McClurg Family Farm, LLC. v. United States ( 2014 )

In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 10-156L
(Filed: February 24, 2014)
__________
MCCLURG FAMILY FARM, LLC, et al., *
for themselves and As Representatives of a * Rails-to-trails case; Cross-motions for partial
Class of Similarly Situated Persons, * summary judgment; Ownership interests
* under Iowa law; Stipulation – application of
Plaintiffs, * Burgess and Jenkins to the parcels in this
* case; Railroad interests – easement versus
* fee; Burden of proof where original
v.
* conveyance documents are missing;
Application of Iowa Code § 327G-77 to
THE UNITED STATES, *
railroad lines owned in fee; Questions of
*
fact.
Defendant. *
*
__________
OPINION
__________
Thomas Scott Stewart, Baker Sterchi Cowden & Rice, Kansas City, MO, for plaintiffs.
Frank James Singer, Environment and Natural Resources Division, United States
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., with whom was Acting Assistant Attorney General
Robert G. Dreher, for defendant.
ALLEGRA, Judge:
Plaintiffs, landowners in Iowa, allege that their property was taken as a result of
defendant’s actions under the National Trails System Act (the Trails Act), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-51.
The court certified the class on July 27, 2010. Pending are cross-motions for partial summary
judgment regarding defendant’s liability as to the 360 parcels at issue. For the reasons that
follow, the court renders a split decision, concluding, as a matter of law, that defendant is liable
with respect to some of these parcels and not as to others. For still other parcels, the court
determines that the existence of genuine issues of material fact precludes a ruling as to liability.
The court’s determinations are summarized in the appendix that follows this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
A brief recitation of the underlying facts sets the context for this decision.
The class of plaintiffs in this case owns real estate that assertedly underlies or adjoins a
36.9 mile railroad corridor that runs through Dickinson and Osceola Counties, Iowa (the
Railroad Line). The Railroad Line was originally created by the Iowa Northwestern Railroad
(INW), which established the corridor through a combination of various forms of conveyance
and transfer.
On September 5, 2008, INW filed a petition for an abandonment exemption with the
Surface Transportation Board (STB), 1 seeking permission to abandon the Railroad Line,
specifically a segment between milepost 215.4, west of Mackenzie Junction, to milepost 252.3,
west of Braaksma, located in Dickenson and Osceola Counties. On October 3, 2008, the Iowa
Trails Council filed a Request for Issuance of a Public Use Condition and Notice of Interim Trail
Use. On October 24, 2008, the STB issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU) 2 relating to the
Railroad Line identified above. Following several extensions of the negotiating period, on or
about August 31, 2009, INW and the Iowa Natural Heritage Foundation (the Foundation), on
behalf of the Dickinson County Trails Board and the Osceola County Conservation Board,
reached an agreement to purchase the Railroad Line from INW for interim trail use and
railbanking pursuant to section 8(d) of the Trails Act. By letter dated October 19, 2009, the
Foundation notified the STB of this agreement.
On March 12, 2010, plaintiffs filed their complaint in this court seeking just
compensation under the Fifth Amendment for property they claim was taken when the STB
issued the NITU pursuant to the Trails Act. As mentioned, on July 27, 2010, the court certified a
1
The STB has exclusive authority over all the nation’s rail lines. See Chi. & N.W.
Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 321 (1981). A railroad cannot terminate rail
service on a particular line without first getting the STB’s consent. See Barclay v. United States,
443 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1209 (2007).
2
There are three ways to terminate rail service. First, a railroad can apply to the STB for
permission to discontinue service. See 49 U.S.C. § 10903(d)(2). Second, a railroad can ask the
STB for permission to abandon the rail line through a proceeding. See id. at § 10903(d)(1).
Finally, under the Trails Act, a railroad can terminate service through a process known as
“railbanking.” Under the railbanking process, the railroad must first file an abandonment
application under 49 U.S.C. § 10903, or a Notice of Exemption from that process under 49
U.S.C. § 10502. Thereafter, a third party may ask the STB to issue a NITU so that the former
railway can be used for interim trail use. The interim trail is subject to the “possible future
reconstruction and reactivation of the right-of-way for rail service.” 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(a)(1)-
(3). The NITU gives the railroad 180 days in which to negotiate an interim trail use agreement
with the third-party trail sponsor. Id. at § 1152.29(d)(1). If an agreement is reached, then the
trail sponsor manages the right-of-way, subject to a possible future restoration of rail service; if
an agreement is not reached, the railroad may exercise its authority to abandon the line. Id. at §§
1152.29(d)(1) and (e)(2).
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class that eventually grew to include 360 individual parcels and 279 individuals or entities. On
August 23, 2010, plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint; on March 21, 2011, they filed a
second amended complaint.
As discovery progressed, the parties generated and exchanged a series of claims books, a
process designed to isolate the documents and arguments associated with given parcels and to
identify the need for additional discovery. Through this process, plaintiffs agreed to dismiss
voluntarily their claims as to 19 parcels, leaving 341 parcels. On June 30, 2011, plaintiffs filed a
motion for partial summary judgment as to 150 of these parcels, for which they claimed
defendant had no bona fide objection to liability. Before oral argument on that motion, plaintiffs
filed a motion to compel seeking to require defendant to stipulate to the ownership and adjacency
to the Railroad Line of 188 parcels. In an effort to get a single motion covering all the parcels,
on March 16, 2012, the court conducted a status conference, at which the parties agreed to cancel
the argument scheduled on plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and to take positions
with respect to all of the parcels at issue.
After the parties exchanged additional documents, plaintiffs filed, on September 13,
2012, a supplemental motion for partial summary judgment on liability. On October 12, 2012,
defendant filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment. In the midst of the briefing of that
motion, the undersigned decided Burgess v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 223 (2013), which dealt
with the issuance of a NITU under the Trails Act with respect to another rail line in Iowa. On
March 7, 2013, the court issued an order setting argument on May 23, 2013, on the parties’
supplemental cross-motions for partial summary judgment. Three days before that argument, on
May 20, 2013, the parties filed a stipulation in which they agreed, for purposes of the court’s
ruling on the pending cross-motions, to have the treatment of certain parcels be governed by
Burgess and Jenkins v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 598 (2011). Unable to determine which
parcels were still at issue, the court cancelled the oral argument and ordered the parties to file
charts setting forth their positions as to each of the parcels at issue in the case. Those charts have
been since been filed, revealing 58 different parcels on which the parties still dispute liability.
Oral argument on the parcels still covered by the cross-motions for partial summary judgment is
deemed unnecessary. 3
II. DISCUSSION
We begin with common ground. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
3
On December 19, 2013, plaintiffs filed a motion seeking a status conference and trial,
seemingly complaining about the delay encountered in this case. On December 20, 2013, that
motion was denied. While case management of this case could have been better, it should not be
overlooked that a significant portion of the delay encountered in this case came from the shifting
fashion in which the parties developed their positions as to many of the hundreds of parcels at
issue.
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of law. See RCFC 56; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). Disputes
over facts that are not outcome-determinative will not preclude the entry of summary judgment.
Id. at 248. However, summary judgment will not be granted if “the dispute about a material fact
is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable [trier of fact] could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Id.; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Becho, Inc. v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 595, 599 (2000).
When making a summary judgment determination, the court is not to weigh the evidence,
but to “determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; see also
Agosto v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 436 U.S. 748, 756 (1978) (“a [trial] court
generally cannot grant summary judgment based on its assessment of the credibility of the
evidence presented”); Am. Ins. Co. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 151, 154 (2004). The court must
determine whether the evidence presents a disagreement sufficient to require fact finding, or,
conversely, is “so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 250-52; see also Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009) (“‘Where the record taken as a
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine
issue for trial.’” (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587)). Where there is a genuine dispute, all
facts must be construed, and all inferences drawn from the evidence must be viewed, in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88 (citing United
States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)); see also Stovall v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl.
336, 344 (2010); L.P. Consulting Grp., Inc. v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 238, 240 (2005).
Where, as here, a court considers cross-motions for (partial) summary judgment, it must view
each motion, separately, through this prism. 4
A. Ownership Interest
It is now settled law that a Fifth Amendment takings occurs when defendant, through
issuance of a NITU, destroys state-defined property rights. See Ladd v. United States, 630 F.3d
1015, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Rasmuson v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 267, 272 (2013). In the
context of cases such as these, takings can arise variously – for example, where the NITU
interferes with the landowner’s right to reversion of an unencumbered fee or prevents the
landowner of property adjoining a rail line from augmenting his property under state law. See
Ladd, 630 F.3d at 1019; Burgess, 109 Fed. Cl. at 235-36.
In Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (en banc), the Federal
Circuit held that a threshold issue in rails-to-trails cases is who owned the land involved, with
particular focus on whether the railroad in question acquired only an easement or instead
4
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Mobil Producing Tex. & N.M., 281 F.3d 1249, 1252-53
(Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Estate of Hevia v. Portrio Corp., 602 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2010);
Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., Inc., 598 F.3d 257, 264 (6th Cir.
2010); Stovall, 94 Fed. Cl. at 344; Northrop Grumman Computing Sys., Inc. v. United States, 93
Fed. Cl. 144, 148 (2010).
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obtained fee simple title to the corridor. “Clearly, if the Railroad obtained fee simple title to the
land over which it was to operate, and that title inures, as it would, to its successors,” the court
observed, a plaintiff “would have no right or interest in those parcels and could have no claim
related to those parcels for a taking.” Id.; see also Sutton v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 436, 438
(2012). The Federal Circuit went on to explain that if an easement is found, the court must then
determine whether it was subject to limitations, particularly, one “limited to use for railroad
purposes.” Preseault, 100 F.3d at 1533; see also Ladd, 630 F.3d at 1019; Ellamae Phillips Co. v.
United States, 564 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Iowa law adds a wrinkle to this property
inquiry, as it confers additional rights on the owners of property adjoining a railroad upon the
extinguishment of a railroad easement. See Rasmuson, 109 Fed. Cl. at 272 n.7; Burgess, 109
Fed. Cl. at 229.
