaintiff must
    demonstrate that an independent source of substantive law relied upon “‘can fairly be
    interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government.’” United States v.
    Navajo 
    Nation, 556 U.S. at 290
    (quoting United States v. 
    Testan, 424 U.S. at 400
    ); see
    also United States v. White Mountain Apache 
    Tribe, 537 U.S. at 472
    ; United States v.
    
    Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 217
    ; Roberts v. United 
    States, 745 F.3d at 1162
    ; Blueport Co., LLC
    v. United States, 
    533 F.3d 1374
    , 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 
    555 U.S. 1153
    (2009). The source of law granting monetary relief must be distinct from the Tucker Act
    itself. See United States v. Navajo 
    Nation, 556 U.S. at 290
    (The Tucker Act does not
    create “substantive rights; [it is simply a] jurisdictional provision[] that operate[s] to waive
    sovereign immunity for claims premised on other sources of law (e.g., statutes or
    contracts).”). “‘If the statute is not money-mandating, the Court of Federal Claims lacks
    jurisdiction, and the dismissal should be for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.’” Jan’s
    Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 
    525 F.3d 1299
    , 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
    (quoting Greenlee Cnty., Ariz. v. United 
    States, 487 F.3d at 876
    ); Fisher v. United States,
    
    402 F.3d 1167
    , 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (The absence of a money-mandating source is
    “fatal to the court’s jurisdiction under the Tucker Act.”); Peoples v. United States, 87 Fed.
    Cl. 553, 565-66 (2009). “Further, the statute and regulations must be money-mandating
    as to the class of which plaintiff claims to be a member.” Roberts v. United 
    States, 745 F.3d at 1162
    (citing Casa de Cambio Comdiv S.A. de C.V. v. United States, 
    291 F.3d 1356
    , 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
    When the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit remanded the
    above-captioned case to this court, the instruction was “to examine its [the Court of
    Federal Claims’] decision in light of Roberts.” The two previous trial court judges who had
    been assigned the case both had found that jurisdiction in this court for Mr. Thomas’ case
    was proper, but both decisions were issued before the Federal Circuit issued Roberts v.
    United States, 
    745 F.3d 1158
    . In Roberts, the Federal Circuit determined that the
    Overseas Differentials and Allowances Act and the DSSR, standing alone, “are only
    money-authorizing and are not money-mandating.” 
    Id. at 1165.
    When, however,
    additional regulations implementing the DSSR “provide that a particular class is entitled
    to LQA and the plaintiff alleges that he is within that class, the regulations are money-
    mandating and the court has jurisdiction.” 
    Id. at 1167.
    The implementing regulation at
    issue in Roberts v. United States was an Order issued by the Commander of the Marine
    Corp Bases Japan (MCBJ), pursuant to a Secretary of the Navy Instruction delegating to
    the Commandant of the Marine Corps, among others, the power to award LQA, a power
    that was delegated to the Secretary of the Navy by the Secretary of Defense in
    Department of Defense Instruction 1400.25, subchapter 1250, itself an implementing
    regulation of the DSSR. See 
    id. at 1166.
    The MCBJ Order limited the granting of LQA to
    two situations: (1) for new hires, when the appointing officer had designated a position as
    LQA-eligible based on recruitment need and expense; and (2) “[a]pplicants currently
    receiving LQA from another DoD component on island may be granted continuance of
    LQA at management's discretion.” 
    Id. (alteration in
    original). The Federal Circuit
    determined that the MCBJ Order, when combined with the Overseas Differentials and
    Allowances Act and the DSSR, was money-mandating “because the payment of money
    is required when the MCBJ Commander, acting pursuant to the Order, determines that a
    particular post is LQA-eligible or an individual should receive an LQA-continuance (i.e.,
    7
    LQA ‘shall be paid,’ 5 U.S.C. § 5922(c), in these instances).” 
    Id. (emphasis in
    original).
    Because the plaintiff in Roberts alleged he was a member of one of these classes,
    jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims existed. See 
    id. at 1167.
    In his complaint in this court, Mr. Thomas alleges that he met the requirements of
    the 2001 LQA Policy at the time of his hire. Like the MCBJ Order in Roberts, the 2001
    LQA Policy was issued pursuant to Department of Defense Instruction 1400.25,
    subchapter 1250, and, thus, was published to implement the DSSR.2 The LQA-
    authorizing provision of the 2001 LQA Policy states that “LQA will be authorized” for
    employees who meet the criteria it lists. Such language is mandatory and requires the
    payment of LQA to these employees. See Britell v. United States, 
    372 F.3d 1370
    , 1378
    (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“This and other courts have repeatedly held that this type of mandatory
    language, e.g., ‘will pay’ or ‘shall pay,’ creates the necessary ‘money-mandate’ for Tucker
    Act purposes.”). Indeed, the language in the 2001 LQA Policy is actually stronger than
    the language in the Roberts MCBJ Order, which stated that an LQA continuance “may be
    granted . . . at management’s discretion.” Roberts v. United 
    States, 745 F.3d at 1166
    (emphasis added). Under Roberts, the Army Corps’ 2001 LQA Policy, therefore, is
    money-mandating when combined with the Overseas Differentials and Allowances Act
    and the DSSR. See 
    id. Because Mr.
    Thomas argues that he met the requirements of the
    2001 LQA Policy at the time he was hired, jurisdiction exists for this court to hear his case.
    As noted in Roberts, “once the regulations provide that a particular class is entitled to
    LQA and the plaintiff alleges that he is within that class, the regulations are
    money-mandating and the court has jurisdiction.” 
    Id. at 1167
    (citing Doe v. United States,
    
    463 F.3d 1314
    , 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
    2 In Roberts, the Federal Circuit treated both Department of Defense Instruction 1400.25,
    subchapter 1250, and the MCBJ Order as “regulations,” see Roberts v. United 
    States, 745 F.3d at 1165-66
    , even though there was no indication that either document was
    promulgated through notice-and-comment rule making. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012)
    (detailing the procedure to be used for agency rule making). Thus, it appears that the
    Federal Circuit intended to take a broad, functional, view of published or generally
    available guidance as sufficient implementing language to direct a money-mandating
    circumstance establishing jurisdiction in this court. The 2001 LQA Policy, like the MCBJ
    Order in Roberts, was not a classic regulation, but was issued to implement LQA policy
    by a military commander and detailed specific criteria for the awarding of LQA to all
    individuals serving in the command.
    8
    II.    The Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment3
    Having determined that this court has jurisdiction of Mr. Thomas’ case, the court
    turns to disposition of the motions filed by the parties. As indicated in Roberts, “[t]he
    question of whether [plaintiff] in fact is within a class and entitled to LQA is a merits issue.”
    
