Arnold v. United States ( 2022 )


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  •    In the United States Court of Federal Claims
    FOR PUBLICATION
    Nos. 15-1252 & 15-1268L
    (Filed: October 24, 2022)
    )
    JOHN ARNOLD, et al.,                    )
    )
    Plaintiffs,                )
    )
    and                              )
    )   Rails-to-Trails Temporary Taking:
    JOE L. DAWSON, et al.,                  )   Attorney’s Fees and Expenses
    )   under 
    42 U.S.C. § 4654
    (c)
    Consolidated Plaintiffs,   )
    )
    v.                               )
    )
    UNITED STATES,                          )
    )
    Defendant.                 )
    )
    Meghan S. Largent, Lewis Rice, LLC, St. Louis, MO, for plaintiffs Conrad C. Cox
    and Mary R. Cox as Trustees of the Conrad C. Cox Trust No. 1 and the Mary R. Cox
    Trust No. 1; Joe L. Dawson; Lloyd E. Edgett; G&M Properties, LP; Shawn Guinn;
    John W. Mathes, Jr. as Executor of the Estate of Rosemary L. Mathes, and Duane
    R. McEwen and Darlene McEwen; Duane R. McEwen and Darlene McEwen; Carol
    K. Ross and Kay L. Lee as Trustees of the Carol K. Ross Trust No. 1; Iris L. Smith
    and Carol Campbell as Trustees of the Larry L. Smith and Iris L. Smith Revocable
    Living Trust Dated 7/17/07; Lisa J. Sonsthagen as Executor of the Estate of Linda
    J. Tomasch, and John E. Bremer and David G. Bremer; and Alan Woodside and
    Sherry Woodside as Trustees of the Shirley Kats Revocable Trust, and Derek Kats
    as Trustee of the Derek Kats Revocable Trust.
    James H. Hulme, ArentFox Schiff LLP, Washington, DC, for plaintiffs Jason Dial
    and Travis Dial; and M. Lee Juenemann and Angela Juenemann as Trustees of the
    M. Lee Juenemann Living Trust and Angela Juenemann Living Trust.
    Davené D. Walker, Senior Attorney, Natural Resources Section, Environment and
    Natural Resources Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for
    defendant. With her on the briefs were Todd Kim, Assistant Attorney General,
    Environment and Natural Resources Division, and David A. Harrington,
    Assistant Chief, and Hannah O’Keefe, Trial Attorney, Natural Resources Section,
    Environment and Natural Resources Division, U.S. Department of Justice,
    Washington, DC.
    OPINION AND ORDER 1
    BONILLA, Judge.
    This rails-to-trails temporary takings case involves fractions of properties
    abutting a now-abandoned interstate railroad extending through parts of Nebraska
    and Kansas. The compensable Fifth Amendment taking began on October 22, 2015,
    when the United States Surface Transportation Board (STB) issued a Notice of
    Interim Trail Use (NITU) under Section 1247(d) of the National Trails System Act,
    
    16 U.S.C. §§ 1241
    –51, and presumably ended on October 16, 2016, with the NITU’s
    expiration. 2 In accordance with Rule 54(b) of the Rules of the United States
    Court of Federal Claims (RCFC), the parties stipulated to the entry of partial final
    judgment in favor of 13 owners of 17 parcels of land totaling 51.09 acres in the
    aggregate amount of $7,595.17 in just compensation, with each plaintiff recovering
    between $11.54 and $2,109.45, plus interest.
    Pending before the Court is plaintiffs’ application for $794,577.50 in
    attorney’s fees and $74,007.37 in litigation expenses under the Uniform Relocation
    Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act (URA), 
    42 U.S.C. § 4654
    (c).
    The claimed attorney’s fees and expenses exceed the bounds of any objective
    measure of reasonableness. For the reasons detailed herein, plaintiffs are awarded
    $100,282.47 in attorney’s fees and $27,424.06 in litigation expenses. Accordingly,
    Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED–IN–PART and DENIED–IN–PART.
    1This decision is limited to the case filed as Dawson v. United States, No. 15-1268 (Fed. Cl.). The
    consolidated matter captioned Arnold v. United States, No. 15-1252 (Fed. Cl.), remains pending.
    2As discussed infra, throughout this litigation, plaintiffs maintained that the taking continued until
    the railway company consummated the abandonment (i.e., September 3, 2019). Because the parties
    resolved this issue in stipulating the just compensation due plaintiffs before the United States
    Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued its decision in Memmer v. United States, 
    50 F.4th 136
    (Fed. Cir. 2022), this Court did not address the disputed three-year gap. See 
    id. at 146
     (“We agree
    with the government that the taking ended upon expiration of the NITU . . . . This is so because it
    was on that date that the United States was no longer responsible for mandating the continuation
    of the easement because, from that point forward, the decision rested solely in the hands of [the
    railroad company].”).
    2
    BACKGROUND 3
    The Nebraska, Kansas & Colorado Railway, LLC (NKCR) previously
    operated an interstate railroad line that ran through, relevant here, Harlan County,
    Nebraska, and three counties in Kansas (i.e., Norton, Decatur, and Phillips). This
    litigation involved 19 landowners in the identified Nebraska and Kansas counties
    claiming an interest in 25 properties adjacent to or near the now-abandoned
    NKCR railroad tracks. Ultimately, as detailed below, the prevailing plaintiffs
    consisted of 13 owners of 17 tracts of land located in Kansas.
    On June 12, 2015, NKCR filed a verified notice of exemption with STB,
    formally announcing its proposed abandonment of the railroad segment relevant
    here. STB issued an abandonment exemption and allowed NKCR until August 7,
    2016, to consummate abandonment. In September 2015, Sunflower Rails-to-Trails
    Conservancy, Inc. (Sunflower) formally noticed its interest in converting the NKCR
    railroad segment to recreational trails. On October 22, 2015, STB issued a NITU
    authorizing NKCR and Sunflower to negotiate a trail-use agreement within
    180 days. At Sunflower’s request, STB extended the negotiation period by an
    additional six months. NKCR and Sunflower did not reach an agreement,
    and the NITU expired on October 16, 2016. 4
    On November 17, 2016, STB directed NKCR to file a notice of consummation
    by December 15, 2016, if the railway company elected to abandon the rail line.
    In response to a series of requests for additional time submitted by NKCR, the
    consummation deadline was extended through March 1, 2020. NKCR consummated
    the abandonment on September 3, 2019.
    SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS
    I.     Complaints Filed and Retainer Agreements Executed
    On October 27, 2015, five days after STB issued the NITU, plaintiff Joe L.
    Dawson filed this action as the sole plaintiff. Thereafter, between May 6 and
    October 26, 2016, three amended complaints were filed adding 18 plaintiffs,
    including additional individual landowners as well as singular and joint trusts
    and families. Plaintiffs’ fourth and fifth amended complaints, filed on February 1
    and July 20, 2017, respectively, did not add plaintiffs, parcels of land, or counts.
    3In Arnold v. United States, 
    137 Fed. Cl. 524
     (2018), the Court recounted the facts and procedural
    history of these consolidated cases in detail. To provide context for the analysis herein, a brief
    recapitulation of the background and a more comprehensive summary of proceedings–particularly
    those post-dating the April 10, 2018 opinion–are included.
    4Sunflower’s request for an additional extension of the NITU negotiation period was denied after
    NKCR noticed its objection.
    3
    Instead, the last two amended complaints reordered the plaintiffs and reorganized
    the documentation related to the disputed land (e.g., deeds, tax records) as well
    as the subject rails-to-trails conversion. In the interim, on February 14, 2017–
    two weeks after filing the fourth amended complaint–the parties stipulated to
    the voluntary dismissal of plaintiffs Donald G. Edgerton and Lisa A. Edgerton
    (originally added in the May 6, 2016 first amended complaint). At the outset
    of this litigation, the initial plaintiff estimated damages at $1 million.
    From the commencement of this action through January 2019, Mark F.
    Hearne, II, and then Meghan S. Largent of the law firm Arent Fox LLP
    (now ArentFox Schiff) [hereinafter “ArentFox”] served as counsel of record for
    all (eventually 19) plaintiffs. 5 In early 2019, Ms. Largent moved her practice to the
    law firm of Lewis Rice LLC [hereinafter “Lewis Rice”] and continued representing
    11 of the 13 plaintiffs ultimately awarded just compensation. The other two
    prevailing plaintiffs remained with ArentFox and, as of August 12, 2019, James H.
    Hulme began serving as their counsel of record. Throughout the pendency of this
    case, in addition to counsel of record, the law firms heavily staffed this matter,
    including roughly three dozen timekeepers comprised of attorneys at all levels
    (i.e., Partners, Members, Of Counsel, Associates) and various supporting legal
    professionals (i.e., Specialist, Paralegals, Project Assistants).
    In connection with their initial representation by ArentFox, each plaintiff
    agreed to a contingent-fee arrangement, whereunder the law firm agreed to incur
    and advance all expenses and the plaintiffs bore no costs unless and until counsel
    secured a successful judgment or award. In the retention letter, more specifically,
    counsel represented:
    The Firm has agreed to represent you, and the other property
    owners that join this action, on a contingency fee basis. This means
    that if we are not successful in obtaining a judgment or award from
    the government there will be no cost to you for the Firm’s professional
    services. If we are successful, we will receive a fee that is the greater
    of either:
    (a) one-third of the “Total Award” received by all property
    owners (or forty-percent in the case of an appeal); or
    (b) the statutory attorney fee determined by the Court.