As to many of the parcels at issue, the parties focus on the same deeds and/or conveyance
documents. Questions involving the interpretation of these documents must be resolved by
reference to state law, in this case, that of Iowa. See Preseault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 16 (1990);
Rhutasel v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 220, 225 (2012); see also Douglas R. Bigelow Trust v.
United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 490, 493 (2012). Under Iowa law, deeds are interpreted according to
the ordinary rules of contract construction. See Wiegmann v. Baier, 203 N.W. 2d 204, 208 (Iowa
1972); Maxwell v. McCall, 124 N.W. 760 (Iowa 1910); Jackson v. Benson, 7 N.W. 97 (Iowa
1880); see also Douglas R. Bigelow Trust, 107 Fed. Cl. at 493; Sutton, 107 Fed. Cl. at 440. As to
a number of the parcels at issue, both parties agree that there are no questions of fact and that
deciding how these deeds should be construed presents a question of law, suitable for resolution
under the cross-motions. 5 See Steele’s Lessee v. Spencer, 26 U.S. 552, 560 (1828); Douglas R.
Bigelow Trust, 107 Fed. Cl. at 493; Sutton, 107 Fed. Cl. at 439-40. As to other parcels, however,
5
In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517
U.S. 370 (1996), the Federal Circuit explained the law on this point thusly:
The interpretation of a contract or a deed, like a patent, is ultimately a question of
law. There is nothing novel about the principle that, in the words of Justice Story,
“the interpretation of written documents properly belongs to the Court, and not to
the jury.” William & James Brown & Co. v. McGran, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 479, 493
(1840). This principle has been routinely evoked in the context of contract law.
See Levy v. Gadsby, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 180, 186 (1805) (“the construction of a
written evidence is exclusively with the court”); Goddard v. Foster, 84 U.S. (17
Wall.) 123, 142 (1872) (“[I]t is well-settled law that written instruments are
always to be construed by the court . . . .”); see also Meredith v. Picket, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 573, 575 (1824) (interpreting a deed, “[t]he Judges must construe the
words of an entry, or any other title paper, according to their own opinion of the
words as they are found in the instrument itself”).
Id. at 997 (string citations omitted); see also Chevy Chase Land Co. of Montgomery Cnty., Md. v.
United States, 158 F.3d 574, 575 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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the parties have raised a host of questions of fact that, as will be seen, precludes this court from
resolving, for now, the claims regarding those parcels.
For ease and clarity of decision, the court has grouped the parcels into seven categories,
each raising the same or similar issues. 6 The court will address each of these categories in turn.
1. Parcels for Which Plaintiffs Concede There is No Liability.
Claimant Name Claim Source
Christian Reformed Church c/o Larry Post 15.A & 15.B 5-353
Tom & Le Ann Ransom 33.B & 33.C 5-495
Mark S. & Carol Coleman 67 H-216, H-163
Martin & Melinda Marten 91 F-384
Albert Bartley 92 F-384
Scott Trigg & Nancy J. Johnson 94
Michael K. De Jong 100 F-406
Maye M. Swanson 101 F-406
Dan M. & Lori D. Lewis 110
George W. Garloff 155.B & 155.C H-321, H-239
Great Lakes Cooperative 156.A - 156.H
Robert Sr. & Robert Jr. Kirschbaum 157.A & 157.B
E. L. Ballou 158.A & 158.B
Robert L. Browning 159.A - 159.D
H. & V. Thompson Farms LTD 160
Lonnie S. Browning 161.A & 161.B
Based on their review of the relevant conveyance documents and deeds (and for some of
the parcels, there were no such documents), plaintiffs concede that there is no liability for the 32
parcels listed in the chart above.
2. Parcels Whose Treatment is Controlled, for Purposes of this Decision,
by either Burgess v. United States or Jenkins v. United States.
This court has issued several opinions in other Trails Act cases involving rail corridors in
Iowa. See Burgess, 109 Fed. Cl. 223; Jenkins, 102 Fed. Cl. 598; Jenkins v. United States, 2012
WL 10205284 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 21, 2012). On May 20, 2013, the parties stipulated to be bound
tentatively by these decisions as they relate to certain parcels at issue in this case, reserving, inter
6
In several instances, the parcels in these categories will be identified in a chart that lists
the name(s) of the claimant(s), as well as the claim identifier that the parties have assigned to the
claim in their class index. The charts also identify the source document(s) that relate to the claim,
using the record number employed in the Dickenson and Osceola County, Iowa, recorder offices.
For instance, a conveyance located at “M-565” is recorded at Book M, page 565, or one at “53
345” is recorded at Book 53, page 345. These same conventions are used in the appendix that
follows this opinion.
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alia, the right to appeal Burgess, Jenkins or any decision reached here. 7 The following segments
reflect the parties’ agreement.
a. Parcels governed by the court’s ruling in Burgess, 109 Fed. Cl.
at 229-31, that certain deeded easements were limited to railroad purposes
and, therefore, subject to Iowa Code § 327G.76.
Claimant Name Claim Source
The Estate of Theodore Pranger; Loreen J.
4.D 5-471
Bruxvoort; John W. Pranger Life Estate
Robert & Sylvia A. Rolfes 8.A - 8.C 5-353
Clear Lake Stock Farms, Inc. 10.A & 10.B 5-394
Sonstegard Family Farms 5-406, 5-471, & 5-
11.A - 11.C
495
Earl Faber 12.A - 12.C 5-469, 5-471
Marlin & Mary Laverman 14.A - 14.C 5-374
Lawrence W. & Vonna R. Leckband 16.A 5-340
Lawrence W. Leckband 16.B – 16.D 5-340
Mark and Verna Salzman 17 5-340
James Hesebeck 18 5-340, 5-480
Cooperative Elevator Association of
19.A 5-340, 5-480
Ocheyedan
Cooperative Elevator Association of 5-519, 5-515 & 5-
19.B - 19.D
Ocheyedan 402
Randall W. Boeke 20.B 5-519
Larry L. & Ruby E. Brunk 21.C 5-519
Douglas D. & Danette K. Block 22.A - 22.D 5-353
Alan Hart 23.A, 23.D. –
5-353, 5-376
23.G
Helen Hart 23.B & 23.C 5-353
Maurice D. & Barbara L. Block 24.A & 24.B 5-353
Hans J. & Bernice Willadsen 25.B & 25.C 5-382
Larry Bosma; Jerry & Marcella Bosma;
Darlene Wassink; Arlene Van Beek; Ester
Bosma; Presentation Sisters, Inc; Charles &
26.A & 26.B 5-384, 5-412
Joyce Bosma; Leo Bosma; Pamela & Duane
Van deHoef; Lucella Bosma; Frances B.
Bosma Trust
Merle L. & Sarah J. Pedley 27.B 5-388
7
In this regard, the stipulation provided that:
In acknowledging [that] this Court’s decision in Burgess (and Judge Firestone’s
decision in Jenkins) resolved some of the same issues that are presented in the
parties’ instant cross-motions, the parties do not waive, compromise, or otherwise
limit their appellate rights with respect to those issues in either Burgess, Jenkins,
or in this case. Instead, the parties simply acknowledge that the rulings in
Burgess and/or Jenkins apply to the issues identified . . . .
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Travaille Family Farms Inc. 28.A & 28.B 5-380, 5-388
Dale L. Peters 31.C 3-390
J&M Partnership LLP 33.D 5-402
Gerald R. & Joan C. Vander Muelen 37.A & 37.B 5-406
Randy E. Clark; Linda Kunzman; Barbra A.
38.A - 38.E H-564, H-560
Cambilargui & Lori M. Clark-Cotterman
Clifford L. Nebelsick 39.A - 39.C H-560
Frederick Goodno; Scott W. Goodno; Stacy
40.A - 40.D H-560, H-555
Wiese; Justin & Shawna Goodno
Jared Andrew Herbert Revocable Trust & The
Mary Julianne Spencer-Herbert Revocable 41.F - 41.H H-191
Trust
Steven A. & Jennifer L. Krummen; Stewart A.