    Id. Rule 56
    of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC) (2014) is
    similar to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in language and effect. Both
    rules provide that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
    there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
    as a matter of law.” RCFC 56(a); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (2014); see also Alabama v. North
    Carolina, 
    560 U.S. 330
    , 344 (2010); Hunt v. Cromartie, 
    526 U.S. 541
    , 549 (1999);
    Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 247-48 (1986); Adickes v. S. H. Kress &
    Co., 
    398 U.S. 144
    , 157 (1970); Biery v. United States, 
    753 F.3d 1279
    , 1286 (Fed. Cir.),
    reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2014); Ladd v. United States, 
    713 F.3d 648
    ,
    651 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Minkin v. Gibbons, P.C., 
    680 F.3d 1341
    , 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012);
    Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc., 
    675 F.3d 1302
    , 1309-10 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Advanced Fiber
    Techs. (AFT) Trust v. J & L Fiber Servs., Inc., 
    674 F.3d 1365
    , 1372 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g and
    reh’g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2012); Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc., 
    620 F.3d 1321
    , 1325
    (Fed. Cir.), reh’g denied (Fed. Cir. 2010); Consol. Coal Co. v. United States, 
    615 F.3d 1378
    , 1380 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
    131 S. Ct. 2990
    (2011); 1st Home Liquidating Trust v. United States, 
    581 F.3d 1350
    , 1355
    (Fed. Cir. 2009); Arko Exec. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 
    553 F.3d 1375
    , 1378 (Fed. Cir.
    2009); Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 
    543 F.3d 1276
    , 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2008),
    reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 
    556 F.3d 1329
    (Fed. Cir. 2009); Moden v. United States,
    
    404 F.3d 1335
    , 1342 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2005); Am.
    Pelagic Fishing Co., L.P. v. United States, 
    379 F.3d 1363
    , 1370-71 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g en
    banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 
    545 U.S. 1139
    (2005); Mata v. United States,
    
    114 Fed. Cl. 736
    , 744 (2014); Leggitte v. United States, 
    104 Fed. Cl. 315
    , 317 (2012);
    3  In their briefings to this court after the remand, both parties argued, in the alternative,
    that there were no genuine issues of material fact, and, that, therefore, they were entitled
    to Summary Judgment for the same reasons they were entitled to Judgment on the
    Administrative Record. The Administrative Record, after remand, was not certified. See
    RCFC 52.1(a) (2014). Therefore, out of an abundance of caution, the court is deciding
    the parties’ motions as Motions for Summary Judgment under RCFC 56, rather than as
    Cross-Motions for Judgment on the Administrative Record under RCFC 52.1. In doing so,
    the court notes that Mr. Thomas’ previous attorney, Ms. Roth, did not immediately object
    that the Administrative Record was not certified. In its initial scheduling Order after the
    above-captioned case was remanded by the Federal Circuit, this court ordered the
    government to file an Administrative Record by August 29, 2014 “after consultation and
    review by plaintiff,” and the Administrative Record was filed on that date. Mr. Thomas’
    attorney raised her objection about the Administrative Record’s lack of certification for the
    first time in Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record, which was filed
    on November 14, 2014, two and half months after the Administrative Record was filed,
    and four weeks after the government filed its Cross-Motion for Judgment on the
    Administrative Record.
    9
    Arranaga v. United States, 
    103 Fed. Cl. 465
    , 467-68 (2012); Cohen v. United States, 
    100 Fed. Cl. 461
    , 469 (2011); Boensel v. United States, 
    99 Fed. Cl. 607
    , 610 (2011).
    A fact is material if it will make a difference in the result of a case under the
    governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
    Inc., 477 U.S. at 248
    ; see also Marriott
    Int’l Resorts, L.P. v. United States, 
    586 F.3d 962
    , 968 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Anderson
    v. Liberty Lobby, 
    Inc., 477 U.S. at 248
    ); Mata v. United 
    States, 114 Fed. Cl. at 744
    ;
    Arranaga v. United 
    States, 103 Fed. Cl. at 467-68
    ; Thompson v. United States, 101 Fed.
    Cl. 416, 426 (2011); Cohen v. United 
    States, 100 Fed. Cl. at 469
    . Irrelevant or
    unnecessary factual disputes do not preclude the entry of summary judgment. See
    Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
    Inc., 477 U.S. at 247-48
    ; see also Scott v. Harris, 
    550 U.S. 372
    , 380 (2007); Monon Corp. v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 
    239 F.3d 1253
    , 1257 (Fed. Cir.
    2001); Gorski v. United States, 
    104 Fed. Cl. 605
    , 609 (2012); Walker v. United States, 
    79 Fed. Cl. 685
    , 692 (2008); Curtis v. United States, 
    144 Ct. Cl. 194
    , 199, 
    168 F. Supp. 213
    ,
    216 (1958), cert. denied, 
    361 U.S. 843
    (1959), reh'g denied, 
    361 U.S. 941
    (1960).
    When reaching a summary judgment determination, the judge’s function is not to
    weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the case presented, but to determine
    whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
    Inc., 477 U.S. at 249
    ; see, e.g., Schlup v. Delo, 
    513 U.S. 298
    , 332 (1995); Ford Motor Co. v. United
    States, 
    157 F.3d 849
    , 854 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Due to the nature of the proceeding, courts
    do not make findings of fact on summary judgment.”); TigerSwan, Inc. v. United States,
    