    5Mr. Hearne served as counsel of record until March 22, 2017, when the Court granted
    Ms. Largent’s motion for substitution of counsel pursuant to RCFC 83.1(c)(4)(A)(i)(I).
    4
    The “Total Award” includes the damage award for the value of the
    property taken, all interest awarded upon this amount, and the
    award of a statutory attorney fee (less any unreimbursed expenses).
    See, e.g., ECF 188-1 6 at 3 (emphasis in original). 7
    II.    Resolution of Title Issues
    During a November 22, 2016 status conference, the Court directed plaintiffs
    to file a “partial motion[] for summary judgment regarding title issues, including fee
    or easement, intervening roads, and adjacency.” ECF 29. By February 14, 2017,
    after seeking additional time to comply with the Court’s November 22, 2016 order,
    the parties stipulated to plaintiffs’ land ownership with regard to all but one parcel
    as well as the railroad adjacency of all but another parcel; nonetheless, the parties
    disputed the nature of the railroad’s ownership interest with regard to the entirety
    of the land at issue. See ECF 35 & 35-1. On March 12, 2017, plaintiffs moved for
    partial summary judgment on the more global issue of liability. ECF 37 & 41.
    After the government filed a cross-motion, the Court denied plaintiffs’ motion as
    premature and directed plaintiffs to file a revised motion addressing solely the
    title issues consistent with the Court’s November 22, 2016 order. See ECF 54 & 55.
    On July 21, 2017, in accordance with the Court’s July 7, 2017 order, plaintiffs
    filed their revised motion for partial summary judgment addressing title issues,
    albeit limited to a subset of plaintiffs (i.e., 13 Kansas property owners).
    See ECF 65. When pressed to comply with the Court’s order to move on behalf of
    all plaintiffs, the five Nebraska plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their six takings
    claims eight days after filing their fifth (and final) amended complaint. Compare
    ECF 67 (motion for voluntary dismissal) with ECF 62 (fifth amended complaint).
    The government filed a renewed dispositive cross-motion on August 18, 2017.
    ECF 73. On November 17, 2017, the government partially withdrew its dispositive
    cross-motion and stipulated that NKCR possessed only an easement for all save
    one of the 18 then-remaining parcels in dispute. 8 See ECF 80 & 80-1. The
    government’s concession was based on the then-recent (October 27, 2017) decision
    of the Supreme Court of Kansas in Jenkins v. Chicago Pac. Corp., 
    306 Kan. 1305
    ,
    6Unless otherwise specified, the ECF numbers used herein refer to the docket entries in Dawson,
    No. 15-1268L.
    7The Court was not provided copies of or otherwise briefed on the terms of any subsequent retention
    agreements signed by the plaintiffs who elected to continue with Ms. Largent’s legal representation
    when she moved her practice to Lewis Rice.
    8The disputed parcel is owned by Conrad C. Cox and Mary R. Cox as Trustees of the Conrad C. Cox
    Trust No. 1 and the Mary R. Cox Trust No. 1 [hereinafter “disputed Cox parcel”]. The Coxes own a
    second parcel that was included in the government’s concession.
    5
    
    403 P.3d 1213
     (2017), clarifying the governing state law regarding railroad
    easements.
    In an Opinion and Order dated April 10, 2018, consistent with the parties’
    stipulations, this Court granted the remaining 13 plaintiffs’ motion for summary
    judgment with regard to the title issues concerning 17 parcels, finding: plaintiffs
    owned the properties at the time of the NITU issuance, the land was adjacent to
    the railroad corridor, and NKCR possessed only an easement limited to railroad
    purposes. See Arnold, 137 Fed. Cl. at 582–84. The Court denied both parties’
    motions as to the disputed Cox parcel. See id. at 536 n.10, 560–61, 582. On
    June 25, 2018, the parties stipulated to the voluntary dismissal of the claim
    involving the disputed Cox parcel. See ECF 91.
    In sum, by June 25, 2018, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed or stipulated to the
    dismissal of 8 of 25 claims brought by or on behalf of 6 of 19 plaintiffs. Additionally,
    title issues regarding the land underlying the remaining 17 claims asserted by
    13 plaintiffs were resolved largely through stipulation.
    III.   Determination of Liability
    With the title issues settled, the focus shifted to the parties’ fundamental
    disagreement regarding the liability analysis applicable where, as here, no trail-use
    agreement is reached before the NITU expires. As documented in a July 6, 2018
    joint status report, plaintiffs argued that the issuance of the NITU gave rise to a
    per se taking; the government, in contrast, maintained that absent an executed
    trail-use agreement, the expired NITU was subject to the multi-factor temporary
    takings analysis under Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 
    568 U.S. 23
    , 38–40 (2012). See ECF 93. The parties further disputed the need for and proper
    scope of discovery. See ECF 97, 99. The government alternatively proposed to stay
    proceedings pending rulings by the Federal Circuit in two cases addressing the
    disputed liability analysis. 9 See, e.g., ECF 103 at 4. Plaintiffs opposed the stay
    and requested that the case proceed to a liability determination.
    9 See Caquelin v. United States, 697 F. App’x. 1016, 1019–20 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Caquelin I)
    (remanding case for further consideration of proper takings framework applicable to cases where
    NITU expired without trail-use agreement), on remand, 
    140 Fed. Cl. 564
     (2018), aff’d, 
    959 F.3d 1360
    (Fed. Cir. 2020) (Caquelin II); Memmer, 50 F.4th at 136 (remanding case for recalculation of
    damages based upon conclusion that expiration of NITU without trail-use agreement served
    as takings end date).
    6
    In May 2019, plaintiffs sought third-party discovery from OmniTRAX Inc. 10
    After the Court limited discovery to state law abandonment issues, plaintiffs
    withdrew the third-party subpoena. See ECF 108, 109, 112. Following the parties’
    stipulated removal of the railroad tracks and ties from the subject railroad segment,
    on July 2, 2019, plaintiffs proposed to file a motion for partial summary judgment
    addressing state law abandonment, noting the government’s objection as to the
    necessity of the proposed briefing. ECF 112 at 1–2. Plaintiffs filed their opening
    brief on July 25, 2019. ECF 114, 119. 11 In sum, the parties disputed whether
    NKCR–which had not yet consummated its abandonment of the railroad under the
    federal regulatory process–effectively abandoned its easement under Kansas state
    law; and, if so, the import of actions by a private party (i.e., NKCR) to a takings
    claim filed against the federal government. See ECF 114, 122. On September 3,
    2019, prior to plaintiffs’ filing of their reply brief, NKCR consummated its
    abandonment. The parties then disputed whether the claimed Fifth Amendment
    taking ceased on October 16, 2016, when the NITU expired, or continued for an
    additional three years until NKCR consummated its abandonment on September 3,
    2019.
    Following the issuance of the Federal Circuit’s May 29, 2020 decision in
    Caquelin II, the parties agreed to engage in settlement discussions and requested
    a stay of proceedings. See ECF 156. The Court ultimately dismissed plaintiffs’
    motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability as moot. ECF 202.
    IV.    Just Compensation Settlement
    On December 17, 2020, the parties reported to the Court that they reached
    a tentative settlement on the just compensation due the remaining landowners
    but needed additional time to negotiate plaintiffs’ claims for attorney’s fees and
    expenses under 
    42 U.S.C. § 4654
    (c). After reaching an impasse in their efforts to
    settle plaintiffs’ claims for attorney’s fees and expenses, discussed infra, the parties
    stipulated to the entry of partial final judgment under RCFC 54(b) in favor of
    13 plaintiffs; specifically, the owners of 17 parcels of land totaling 51.09 acres
    10According to its motion to quash or modify the subpoena and for a protective order: “OmniTRAX,
    Inc. is a transportation management company that manages and provides corporate services to
    numerous shoreline railroads, including NKCR, and other transportation entities, pursuant to
    independent management arrangements with each transportation entity. OmniTRAX, Inc. has
    no ownership interest in any of the entities it manages.” ECF 109 at 2 n.1.
    11 The motion was filed on behalf of all remaining plaintiffs by Ms. Largent who, by that point,
    had moved from ArentFox to Lewis Rice. Compare ECF 114 (motion for partial summary judgment
    filed on July 25, 2019) with ECF 105 (Largent notice of address change). On August 16, 2019,
    four days after Mr. Hulme (ArentFox) became counsel of record for 2 of the 13 remaining plaintiffs
    (i.e., Jason Dial and Travis Dial, M. Lee Juenemann and Angela Juenemann as Trustees of the
    M. Lee Juenemann Living Trust and Angela Juenemann Living Trust), the Dials and Juenemanns
    noticed their intent to join the pending motion. See ECF 115–16, 119.