Krummen; Craig S. Krummen & Royce 42.E H-191
Krummen
Randall J. Johnson 43.C H-191
Arco Dehydrating Co. Inc. 44.B - 44.D H-191
Gregory L. Baloun 45.A - 45.D H-191
Gregory L. Baloun & Wes McClure 45.E H-135
Allen and Mary J. Arnold 46 H-135
William Steven & Dianne Kathleen Jansen 47 H-135
Lake Park Development Corp. 48 H-135
Bradley T. & Francel L. Graham 49.A - 49.C H-135
Krummen Farms LP 50.A - 50.E H-135
Robert Allen 51.A - 51.C H-162
Harold R. Hartmann Trust 52.A & 52.B H-162
Harold R. Hartmann Trust 52.C H-218, H-222
Timothy S. Hoerichs & Ann L. Hoerichs
57.A & 57.B H-161
Family Trust
David B. Olson 58 H-161
Jon Gunderson 63.B H-289
Cohrs Construction, Inc. 66 H-289
Evelyn McClurg & McClurg Family Farm,
68.A - 68.C H-288
LLC
Paul J. & Diane L. Kollasch 69 H-288
Jerry Edward Miller 70.A & 70.B H-288
Gwendolyn Vetter H-288, H-177 &
71.A - 71.E
H-193
Janet Bergman Revocable Trust 72 H-194
Terry L. & Cheryl L. Bruns 73 H-194
Don B. & Barbara F. Erlandson 74 H-194
Raymond A. & Darlene Gustafson 75.A & 75.B H-194
Scott & Mary Lynn Ingvall 76 H-194
Richard L. & Kathy S. Kleen 77.A H-194
Todd Krieger 78.A & 78.B H-194
Kathleen M. Krueger 79.A - 79.C H-194
Dennis A. & Marilyn K. Ladwig 80.A & 80.B H-194
G. Wallis Reed Trust 81 H-194
Roger F. Reppert Revocable Trust 82 H-194
Arthur J. Thompson & Jill N. McDowell 83.B H-194
Ferrellgas Inc. 84 H-194
-8-
Jack L. & Beverly J. Longmore 85.A & 85.B F-402
Craig F. & Ellen M. Moffitt 86 H-194
Richard A. & Karla J. Heinrichs 95.A - 95.C F-384
Ronald D. Claussen Revocable Trust 96.A & 96.B F-384
Brian A. & Carol A. Woods 99 F-384
Robert W. Thorbrogger 116 F-403, F-413
Janice M. Schultz 117 F-403, F-413
Frigate LLC 118.A & 118.B F-403, F-413
David S. & Darlene I. Shaw 119.A & 119.B F-403, F-413
Keith L. & Susan L. Ostrum 121 H-313
Mark A. & Kristine L. Hoss 122 F-403, F-413
Reed L. Potter 123 F-403, F-413
James E. & Pamela A. Feld 124 H-313
Thomas L. Hoffman 125 H-313
Linda S. Taylor 126 H-313
Dennis D. & Anita Dean 127.A & 127.B H-313
Scott V. & Jolene C. Egertson 128 H-313
Gregory A. & Connie J. Tolan 129 H-313
Michael T. & Rhonda F. Reekers 130 H-313
Beverly Jean Steinberger 131 H-313
Arthur C & Roxa L. Cummings 132 H-313
Kathleen M. Drysdale 133 H-313
Kimberly K. Durst 134 H-313
Gary & Tom Kuhlman, Kathy Jo Swalve, Sally
135 H-313
Ann Lundberg & Phoebe Hersom
Duane H. Serck 136 F-417
Clint T. & Lindsay R. Robinson 137 H-164
William J. & Carleen C. Lambert 138.A & 138.B H-164, F-420
Joyce Overocker F-412, F-411 &
139.A - 139.D
F-419
Rohn K. Shepley 140 F-412
Lavonne Esther Hansen 141.A & 141.B F-411
Margerite Butcher Revocable Trust F-420, F-404, &
142.A - 142.D
F-416
Margaret Hill Northey 143.A & 143.B F-415
Douglas A. & Nancy N. Pringnitz 144.A & 144.B F-415
Steven J. & Julie A. Ingvall 153 H-194
Jerry Moore 154 H-313
George W. Garloff 155.A H-135
In Burgess, a number of the “right-of-way” deeds indicated that the property owner
granted the railroad “the right of way for their railroad,” going on to describe the conveyance as
“[a] strip of land for that purpose one hundred feet wide across.” Construing these deeds, the
undersigned concluded that the language therein conveyed to the railroad only an easement for
railroad purposes. Burgess, 109 Fed. Cl. at 226, 230. Citing, inter alia, Iowa Code §§ 327G-76-
77, 8 the court concluded that “[i]f the easements in question were not unrestricted, but instead
8
For the years in question, Iowa Code § 327G-76 provided:
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limited for railroad purposes only, they were extinguished upon abandonment of the rail line.”
Burgess, 109 Fed. Cl. at 231. In addition, to the extent that these properties adjoined the Rail
Line, for purposes of Iowa Code § 327G.76, the easements in question extinguished due to non-
use before the NITU was issued, making defendant liable for a takings. See Burgess, 109 Fed.
Cl. at 229.
With the limitations discussed above, the parties agree that this ruling in Burgess applies
to the 180 properties listed in the chart above. 9
Railroad property rights which are extinguished upon cessation of service by the
railroad divest when the department of transportation or the railroad, having
obtained authority to abandon the rail line, removes the track materials to the
right-of-way. If the department of transportation does not acquire the line and the
railway company does not remove the track materials, the property rights which
are extinguished upon cessation of service by the railroad divest one year after the
railway obtains the final authorization necessary from the proper authority to
remove the track materials.
For the years in question, Iowa Code § 327G.77(1) provided, in pertinent part, that “[i]f a
railroad easement is extinguished under section 327G.76, the property shall pass to the owners of
the adjacent property at the time of abandonment. If there are different owners on either side,
each owner will take to the center of the right-of-way.” See also Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v.
Kmezich, 48 F.3d 1047, 1049-50 (8th Cir. 1995) (discussing these provisions); Macerich Real
Estate Co. v. City of Ames, 433 N.W. 2d 726, 729 (Iowa 1988); Burgess, 109 Fed. Cl. at 229.
9
A few notes regarding the parcels in this category are in order. While the parties have
not included parcel 31.C in the stipulation, based on a review of the source documents for that
parcel, the court concludes that this parcel was an easement for railroad purposes. Several of the
parcels in group 2(a), (specifically parcels 18, 44.B, 52.C, 139.A and 139.B) had two segments –
one owned in fee by the Railroad, the other a deeded easement. The stipulation covers only the
latter of these segments. However, for the reasons stated below, see discussion regarding
category 4, infra, the court concludes that the segment of the trail that the Railroad owned in fee
did not pass to the adjoining property owner under Iowa Code § 327G.76. In addition, defendant
has expressed caveats and reservations with respect to certain parcels in this group. For
example, defendant asserts in the stipulation that the width of parcels 19.A and 154 are not 100
feet; however, insofar as the court can see, defendant provides no support for these assertions in
any of its filings, and the court determines that these points are waived. The court also rejects
defendant’s claim that a portion of parcel 20.B does not adjoin the Rail Line, as it appears that
the parcel is undivided and does adjoin that line. In addition, defendant correctly contends that
parcels 38.A through 38.E are subject to a life estate in Allen E. Clark, who is not a party to this
action. Likewise, defendant is correct that parcels 26.A and 26.B are partially owned by
individuals who are not parties to this suit.
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b. Parcels governed by the court’s ruling in Burgess, 109 Fed. Cl. at 238-40,
that 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) imposes an easement for interim trail use and for
future reactivation of rail service.
Claimant Name Claim Source
Dale W. and Danna S. Braaksma 1.A & 1.B 3-402
The Estate of Theodore Pranger, Loreen J.
4.A - 4.C 3-419, 13-287
Bruxvoort; John W. Pranger
Wayne D. & Esther Moet 5.A - 5.C 3-417
Juliana Garret & Judson Te Paske 6.A - 6.E 5-353
M. Rock Marco & Dan Hartwig 7.A - 7.C 5-353
Sonstegard Family Farms 11.H, 11.J & 3-388, 3-384, H-
11.L 555
Mary Swalve; Janice Neilsen; Debra Swalve;
Roger Swalve; Norman Swalve; Dwaine 13.A &13.B 3-400
Swalve; Allen Swalve; Karen Swalve
Cooperative Elevator Association of
19.E 3-388
Ocheyedan
Merle L. & Sarah J. Pedley 27.C 5-394
Eugene C. Schmidt 29 3-394
Wilfred & Ellen Bosma 30.A - 30.D 3-394, 3-392
Dale L. Peters 31.A & 31.B 3-392
J&M Partnership LLP 33.E & 33.F 3-388
Ardyce Rueter 35.A & 35.B 3-384, 3-386
Jared Andrew Herbert Revocable Trust & The
H-555, H-565, H-
Mary Julianne Spencer-Herbert Revocable 41.A - 41.E
557
Trust
Steven A. & Jennifer L. Krummen; Stewart A.
Krummen; Craig S. Krummen & Royce 42.A - 42.D H-565, H-557
Krummen
Randall J. Johnson 43.A & 43.B H-557
Arco Dehydrating Co. Inc. 44.F & 44.G H-239
Harold R. Hartmann Trust 52.D & 52.E H-221, H-220
James H. & Mary C. Watts 53 H-231, H-233
Randall & Russell Eckard 54.A & 54.B H-231, H-233
Donald C. McHose, Richard R. McHose & H-231, H-233, H-
55.A - 55.D
Elwin Pearey 229
Estate of Ester Gath H-231, H-233, H-
56.A - 56.C
229
Harlen M. Mitchell Revocable Trust &
60.A & 60.B H-226
Lennace E. Mitchell Revocable Trust
Orr Family Farm Company LLC 61 H-224
Sunny Joan Fronk Revocable Trust 62 H-224
Furman Realty 64 H-224
Donald R. & Phyllis Lago 65.A 10 - 65.C H-218, H-220,
10
Parcel 65.A is listed as “partially” falling under this category within the stipulation.
Like parcels 18, 44.B, 52.C, and 139.A-B, this parcel has two segments—one owned in fee and
- 11 -
H-221, H-222
Underwood Family Trust 115.B & 115.C H-74
William J. & Carleen C. Lambert 138.C F-404
Robert Turpin, Mary Seylar, James L. Turpin
145.A & 145.B H-74
Family Trust
Robert & Peggy Turpin 145.C H-74
Arnold Cook Trust 146.A & 146.B H-76
Monte R. & Chet H. Hartung and Kristyn S.
147.A - 147.D H-76
Shafrath
Giese Family Farms, Inc. 148 H-77
Irel D. and June R. Bruns 149 H-77
James C. & Susan M. Wendelsdorf 150.A H-77
Jon & Deborah Brekke 151.A & 151.B H-77
Wireless Network Management Inc. 152 H-77
It is less than obvious to which part of Burgess this prong of the parties’ stipulation
relates. A review of the cited portion of Burgess reveals that there are no specific references
therein to 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). The cited provision, entitled “Interim use of railroad rights-of-
way,” provides, in pertinent part, that –
Consistent with the purposes of th[e Trails] Act, and in furtherance of the national
policy to preserve established railroad rights-of-way for future reactivation of rail
service, to protect rail transportation corridors, and to encourage energy efficient
transportation use, in the case of interim use of any established railroad rights-of-
way pursuant to donation, transfer, lease, sale, or otherwise in a manner consistent
with this chapter, if such interim use is subject to restoration or reconstruction for
railroad purposes, such interim use shall not be treated, for purposes of any law or
rule of law, as an abandonment of the use of such rights-of-way for railroad
purposes.