    118 Fed. Cl. 447
    , 451 (2014); Dana R. Hodges Trust v. United States, 
    111 Fed. Cl. 452
    ,
    455 (2013); Cohen v. United 
    States, 100 Fed. Cl. at 469
    -70; Boensel v. United 
    States, 99 Fed. Cl. at 611
    ; Macy Elevator, Inc. v. United States, 
    97 Fed. Cl. 708
    , 717 (2011); Dick
    Pacific/GHEMM, JV ex rel. W.A. Botting Co. v. United States, 
    87 Fed. Cl. 113
    , 126 (2009);
    Johnson v. United States, 
    49 Fed. Cl. 648
    , 651 (2001), aff’d, 52 F. App’x 507 (Fed. Cir.
    2002), published at 
    317 F.3d 1331
    (Fed. Cir. 2003). The judge must determine whether
    the evidence presents a disagreement sufficient to require submission to fact finding, or
    whether the issues presented are so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of
    law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
    Inc., 477 U.S. at 250-52
    ; Jay v. Sec’y of Dep’t of
    Health and Human Servs., 
    998 F.2d 979
    , 982 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g denied and en banc
    suggestion declined (Fed. Cir. 1993); Leggitte v. United 
    States, 104 Fed. Cl. at 316
    . When
    the record could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no
    genuine issue for trial, and the motion must be granted. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus.
    Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
    475 U.S. 574
    , 587 (1986); Advanced Fiber Techs. (AFT) Trust
    v. J & L Fiber Servs., 
    Inc., 674 F.3d at 1372
    ; Marriott Int’l Resorts, L.P. v. United 
    States, 586 F.3d at 968
    ; Am. Seating Co. v. USSC Grp., Inc., 
    514 F.3d 1262
    , 1266 (Fed. Cir.),
    reh’g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2008); Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 
    262 F.3d 1306
    , 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Hall v. Aqua Queen Mfg., Inc., 
    93 F.3d 1548
    , 1553 n.3 (Fed.
    Cir. 1996). In such cases, there is no need for the parties to undertake the time and
    expense of a trial, and the moving party should prevail without further proceedings.
    In appropriate cases, summary judgment:
    saves the expense and time of a full trial when it is unnecessary. When the
    material facts are adequately developed in the motion papers, a full trial is
    10
    useless. “Useless” in this context means that more evidence than is already
    available in connection with the motion for summary judgment could not
    reasonably be expected to change the result.
    Dehne v. United States, 
    23 Cl. Ct. 606
    , 614-15 (1991) (quoting Pure Gold, Inc. v. Syntex,
    (U.S.A.) Inc., 
    739 F.2d 624
    , 626 (Fed. Cir. 1984)), vacated on other grounds, 
    970 F.2d 890
    (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citation omitted); see also Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g,
    Inc., 
    200 F.3d 795
    , 806 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The purpose of summary judgment is not to
    deprive a litigant of a trial, but to avoid an unnecessary trial when only one outcome can
    ensue.”); Metric Constr. Co., Inc. v. United States, 
    73 Fed. Cl. 611
    , 612 (2006).
    Summary judgment, however, will not be granted if “the dispute about a material
    fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable [trier of fact] could return
    a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
    Inc., 477 U.S. at 248
    ; see
    also Long Island Sav. Bank, FSB v. United States, 
    503 F.3d 1234
    , 1244 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g
    and reh’g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 
    555 U.S. 812
    (2008); Eli Lilly &
    Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 
    251 F.3d 955
    , 971 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied
    (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 
    534 U.S. 1109
    (2002); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Nintendo Co., 
    179 F.3d 1350
    , 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999); TigerSwan, Inc. v. United 
    States, 118 Fed. Cl. at 451
    ;
    Stephan v. United States, 
    117 Fed. Cl. 68
    , 70 (2014); Gonzales-McCaulley Inv. Group,
    Inc. v. United States, 
    101 Fed. Cl. 623
    , 629 (2011). In other words, if the nonmoving party
    produces sufficient evidence to raise a question as to the outcome of the case, then the
    motion for summary judgment should be denied. Any doubt over factual issues must be
    resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment, to whom the benefit of all
    presumptions and inferences runs. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 
    557 U.S. 557
    , 586 (2009);
    Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
    Corp., 475 U.S. at 587-88
    ; Yant v. United
    States, 
    588 F.3d 1369
    , 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 
    131 S. Ct. 69
    (2010);
    Dethmers Mfg. Co. v. Automatic Equip. Mfg. Co., 
    272 F.3d 1365
    , 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001),
    reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 
    293 F.3d 1364
    (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 
    539 U.S. 957
    (2003); Monon Corp. v. Stoughton Trailers, 
    Inc., 239 F.3d at 1257
    ; Wanlass v.
    Fedders Corp., 
    145 F.3d 1461
    , 1463 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g denied and en banc suggestion
    declined (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Am. Pelagic Co. v. United 
    States, 379 F.3d at 1371
    (citing Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., 
    208 F.3d 1339
    , 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); Dana R.
    Hodges Trust v. United 
    States, 111 Fed. Cl. at 455
    ; Boensel v. United 
    States, 99 Fed. Cl. at 611
    (“‘The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences
    are to be drawn in his favor.’”) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
    Inc., 477 U.S. at 255
    )
    (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
    Corp., 475 U.S. at 587-88
    ; Casitas
    Mun. Water Dist. v. United 
    States, 543 F.3d at 1283
    ; Lathan Co. Inc. v. United States, 
    20 Cl. Ct. 122
    , 125 (1990))); see also Am. Seating Co. v. USSC Grp., 
    Inc., 514 F.3d at 1266
    -
    67; Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, 
    Inc., 200 F.3d at 807
    . “However, once a moving
    party satisfies its initial burden, mere allegations of a genuine issue of material fact without
    supporting evidence will not prevent entry of summary judgment.” Republic Sav. Bank,
    F.S.B. v. United States, 
    584 F.3d 1369
    , 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Anderson v.
    Liberty Lobby, 
    Inc., 477 U.S. at 247-48
    .
    The initial burden on the party moving for summary judgment to produce evidence
    showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact may be discharged if the moving
    11
    party can demonstrate that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving
    party’s case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 325 (1986); see also Riley &
    Ephriam Constr. Co. v. United States, 
    408 F.3d 1369
    , 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Crown
    Operations Int’l Ltd. v. Solutia Inc., 
    289 F.3d 1367
    , 1377 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g denied (Fed.
    Cir. 2002); Trilogy Commc’ns, Inc. v. Times Fiber Commc’ns, Inc., 
    109 F.3d 739
    , 741
    (Fed. Cir.) (quoting Conroy v. Reebok Int’l, Ltd., 
    14 F.3d 1570
    , 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1994),
    reh’g denied and en banc suggestion declined (Fed. Cir. 1995)), reh’g denied and en
    banc suggestion declined (Fed. Cir. 1997); Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 
    107 F.3d 1565
    ,
    1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, 
    Inc., 200 F.3d at 807
    ; RQ
    Squared, LLC v. United States, 
    119 Fed. Cl. 751
    , 757-58 (2015). If the moving party
    makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate that a
    genuine dispute regarding a material fact exists by presenting evidence which establishes
    the existence of an element essential to its case upon which it bears the burden of proof.
    See Celotex Corp. v. 
    Catrett, 477 U.S. at 322
    ; see also Wavetronix LLC v. EIS Elec.
    Integrated Sys., 
    573 F.3d 1343
    , 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Long Island Sav. Bank, FSB v.
    United 
    States, 503 F.3d at 1244
    ; Florida Power & Light Co. v. United States, 
    375 F.3d 1119
    , 1124 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Schoell v. Regal Marine Indus., Inc., 
    247 F.3d 1202
    , 1207
    (Fed. Cir. 2001); Am. Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 
    204 F.3d 1103
    , 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
    Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, 
    Inc., 200 F.3d at 807
    ; Rasmuson v. United States,
    