    7
    would split the aggregate sum of $7,595.17 in just compensation, with claimants
    recovering between $11.54 and $2,109.45, plus a nominal amount of interest. 12
    On May 25, 2022, the Court entered partial judgment consistent with the parties’
    settlement. 13
    V.        Attorney’s Fees and Expenses
    On April 2, 2021, the parties reported to the Court that they reached a
    tentative comprehensive settlement, inclusive of attorney’s fees and expenses. 14
    ECF 167. Four months later, on August 2, 2021, the government reported that the
    settlement was not approved by the authorized representative of the United States
    Attorney General. See ECF 175. Consequently, as noted above, on May 25, 2022,
    by stipulation, partial final judgment was entered for plaintiffs in an aggregate
    amount of $7,595.17 in just compensation, plus interest.
    Pending before the Court is plaintiffs’ request for a total of $794,577.50
    in attorney’s fees and $74,007.37 in litigation expenses. According to plaintiffs’
    counsel’s joint application, between October 2015 and January 2019 (i.e., when
    Ms. Largent moved from ArentFox to Lewis Rice), plaintiffs purportedly incurred
    $532,485 in attorney’s fees and $73,710.51 in litigation expenses. The two plaintiffs
    who continued to be represented by ArentFox (eventually by Mr. Hulme) thereafter
    purportedly incurred $93,431.50 in attorney’s fees through April 2022. 15 The
    eleven plaintiffs who elected to continue with Ms. Largent’s legal representation
    following her move to Lewis Rice purportedly incurred $168,661 in attorney’s fees
    and $296.86 in expenses between January 2019 and April 2022.
    The government challenges the reasonableness of plaintiffs’ request for
    attorney’s fees and expenses on several grounds. First, the government contends
    that the URA limits recovery to attorney’s fees and expenses “actually incurred”
    by plaintiffs which, based on the initial ArentFox retainer agreement executed by
    the plaintiffs, is one-third of the $7,595.17, plus interest, in total damages awarded.
    Alternatively, the government argues that plaintiffs’ claimed hourly billing rates
    far exceed applicable local-market rates; and, further, that plaintiffs improperly
    12The parties agreed to the accrual of interest at a rate of $0.55 per day, from May 13, 2022,
    through the date of payment.
    13An amended judgment was necessitated by plaintiffs’ post-judgment discovery that certain
    plaintiffs were now deceased, and that the identities of certain trustees and executors changed.
    14The parties simultaneously engaged in settlement discussions involving three other then-
    consolidated cases, including David H. Field Trust No. 1 v. United States, No. 19-1202 (Fed. Cl.),
    which involved the same plaintiffs’ counsel and was subsequently settled and dismissed.
    15   ArentFox did not submit litigation expenses for this period.
    8
    seek payment for hours attributed to client solicitation, unsuccessful efforts,
    duplicative and excessive work, and administrative or clerical tasks. Finally, the
    government avers plaintiffs’ minimal success in this case warrants an additional
    reduction to plaintiffs’ attorney’s fee demand. At bottom, the government contends
    that attorney’s fees should be capped at $2,531.72 (i.e., one-third of the $7,595.17
    in damages awarded to plaintiffs as specified in the client retention agreements).
    The government’s alternative calculation–using the lodestar method–posits that the
    maximum attorney’s fees award should be $24,632.81 16: based on the government’s
    assessment of the applicable (local) billing rates multiplied by the reasonable hours
    expended, further reduced by 75% due to plaintiffs’ minimal degree of success
    (i.e., $1 million claimed v. $7,595.17 awarded). Turning to the requested expenses,
    the government contends that recoverable expenses should be limited to $35,694.21
    for ArentFox and $240.80 for Lewis Rice.
    DISCUSSION
    I.     Fee-Shifting Statute
    “Congress has determined that in certain cases the prevailing parties may
    recover their attorney fees from the opposing side.” Haggart v. Woodley, 
    809 F.3d 1336
    , 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 
    42 U.S.C. § 4654
    (c)). In enacting the URA,
    Congress established a uniform policy for the fair and equitable treatment of
    displaced landowners and persons whose property is permanently or temporarily
    taken for federal use or designated federal programs or projects. The URA is
    distinctively tied to the Fifth Amendment principle of just compensation and is
    designed to make plaintiffs whole. To that end, the URA’s fee-shifting provision
    provides that plaintiffs are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and
    expenses for services rendered in vindicating their takings or condemnation claims:
    The court rendering a judgment for the plaintiff in a proceeding
    brought under section 1346(a)(2) or 1491 of Title 28, awarding
    compensation for the taking of property by a Federal agency, or the
    Attorney General effecting a settlement of any such proceeding,
    shall determine and award or allow to such plaintiff, as a party of such
    judgment or settlement, such sum as will in the opinion of the court or
    the Attorney General reimburse such plaintiff for his reasonable costs,
    disbursements, and expenses, including reasonable attorney . . . fees,
    actually incurred because of such proceeding.
    
    42 U.S.C. § 4654
    (c).
    16Using the government’s proffered calculation, the $24,632.81 attorney fee award would be divided
    between the two law firms as follows: $18,770.81 payable to ArentFox and $5,862 to Lewis Rice.
    9
    The URA’s fee-shifting provision ensures that plaintiffs with small takings
    claims can attract and retain the assistance of competent counsel. See Bywaters v.
    United States, 
    684 F.3d 1295
    , 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2012). As noted by the Federal
    Circuit: “litigation of these types of disputes serves a greater purpose (vindicating
    constitutionally protected property rights).” 
    Id. at 1296
    . In determining awards of
    attorney’s fees and recoverable expenses under federal fee-shifting statutes like the
    URA, trial courts have considerable discretion but “must ‘provide a concise but clear
    explanation of its reasons for the fee award.’” Biery v. United States, 
    818 F.3d 704
    ,
    710 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 
    461 U.S. 424
    , 437 (1983)).
    Fee-shifting statutes like the URA, however, “were not designed as a form of
    economic relief to improve the financial lot of attorneys, nor were they intended to
    replicate exactly the fee an attorney could earn through a private fee arrangement
    with his client.” Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air,
    
    478 U.S. 546
    , 565 (1986) (Delaware Valley I), as supplemented, 
    483 U.S. 711
     (1987);
    accord Biery, 818 F.3d at 710 (“Ultimately, a fee award must ‘be adequate to
    attract competent counsel,’ but must not ‘produce windfalls to attorneys.’”)
    (quoting Hensley, 
    461 U.S. at 444
    ). Indeed, jurisprudence surrounding the award
    of reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses pursuant to the URA and other
    fee-shifting statutes prevents windfalls and avoids situations where counsel are
    overcompensated through excessive or unreasonable fee requests. See, e.g., Davis
    Cnty. Solid Waste Mgmt. & Energy Recovery Special Serv. Dist. v. U.S. Env’t Prot.
    Agency, 
    169 F.3d 755
    , 758 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Davis County) (recognizing exception
    to forum-rate rule to “prevent the occasional erratic result where the successful
    [plaintiff] is vastly overcompensated given the amount he contracted to pay for
    legal services”), cited with approval in Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,
    
    515 F.3d 1343
    , 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (adopting Davis County exception).
    II.   Contingent-Fee Arrangement
    The government argues that the attorney’s fees “actually incurred” as
    prescribed under the URA are limited to what plaintiffs actually committed to pay
    their counsel. Here, according to the government, the amount is therefore capped
    at the calculation specified in the ArentFox contingency-based retention agreement:
    one-third of the $7,595.17 in just compensation awarded to plaintiffs, or $2,531.72.
    The Court disagrees.
    As an initial matter, as quoted supra, the cited retention agreement expressly
    entitles ArentFox to “the greater of either” one-third of the total damages award
    recovered by all plaintiffs (including interest and statutory attorney’s fees) “or”
    “the statutory attorney fee determined by the Court.” See ECF 188-1 at 3
    (emphasis added). In seeking to limit attorney’s fees to a percentage of the just
    compensation award in this case, the government’s calculation ignores the plain
    language of the contingent-fee agreement; specifically, the inclusion of interest
    10
    and attorney’s fee award in the “Total Award” and, more importantly, the
    disjunctive clause which expressly provides for the alternative recovery of attorney’s
    fees under the URA. Thus, per its express terms, plaintiffs’ retention agreement
    does not cap or otherwise limit attorney’s fees to a percentage of recovery. See, e.g.,
    Bywaters, 670 F.3d at 1231–32 (contingent-fee agreement providing for “the greater
    of either” regular billing rates for hours expended “or” one-third of the damages
    award “did not cap attorneys’ fees as a percentage of the recovery”).
    The Federal Circuit has not squarely addressed whether a contingent-fee
    arrangement imposes a cap on the recovery of attorney’s fees under the URA.
    See Bywaters, 670 F.3d at 1232 n.7 (“We need not decide in this case whether a
    contingent-fee agreement providing for fees based on a percentage of the [plaintiffs’]
    recovery would impose a limit on recovery of attorneys’ fees under the URA,
    which . . . requires that the attorneys’ fees be ‘actually incurred.’”). Nevertheless,
    the law is clear that where the contingent-fee arrangement does not cap attorney’s
    fees at a percentage of the damages award, it cannot be used as the sole (or even
    primary) factor to limit the recovery of attorney’s fees. Id. at 1232. Instead, the
    financial arrangement between an attorney and their client “may be considered in
    calculating the lodestar figure.” Id. The same applies in non-URA cases. See, e.g.,
    Blanchard v. Bergeron, 
    489 U.S. 87
    , 93 (1989) (while a contingent-fee agreement
    can assist a court in determining the reasonableness of attorney’s fees requested
    under the Civil Rights Act fee-shifting statute, 
    42 U.S.C. § 1988
    (b), the
    arrangement does not impose an “automatic ceiling” on the court’s award of
    reasonable attorney’s fees).