16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). In Carolina Plating Works, Inc. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 555, 560
(2011), this court discussed this provision in concluding that “[i]n the Rails-to-Trails Act,
Congress provided that conversions to trail use that were subject to reactivation of rail service on
the route did not constitute abandonment.” In Burgess, defendant suggested that the activity
authorized by the Trails Act (which includes section 1247(d)) and the NITUs was within the
scope of the permissible uses for easements dedicated to railroad purposes. The court rejected
this claim, concluding that neither the creation of a public recreational trail nor the railbanking of
the property for potential future use could be considered an act in furtherance of a railroad
purpose. Burgess, 109 Fed. Cl. at 239-40; see also West Chelsea Bldgs., LLC v. United States,
109 Fed. Cl. 5, 26 (2013); Jenkins, 102 Fed. Cl. at 609.
The court believes that the parties’ stipulation refers to the ruling in Burgess in which the
court refused to conclude that the activity authorized by the Trails Act came within the scope of
the other a deeded easement. It is the easement that is covered by the stipulation; the fee portion
did not pass to the adjoining property owner under Iowa Code § 327G.76.
- 12 -
easements restricted to railroad use. Accordingly, it would appear that under the stipulation,
defendant agrees (with all the caveats discussed above) that the 85 parcels in this category will
be ones for which liability for a takings should be imposed. 11
c. Parcels governed by this court’s ruling in Burgess, 109 Fed. Cl. at
232-36, that subsequent deeds for a depot merged with prior easement
deeds for the right-of-way.
Claimant Name Claim Source
Allendorf Wind Farm Inc. 3-402, 3-419, 13-
2.A & 2.B
287
Farmers Cooper Elevator Company of
3 3-402, 13-286
Allendorf
Sonstegard Family Farms 11.E - 11.G 5-495
Randall W. Boeke 20.A 5-519
Tom & Le Ann Ransom 32.B - 32.D 5-495
J&M Partnership LLP 33.A 5-424
Scott Rueter Revocable Trust 36.A & 36.B 5-495
Jon & Tim Gunderson 63.A H-224
Deja Blues Diner 87 F-402
BV Buildings, LLC 88.A & 88.B F-402
Neil & Katie Slater 98 F-402
In Burgess, this court held that under Iowa law, the acquisition by a grantee of a fee
interest in the same property in which it previously held an easement extinguishes the easement,
leaving only a fee. See 109 Fed. Cl. at 234 (citing cases). The court held that this rule applied to
a variety of properties that had been sold and conveyed to the railroad for building a depot,
finding that “when the railroad obtained a fee interest in portions of the parcels in question any
prior easement it possessed in the same property ceased to exist and, more importantly, no longer
limited the use of the property.” Id.; see also Jenkins, 2012 WL 10205284, at *5-6.
With the caveats highlighted above, the parties agree that this ruling in Burgess applies to
the 18 properties listed in the chart above. 12
11
Defendant argues as to six parcels in this category (6.A, 6.B, 6.C, 6.D, 6.E and 23.C)
that plaintiffs have failed to account for all of the ownership interests associated with these
parcels. In one of its briefs, however, defendant indicated that it did “not object to ownership
because it appears that the omitted owners are closely related to the claimants.” (Supplement to
United States’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment & United States’ Response to Plaintiffs’
Supplement to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, p. 15 n.3). Relying upon the latter
statement, the court rejects defendant’s caveats as to these six parcels. Defendant also contests
the ownership of Parcel 4.C at the time the NITU was issued. Having reviewed plaintiffs’
response to these objections, the court finds that defendant’s objections are not well-taken.
- 13 -
d. Parcels governed by the ruling in Jenkins, 102 Fed. Cl. 598 (2011), that a
municipality or county which becomes the trail operator is a successor to the
railroad and not a proper party.
Claimant Name Claim Source
Osceola County Courthouse 5-353, 5-394,
9.A - 9.E & 9.K
5-406, 5-495
Osceola County Conservation Board 9.F - 9.I 5-471
Osceola County 9.J 5-519
This portion of the parties’ stipulation mistakenly refers to Judge Firestone’s 2011
opinion in Jenkins. In fact, the principle referenced in the stipulation appears in a later opinion
in the same case, Jenkins v. United States, 2012 WL 10205284 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 21, 2012). In that
2012 opinion, Judge Firestone held that the City of Dallas Center was a successor-in-interest to
the Union Pacific and excluded from the class defined by the court. Id. at *7-8. Like the
definition of the class in Jenkins, the class here is defined to exclude “railroad companies and
their successors-in-interest.” Hence, the parties’ stipulation gives effect to this class definition in
excluding the eleven properties listed in the chart above.
3. Parcels that Adjoin Segments of the Rail Corridor Which the
Railroad Allegedly Owned in Fee, But For Which the Original
Conveyance Documents Are Missing.
Claimant Name Claim Source
Sonstegard Family Farms 11.D 3-114
Sonstegard Family Farms 11.I & 11.K
Tom & Le Ann Ransom 32.A H-313
As to the four parcels listed above, plaintiffs argue that defendant has not established that
the Railroad owned the adjoining corridor in fee. As to some of these parcels, plaintiffs note that
the deeds provided by defendant are not evidence of the original source conveyance, but merely
reflect a later transfer of the parcels from one railroad to another, albeit in fee. Because there is
no documentation of the original source conveyance, plaintiffs contend, the railroad only
acquired an easement by prescription, which easement must be presumed to be for railroad
purposes only. Defendant argues that these parcels are controlled by this court’s earlier decision
in Burgess. There, this court rejected the notion that, under Iowa law, a railroad cannot obtain
and own corridors in fee. Burgess, 109 Fed. Cl. at 231-32; see also Lowers v. United States, 663
12
For the reasons stated, in the court’s view, the cited ruling in Burgess also applies to
parcel 3.
- 14 -
N.W. 2d 408, 411 (Iowa 2003). 13 To the extent that plaintiffs may be viewed as reiterating this
argument, the court adheres to its prior ruling.
Burgess, however, did not address whether a railroad should be viewed as acquiring an
easement limited to railroad purposes or a fee, where the original conveyance documents are
missing. Under Iowa law, the answer to this question may depend upon whether there is other
evidence bearing on the question. If no conveyance documents can be found, the Iowa courts
have held that the railroad company is presumed to hold a prescriptive easement by adverse
possession. See Collins Trust v. Allamakee Cnty. Bd. of Sup’rs of Allamakee Cnty., 599 N.W. 2d
460 (Iowa 1999); Drake v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 19 N.W. 215, 217 (Iowa 1884). But, these
cases are distinguishable as they apply only where there is no deed – quitclaim or otherwise –
upon which to predicate, at least in part, a fee title claim. See Jenkins, 2012 WL 10205284, at
*6. The result appears to be different if there is such evidence, as was true in Louisa Cnty.
Conservation Bd. v. Malone, 778 N.W. 2d 204 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009). In Louisa County, the
court held that the county established fee title by adverse possession because, even though the
original conveyance documents could not be produced, the county had a quitclaim deed to the
property that appeared valid on its face. 778 N.W. 2d at 207; see also Jenkins, 2012 WL
10205284, at *6. Such is the case here, rendering decisions like Collins Trust inapplicable. See
Jenkins, 2012 WL 10205284, at *6 (distinguishing Louisa County on this basis). Plaintiffs have
provided no basis – statutory or otherwise – for this court to apply a different rule here.
To be sure, plaintiffs cite Nichols v. City of Evansdale, 687 N.W. 2d 562 (Iowa 2004), for
the proposition that it is the law “everywhere[] that a railroad merely obtains a prescriptive
easement for railroad purposes if no original source conveyance exists.” But Nichols did not
involve a railroad, but rather a sewer main that was not reserved in a deed the city gave to a
private party. 687 N.W. 2d at 565-66. The Iowa Supreme Court held that the city did not
perfect a prescriptive easement because ten years had not passed since the city deeded the land in
question to the private party. Id. at 568. Nothing in Nichols suggests that absent a source
document indicating otherwise, this court (or any other) must presume that a railroad obtained
merely a prescriptive easement. The burden remains on plaintiffs to prove their case.
Accordingly, the court concludes that the parcels in this category represent ones in which
the railroad owned a fee simple interest.
13
In Rasmuson, 109 Fed. Cl. at 275, this court likewise concluded that “[t]he
condemnation statute did not bar the railroad’s right to acquire greater interests in land than
otherwise authorized through condemnation,” adding that “[n]othing in Iowa law provides that a
deed granting a fee interest to a railroad for a negotiated sum should be construed in accordance
with anything but the intent of the parties as expressed in plain terms.”
- 15 -
4. Parcels that Adjoin Segments of the Rail Corridor Which the Railroad
Allegedly Owned in Fee, Where the Deed or Other Conveyance Documents
Are Available.
As to three parcels (44.E, 114 and 150.B), which were once owned by the Railroad in fee,
plaintiffs argue that Iowa Code § 327G-77(1), conferring property interests to the owners of
property adjoining an abandoned rail line, applies. However, by its terms, this provision applies
only to “a railroad easement is extinguished under section 327G.76.” As this language indicates,
this provision does not apply where the rail corridor is owned in fee. See McKinley v. Waterloo
R. Co., 368 N.W. 2d 131, 138 (Iowa 1985) (“This statute applies only to easements and land
acquired by condemnation.”); Turner v. Unknown Claimants of Land in Section 4, 207 N.W. 2d
544, 546 (Iowa 1973) (“reverter statute does not apply” where railroad “own[ed] the strip of
land”); see also Montgomery Cnty. v. Case, 232 N.W. 150 (Iowa 1930). Accordingly, the
reverter statute does not apply to the parcels listed above. 14
5. Parcels that Do Not Adjoin the Rail Corridor.
Claimant Name Claim Source
Richard L. & Kathy S. Kleen 77.B F-406
American Legion Post #23 89 H-297
Robert Tatman 90 F-384
Carol & Larry Rasmussen 93 F-384
Dawn Shryock 97 F-384
Rick B. & Phyllis M. Hartwig 102 F-406
Brett Heaton 103 F-406
Matthew L. & Dawn D. Zeman 104 F-406
Michael E. & Richard H. Jensen 105 F-406
Larry Gilbert Revocable Trust 106 F-406
Gertrude M. Shipley 107 F-406
Evelyn Larsen 108 F-406
Raymond N. & Mary Lou John 109 F-406
Jean J. & Joan J. McKnight 111 F-406
Tanya A. Noble 112 F-406
Sarah E. Page Verrips 113 F-406
Underwood Family Trust 115.A F-410
William A. & Carol J. Naviaux 120 F-403, F-413
As to the parcels in Spirit Lake, Iowa, listed above, defendant argues that one or more
parcels owned by a third party, Dickinson County, separates the parcels from the rail corridor.