    109 Fed. Cl. 267
    , 271 (2013). However, “a non-movant is required to provide opposing
    evidence under Rule 56(e) only if the moving party has provided evidence sufficient, if
    unopposed, to prevail as a matter of law.” Saab Cars USA, Inc. v. United States, 
    434 F.3d 1359
    , 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
    Even if both parties argue in favor of summary judgment and allege an absence of
    genuine issues of material fact, the court is not relieved of its responsibility to determine
    the appropriateness of summary disposition in a particular case, and it does not follow
    that summary judgment should be granted to one side or the other. See Prineville Sawmill
    Co. v. United States, 
    859 F.2d 905
    , 911 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing Mingus Constructors, Inc.
    v. United States, 
    812 F.2d 1387
    , 1391 (Fed. Cir. 1987)); see also Marriott Int’l Resorts,
    L.P. v. United 
    States, 586 F.3d at 968
    –69; B.F. Goodrich Co. v. U.S. Filter Corp., 
    245 F.3d 587
    , 593 (6th Cir. 2001); Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, 
    226 F.3d 1138
    , 1148 (10th Cir. 2000); Chevron USA, Inc. v. Cayetano, 
    224 F.3d 1030
    , 1037 n.5
    (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 
    532 U.S. 942
    (2001); Bubble Room, Inc. v. United States,
    
    159 F.3d 553
    , 561 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The fact that both the parties have moved for
    summary judgment does not mean that the court must grant summary judgment to one
    party or the other.”), reh’g denied and en banc suggestion declined (Fed. Cir. 1999);
    Allstate Ins. Co. v. Occidental Int’l, Inc., 
    140 F.3d 1
    , 2 (1st Cir. 1998); Massey v. Del Labs.,
    Inc., 
    118 F.3d 1568
    , 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1997); LewRon Television, Inc. v. D.H. Overmyer
    Leasing Co., 
    401 F.2d 689
    , 692 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 
    393 U.S. 1083
    (1969);
    Rogers v. United States, 
    90 Fed. Cl. 418
    , 427 (2009), subsequent determination, 93 Fed.
    Cl. 607 (2010); Consol. Coal Co. v. United States, 
    86 Fed. Cl. 384
    , 387 (2009), aff’d, 
    615 F.3d 1378
    , (Fed. Cir.), and reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
    
    131 S. Ct. 2990
    (2011); St. Christopher Assocs., L.P. v. United States, 
    75 Fed. Cl. 1
    , 8
    (2006), aff’d, 
    511 F.3d 1376
    (Fed. Cir. 2008); Reading & Bates Corp. v. United States, 
    40 Fed. Cl. 737
    , 748 (1998). The court must evaluate each party’s motion on its own merits,
    taking care to draw all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under
    12
    consideration, or, otherwise stated, in favor of the non-moving party. See First Commerce
    Corp. v. United States, 
    335 F.3d 1373
    , 1379 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied
    (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also DeMarini Sports, Inc. v. Worth, Inc., 
    239 F.3d 1314
    , 1322 (Fed.
    Cir. 2001); Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 
    254 F.3d 1334
    , 1338–39 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g and reh’g en
    banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 
    534 U.S. 1114
    (2002); Oswalt v. United States,
    