    Finally, over twenty years ago this Court rejected a statutory interpretation
    of “actually incurred” similar to the interpretation advanced by the government
    here. See Preseault v. United States, 
    52 Fed. Cl. 667
    , 673–77 (2002). As explained
    in Preseault, under Federal Circuit precedent, “[attorney’s] fees are ‘“incurred”
    within the meaning of a fee shifting statute when there is ‘an express or implied
    agreement that the fee award will be paid over to the legal representative.’” 
    Id. at 673
     (quoting Phillips v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 
    924 F.2d 1577
    , 1582–83 & n.4 (Fed. Cir.
    1991); Raney v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 
    222 F.3d 927
    , 933 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
    (en banc)). The modification of “incurred” by the term “actually” does not limit
    recovery under the URA fee-shifting provision to attorney’s fees actually billed to,
    paid by, or owed by the plaintiffs. See id. at 675. Instead, the phrase “actually
    incurred” in the URA context, properly interpreted, allows for the recovery of
    reasonable attorney’s fees–commonly calculated using the lodestar method–for
    reasonable hours expended at reasonable rates in vindicating the plaintiffs’
    constitutional rights. See id. at 675–77.
    11
    III.   Lodestar Calculation
    “Under a fee-shifting statute, the court calculates awards for attorney fees
    using the ‘lodestar method’ which is ‘the product of reasonable hours times a
    reasonable rate.’” Haggart, 809 F.3d at 1355 (quoting City of Burlington v. Dague,
    
    505 U.S. 557
    , 559–60 (1992) (quoting Delaware Valley I, 
    478 U.S. at 565
    ));
    accord Bywaters, 670 F.3d at 1228–29 (“In determining the amount of reasonable
    attorneys’ fees under federal fee-shifting statutes, the Supreme Court has
    consistently upheld the lodestar calculation as the ‘guiding light of [its] fee-shifting
    jurisprudence.’”) (quoting Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 
    559 U.S. 542
    , 551 (2010)).
    Plaintiffs bear the burden of documenting the hours expended on the litigation
    with the requisite specificity to enable meaningful review and demonstrating the
    reasonableness of those hours as well as the claimed hourly rates. See Hensley,
    
    461 U.S. at 437
    . “A fee award that is determined through the use of a lodestar
    calculation carries a ‘strong presumption’ that it represents a ‘reasonable’ attorney
    fee.” Biery, 818 F.3d at 710 (quoting Bywaters, 670 at 1229).
    A.    Hourly Rates
    Courts generally employ forum rates to calculate attorney’s fee awards under
    fee-shifting statutes. Avera, 
    515 F.3d at
    1348 (citing cases). More specifically,
    courts look to the “prevailing market rate” of the forum court in assessing the
    reasonableness of the hourly rates claimed by counsel for the prevailing party. 
    Id.
    “‘[T]he prevailing market rate’ [is] defined as the rate ‘prevailing in the community
    for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and
    reputation.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 
    465 U.S. 886
    , 896 n.11 (1984)). The
    United States Court of Federal Claims–which exercises exclusive jurisdiction over
    this Fifth Amendment takings action under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1346
    (a)(2)–is located in
    Washington, DC. However, that this Court sits in Washington, DC and has
    nationwide jurisdiction does not dictate that Washington, DC or national rates
    apply in every case.
    An exception to the forum court prevailing market rate lies where, as here,
    “the bulk of the work is done outside of the District of Columbia in a legal market
    where the prevailing attorneys’ rates are substantially lower.” See Avera, 
    515 F.3d at 1349
     (adopting Davis County exception in Vaccine Act case litigated in the
    Court of Federal Claims where legal services were performed entirely in Cheyenne,
    Wyoming, and the prevailing market rates in Cheyenne were significantly lower
    than the requested Washington, DC rates). Plaintiffs’ counsel performed the vast
    majority of their work in St. Louis, Missouri–a legal market where the prevailing
    hourly rates are significantly lower than those in Washington, DC. Accordingly,
    the Court employs the Davis County exception in this case.
    12
    1.      Bulk of the Work: Performed in St. Louis, Missouri
    Plaintiffs do not contend or proffer any evidence that most of the legal work
    in this case was performed in Washington, DC. On the contrary, according to
    plaintiffs: “Prior to January 2019, Megan Largent was the primary attorney
    timekeeper on this matter, and a large percentage of the fees related to work that
    was performed by Ms. Largent in successfully litigating these claims.” ECF 196
    at 21. During this time, Ms. Largent was employed by ArentFox and worked in
    the firm’s St. Louis office until around the time that office closed in early 2019.
    See ECF 196-7 at ¶ 2; ECF 196-4 at ¶ 3. In January 2019, Ms. Largent moved
    her practice to the Missouri-based law firm Lewis Rice. 17 ECF 196-7 at ¶ 2.
    After January 2019, while at Lewis Rice, Ms. Largent continued to serve as the
    primary attorney handling this case, representing 11 of the 13 remaining plaintiffs.
    See ECF 196 at 25–26 (proffering Ms. Largent is responsible for 219.1 hours out of
    340.5 hours claimed by Lewis Rice–more than ten-fold the hours claimed by any of
    the other 11 Lewis Rice timekeepers); ECF 196-7 at ¶ 2 (“While at Arent Fox [sic],
    I served as counsel-of-record for all thirteen (13) Plaintiffs from March 14, 2017
    until January 2019. Upon moving my practice to Lewis Rice LLC in January 2019,
    I continued to represent eleven (11) of the thirteen (13) Plaintiffs in this matter as
    counsel-of-record.”) (internal citations omitted). Mr. Hearne, the second most
    prolific timekeeper in this entire case, served as counsel-of-record for all plaintiffs
    prior to March 14, 2017, during his time at ArentFox. When filing this case,
    Mr. Hearne provided the Court with ArentFox’s St. Louis office as his business
    address. 18
    After January 2019, only 2 of 13 plaintiffs remained with ArentFox, and the
    matter was referred to the firm’s Washington, DC office due to the closure of its
    St. Louis Office. Compared with the 340.5 hours claimed by Lewis Rice, ArentFox
    claimed only 142.6 hours for this matter after January 2019. Compare ECF 196-5
    (Lewis Rice billing spreadsheet) with ECF 196-2 (ArentFox billing spreadsheet).
    Both data points are dwarfed by the 1,351.3 hours claimed by ArentFox (St. Louis
    office) between October 2015 and December 2018. See ECF 196-1 (ArentFox billing
    spreadsheet). In sum, out of the 1,834.4 hours claimed in this case, 142.6 hours
    were purportedly attributable to services performed in ArentFox’s Washington, DC
    office following the closure of its St. Louis office. Moreover, throughout the
    seven-year pendency of this case, all court proceedings were conducted
    telephonically, obviating the need for counsel to travel to Washington, DC to attend
    17Lewis Rice’s website highlights that the firm was founded in St. Louis and lists the firm’s primary
    offices in St. Louis and Kansas City, Missouri. See https://www.lewisrice.com/offices/ (last visited
    Oct. 24, 2022).
    18Around 2018, Mr. Hearne moved his practice to another St. Louis-based law firm, which shares
    the same St. Louis business address Mr. Hearne listed in the records of this case during his time at
    ArentFox. See https://truenorthlawgroup.com/meet-our-firm/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2022).
    13
    any case-related proceedings. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the bulk of
    the work in this case was performed in St. Louis for purposes of applying the
    Davis County exception.
    2.      Legal Market Prevailing Rates: St. Louis v. Washington, DC
    Plaintiffs request reimbursement of the hourly rates established by ArentFox
    and Lewis Rice for their respective attorneys and professionals, describing them as
    “the usual and customary rates billed by each timekeeper during the relevant time
    period rather than rates for this particular case.” ECF 196 at 23, 27; accord
    ECF 196-4 at ¶ 4; ECF 196-8 at ¶¶ 3–5. For the period commencing January 2019,
    plaintiffs claim the following hourly rates for Lewis Rice:
    See ECF 196 at 27. 19 As for ArentFox, plaintiffs assert the following hourly rates
    applied throughout the pendency of this action:
    19Footnote “9” denoted in the chart explains that the claimed Lewis Rice hourly rates are based on
    the firm’s fiscal year (i.e., February 1 to January 31).
    14
    See ECF 196 at 23.
    In support of their claimed rates, plaintiffs submitted culled billing
    spreadsheets for ArentFox and Lewis Rice timekeepers as well as declarations from
    counsel of record (Ms. Largent and Mr. Hulme) and the Chairman of Lewis Rice
    (Richard B. Walsh, Jr.). See ECF 196-1 to 196-8. According to Mr. Hulme:
    15
    ArentFox [] establishes hourly rates for all of the attorneys in the
    firm, including partners, associates, of counsel attorneys, as well as
    paralegals. These hourly rates are established and reviewed annually.