Defendant bases that assertion on a quitclaim deed that Dickinson County obtained from Iowa
Northwestern’s predecessor-in-interest, Midwestern Railroad, in 1994. Plaintiffs argue that the
14
The parties’ briefs appear to agree that only a portion of parcel 150.B was owned in
fee and is subject to this ruling; as to the remainder of that parcel, it is difficult to discern what
the parties are arguing and the court defers its ruling.
- 16 -
1994 conveyance should be ignored because Midwestern possessed only an easement for railroad
purposes and that Dickinson could acquire no greater rights from Midwestern than the railroad
itself possessed.
A review of the relevant deeds does suggest that the interest originally possessed by the
Midwestern Railroad was an easement for railroad purposes. 15 At the very least, that position is
strongly arguable. However, the 1994 quitclaim deed, under which the Dickinson County
Conservation Board obtained its interest in the properties, contained different language,
conveying “all interest” in the affected parcels, including an “[i]ncorporated railroad right of
way.” Contrary to plaintiffs’ claims, this quitclaim deed does not appear to transfer only the
right-of-way. This is important, for defendant appears correct in arguing that if Dickinson
County did not obtain a fee interest in the intervening parcel through the 1994 conveyance, it,
nevertheless, acquired the same through adverse possession prior to the time the NITU was
issued here. Under Iowa law:
[W]hen one who in good faith enters into possession of a tract of land under a
deed conveying the same to him absolutely without exception or reservation, and
continues in possession thereof for 10 years, all outstanding claims or interests in
or to said tract are completely barred by the statute of limitations.
Collins v. Reimers, 165 N.W. 373, 375 (Iowa 1917). For this doctrine to apply, there must be
proof that the “possession” was “hostile, actual, open, exclusive and continuous” for the required
ten-year period. C.H. Moore Trust Est. by Warner v. City of Storm Lake, 423 N.W. 2d 13, 15
(Iowa 1988); see also Garrett v. Huster, 684 N.W. 2d 250, 253 (Iowa 2004). Proof of these
elements must be “clear and positive.” C.H. Moore Trust Est., 423 N.W. 2d at 15.
Here, Dickinson County, relying on the 1994 quitclaim deed from Midwestern Railroad,
openly constructed, maintained and used the parcels in question as a trail. Every indication is
that it thereby exercised “the type of possession or control owners ordinarily exercise in holding,
managing and caring for property of like nature and condition.” Burgess v. Leverett & Assocs.,
105 N.W. 2d 703, 706 (Iowa 1960). Evidence in the case indicates that the trail was in use by no
later than July 1998, more than ten years before the NITU was issued in this case, and that
adverse possession thus ripened into fee ownership prior to the issuance of the NITU. An Iowa
court reached an analogous holding in Louisa County, 778 N.W. 2d at 204. There, a county
conservation board filed a quiet title action seeking to be declared the absolute owner in fee
simple of an abandoned railroad right-of-way based on a quitclaim deed. Reversing a contrary
trial court decision, the Iowa appellate court held that the board’s predecessor-in-interest’s use of
a parcel as a nature trail triggered the adverse possession rules, shifting ownership to those
15
Twelve of the eighteen (parcels) were subject to deeds in which the property owners
conveyed to the railroad a “Right-of-Way for [a described] railway,” to be used “for the purposes
of constructing a Railway thereon, and for all uses and purposes connected with the use of said
Railway.”
- 17 -
predecessors prior to the time the property was quit claimed. Id. at 207. The court of appeals
held that the interest so acquired was then transferred by deed to the board. Id. at 209.
Based on the rules outlined in Louisa County, the court holds that Dickinson County, by
relying on its 1994 deed and operating the corridor as a trail, acquired an interest in the
intervening parcels via adverse possession prior to the time of the NITU here. Because
Dickinson’s actions were based upon a deed, its adverse use gave rise not merely to a
prescriptive easement, but also to the acquisition of fee title to the property. See Ravenwood,
L.L.C v. Kevin Koethe, 8450/10, L.L.C., 808 N.W. 2d 754 (Iowa App. 2011) (table) (describing
the difference between an easement obtained through prescription and adverse possession
leading to acquisition of the title to the property). 16 This prevents the owners of the parcels in
this category from claiming compensation as adjoining property holders. 17
6. Parcels for Which Plaintiffs are Unable to Produce Conveyance
Documents or Other Documents Demonstrating Ownership.
As to the two parcels in this category (27.A and 83.A), plaintiffs have failed to produce
any documents documenting the circumstances under which the railroad acquired use of the
property. Plaintiffs argue that absent such documentation, the court must presume that the
Railroad possessed only an easement for railroad purposes. Adoption of this argument, however,
would turn the burden of proof in this case on its head.
The Federal Circuit has made amply clear that “[i]t is plaintiffs’ burden to establish
cognizable property interests for purposes of their takings . . . claims.” Klamath Irr. Dist. v.
United States, 635 F.3d 505, 519 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also Estate of Hage v. United States,
687 F.3d 1281, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206,
1212 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
16
Because Dickinson County was relying on a deed, it did not need to meet the other
requirements under Iowa law relating to easements by prescription. See Iowa Code § 564.1(requiring a claimant to provide express notice to the owner of the servient estate).
17
The court likewise finds that parcels that were separated from the rail corridor by 140th
Street (34.A and 34.B) do not adjoin the rail corridor. Plaintiffs rely on Adkins v. United States,
2013 WL 951158 (Fed. Cl. 2013) for the proposition that the filing of a plat dedicating a road to
an unincorporated village conveys only an easement to use the tract for public purposes. Id. at
*4-5 (citing Town of Kenwood Park v. Leonard, 158 N.W. 655, 658 (Iowa 1916)). In Steicklein,
however, the Iowa Supreme Court made clear that upon the incorporation of a city and its
acceptance of the same dedication, the village streets “are held by the incorporated city in fee
simple.” Steicklein, 693 N.W. 2d 335, 339 (Iowa 2005); see also Kelroy v. City of Clear Lake, 5
N.W. 2d 12, 16 (Iowa 1942); Inc. Town of Ackley v. Cent. States Elec. Co., 220 N.W. 315, 316
(Iowa 1928). The latter rule of law applies here and compels the court to conclude, as to this
issue, that defendant is correct.
- 18 -
And this requirement plainly applies to rails-to-trails cases. See Burgess, 109 Fed. Cl. at 237;
Thomas v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 467, 478 (2012); Rhutasel, 105 Fed. Cl. at 226-27.
Moreover, nothing in Iowa law alters this proof requirement. See Burgess, 109 Fed. Cl. at 237;
Jenkins, 102 Fed. Cl. at 604.
The affected plaintiffs have not met their burden of proof. In some instances, this is
because they have produced nothing to support their ownership claim. In other instances, it is
because the evidence produced merely suggests that a right-of-way was transferred, but does not
prove whether such an interest was, in fact, conveyed, or if an easement was conveyed, whether
that interest was unrestricted, subject only to railroad use, or subject to some other limitation.
See Burgess, 109 Fed. Cl. at 237. Accordingly, as to these parcels, plaintiffs have failed to
establish that they have a cognizable property interest, requiring that the claims relating to these
parcels be dismissed. 18
7. Other Parcels for Which the Evidence is Disputed.
Claimant Name Claim Source
Larry L. & Ruby E. Brunk 21.A & 21.B 5-519
Hans J. & Bernice Willadsen 25.A 5-382
Kay G. & Susan D. Blahauvietz 34.A & 34.B 3-384
Arco Dehydrating Co., Inc. 44.A H-191
Everett J. & Phyllis A. Johnson Revocable
59 F-410
Trust
As to the seven parcels listed above, the parties make various conflicting factual
arguments that rely, inter alia, on the chain of title and plat maps in the record. As to six of these
parcels (all but parcel 59), the parties have provided conflicting evidence as to whether these
parcels adjoin the rail corridor. Determining whether that is the case is, of course, critical under
Iowa Code §§ 327G.76 and 77, which confer a statutory reversionary right to adjoining
landowners triggered upon the extinguishment of a railroad easement. Primarily, these factual
disputes focus on whether the parcel in question is separated from the rail corridor by property
owned by a third party. In some instances, these disputes impact only a portion of the affected
parcel, with the parties agreeing that the remainder of the parcel either does or does not adjoin
the rail corridor. In the court’s view, these disputes give rise to genuine issues of material fact
that cannot be resolved under the pending motions, but must instead be resolved at trial. See
Burgess, 109 Fed. Cl. at 238.
18
Contrary to defendant’s claims, the court believes that plaintiffs have provided
sufficient documentation of ownership as to parcel 27.A. While plaintiffs are unable to provide a
deed that perfectly matches the legal description of the subject property, that incongruity is
explained by a 1959 affidavit of the county assessor. Defendant has not provided any evidence
contradicting this affidavit. In the court’s view, this means that plaintiffs are entitled to partial
summary judgment as to liability for this parcel. See RCFC 56(c)(1); 56(d)(2); see also Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
- 19 -
* * * * *
A chart summarizing the court’s conclusions regarding all 360 parcels may be found in
Appendix A to this opinion.