    85 Fed. Cl. 153
    , 158 (2008); Telenor Satellite Servs., Inc. v. United States, 
    71 Fed. Cl. 114
    , 119 (2006).
    Cross-motions are no more than a claim by each party that it alone is entitled to
    summary judgment. The making of such inherently contradictory claims, however, does
    not establish that if one is rejected the other necessarily is justified. See B.F. Goodrich
    Co. v. United States Filter 
    Corp., 245 F.3d at 593
    ; Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank
    of 
    Wichita, 226 F.3d at 1148
    ; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Occidental Int’l, 
    Inc., 140 F.3d at 2
    ;
    Rogers v. United 
    States, 90 Fed. Cl. at 427
    ; Reading & Bates Corp. v. United 
    States, 40 Fed. Cl. at 748
    .
    “Questions of law are particularly appropriate for summary judgment.” Oenga v.
    United States, 
    91 Fed. Cl. 629
    , 634 (2010) (citing Dana Corp. v. United States, 
    174 F.3d 1344
    , 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Summary judgment was appropriate here [in Dana Corp.]
    because no material facts were disputed, many being stipulated, and the only disputed
    issues were issues of law. Moreover, on each issue one party or the other is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law.”)); see also Santa Fe Pac. R.R. v. United States, 
    294 F.3d 1336
    , 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Issues of statutory interpretation and other matters of law
    may be decided on motion for summary judgment.”).
    LQA is a payment awarded to eligible civilian employees of the United States
    government serving overseas for the annual cost of suitable housing for the employees
    and their families. See Roberts v. United 
    States, 745 F.3d at 1160
    . The granting of LQA
    is dictated by the Overseas Differentials and Allowances Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5921 et seq.
    (2012), and its implementing regulations. Under 5 U.S.C § 5923(a), LQA may be granted
    “[w]hen Government owned or rented quarters are not provided without charge for an
    employee in a foreign area.” The President is empowered to prescribe regulations
    governing such allowances, see 
    id. at §
    5922(c), an authority which the President has
    delegated to the Secretary of State. See Exec. Order No. 10903, 26 Fed Reg. 217-03,
    217-18 (Jan. 9, 1961).
    The Secretary of State has used this authority to set “baseline requirements for
    LQA eligibility” in the DSSR. See Roberts v. United 
    States, 745 F.3d at 1164
    . The relevant
    portion of the DSSR makes a distinction between “Employees Recruited in the United
    States” (DSSR § 031.11) and “Employees Recruited Outside the United States” (DSSR
    § 031.12). DSSR § 031.11 states that LQA “may be granted to employees who were
    recruited by the employing government agency in the United States.” By contrast, DSSR
    § 031.12 states, in relevant part, that:
    [LQA] may be granted to employees recruited outside the United States,
    provided that:
    13
    a. the employee’s actual place of residence in the place to which the
    quarters allowance applies at the time of receipt thereof shall be fairly
    attributable to his/her employment by the United States Government;
    and
    b. prior to appointment, the employee was recruited in the United
    States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the
    Northern Mariana Islands, the former Canal Zone, or a possession
    of the United States, by:
    (1) the United States Government, including its Armed Forces;
    (2) a United States firm, organization, or interest;
    (3) an international organization in which the United States
    Government participates; or
    (4) a foreign government
    and had been in substantially continuous employment by such
    employer under conditions which provided for his/her return
    transportation to the United States, the Commonwealth of Puerto
    Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the former
    Canal Zone, or a possession of the United States . . . .
    DSSR § 031.12.
    The DSSR delegates to agency heads such as the Secretary of Defense the power
    to issue implementing regulations regarding the granting of LQA, “[w]ithin the scope of
    [the DSSR],” see DSSR § 013, an authority which the Secretary of Defense has delegated
    to the heads of the Department of Defense’s components. See Department of Defense
    Instruction 1400.25, subchapter 1250.4.1 (Dec. 1996). It was pursuant to this authority
    that the Army Corps’ 2001 LQA Policy and AER 690-500.592, the two documents that
    have relevance to Mr. Thomas’ LQA entitlement claim at various times during his
    employment with the Army Corps, were promulgated.
    The Army Corps’ 2001 LQA Policy, a memorandum titled “Living Quarters
    Allowance (LQA) Policy,” was addressed to “All Europe District Employees,” dated July
    20, 2001, and signed by Col. Michael R. Pelkey, Commander of the Army Corps, Europe
    District. The 2001 LQA Policy governed the awarding of LQA to all employees in the Army
    Corps, Europe District, including Mr. Thomas, from the time he was hired at least through
    March 2008. The operative portion of the 2001 LQA Policy states:
    If adequate and suitable Government quarters are not available, LQA will
    be authorized for the following employees:
    a. Recruited from the United States, U.S. territories, possessions, or
    protectorates with a period of one year or more continuous residence
    not OCONUS [outside the continental United States].
    b. Transferred from another overseas activity, agency, or command
    that originally recruited the employee from the United States, eligible
    to receive or receiving LQA, and has not exceeded five years
    14
    overseas in the EUCOM [United States European Command] Area
    of Responsibility (AOR) at the time of selection.
    c. Transferred from another overseas activity, agency, or command in
    the EUCOM AOR, eligible to receive or receiving LQA, and has not
    exceeded five years overseas at the time of selection.
    d. For locally hired individuals selected for positions for which
    recruitment from the U.S. is normally made if approved by the
    Commander prior to selection and the selectee meets the criteria of
    Section 031.12a and b or Section 031.12c of [the DSSR].
    2001 LQA Policy ¶ 8.
    The second document at issue in Mr. Thomas’ case is AER 690-500.592, issued
    November 18, 2005. This regulation became applicable to employees of the Army Corp,
    Europe District, supplanting the 2001 LQA Policy, in April 2008, when the CHRA-E
    assumed responsibility for servicing them. The operative portion of the regulation, titled
    “LQA Authorization,” states:
    LQA will be granted for the following APF [appropriated fund] employees:
    (1) Employees recruited in the United States or its possessions for
    positions at grades GS-09 (or equivalent), WG-11, WL-09, WS-05,
    and above. . . . Employees who previously vacated an outside the
    continental United States (OCONUS) civilian or contractor position
    must have resided permanently in the United States for at least 1