    Firm management establishes these hourly rates based upon
    significant analysis and research of the legal marketplace. . . . The
    hourly rates are rates which are competitive hourly rates justified
    by the rates private clients pay for comparable legal representation
    in the prevailing legal marketplace.
    ECF 196-4 at ¶ 4.
    Similarly, Ms. Largent states: “All of the time entries contained in [Lewis
    Rice’s billing spreadsheet] are reasonable and consistent with the prevailing
    market rates charged in the St. Louis legal market for such services.” ECF 196-7
    at ¶ 8. Mr. Walsh, in turn, represents:
    [E]ach year [Lewis Rice] review[s] data on the hourly rates charged by
    other law firms in the St. Louis region and adjust[s] Lewis Rice’s rates
    to be consistent with local standards.
    ...
    . . . Based on my knowledge of the market and annual review
    of similar local firms’ rates, each of the rates above is reasonable and
    consistent with the St. Louis market standard rates for other legal
    professionals with comparable skill and experience.
    ECF 196-8 at ¶¶ 3, 6. In support of these self-serving statements, plaintiffs cite
    the United States Attorney’s Office Matrix (2015–2021), 20 the Laffey Matrix
    (June 1, 1994–May 31, 2023), 21 and the Fitzpatrick Matrix (2013–2021)22–each of
    which is based on rates for either the greater Washington, DC metropolitan area or
    the District of Columbia. Nevertheless, even these data largely reflect hourly rates
    lower than those claimed by ArentFox and Lewis Rice.
    Regarding ArentFox’s proffered rates, regardless of whether the firm’s
    advertised (national) rates are consistent with or excessive relative to other firms’
    rates in the Washington, DC market, plaintiffs must demonstrate that their
    requested rates are reasonable–i.e., “‘prevailing in the [relevant] community
    20   See www.justice.gov/file/1461316/download (last visited Oct. 24, 2022).
    21   See http://www.laffeymatrix.com/see.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2022).
    22   See https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/page/file/1189846/download (last visited Oct. 24, 2022).
    16
    for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and
    reputation.’” See Avera, 
    515 F.3d at 1348
     (quoting Blum, 
    465 U.S. at 896
    ). For the
    reasons set forth in the preceding section, moreover, the proper comparison thus
    lies not with other law firms in Washington, DC (or nationally), but with the hourly
    rates applicable to law firms in the St. Louis area for the same or similar services.
    Plaintiffs have not provided the Court the necessary information or data enabling
    the apt comparison or analysis, and the requested ArentFox rates lack reliable
    support. The claimed Lewis Rice rates are similarly unsubstantiated. Although
    Lewis Rice is based in St. Louis, Ms. Largent’s and Mr. Walsh’s unsupported and
    conclusory representations regarding the reasonableness of their firm’s hourly
    rates, quoted supra, are insufficient for the Court to summarily adopt the proposed
    rates as reasonable for comparable legal services in the St. Louis market.
    Notably, when asked, plaintiffs declined to provide the government with
    information or underlying data supporting counsel’s representations regarding the
    requested hourly rates and, thereafter, opposed (and litigated) the government’s
    request for discovery on this issue. Although the Court denied the government’s
    motion to compel discovery, see ECF 200, the burden of demonstrating the
    reasonableness of the claimed rates rests on the plaintiffs at all times. See Biery,
    818 F.3d at 715 (“It was [plaintiffs’] counsel’s burden to provide evidence tending to
    show an appropriate rate in the St. Louis area. . . . When a party has a burden of
    production, it must submit evidence in order to meet the burden.”) (internal citation
    omitted).
    The government counters that the Court should adopt the “market rates for
    real estate litigation work by St. Louis practitioners” in any lodestar calculation in
    this case, and proposes the following “market-based” rates:
    ECF 204 at 27. In support of the proposed rates, the government relies upon the
    declaration of Laura A. Malowane, Ph.D., a noted economist and an attorney who
    represents that she has “extensive experience in analyzing and testifying on issues
    relating to the awarding of attorney[’s] fees . . . .” ECF 204-1 at ¶ 2. The
    government contends that the above rates ascertained by Dr. Malowane represent
    the hourly rates “actually paid to St. Louis practitioners in cases, like this one,
    that involve real estate litigation.” ECF 204 at 26 (emphasis in original). The
    17
    government further cites Dr. Malowane’s proffered opinion that the “rack rate”
    plaintiffs seek in this case “far exceeds the market rate (i.e., the amount actually
    paid by clients) for real estate litigation work by St. Louis attorneys.” Id. at 27.
    The Court places limited weight on the government’s proffered expert
    analysis and opinion. In her declaration, Dr. Malowane notes she is relying on a
    single national survey–i.e., Real Rate Report (2016, 2018, 2020, and 2021 editions)–
    that offers analyses on law firm rack rates as compared to actual collected rates,
    staffing, and billing practice in major markets including, relevant here, St. Louis.
    See ECF 204-1 at ¶¶ 22–23. Although relevant, the singular resource, without
    pressure tests against other available data sources, is not determinative.
    Furthermore, the Court notes that plaintiffs’ counsel (ArentFox) previously
    retained Dr. Malowane to support their application for attorney’s fees requesting
    “‘national’ hourly rates based on a ‘national’ market” in other rails-to-trails cases for
    legal services provided, like here, primarily in St. Louis. See Biery v. United States,
    Nos. 07-693 & 07-675, 
    2014 WL 12540517
     at *8 (Fed. Cl. Jan 24, 2014); Biery v.
    United States, Nos. 07-693 & 07-675, 
    2012 WL 5914260
     at *4 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 27,
    2012) (citing Dr. Malowane’s declaration opining that ArentFox should recover the
    firm’s national hourly rates and that the requested rates are reasonable and
    comparable to other firms’ national rates); see also Whispell Foreign Cars, Inc. v.
    United States, 
    139 Fed. Cl. 386
    , 390 (2018) (noting ArentFox’s reliance upon
    Dr. Malowane’s opinion). Accordingly, the Court assesses Dr. Malowane’s proffered
    expert opinion with a heightened degree of skepticism.
    Finally, as discussed infra, the government’s proposed rates are at odds
    with attorney’s fees recently awarded by various district courts in Missouri. The
    government’s proposal is also discordant with St. Louis rates published in the
    most recent editions of Missouri Lawyers Media, which this Court previously found
    reliable in assessing reasonable St. Louis rates in rails-to-trails cases. See, e.g.,
    Whispell Foreign Cars, 139 Fed. Cl. at 400 (“The court concludes that the average
    St. Louis hourly rates for attorneys, as presented in the Missouri Lawyers Weekly
    surveys, provide a reasonably reliable basis for establishing appropriate rates in
    this case.”); Bratcher v. United States, 
    136 Fed. Cl. 786
    , 800 (2018) (considering
    attorney rate ranges and average rates listed in Missouri Lawyers Weekly survey,
    finding them consistent with Missouri federal district court attorney’s fee awards).
    In evaluating the parties’ contrasting proposals, the Court finds that recent
    attorney’s fee awards in Missouri district courts provide relevant and helpful
    comparison. See Biery, 818 F.3d at 715 (Court of Federal Claims did not abuse its
    discretion in turning to attorney’s fees awarded in the Eastern District of Missouri
    to determine appropriate hourly rates in St. Louis). In a recent § 1983 civil rights
    case brought in the Eastern District of Missouri (i.e., alleged unlawful arrest and
    excessive force), the court awarded attorney’s fees at rates of: $500–$595 an hour
    18
    for experienced civil rights lawyers who handled the summary judgment motion,
    the appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and the
    subsequent jury trial; $250–$450 an hour for junior attorneys who worked on the
    case; and $250 an hour for paralegals assigned to the matter. See Gerling v. Waite,
    No. 17-2702, 
    2022 WL 558083
     at *2 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 24, 2022) (citing cases where
    reasonable attorney’s fee awards were based on hourly rates ranging from $350–
    $575 for experienced and senior litigators and rates of up to $375 an hour were
    appropriate for more junior associates).
    Similarly, in a § 1983 class action filed and eventually settled in the Western
    District of Missouri (i.e., allegations involving administration of psychotropic drugs
    to children in foster care), the court awarded attorney’s fees at the hourly rates of
    $400–$500 for the most senior litigators; $200–$350 for junior associates, and
    $150 for paralegals. See M.B. v. Tidball, No. 17-4102, 
    2020 WL 1666159
     at *10–14
    (W.D. Mo. April 3, 2020). In adopting the $500 hourly rate for the most senior
    attorneys, the court noted that the attorneys had more than 30 years of experience,
    including experience serving as counsel in numerous class actions alleging
    constitutional and federal statutory violations, and further cited the uniquely
    technical and complex nature of the case. 
    Id. at *10
    .