III. CONCLUSION
This court need go no further. Based on the foregoing, the court GRANTS, in part, and
DENIES, in part, plaintiffs’ supplemental motion for partial summary judgment, and
GRANTS, in part, and DENIES, in part, defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment. On
or before March 14, 2014, the parties shall file a joint status report indicating how this case
should proceed, with a proposed schedule, as appropriate. The parties shall have at least one
serious discussion regarding settlement before filing this report.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Francis M. Allegra
Francis M. Allegra
Judge
- 20 -
APPENDIX A
Claimant Name Claim Source Category
1. Dale W. and Danna S. Braaksma 1.A 3-402 2(b)
2. Dale W. & Danna S. Braaksma 1.B 3-402 2(b)
3. Allendorf Wind Farm Inc., c/o Irvin Clubine 2.A 3-402 2(c)
4. Allendorf Wind Farm Inc., c/o Irvin Clubine 2.B 3-419, 13-287 2(c)
5. Farmers Cooper Elevator Company of Allendorf 3 3-402, 13-286 2(c)
6. The Estate of Theodore Pranger; Loreen J. Bruxvoort; John W. Pranger 4.A 3-419, 13-287 2(b)
7. The Estate of Theodore Pranger; Loreen J. Bruxvoort; John W. Pranger 4.B 3-419 2(b)
8. The Estate of Theodore Pranger; Loreen J. Bruxvoort; John W. Pranger 4.C 3-419 2(b)
9. The Estate of Theodore Pranger; Loreen J. Bruxvoort; John W. Pranger 4.D 5-471 2(a)
10. Wayne D. & Esther Moet 5.A 3-417 2(b)
11. Wayne D. & Esther Moet 5.B 3-417 2(b)
12. Wayne D. & Esther Moet 5.C 3-417 2(b)
13. Juliana Garret & Judson Te Paske 6.A 5-353 2(b)
14. Juliana Garret & Judson Te Paske 6.B 5-353 2(b)
15. Juliana Garret & Judson Te Paske 6.C 5-353 2(b)
16. Juliana Garret & Judson Te Paske 6.D 5-353 2(b)
17. Juliana Garret & Judson Te Paske 6.E 5-353 2(b)
18. M. Rock Marco & Dan Hartwig 7.A 5-353 2(b)
19. M. Rock Marco & Dan Hartwig 7.B 5-353 2(b)
20. M. Rock Marco & Dan Hartwig 7.C 5-353 2(b)
21. Robert & Sylvia A. Rolfes 8.A 5-353 2(a)
22. Robert & Sylvia A. Rolfes 8.B 5-353 2(a)
23. Robert & Sylvia A. Rolfes 8.C 5-353 2(a)
24. Osceola County Courthouse 9.A 5-353 2(d)
25. Osceola County Courthouse 9.B 5-353 2(d)
26. Osceola County Courthouse 9.C 5-394 2(d)
27. Osceola County Courthouse 9.D 5-394 2(d)
28. Osceola County Courthouse 9.E 5-406 2(d)
29. Osceola County Conservation Board 9.F 5-471 2(d)
30. Osceola County Conservation Board 9.G 5-471 2(d)
31. Osceola County Conservation Board 9.H 5-471 2(d)
32. Osceola County Conservation Board 9.I 5-471 2(d)
33. Osceola County 9.J 5-519 2(d)
34. Osceola County Courthouse 9.K 5-495 2(d)
35. Clear Lake Stock Farms, Inc., c/o John Dreeson 10.A 5-394 2(a)
36. Clear Lake Stock Farms, Inc., c/o John Dreeson 10.B 5-394 2(a)
37. Sonstegard Family Farms, c/o Phil Sonstegard 11.A 5-406 2(a)
38. Sonstegard Family Farms, IA General Partnership 11.B 5-406 2(a)
39. Sonstegard Family Farms, IA General Partnership 11.C 5-471 2(a)
40. Sonstegard Family Farms, IA General Partnership 11.D 3-114 3
41. Sonstegard Family Farms, IA General Partnership 11.E 5-495 2(c)
42. Sonstegard Family Farms, IA General Partnership 11.F 5-495 2(c)
43. Sonstegard Family Farms, IA General Partnership 11.G 5-495 2(c)
44. Sonstegard Family Farms, IA General Partnership 11.H 3-388 2(b)
45. Sonstegard Family Farms, IA General Partnership 11.I 3
46. Sonstegard Family Farms, IA General Partnership 11.J 3-384 2(b)
47. Sonstegard Family Farms, c/o John Carlson, Sr. 11.K 3
48. Sonstegard Family Farms, c/o John Carlson, Sr. 11.L H-555 2(b)
49. Earl Faber 12.A 5-469 2(a)
50. Earl Faber 12.B 5-471 2(a)
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Claimant Name Claim Source Category
51. Earl Faber 12.C 5-471 2(a)
52. Mary, Debra, Roger, Norman, Dwaine, Allen, & Karen Swalve; Janice Neilsen 13.A 3-400 2(b)
53. Mary, Debra, Roger, Norman, Dwaine, Allen, & Karen Swalve; Janice Neilsen 13.B 3-400 2(b)
54. Marlin & Mary Laverman 14.A 5-374 2(a)
55. Marlin & Mary Laverman 14.B 5-374 2(a)
56. Marlin & Mary Laverman 14.C 5-374 2(a)
57. Christian Reformed Church c/o Larry Post 15.A 5-353 1
58. Christian Reformed Church c/o Larry Post 15.B 5-353 1
59. Lawrence W. & Vonna R. Leckband 16.A 5-340 2(a)
60. Lawrence W. Leckband 16.B 5-340 2(a)
61. Lawrence W. Leckband 16.C 5-340 2(a)
62. Lawrence W. Lackband 16.D 5-340 2(a)
63. Mark and Verna Salzman 17 5-340 2(a)
64. James Hesebeck 18 5-340, 5-480 2(a)
65. Cooperative Elevator Association of Ocheyedan 19.A 5-340, 5-480 2(a)
66. Cooperative Elevator Association of Ocheyedan 19.B 5-519, 5-515 2(a)
67. Cooperative Elevator Association of Ocheyedan 19.C 5-519, 5-515 2(a)
68. Cooperative Elevator Association of Ocheyedan, c/o Robert Jacobs 19.D 5-402 2(a)
69. Cooperative Elevator Association of Ocheyedan 19.E 3-388 2(b)
70. Randall W. Boeke 20.A 5-519 2(c)
71. Randall W. Boeke 20.B 5-519 2(a)
72. Larry L. & Ruby E. Brunk 21.A 5-519 7
73 Larry L. & Ruby E. Brunk 21.B 5-519 7
74. Larry L. & Ruby E. Brunk 21.C 5-519 2(a)
75. Douglas D. & Danette K. Block 22.A 5-353 2(a)
76. Douglas D. & Danette K. Block 22.B 5-353 2(a)
77. Douglas D. & Danette K. Block 22.C 5-353 2(a)
78. Douglas D. & Danette K. Block 22.D 5-353 2(a)
79. Alan Hart 23.A 5-353 2(a)
80. Helen Hart 23.B 5-353 2(a)
81. Helen Hart 23.C 5-353 2(a)
82. Alan Hart 23.D 5-353 2(a)
83. Alan Hart 23.E 5-353 2(a)
84. Alan Hart 23.F 5-353 2(a)
85. Alan Hart 23.G 5-376 2(a)
86. Maurice D. & Barbara L. Block 24.A 5-353 2(a)
87. Maurice D. & Barbara L. Block 24.B 5-353 2(a)
88. Hans J. & Bernice Willadsen 25.A 5-382 7
89. Hans J. & Bernice Willadsen 25.B 5-382 2(a)
90. Hans J. & Bernice Willadsen 25.C 5-382 2(a)
91. Larry Bosma; Jerry & Marcella Bosma; Darlene Wassink; Arlene Van Beek;
Ester Bosma; Presentation Sisters, Inc; Charles & Joyce Bosma; Leo Bosma; 26.A 5-384 2(a)
Pamela & Duane Van deHoef; Lucella Bosma; Frances B. Bosma Trust
92. Larry Bosma; Jerry & Marcella Bosma; Darlene Wassink; Arlene Van Beek;
Ester Bosma; Presentation Sisters, Inc; Charles & Joyce Bosma; Leo Bosma; 26.B 5-412 2(a)
Pamela & Duane Van deHoef; Lucella Bosma; Frances B. Bosma Trust
93. Merle L. & Sarah J. Pedley 27.A 5-380 6
94. Merle L. & Sarah J. Pedley 27.B 5-388 2(a)
95. Merle L. & Sarah J. Pedley 27.C 5-394 2(b)
96. Travaille Family Farms Inc., c/o Robert Travaille, President 28.A 5-380 2(a)
97. Travaille Family Farms Inc., c/o Robert Travaille, President 28.B 5-388 2(a)
98. Eugene C. Schmidt 29 3-394 2(b)
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Claimant Name Claim Source Category
99. Wilfred & Ellen Bosma 30.A 3-394 2(b)
100. Wilfred & Ellen Bosma 30.B 3-392 2(b)
101. Wilfred & Ellen Bosma 30.C 3-392 2(b)
102. Wilfred & Ellen Bosma 30.D 3-392 2(b)
103. Dale L. Peters 31.A 3-392 2(b)
104. Dale L. Peters 31.B 3-392 2(b)
105. Dale L. Peters 31.C 3-390 2(a)
106. Tom & Le Ann Ransom 32.A H-313 3
107. Tom & Le Ann Ransom 32.B 5-495 2(c)
108. Tom & Le Ann Ransom 32.C 5-495 2(c)
109. Tom & Le Ann Ransom 32.D 5-495 2(c)
110. J&M Partnership LLP, c/o Mark Bergman 33.A 5-424 2(c)
111. J&M Partnership LLP, c/o Mary Bergman 33.B 5-424 1
112. J&M Partnership LLP, c/o Mary Bergman 33.C 5-424 1
113. J&M Partnership LLP, c/o Mary Bergman 33.D 5-402 2(a)
114. J&M Partnership LLP, c/o Mary Bergman 33.E 3-388 2(b)