    year immediately before accepting the formal job offer. This 1-year
    residency requirement does not apply to— . . . .
    (b) Applicants hired into hard-to-fill positions. . . .
    (2) Employees who are recruited from outside the United States or its
    possessions for positions in grades GS-09 (or equivalent) WG-11,
    WL-09, WS-05, and above. . . . Former military members and civilian
    employees will be considered to meet the DSSR, section 031.12,
    eligibility requirement of “substantially continuous employment” if
    they are appointed within 1 year after the date of separation or when
    the transportation entitlement is lost, whichever occurs first. . . .
    (3) Federal civilian or NAF [nonappropriated fund] employees selected
    for or converted from NAF to positions in grades GS-09 (or
    equivalent) WG-11, WL-09, WS-05, and above . . . who meet all of
    the following:
    (a) Are transferring to the European theater from another overseas
    Government activity or agency without a break in service.
    (b) Meet basic eligibility criteria of DSSR, section 031.11 or 031.12a
    and b.
    (c) Were already receiving or eligible to receive LQA at the time of
    selection.
    15
    AER 690-500.592 ¶ 7a. Also relevant to Mr. Thomas’ claim is paragraph 9 of AER
    690-500.592, titled “Continuing Eligibility,” which states: “Unless otherwise prescribed, all
    employees who met the eligibility criteria in prevailing regulations at the time of
    appointment but who do not meet the criteria of this regulation will continue to receive
    LQA.” Paragraph 9 further states that this provision “[w]ill not extend or reinstate payment
    of LQA when law, regulation, or policy directed termination of payment.” AER
    690-500.592 ¶ 9b.
    DSSR §§ 031.11 and 031.12 provide the “baseline requirements for LQA
    eligibility,” Roberts v. United 
    States, 745 F.3d at 1164
    , establishing when LQA “may be
    granted” to employees, DSSR § 031, and any grant of LQA must be made “subject to
    [their] provisions.” DSSR § 013. Cf. AER 690-500.592 ¶ 4 (Nov. 18, 2005) (“To be
    considered eligible for allowances covered by this regulation, employees must meet the
    basic eligibility requirements of DSSR, section 031.11 and section 031.12a and b.”).
    Therefore, to have been eligible to receive LQA, Mr. Thomas first must have met the
    criteria contained in either DSSR § 031.11 or § 031.12.
    DSSR § 031.11 authorizes LQA for employees “recruited by the employing
    government agency in the United States.” Before this court, Mr. Thomas argues that the
    structure of this sentence means that “[w]hat is significant is not the location of the
    employee, but the location of the employing government agency” (emphasis in original).
    This argument ignores the basic structure of the DSSR § 031, which creates two separate
    classes of employees: “Employees Recruited in the United States” (DSSR § 031.11) and
    “Employees Recruited Outside the United States” (DSSR § 031.12). This distinction
    furthers the purpose of LQA under the Overseas Allowances and Differentials Act, which
    was “designed to give something extra to employees who must go overseas.” Acker v.
    United States, 
    223 Ct. Cl. 281
    , 290 (1980); see also Bortone v. United States, 110 Fed.
    Cl. 668, 677 (2013) (“[I]t appears from the statute that the purpose of LQA is to provide
    an incentive to prospective employees to move overseas to work for the federal
    government.”). DSSR § 031.11 applies only to those employees who were physically
    located in the United States at the time of their hire. Because Mr. Thomas was living and
    working in Italy at the time of his recruitment, this provision does not apply to him,
    regardless of where his employing agency was located. See Bortone v. United States,
    110 Fed Cl. at 677 (holding that the Navy properly construed DSSR § 031.11 “to exclude
    individuals who live abroad, are encouraged to apply for a job and then apply for a job in
    the foreign location but travel to the United States for the purposes of being formally hired
    and sworn in”).
    Therefore, to qualify for LQA, Mr. Thomas must have met the requirements of
    DSSR §§ 031.12a and b. Mr. Thomas met the requirement of DSSR § 031.12a that his
    place of residence in the place to which the LQA applies be “fairly attributable to his/her
    employment by the United States Government,” as it is undisputed that it was understood
    Mr. Thomas would return to Texas when his contract with Wireless ended. Mr. Thomas
    also met the requirements of DSSR § 031.12b(2) that prior to his appointment he be
    recruited in the United States by a United States firm and that his employment with this
    firm have been “substantially continuous,” as it is also undisputed that he was recruited
    16
    in Texas by Wireless, a United States firm, where he worked continuously from October
    2003 until May 2004.
    Contested is whether Mr. Thomas also met the requirement of DSSR § 031.12b
    that his previous employment have been “under conditions which provided for his/her
    return transportation to the United States.” The government argues that, because
    Mr. Thomas’ offer letter from Wireless entitled him to return transportation only “[u]pon
    completion of 12 months of employment,” and Mr. Thomas, in fact, had completed only
    eight months of employment with Wireless before joining the Army Corps, his return
    transportation entitlement never vested, and, therefore, his previous employment did not
    provide for his return transportation to the United States, as required by DSSR § 031.12b.
    In support of this argument, the government cites to Urban v. United States, 
    119 Fed. Cl. 57
    (2014). In Urban, the plaintiff’s prior employer had a policy entitling employees to return
    transportation to the United States if they worked there for at least twelve months. See 
    id. at 59-60.
    The Urban plaintiff worked at his employer for only three months before
    resigning to take an overseas civilian position with the Army, for which he was denied
    LQA on the grounds that his previous work agreement failed to provide return
    transportation to the United States. See 
    id. at 60.
    In upholding this denial, the court in
    Urban noted that the plaintiff’s entitlement under the return policy had never vested
    because he failed to satisfy its twelve month requirement. See 
    id. at 62.
    Thus, the court
    found, the plaintiff had failed to satisfy DSSR § 031.12b’s requirement “that the conditions
    already be in place to insure return transportation to the United States.” 
    Id. at 63.
    Mr. Thomas argues that Urban is distinguishable because, unlike his offer letter,
    “the agreement in question in the Urban case did not ensure return transportation.” The
    relevant terms of Mr. Thomas’ Wireless offer letter, however, which provided for return
    transportation to the United States “[u]pon completion of 12 months of employment” are
    very similar to those in the employer policy at issue in Urban, which provided for return
    transportation “as long as [the employee had] been on board for at least twelve months.”
    