    Gerling and Tidball are representative of the hourly rates adopted by
    federal courts in Missouri in determining attorney’s fees awards, particularly
    in complex cases. See, e.g., S.C. v. Riverview Gardens Sch. Dist., No. 18-4162,
    
    2020 WL 5262267
    , at *9 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 3, 2020) (awarding law firm partner
    with 25 years of civil litigation experience an hourly rate of $475, rather than $700
    requested, and more junior associates an hourly rate of $200–$300 in § 1988 action
    involving alleged denial of education to homeless children that ultimately settled);
    Dinosaur Merch. Bank Ltd. v. Bancservices Int’l LLC, No. 19-84, 
    2020 WL 3489344
    ,
    at *6 (E.D. Mo. June 26, 2020) (reducing New York market rates proffered by
    counsel from $475–$800 to $380–$645 per hour in a “basic breach of contract”
    action). The Court finds this body of caselaw on point and persuasive.
    Consistent with relevant caselaw, the Court also considers the St. Louis
    billing rates published in Missouri Lawyers Media (Aug. 2019 & Nov. 2021).
    E.g., Ascentium Cap. LLC v. Littell, No. 20-4215, 
    2022 WL 1087424
    , at *2 (W.D. Mo.
    Apr. 11, 2022); Sheppard v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, No. 17-1037, 
    2022 WL 245480
    ,
    at *2 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 25, 2022); Hardy v. United States, 
    157 Fed. Cl. 464
    , 472–73
    (2021). These surveys provide hourly rate data for attorneys and law firm
    professional staff throughout the state of Missouri, including St. Louis and
    Kansas City. 23 According to the August 2019 survey, the median hourly rates
    23 The “Methodology” section of the surveys explains that Missouri Lawyers Media gathers hourly
    rates from attorney’s fees applications filed with courts in Missouri within the past year; rate
    information generally comes from bankruptcy cases, class-action lawsuits, and cases where the
    19
    for attorneys based in St. Louis was $390 for partners and $298 for associates.
    See Billing Rates 2019, MO. LAW. MEDIA, Aug. 2021, at BR2. The median hourly
    rate across the state of Missouri was $370 per hour. 
    Id.
     The 2019 survey also
    provides that the median hourly rate for support staff was $175. 
    Id.
     The November
    2021 survey provides that the median hourly rate for attorneys based in St. Louis
    increased to $450 for partners and decreased to $250 for associates. See Billing
    Rates 2021, MO. LAW. MEDIA, Nov. 2021, at BR2. The median hourly rate in all
    of Missouri decreased to $330 per hour. 
    Id.
    The hourly rates adopted by district courts in Missouri in calculating
    attorney’s fee awards, and the billing rates published by Missouri Lawyers Weekly,
    are consistent with the St. Louis hourly rates recently assessed by this Court in
    similar rails-to-rails cases litigated by many of the same counsel in this case. See,
    e.g., Bratcher, 136 Fed. Cl. at 800–01; Whispell Foreign Cars, 139 Fed. Cl. at 400–
    01. For the reasons stated above, and in view of the nature of the issues litigated in
    this case as detailed in this opinion, this Court concludes that the reasonable rates
    for the services of counsel and other professionals in this case are as follows:
    Timekeeper                         Requested Rate                     Adjusted Rate
    Partner
    Albin-Riley, Debra                     $670–$795/hour                        $500/hour
    Hearne II, Mark F.                     $555–$645/hour                        $500/hour
    Hulme, James H.                       $835–$955/hour                        $500/hour
    Largent, Meghan S.                     $415–$660/hour                        $450/hour
    Brinton, Lindsay S.                    $395–$660/hour                        $450/hour
    Hart, Kirsten A.                         $480/hour                          $400/hour
    Of Counsel
    Pafford, Abram J.                     $600–$670/hour                        $350/hour
    Associate
    Davis, Stephen S.                      $395–$480/hour                        $300/hour
    Armstrong, Michael                      $395–$495/hour                        $300/hour
    LaMontagne, Laurel                      $380–$485/hour                        $275/hour
    Pankow, Morgan R.                       $395–$515/hour                        $275/hour
    White, Sarah L.                          $250/hour                          $250/hour
    Jefferson, Evan P.                        $225/hour                          $225/hour
    McWherter, Katherine G.                      $215/hour                          $215/hour
    prevailing party was able to request reimbursement of attorney’s fees and expenses under a
    fee-shifting statute. Billing Rates 2019, MO. LAW. MEDIA, Aug. 2021, at BR2; Billing Rates 2021,
    MO. LAW. MEDIA, Nov. 2021, at BR2. “Where possible, [Missouri Lawyers Media] use[s] the
    attorney’s standard or customary rates, rather than the rate the court applied, or discounted rates
    offered to a particular client.” See Scott Lauck, Billing Rates 2021: Fee awards few and far between
    during pandemic, MO. LAW. MEDIA, 2021 WLNR 37503966 (Nov. 29, 2021) (comparing 2019 and
    2021 hourly rates).
    20
    Other
    Paralegal/Specialist                     $115–$380/hour                       $150/hour
    Project Assistant                       $155–$185/hour                       $100/hour
    The chart above lists plaintiffs’ counsel by position and years of experience
    and, as adjusted: partners with 25 or more years of experience a rate of $500 per
    hour; partners with 15-25 years of experience a rate of $450 per hour; and partners
    with less than 15 years of experience a rate of $400 per hour. 24 The Court
    determines for Abram J. Pafford–designated “Of Counsel”–a reasonable rate of
    $350 per hour, accounting for Mr. Pafford’s over 20 years of experience. For more
    junior attorneys, the Court finds their requested rates of $250 per hour or less
    reasonable, and that the reasonable rate for the several associates with relatively
    more experience is $275 per hour. Accounting for their years of experience and
    transitions to partnership, the Court finds the reasonable rate for Stephen S. Davis
    and Michael Armstrong–designated “associates”–to be $300 per hour. For
    supporting professionals, the Court finds a reasonable rate for paralegals and
    specialists to be $150 per hour, and for project assistants $100 per hour, in view of
    the respective work provided and the skills required. These rates are substantially
    lower than the Washington, DC (or national) rates requested by plaintiffs’ counsel
    at ArentFox.
    B.      Compensable Hours
    Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that their URA attorney’s fee
    application seeks reimbursement only for “appropriate hours expended.” Hensley,
    
    461 U.S. at 437
    . In this case, plaintiffs request reimbursement of 1,834.4 hours
    (i.e., 1,493.9 hours for ArentFox and 340.5 hours for Lewis Rice). The government
    contends that plaintiffs’ application includes hours expended on several categories
    of non-compensable work, including time devoted to client solicitation, unsuccessful
    claims and efforts, excessive and duplicative hours, wasteful and unnecessary
    efforts, administrative tasks, and vague time entries. The government further
    contends that plaintiffs’ minimal success in this case (i.e., $1 million initial demand
    versus $7,595.17 ultimate recovery) warrants an additional significant deduction.
    The Court addresses each of these issues seriatim. 25
    24The Court designated Ms. Largent and Lindsay S. Brinton as “partners” to account for their
    transition to “Members” of Lewis Rice in or about 2018 or 2019.
    25By Order dated March 31, 2022, this Court directed plaintiffs’ counsel to attribute, where possible,
    claimed compensable hours (and expenses) to specific docket entries (ECF No(s).) to facilitate the
    Court’s review and assessment of their URA attorney’s fees application. See Arnold, No. 15-1252,
    ECF 170.
    21
    1.      Client Solicitation
    Time devoted to soliciting potential clients and exploring business
    opportunities is not compensable under the URA. See Preseault, 
    52 Fed. Cl. at 671
    (“Section 4654(c) does not provide for the reimbursement of expenses incurred by
    plaintiffs before their decision to file suit in the Court of Federal Claims.”) (citing
    Yancey v. United States, 
    915 F.2d 1534
    , 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Emery v. United
    States, 
    526 F.2d 1121
    , 1124 (Ct. Cl. 1975)); see, e.g., Campbell v. United States,
    
    138 Fed. Cl. 65
    , 71 (2018) (disallowing hours expended on client solicitation and
    development). In private practice, such hours are not customarily submitted to a
    paying client. The URA requires no less reasonable billing judgment and ethical
    discipline in determining compensable hours. Put simply: “Hours that are not
    properly billed to one’s client also are not properly billed to one’s adversary
    pursuant to statutory authority.” Hensley, 
    461 U.S. at 434
     (quoting Copeland v.
    Marshall, 
    641 F.2d 880
    , 891 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc) (emphasis in original),
    quoted in Whispell Foreign Cars, 139 Fed. Cl. at 395 (disallowing hours claimed
    for soliciting–as opposed to representing–clients).
    On October 27, 2015, five days after the NITU was issued, counsel at
    ArentFox filed the complaint on behalf of the then-sole Dawson plaintiff. 26 In
    the weeks and days leading up to the filing of the original complaint, counsel billed
    48.7 hours, the majority of which dedicated to, inter alia, “[l]ocation scouting for
    property meetings for all four counties,” “[s]chedul[ing] travel to Nebraska and
    Kansas,” preparing for and meeting and corresponding with landowners in
    various counties, and “[a]nalyz[ing] STB map with list of landowners regarding
    discontinued rail and abandoned rail.” See ECF 196-1 at 2–3. These hours clearly
    represent counsel’s client solicitation and business development efforts, as opposed
    to the firm’s representation of retained clients. Counsel at ArentFox thereafter
    continued the firm’s year-long effort to track the regulatory process, investigate the
    land near the rail segment in various counties in Nebraska and Kansas, discover
    the corresponding landowners, and solicit and retain a subset of these property
    owners as clients. ArentFox’s billing records document the firm’s continued
    business development efforts into 2016, as counsel solicited, retained, and added
    18 plaintiffs to this case. 27
    26 The record does not include information specifying when the first Dawson plaintiff retained
    counsel at ArentFox to draft and file the original complaint. Of the 19 plaintiffs eventually named
    in this lawsuit, the record contains only the Dials’ retention agreement dated May 6, 2016.