115. J&M Partnership LLP, c/o Mary Bergman 33.F 3-388 2(b)
116. Kay G. & Susan D. Blahauvietz 34.A 3-384 7
117. Kay G. & Susan D. Blahauvietz 34.B 3-384 7
118. Ardyce Rueter 35.A 3-384 2(b)
119. Ardyce Rueter 35.B 3-386 2(b)
120. Scott Rueter Revocable Trust 36.A 5-495 2(c)
121. Scott Rueter Revocable Trust 36.B 5-495 2(c)
122. Gerald R. & Joan C. Vander Muelen 37.A 5-406 2(a)
123. Gerald R. & Joan C. Vander Muelen 37.B 5-406 2(a)
124. Randy E. Clark; Linda Kunzman; Barbra A. Cambilargui & Lori M. Clark- 2(a)
38.A H-564
Cotterman
125. Randy E. Clark; Linda Kunzman; Barbra A. Cambilargui & Lori M. Clark- 2(a)
38.B H-564
Cotterman
126. Randy E. Clark; Linda Kunzman; Barbra A. Cambilargui & Lori M. Clark- 2(a)
38.C H-564
Cotterman
127. Randy E. Clark; Linda Kunzman; Barbra A. Cambilargui & Lori M. Clark- 2(a)
38.D H-560
Cotterman
128. Randy E. Clark; Linda Kunzman; Barbra A. Cambilargui & Lori M. Clark- 2(a)
38.E H-560
Cotterman
129. Clifford L. Nebelsick 39.A H-560 2(a)
130. Clifford L. Nebelsick 39.B H-560 2(a)
131. Clifford L. Nebelsick 39.C H-560 2(a)
132. Frederick & Scott W. Goodno; Stacy Wiese; Justin & Shawna Goodno 40.A H-560 2(a)
133. Frederick & Scott W. Goodno; Stacy Wiese; Justin & Shawna Goodno 40.B H-560 2(a)
134. Frederick & Scott W. Goodno; Stacy Wiese; Justin & Shawna Goodno 40.C H-555 2(a)
135. Frederick & Scott W. Goodno; Stacy Wiese; Justin & Shawna Goodno 40.D H-555 2(a)
136. Jared Andrew Herbert Revocable Trust & The Mary Julianne Spencer-Herbert 2(b)
41.A H-555
Revocable Trust
137. Jared Andrew Herbert Revocable Trust & The Mary Julianne Spencer-Herbert 2(b)
41.B H-565
Revocable Trust
138. Jared Andrew Herbert Revocable Trust & The Mary Julianne Spencer-Herbert 2(b)
41.C H-565
Revocable Trust
139. Jared Andrew Herbert Revocable Trust & The Mary Julianne Spencer-Herbert 2(b)
41.D H-557
Revocable Trust
140. Jared Andrew Herbert Revocable Trust & The Mary Julianne Spencer-Herbert 2(b)
41.E H-557
Revocable Trust
141. Jared Andrew Herbert Revocable Trust & The Mary Julianne Spencer-Herbert 2(a)
41.F H-191
Revocable Trust
142. Jared Andrew Herbert Revocable Trust & The Mary Julianne Spencer-Herbert 2(a)
41.G H-191
Revocable Trust
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Claimant Name Claim Source Category
143. Jared Andrew Herbert Revocable Trust & The Mary Julianne Spencer-Herbert 2(a)
41.H H-191
Revocable Trust
144. Steven A. & Jennifer L. Krummen; Stewart A. Krummen; Craig S. Krummen & 2(b)
42.A H-565
Royce Krummen
145. Steven A. & Jennifer L. Krummen; Stewart A. Krummen; Craig S. Krummen & 2(b)
42.B H-565
Royce Krummen
146. Steven A. & Jennifer L. Krummen; Stewart A. Krummen; Craig S. Krummen & 2(b)
42.C H-557
Royce Krummen
147. Steven A. & Jennifer L. Krummen; Stewart A. Krummen; Craig S. Krummen & 2(b)
42.D H-557
Royce Krummen
148. Steven A. & Jennifer L. Krummen; Stewart A. Krummen; Craig S. Krummen & 2(a)
42.E H-191
Royce Krummen
149. Randall J. Johnson 43.A H-557 2(b)
150. Randall J. Johnson 43.B H-557 2(b)
151. Randall J. Johnson 43.C H-191 2(a)
152. Arco Dehydrating Co. Inc., c/o Steven Krummen, President 44.A H-191 7
153. Arco Dehydrating Co. Inc., c/o Steven Krummen, President 44.B H-191 2(a)
154. Arco Dehydrating Co. Inc., c/o Steven Krummen, President 44.C H-191 2(a)
155. Arco Dehydrating Co. Inc., c/o Steven Krummen, President 44.D H-191 2(a)
156. Arco Dehydrating Co. Inc., c/o Steven Krummen, President 44.E H-191 4
157. Arco Dehydrating Co. Inc., c/o Steven Krummen, President 44.F H-239 2(b)
158. Arco Dehydrating Co. Inc., c/o Steven Krummen, President 44.G H-239 2(b)
159. Gregory L. Baloun 45.A H-191 2(a)
160. Gregory L. Baloun 45.B H-191 2(a)
161. Gregory L. Baloun 45.C H-191 2(a)
162. Gregory L. Baloun 45.D H-191 2(a)
163. Gregory L. Baloun & Wes McClure 45.E H-135 2(a)
164. Allen and Mary J. Arnold 46 H-135 2(a)
165. William Steven & Dianne Kathleen Jansen 47 H-135 2(a)
166. Lake Park Development Corp. c/o Richard Packebush 48 H-135 2(a)
167. Bradley T. & Francel L. Graham 49.A H-135 2(a)
168. Bradley T. & Francel L. Graham 49.B H-135 2(a)
169. Bradley T. & Francel L. Graham 49.C H-135 2(a)
170. Krummen Farms LP, c/o Steven Krummen 50.A H-135 2(a)
171. Krummen Farms LP, c/o Steven Krummen 50.B H-135 2(a)
172. Krummen Farms LP, c/o Steven Krummen 50.C H-135 2(a)
173. Krummen Farms LP, c/o Steven Krummen 50.D H-135 2(a)
174. Krummen Farms LP, c/o Steven Krummen 50.E H-135 2(a)
175. Robert Allen 51.A H-162 2(a)
176. Robert Allen 51.B H-162 2(a)
177. Robert Allen 51.C H-162 2(a)
178. Harold R. Hartmann Trust, Darlene S. Hartmann, Trustee 52.A H-162 2(a)
179. Harold R. Hartmann Trust, Darlene S. Hartmann, Trustee 52.B H-162 2(a)
180. Harold R. Hartmann Trust, Darlene S. Hartmann, Trustee 52.C H-218, H-222 2(a)
181. Harold R. Hartmann Trust, Darlene S. Hartmann, Trustee 52.D H-221, H-220 2(b)
182. Harold R. Hartmann Trust, Darlene S. Hartmann, Trustee 52.E H-221, H-220 2(b)
183. James H. & Mary C. Watts 53 H-231, H-233 2(b)
184. Randall & Russell Eckard 54.A H-231, H-233 2(b)
185. Randall & Russell Eckard 54.B H-231, H-233 2(b)
186. Donald C. McHose, Richard R. McHose & Elwin Pearey 55.A H-231, H-233 2(b)
187. Donald C. McHose, Richard R. McHose & Elwin Pearey H-231, H-233, 2(b)
55.B
H-229
188. Donald C. McHose, Richard R. McHose & Elwin Pearey H-231, H-233, 2(b)
55.C
H-229
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Claimant Name Claim Source Category
189. Donald C. McHose, Richard R. McHose & Elwin Pearey H-231, H-233, 2(b)
55.D
H-229
190. Estate of Ester Gath H-231, H-233, 2(b)
56.A
H-229
191. Estate of Ester Gath H-231, H-233, 2(b)
56.B
H-229
193. Timothy S. Hoerichs & Ann L. Hoerichs Family Trust, Timothy & Ann 2(a)
57.A H-161
Hoerichs, Trustees
194. Timothy S. Hoerichs & Ann L. Hoerichs Family Trust, Timothy & Ann 2(a)
57.B H-161
Hoerichs, Trustees
195. David B. Olson 58 H-161 2(a)
196. Everett J. & Phyllis A. Johnson Revocable Trust 59 F-410 7
197. Harlen M. Mitchell Revocable Trust & Lennace E. Mitchell Revocable Trust, 2(b)
60.A H-226
c/o Scott Mitchell POA
198. Harlen M. Mitchell Revocable Trust & Lennace E. Mitchell Revocable Trust, 2(b)
60.B H-226
c/o Scott Mitchell POA
199. Orr Family Farm Company LLC, c/o Julia Ceasar 61 H-224 2(b)
200. Sunny Joan Fronk Revocable Trust 62 H-224 2(b)
201. Jon & Tim Gunderson 63.A H-224 2(c)
202. Jon Gunderson 63.B H-289 2(a)
203. Furman Realty, c/o CJ Furman 64 H-224 2(b)
204. Donald R. & Phyllis Lago, c/o Douglas K. Lago POA 65.A H-222 2(b)
205. Donald R. & Phyllis Lago, c/o Douglas K. Lago POA 65.B H-220, H-221 2(b)
206. Donald R. & Phyllis Lago, c/o Douglas K. Lago POA 65.C H-220, H-221 2(b)
207. Cohrs Construction, Inc. 66 H-289 2(a)
208. Mark S. & Carol Coleman 67 H-216, H-163 1
209. Evelyn McClurg & The McClurg Family Farm, LLC 68.A H-288 2(a)
210. Evelyn McClurg & The McClurg Family Farm, LLC 68.B H-288 2(a)
211. Evelyn McClurg & The McClurg Family Farm, LLC 68.C H-288 2(a)
212. Paul J. & Diane L. Kollasch 69 H-288 2(a)
213. Jerry Edward Miller 70.A H-288 2(a)
214. Jerry Edward Miller 70.B H-288 2(a)
215. Gwendolyn Vetter 71.A H-288 2(a)
216. Gwendolyn Vetter 71.B H-288 2(a)
217. Gwendolyn Vetter 71.C H-177 2(a)
218. Gwendolyn Vetter 71.D H-193 2(a)