    Id. at 59.
    As in Urban, Mr. Thomas resigned from his employer before the twelve months
    his contract required for return transport. Therefore, as in Urban, Mr. Thomas’ entitlement
    to return transportation had failed to vest at the time he was hired by the Army Corps, for
    which reason the conditions were not in place to ensure his return transportation to the
    United States. Thus, Mr. Thomas failed to satisfy the requirements of DSSR § 031.12b.
    Mr. Thomas also argues that because the Army Corps never made a determination
    of his eligibility, or lack thereof, for LQA under the DSSR before denying him LQA, the
    government cannot now rely on his ineligibility under the DSSR to justify its decision after
    the fact. Regardless of how it justified its decision, the Army Corps had no power to grant
    LQA in situations not authorized by the DSSR, and to have done so would have been
    without a basis in the law.4 See Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 
    496 U.S. 414
    , 416
    4DSSR § 031.12 provides that DSSR § 031.12b “may be waived by the head of agency
    upon determination that unusual circumstances in an individual case justify such action.”
    The version of the regulation delegating authority to Department of Defense component
    heads to implement regulations regarding LQA that is included in the Administrative
    Record, Department of Defense Instruction 1400.25, subchapter 1250.5.1.3 (December
    17
    (1990) (“[P]ayments of money from the Federal Treasury are limited to those authorized
    by statute . . . .”); Poillucci v. Dep’t of Justice, 
    459 F.3d 1351
    , 1355-56 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
    (holding there was no legal basis for granting plaintiff retirement benefits to which he is
    not entitled by statute, “even though a government agency expressed the view that he
    was eligible for those benefits”) (citing Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. 
    Richmond, 496 U.S. at 416
    ). Because he did not meet the baseline requirements laid out in the DSSR at the time
    of his hire, Mr. Thomas was not, and is not, eligible to receive LQA.
    Even assuming that he did meet the requirements of the DSSR at the time of his
    hire, Mr. Thomas would not be now, nor have been, at any point during his employment
    with the Army Corps, entitled to receive LQA. To have an entitlement to LQA, an
    employee must meet not only the requirements of the DSSR, but also any implementing
    regulations promulgated pursuant to it. See Roberts v. United 
    States, 745 F.3d at 1167
    (“[Plaintiff’s] recovery turns on whether he is a member of a class entitled to LQA under
    the Order and the Job Announcement.”) (emphasis in original). Based on the information
    provided by the parties, Mr. Thomas failed, however, at any point during his employment
    with the Army Corps, to meet the requirements of either of the two implementing
    regulations applicable to him, the 2001 LQA Policy or AER 690-500.592.
    Mr. Thomas failed to meet any of the criteria in the 2001 LQA Policy, which was
    applicable to him from the time he was hired until April 2008. He was not recruited in the
    United States, but had been living and working in Italy for five months at the time he was
    hired by the Army Corps. See 2001 LQA Policy ¶ 8a. He was not transferred to the Army
    Corps from another overseas activity, agency, or command, but was hired after working
    for a civilian contractor. See 
    id. ¶¶ 8b,
    c. His Commander did not approve LQA for his
    position prior to his selection. See 
    id. ¶ 8d.
    Rather than contest these facts, Mr. Thomas
    argues that the Army Corps erred in denying him LQA at the time of his hire because it
    failed to follow its own procedures in doing so. In particular, Mr. Thomas argues that the
    2001 LQA Policy provision authorizing LQA for local hires, “if approved by the
    Commander prior to selection,” paragraph 8d, actually “required” the Commander to
    personally review and consider LQA for Mr. Thomas’ position prior to his selection.
    Mr. Thomas argues that the evidence shows that the decision not to approve LQA for his
    position was not made by the Commander, but “was apparently made by a Human
    Resources clerk based on some undisclosed criteria,” and that this clerk “effectively
    usurped the Commander’s authorizing authority.” Mr. Thomas further argues that the
    evidence shows that the clerk’s decision was “based on two erroneous assumptions: 1)
    that local hires were not eligible for LQA; and 2) that if LQA had been authorized that
    authorization would have been contained in the vacancy announcement.” Because of
    these alleged failures, Mr. Thomas argues the Army Corps’ decision that he was not
    1996), states that such a waiver will be approved only if the employee “entered the country
    in which the foreign post is located as the spouse of a sponsor who was eligible for the
    quarters allowance” or “[t]he employee is an incumbent of a position designated as
    emergency-essential according to DoD Directive 1404.10.” Plaintiff has not alleged any
    facts that would allow him to meet these requirements.
    18
    eligible for LQA at the time of his hire was “arbitrary, capricious and not based on law,
    and therefore should be overturned.”
    In arguing that the Army Corps’ actions were arbitrary, capricious, and not based
    on law, Mr. Thomas must overcome a high hurdle. “[M]ilitary administrators are presumed
    to act lawfully and in good faith like other public officers, and the military is entitled to
    substantial deference in the governance of its affairs.” Dodson v. U.S. Gov’t, Dep’t of
    Army, 
    988 F.2d 1199
    , 1204 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The plaintiff bears the burden of overcoming
    the “‘strong, but rebuttable, presumption’ that the military discharges its duties ‘correctly,
    lawfully, and in good faith.’” Bernard v. United States, 
    59 Fed. Cl. 497
    , 501 (quoting Hary
    v. United States, 
    223 Ct. Cl. 10
    , 17, 
    618 F.2d 704
    , 707 (1980) (citations omitted)), aff'd,
    98 F. App’x 860 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g denied (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Spellissy v. United
    States, 
    103 Fed. Cl. 274
    , 283 (2012); Boyle v. United States, 
    101 Fed. Cl. 592
    , 596 (2011)
    (citing Richey v. United States, 
    322 F.3d 1317
    , 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
    Mr. Thomas has not proven that the Army Corps actually committed the errors he