    See ECF 188-1.
    27See ECF 15, 18, 24; see, e.g., ECF 196-1 at 3–23 (various time entries for, inter alia, traveling
    to and from Kansas and Nebraska for “meeting[s] with landowners,” monitoring STB docket,
    reviewing “STB maps for entire rail line” and researching “landowners for entire rail line,” preparing
    “marketing materials,” arranging and attending “city [hall, or town] meeting[s],” “sending postcard
    out about upcoming meeting,” managing “solicitation[s]” to landowners and “plaintiff report,”
    22
    Counsel’s billing records further include various entries for retrieving,
    managing, or analyzing property records (i.e., “deeds,” “conveyances,” “maps,”
    “property data”). 28 Similar to the generically narrated entries of “correspondence”
    with landowners or clients, these entries do not contain sufficient distinction
    between compensable effort dedicated to advancing claims of retained clients and
    non-compensable time facilitating counsel’s efforts to identify or select landowners
    for recruitment. ArentFox’s billing records also include entries dedicated to
    tracking competing firms’ filings and client lists. 29 For retained clients, the billing
    records include dozens of entries reportedly devoted to reviewing or analyzing
    engagement letters. See generally ECF 196-1. This collection of conflated
    non-compensable and questionable entries reflects the majority of the billable hours
    submitted by ArentFox between October 2015 and October 2016.
    By October 26, 2016, when plaintiffs filed their third amended complaint,
    counsel billed a total of 626.1 hours–representing $199,100 in claimed legal fees. 30
    The Court recognizes that the 626.1 hours billed as of filing of the third amended
    gathering and reviewing “new property owner [landowner] information,” reviewing “press and
    media release” or researching “local newspapers,” researching and corresponding with “state
    representatives” or “city and county attorneys,” maintaining case and “client data,” “correspondence”
    with unspecified landowners and unspecified nature of communication). In the few billing entries
    indicating the nature of the correspondence, counsel included time expended on claims ultimately
    dismissed. See, e.g., 196-1 at 9 (“Draft letter to client M. Christensen. Revise same.”); id. at 19
    (“Review client correspondence regarding dismissal . . . .”); id. at 21 (“Draft and finalize status letters
    regarding voluntarily dismissal. . . .”).
    28 See e.g., id. at 3 (“Manage various val [sic] maps, STB map and reports of landowners”); id. at 10
    (“Review maps, valuation schedules, deeds, and property records”); id. at 11 (“Work on preparation
    of upcoming meeting and marketing materials, analyze deeds and tax receipts received from
    Norton and Harlan County, follow up missing deeds from Phillips County”); id. at 12 (“Analyze
    east, west and central maps from experts and compare all landowners and request research for
    new landowners [sic] address . . . .”); id. at 19 (“Review deed and title work and tax records”); id.
    at 13 (“Correspond with Harlan, Phillips, Norton and Decatur Recorder of Deeds Office”); id. at 16
    (“Manage individual clients' deeds and tax receipts, review exhibit maps from experts”).
    29 See, e.g., ECF 196-1 at 3 (“Review complaint filed by other counsel,” “Analyze competing firm’s
    complaint and filed documents regarding landowners needing to be removed from our solicitation
    and work on website blog to advertise our case”); id. at 9 (“Review companion cases”); id. at 15
    (“analyze with client list and competing firms [sic] client lists,” “analyze competing firms’ cases on
    the US Court of Claims website,” “research competing firms’ plaintiffs on amended complaint to
    ensure no future solicitation and review competing firm’s pleadings”); id. at 16 (“Analyze second
    amended complaint filed by competing firm regarding new clients to ensure we do not solicit”); id.
    at 19 (“Review list of clients to whom we communicated ‘no representation’ based on location”).
    30Based on the record presented, counsel’s solicitation effort did not generate additional clients
    after October 2016. The fourth and fifth amended complaints reorganized plaintiff and parcel
    information but did not add additional plaintiffs. See ECF 33; ECF 62. Other than adding and
    then reorganizing landowners and parcel information, the six complaints are substantively similar.
    Compare ECF 1 with ECF 15 and ECF 18 and ECF 24 and ECF 33 and ECF 62.
    23
    complaint necessarily includes certain compensable work while counsel: engaged in
    substantive discussions with retained clients, conducted investigations to develop
    the case, researched and drafted court filings, and communicated with government
    counsel. The billing records presented, however, do not delineate between hours
    devoted to compensable client representation and non-compensable client
    recruitment and business development. As highlighted above, the billing records
    submitted are replete with entries properly categorized as the latter. Based
    on the record presented–reflective of plaintiffs’ failure to meet their burden of
    documenting billable hours limited to compensable client representation hours–
    the Court finds that a 60% reduction of the hours billed as of October 26, 2016,
    is warranted. 31
    2.      Unsuccessful Claims and Wasteful Effort
    Fee-shifting statutes like the URA do not permit reimbursement of hours
    expended on unsuccessful claims. Hensley, 
    461 U.S. at 435
     (“no fee may be awarded
    for services on the unsuccessful claim[s]”). In this case, the original complaint with
    one plaintiff claimed monetary relief estimated at $1 million. Although the case
    ultimately involved upwards of 19 plaintiffs and 25 claims, in the course of this
    litigation, six plaintiffs and claims involving eight distinct parcels of land were
    voluntarily dismissed. The parties ultimately settled the remaining 17 claims
    brought by 13 plaintiffs in the aggregate amount of $7,595.17. Because the
    unsuccessful claims involved different parcels of land and, in most cases, different
    plaintiffs, the hours expended on those unsuccessful claims must be excluded from
    the lodestar calculation. See Biery, 818 F.3d at 712 (“There is no dispute that work
    done on behalf of the unsuccessful plaintiffs is not recoverable.”); Bratcher,
    136 Fed. Cl. at 793 (same for unsuccessful claims).
    Counsel’s billing records do not specify the claim(s) or piece(s) of property
    on which the claimed hours were expended, or how the time billed was allocated
    among the claims. 32 Notably, despite the fact that all claims involving Nebraska
    landowners were dismissed–and, therefore, definitionally unsuccessful–counsel
    request reimbursement for hours spent traveling to Nebraska, meeting with
    Nebraska landowners, researching Nebraska law, investigating Nebraska
    properties, and correspondence with Nebraska landowners. Previously commenting
    31 By the time the fifth and final amended complaint was filed on July 20, 2017, counsel billed a total
    of 1,025.8 hours. The roughly 400 hours billed between the filing of the third and the fifth amended
    complaints includes time associated with: plaintiffs’ summary judgment briefing on liability, which
    the Court denied as premature; and the parties’ unsuccessful settlement negotiations. No additional
    plaintiffs were added during this period. Although other bases for hour reductions apply, discussed
    infra, no further reduction for client solicitation is imposed for the post-October 26, 2016 period.
    32Most billing entries cite generic descriptions of work devoted to unspecified “landowner,” “client,”
    or “property.”
    24
    upon this issue in cases involving the same counsel, this Court noted the difficulty
    of allocating compensable hours when counsel’s billing records fail to delineate
    hours between successful and unsuccessful claims and counsel make no effort to
    claim only what they are entitled to recover. See, e.g., Bratcher, 136 Fed. Cl. at 793
    (“Plaintiffs’ time records do not specify the claims or parcels of property to which the
    recorded hours pertain.”); Biery, 
    2014 WL 12540517
    , at *5 (noting counsel’s failure
    to delineate between hours expended on successful and unsuccessful claims or
    parcels of land). Consistent with the governing caselaw, the Court finds that
    plaintiffs’ request warrants a percentage adjustment to account for the unsuccessful
    claims. See, e.g., Biery, 818 F.3d at 712 (“[T]he Court of Federal Claims did not
    abuse its discretion when it reduced the hours and costs by 30% in order to take
    into account work done on behalf of the unsuccessful plaintiffs.”). Here, 32% of the
    claims filed (i.e., 8 of 25) were voluntarily dismissed and, therefore, not successful.
    Accordingly, the court imposes a 25% reduction on the hours billed as of June 25,
    2018 (i.e., the date the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the eighth claim). 33, 34
    The government proposes a further reduction to account for counsel’s efforts
    that did not contribute to any favorable result for plaintiffs in this case. The Court
    agrees. During the title resolution phase of this case, the Court directed the parties
    to limit their cross-motions for partial summary judgment to title issues. Despite
    the Court’s express instructions, plaintiffs filed a more comprehensive dispositive
    motion on liability. The Court summarily denied plaintiffs’ motion as premature
    and ordered revised briefing consistent with the Court’s instructions. See ECF 55.