219. Gwendolyn Vetter 71.E H-193 2(a)
220. Janet Bergman Revocable Trust, c/o Janet Bergman, Trustee 72 H-194 2(a)
221. Terry L. & Cheryl L. Bruns 73 H-194 2(a)
222. Don B. & Barbara F. Erlandson 74 H-194 2(a)
223. Raymond A. & Darlene Gustafson 75.A H-194 2(a)
224. Raymond A. & Darlene Gustafson 75.B H-194 2(a)
225. Scott & Mary Lynn Ingvall 76 H-194 2(a)
226. Richard L. & Kathy S. Kleen 77.A H-194 2(a)
227. Richard L. & Kathy S. Kleen 77.B F-406 5
228. Todd Krieger 78.A H-194 2(a)
229. Todd Krieger 78.B H-194 2(a)
230. Kathleen M. Krueger 79.A H-194 2(a)
231. Kathleen M. Krueger 79.B H-194 2(a)
232. Kathleen M. Krueger 79.C H-194 2(a)
233. Dennis A. & Marilyn K. Ladwig 80.A H-194 2(a)
234. Dennis A. & Marilyn K. Ladwig 80.B H-194 2(a)
235. G. Wallis Reed Trust, G. Wallis Reed, Trustee 81 H-194 2(a)
236. Roger F. Reppert Revocable Trust, Roger F. Reppert, Trustee 82 H-194 2(a)
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Claimant Name Claim Source Category
237. Arthur J. Thompson & Jill N. McDowell 83.A H-194 6
238. Arthur J. Thompson & Jill N. McDowell 83.B H-194 2(a)
239. Ferrellgas Inc. c/o Jason P. Cullen 84 H-194 2(a)
240. Jack L. & Beverly J. Longmore 85.A F-402 2(a)
241. Jack L. & Beverly J. Longmore 85.B F-402 2(a)
242. Craig F. & Ellen M. Moffitt 86 H-194 2(a)
243. Deja Blues Diner, LLC c/o Ivan Brown 87 F-402 2(c)
244. BV Buildings, LLC c/o John C. Brown 88.A F-402 2(c)
245. BV Buildings, LLC c/o John C. Brown 88.B F-402 2(c)
246. American Legion Post #23 c/o Denny L. Perry, Commander 89 H-297 5
247. Robert Tatman 90 F-384 5
248. Martin & Melinda Marten 91 F-384 1
249. Albert Bartley 92 F-384 1
250. Carol & Larry Rasmussen 93 F-384 5
251. Scott Trigg & Nancy J. Johnson 94 1
252. Richard A. & Karla J. Heinrichs 95.A F-384 2(a)
253. Richard A. & Karla J. Heinrichs 95.B F-384 2(a)
254. Richard A. & Karla J. Heinrichs 95.C F-384 2(a)
255. Ronald D. Claussen Revocable Trust 96.A F-384 2(a)
256. Ronald D. Claussen Revocable Trust 96.B F-384 2(a)
257. Dawn Shryock 97 F-384 5
258. Neil & Katie Slater 98 F-402 2(c)
259. Brian A. & Carol A. Woods 99 F-384 2(a)
260. Michael K. De Jong 100 F-406 1
261. Maye M. Swanson 101 F-406 1
262. Rick B. & Phyllis M. Hartwig 102 F-406 5
263. Brett Heaton 103 F-406 5
264. Matthew L. & Dawn D. Zeman 104 F-406 5
265. Michael E. & Richard H. Jensen 105 F-406 5
266. Larry Gilbert Revocable Trust, c/o Larry Gilbert and Chris & Angela Geinitz 106 F-406 5
267. Gertrude M. Shipley 107 F-406 5
268. Evelyn Larsen 108 F-406 5
269. Raymond N. & Mary Lou John 109 F-406 5
270. Dan M. & Lori D. Lewis 110 1
271. Jean J. & Joan J. McKnight 111 F-406 5
272. Tanya A. Noble 112 F-406 5
273. Sarah E. Page Verrips 113 F-406 5
274. Mark & Karen Byers 114 F-410 4
275. Underwood Family Trust, c/o Tom Underwood 115.A F-410 5
276. Underwood Family Trust, c/o Tom Underwood 115.B H-74 2(b)
277. Underwood Family Trust, c/o Tom Underwood 115.C H-74 2(b)
278. Robert W. Thorbrogger 116 F-403, F-413 2(a)
279. Janice M. Schultz 117 F-403, F-413 2(a)
280. Frigate LLC, c/o Natalie Brenton 118.A F-403, F-413 2(a)
281. Frigate LLC, c/o Natalie Brenton 118.B F-403, F-413 2(a)
282. David S. & Darlene I. Shaw 119.A F-403, F-413 2(a)
283. David S. & Darlene I. Shaw 119.B F-403, F-413 2(a)
284. William A. & Carol J. Naviaux 120 F-403, F-413 5
285. Keith L. & Susan L. Ostrum 121 H-313 2(a)
286. Mark A. & Kristine L. Hoss 122 F-403, F-413 2(a)
287. Reed L. Potter, Julie A. Bergquist, POA 123 F-403, F-413 2(a)
- 26 -
Claimant Name Claim Source Category
288. James E. & Pamela A. Feld 124 H-313 2(a)
289. Thomas L. Hoffman 125 H-313 2(a)
290. Linda S. Taylor 126 H-313 2(a)
291. Dennis D. & Anita Dean 127.A H-313 2(a)
292. Dennis D. & Anita Dean 127.B H-313 2(a)
293. Scott V. & Jolene C. Egertson 128 H-313 2(a)
294. Gregory A. & Connie J. Tolan 129 H-313 2(a)
295. Michael T. & Rhonda F. Reekers 130 H-313 2(a)
296. Beverly Jean Steinberger 131 H-313 2(a)
297. Arthur C & Roxa L. Cummings 132 H-313 2(a)
298. Kathleen M. Drysdale 133 H-313 2(a)
299. Kimberly K. Durst 134 H-313 2(a)
300. Gary & Tom Kuhlman, Kathy Jo Swalve, Sally Ann Lundberg & Phoebe 2(a)
135 H-313
Hersom
301. Duane H. Serck 136 F-417, H-66 2(a)
302. Clint T. & Lindsay R. Robinson 137 H-164 2(a)
303. William J. & Carleen C. Lambert 138.A H-164 2(a)
304. William J. & Carleen C. Lambert 138.B F-420 2(a)
305. William J. & Carleen C. Lambert 138.C F-404 2(b)
306. Joyce Overocker 139.A F-412, F-419 2(a)
307. Joyce Overocker 139.B F-412, F-419 2(a)
308. Joyce Overocker 139.C F-412 2(a)
309. Joyce Overocker 139.D F-411 2(a)
310. Rohn K. Shepley 140 F-412 2(a)
311. Lavonne Esther Hansen 141.A F-411 2(a)
312. Lavonne Esther Hansen 141.B F-411 2(a)
313. Margerite Butcher Revocable Trust 142.A F-420 2(a)
314. Margerite Butcher Revocable Trust 142.B F-404 2(a)
315. Margerite Butcher Revocable Trust 142.C F-416 2(a)
316. Margerite Butcher Revocable Trust 142.D F-416 2(a)
317. Margaret Hill Northey 143.A F-415 2(a)
318. Margaret Hill Northey 143.B F-415 2(a)
319. Douglas A. & Nancy N. Pringnitz 144.A F-415 2(a)
320. Douglas A. & Nancy N. Pringnitz 144.B F-415 2(a)
321. Robert Turpin, Mary Seylar, James L. Turpin Family Trust 145.A H-74 2(b)
322. Robert Turpin, Mary Seylar, James L. Turpin Family Trust 145.B H-74 2(b)
323. Robert & Peggy Turpin 145.C H-74 2(b)
324. Arnold Cook Trust, Bruce Cook, Trustee (signed by Van C. Vernon) 146.A H-76 2(b)
325. Arnold Cook Trust, Bruce Cook, Trustee (signed by Van C. Vernon) 146.B H-76 2(b)
326. Monte R. & Chet H. Hartung and Kristyn S. Shafrath 147.A H-76 2(b)
327. Monte R. & Chet H. Hartung and Kristyn S. Shafrath 147.B H-76 2(b)
328. Monte R. & Chet H. Hartung and Kristyn S. Shafrath 147.C H-76 2(b)
329. Monte R. & Chet H. Hartung and Kristyn S. Shafrath 147.D H-76 2(b)
330. Giese family Farms, Inc. 148 H-77 2(b)
331. Irel D. and June R. Bruns 149 H-77 2(b)
332. James C. & Susan M. Wendelsdorf 150.A H-77 2(b)
333. James C. & Susan M. Wendelsdorf 150.B H-77 4
334. Jon & Deborah Brekke 151.A H-77 2(b)
335. Jon & Deborah Brekke 151.B H-77 2(b)
336. Wireless Network Management Inc., c/o Michael A. Mitchell 152 H-77 2(b)
337. Steven J. & Julie A. Ingvall 153 H-194 2(a)
338. Jerry Moore 154 H-313 2(a)
- 27 -
Claimant Name Claim Source Category
339. George W. Garloff 155.A H-135 2(a)
340. George W. Garloff 155.B H-321, H-239 1
341. George W. Garloff 155.C H-321, H-239 1
342. Great Lakes Cooperative 156.A 1
343. Great Lakes Cooperative 156.B 1
344. Great Lakes Cooperative 156.C 1
345. Great Lakes Cooperative 156.D 1
346. Great Lakes Cooperative 156.E 1
347. Great Lakes Cooperative 156.F 1
348. Great Lakes Cooperative 156.G 1
349. Great Lakes Cooperative 156.H 1
350. Robert Sr. & Robert Jr. Kirschbaum 157.A 1
351. Robert Sr. & Robert Jr. Kirschbaum 157.B 1
352. E. L. Ballou, c/o David H. Dreryser, Executor of Estate 158.A 1
353. E. L. Ballou, c/o David H. Dreryser, Executor of Estate 158.B 1
354. Robert L. Browning 159.A 1
355. Robert L. Browning 159.B 1
356. Robert L. Browning 159.C 1
357. Robert L. Browning 159.D 1
358. H. & V. Thompson Farms LTD, by Virginia Thompson 160 1
359. Lonnie S. Browning 161.A 1
360. Lonnie S. Browning 161.B 1
- 28 -