    alleges. First, there is evidence that a senior official in Mr. Thomas’ command did consider
    whether to provide LQA for his position prior to his hiring, but declined to do so. In
    explaining why Mr. Thomas had initially been denied LQA, Col. Burcham stated that “it
    was never the intent to offer LQA for the position to which you were hired.” Similarly,
    Lt. Col. Lungu explained that Mr. Thomas was denied LQA, in part, because “[LQA] was
    not being offered to other applicants who may have applied through the competitive
    process for the same position.” While these statements were made after the fact, they are
    consistent with the record created contemporaneously to Mr. Thomas’ hiring, which
    demonstrates that there was no intent by the Army Corps to offer Mr. Thomas LQA. The
    vacancy announcement for Mr. Thomas’ position made no mention of the availability of
    LQA if hired. Notes on Mr. Thomas’ Standard Forms 50 and 52 stated “Local hire - not
    entitled to LQA.” A note on his Checklist for Recruit Actions indicated that a “Completed
    LQA Eligibility Form” was not applicable. Moreover, an Army Corps administrative
    assistant told Mr. Thomas six days after he was offered the position that “No LQA nor
    PCS [was] authorized.”
    More fundamentally, Mr. Thomas’ argument fails because the 2001 LQA Policy did
    not impose a requirement on the Commander to personally consider the applicability of
    LQA to his particular position or to personally consider LQA for every hire. In fact, the
    language of the 2001 LQA Policy stating that LQA would be granted “if approved by the
    Commander prior to selection” required the Commander to review and make such a
    decision only if LQA was to be granted to a local hire. See 2001 LQA Policy ¶ 8d.
    Additionally, there is strong evidence that such LQA grants to local hires were meant to
    be exceptional, with the 2001 LQA Policy stating “Living Quarters Allowance (LQA) is not
    an automatic salary supplement or an entitlement. . . . When an individual is already
    residing in a foreign area, LQA as a recruitment incentive is not normally required.” Thus,
    the most logical reading of the 2001 LQA policy is that, absent an express determination
    by the Commander that LQA should be provided for a position, a determination that in
    most cases would not be made, no LQA would be provided to local hires. See Roberts v.
    United 
    States, 745 F.3d at 1167
    (finding plaintiff was not entitled to LQA because his
    “position was not designated as LQA-eligible” in its job announcement).
    19
    Nor can Mr. Thomas find relief based on AER 690-500.592, which has governed
    his LQA status since April 2008. While AER 690-500.592’s Continuing Eligibility provision
    might have entitled Mr. Thomas to continue receiving LQA had he already been receiving
    it under the 2001 LQA Policy, no other provision of the AER 690-500.592 provided
    Mr. Thomas with an LQA entitlement, as apparently was conceded by Mr. Thomas’ new
    attorney at the June 16, 2015 oral argument. AER 690-500.592 authorizes LQA for three
    types of employees: (1) employees recruited in the United States at grade GS-09 and
    above; (2) employees recruited outside the United States at grade GS-09 and above; and
    (3) employees transferring to the European theater from another overseas Government
    activity or agency who were already receiving or eligible to receive LQA. AER
    690-500.592 ¶ 7a. Mr. Thomas had already been recruited at the time CHRA-E began
    servicing the Army Corps and, thus, (1) and (2) are not applicable. See 
    id. ¶ 5a(1)
    (“The
    CHRA-E will . . . Determine the employee’s eligibility for LQA before the employee is
    appointed.”) (emphasis added). Nor was Mr. Thomas transferred from another overseas
    government activity or agency. Since he was hired in April 2004, Mr. Thomas has worked
    in the same construction representative position for the Army Corps. Although the 2001
    LQA Policy was supplanted by AER 690-500.592, he remained in the same job and no
    transfer was made. Therefore, even if he had met the DSSR eligibility requirements,
    Mr. Thomas would not, at any point during his employment with the Army Corps, have
    had an entitlement to receive LQA under either the 2001 LQA policy or AER 690-500.592.
    The two requests made by the Commander of Mr. Thomas’ Army Corps District,
    Col. Kem, to Army CPD in 2009, that Mr. Thomas be granted LQA and that any provisions
    of AER 690-500.592 that Mr. Thomas did not meet be waived, do not change this
    conclusion. There are two waiver provisions in AER 690-500.592: paragraph 8c and
    paragraph 8d. Paragraph 8c discusses “waivers of unauthorized allowances based on
    eligibility factors that are not locally governed” and states that “[t]he CPD will review claims
    and forward them with appropriate recommendations to the decision-making authority.”
    Although it is unclear whether this provision applied to Col. Kem’s waiver request, even if
    it did, the CPD would have fulfilled its obligations through the response, dated March 2,
    2010, of Aleck Hernandez to Col. Kem’s request. Paragraph 8d governs waivers
    exercised under the provisions of Department of Defense Instruction 1400.25, subchapter
    1250, “paragraph 5.1.1.2.2,” a provision which is not contained in the version of
    Department of Defense Instruction 1400.25, subchapter 1250 (December 1996), that was
    provided in the Administrative Record. Regardless, paragraph 8d simply repeats the
    requirements that the Administrative Record’s version of Department of Defense
    Instruction 1400.25, subchapter 1250.5.1.3, lists for waivers of the requirements of DSSR
    § 031.12b, and, states that, in addition, “employees must meet the requirements of this
    regulation (AE Reg 690-500.592).” Thus, Mr. Thomas’ failure to meet the requirements
    of AER 690-500.592 made him ineligible for such a waiver.
    20
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is
    GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DISMISSED. Plaintiff’s amended
    complaint is DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court shall enter JUDGMENT for the defendant
    consistent with this opinion.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    s/Marian Blank Horn
    MARIAN BLANK HORN
    Judge
    21
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-303C

Citation Numbers: 122 Fed. Cl. 53, 2015 U.S. Claims LEXIS 814, 2015 WL 3979931

Judges: Marian Blank Horn

Filed Date: 6/30/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/7/2024

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