    Nevertheless, included in counsel’s URA reimbursement request are at least
    86.5 hours attributable to the rejected brief and, despite repurposing a number
    of identical passages and arguments in the revised filing, counsel billed at least
    another 129.4 hours for the revised motion. 35 Compare ECF 37 with ECF 65.
    Notably, for the 17 claims where the 13 landowners ultimately recovered
    just compensation, the parties resolved the title issues largely through stipulation
    rather than litigation. Thereafter, the parties disputed the applicable liability
    determination framework–an issue then pending before the Federal Circuit in
    Caquelin; specifically, the applicable takings liability analysis where a NITU
    expires without a trail-use agreement and, relatedly, whether the temporary taking
    continues beyond the NITU expiration. See ECF 93. Having filed an amicus brief
    33The 25% reduction (rather than a 32% reduction) takes into account the fact that seven of the
    eight unsuccessful claims were dismissed by July 28, 2017, and the parties stipulated to the
    dismissal of the eighth claim about a year later, on June 25, 2018.
    34To the extent multiple grounds of reduction apply to the same period, the reductions apply
    cumulatively. For instance, for hours billed as of October 26, 2016, this additional 25% reduction
    applies to the already adjusted hours based on non-compensable client solicitation activities.
    35   These calculations exclude time counsel attribute to multiple (or no) ECF entries.
    25
    supporting the landowners’ position in the first Caquelin appeal in January 2017,
    plaintiffs’ counsel were fully aware of the potential impact of the pending decision. 36
    Nevertheless, before the federal regulatory process concluded in this case,
    plaintiffs repeatedly opposed a stay of proceedings in this matter pending the
    Federal Circuit’s anticipated (ultimately realized) clarification in Caquelin.
    Meanwhile, over the government’s objections (e.g., necessity, relevance), plaintiffs
    pressed for discovery and to litigate state law abandonment issues. Less than
    two months after briefing on the state law abandonment commenced at plaintiffs’
    request, NKCR consummated its abandonment on September 3, 2019; plaintiffs
    subsequently agreed that there was “no need for the Court to consider the issue of
    state-law abandonment in the context of the government’s liability.” ECF 138.
    Compare ECF 112 with ECF 125 and ECF 138.
    Following the Federal Circuit’s May 29, 2020 decision in Caquelin II, the
    parties engaged in settlement discussions without further litigation and little
    judicial intervention. By December 17, 2020, the parties amicably resolved all
    issues of liability and damages save attorney’s fees and expenses. See ECF 162.
    The Court concludes that plaintiffs’ objections to the government’s motion to stay
    proceedings in this case pending the Federal Circuit’s decision in Caquelin II–
    instead compelling third-party discovery, discussed supra, and litigating issues
    ultimately immaterial to the resolution of this case–were unreasonable and
    wasteful. The URA entitles counsel to reimbursement of reasonable hours
    expended, not every hour counsel elects to spend without regard to the import to
    or ultimate impact on the case. Mindful of potential overlapping reductions
    attributable to the effort pursuing unsuccessful claims, the Court nevertheless
    imposes a further 40% reduction on hours expended from the inception of this case
    until February 24, 2020, to account for plaintiffs’ overly litigious approach to this
    case and the series of unnecessary filings. 37
    3.      Excessive, Redundant, and Unnecessary Hours
    “Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort to exclude
    from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary,
    just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such hours from
    36 See Caquelin v. United States, No. 16-1663 (Fed. Cir.) (ECF 65 filed Jan. 19, 2017) (amicus brief
    filed by Largent, Hearne, Brinton, and Davis). The four attorneys also filed two amicus briefs in the
    second Caquelin appeal. See Caquelin v. United States, No. 19-1385 (Fed. Cir.) (ECF 93–94 filed
    July 29, 2019) (amicus briefs filed by Largent and Brinton and by Hearne and Davis, respectively).
    37 Counsel began attributing billed hours toward their March 12, 2017 motion for partial summary
    judgment on liability (ECF 37) on November 4, 2015–eight days after filing the original complaint
    with just one plaintiff and 16 months before the brief was actually filed. As noted supra, that motion
    departed from the Court’s case management order and was summarily denied as premature. The
    end date of February 24, 2020 coincides with plaintiffs’ formal abandonment of their collateral
    litigation of Caquelin and state law abandonment issues.
    26
    his fee submission.” Hensley, 
    461 U.S. at 434
    . Reimbursable hours under the URA
    must similarly exclude such hours. Based on itemized adjustments, the government
    proposes a reduction of 671.9 hours to account for excessive, redundant, wasteful,
    or otherwise unnecessary hours. For the reasons that follow, the Court agrees that
    a significant reduction is warranted.
    Plaintiffs request reimbursement for 1,834.4 hours billed by a timekeeping
    ensemble of 34 different legal professionals comprised of: 4 Partners, 3 Of Counsels,
    3 Associates, and 14 professional support staff at ArentFox 38 and, beginning in
    January 2019, 2 Members, 39 4 Associates, 40 and 6 paralegals at Lewis Rice. At
    times, over a dozen timekeepers simultaneously billed to this matter, including
    entries attributed to internal communications or the performance of nearly identical
    tasks. For the original complaint–which included one plaintiff and recycles various
    passages from complaints filed by counsel in other rails-to-trails cases 41–the billing
    team included at least 2 Partners, 2 Of Counsels, and 3 Paralegals. By the time
    plaintiffs filed their fifth (and final) amended complaint in this case on July 20,
    2017 (reorganizing party and parcel information), see ECF 62, counsel billed a total
    of 1,025.8 hours to this matter. Of that time, roughly 500 hours are attributed
    to the preparation and filing of the original and five amended complaints. At
    that point, except for briefing plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment
    on liability (again, summarily denied as contrary to the Court’s directive and
    premature), the parties had not engaged in substantive briefing.
    Review of the docket in this case side-by-side with ArentFox’s and Lewis
    Rice’s billing records reveals that counsel heavily staffed this matter and now
    seek reimbursement for every hour purportedly expended by every member of
    the litigation team. In filing a 4-page joint status report with the government on
    February 24, 2020, for example, counsel at ArentFox and Lewis Rice billed at
    least 13.7 hours preparing and conferring. 42 For a 30-minute status conference
    conducted by the Court on March 31, 2022, counsel recorded roughly 10 hours
    38ArentFox’s billing records included entries by 13 support professionals; counsel additionally
    included another support staff member, Karen E. Reyes, in their summary of the requested rates.
    See ECF 196 at 19; see generally ECF 196-1, 196-2.
    39The two Members are Lindsay S.C. Brinton and Ms. Largent, two primary timekeepers in this case
    during their time at ArentFox before they moved their practice to Lewis Rice.
    40   One of the four Associates was promoted to Member in February 2022.
    41   Compare, e.g., ECF 1 with Brooks v. United States, No. 15-843 (Fed. Cl.) (ECF 1 filed Aug. 7, 2015).
    42   Compare ECF 138 with ECF 196-2 at 3 and ECF 196-5 at 11–12.
    27
    preparing for and participating in the telephonic conference. 43
    Moreover, for the same NITU and railroad segment at issue in this case,
    multiple law firms targeted the potentially affected landowners, leading to at least
    four related cases with substantively identical claims. Plaintiffs objected to the
    consolidation of the related cases. During the course of litigation, however, counsel
    expended–and are now seeking reimbursement for–a significant number of hours
    communicating and corresponding with counsel in the related cases and reviewing
    filings and other documents prepared by other counsel. For the now-consolidated
    Arnold case, see supra note 1, for example, counsel now seek over 120 hours in
    entries dedicated to, in whole or in part, communicating with counsel of record in
    that case. Many of these billing entries are not associated with any ECF entry, are
    block-billed, or are generically categorized as “correspondence” or “call” with little
    indication as to whether or how the particular communication contributed to this
    case or the successful resolution of a particular claim. While the Court recognizes
    such communications may involve cooperation necessary to advance plaintiffs’
    claims, the billing records lack sufficient detail enabling effective review, reflect
    little efficiency or contemplation by counsel in including them in their URA
    application, and cannot serve as a basis to award attorney’s fees under the
    fee-shifting statute.
    Next, despite plaintiffs’ counsel’s participation in Caquelin I & II, noted
    supra, counsel billed over 20 hours–after filing an amicus brief in that case–to
    review and research that case. For most of these entries, moreover, counsel did not
    identify any relevant ECF entry in this case. Along these lines, Mr. Hearne–an
    attorney touting over 30 years of experience representing over 1,000 landowners in
    cases under the Trails Act 44–billed 76.5 hours (out of 158.9 total hours) in this case
    as follows: 5 hours “[r]eview[ing] law and conveyances re: government’s liability for
    a compensable taking” the day the original complaint (with one plaintiff) was filed;
    7.5 hours reviewing a draft amended complaint (Feb. 1–2, 2017); 3.6 hours on two
    identical entries for researching “government’s temporary taking argument and
    issues re: trail use agreement . . .” (Mar. 20 & 30, 2017) with no associated ECF
    entry identified; 11 hours on two identical entries 45 for researching “Arkansas Game
    and Fish ruling . . .” (July 1–2, 2017); and 49.4 hours attributed to plaintiffs’ revised
    motion for partial summary judgment (ECF 65 filed on July 21, 2017) which, as
    43   Compare Arnold, No. 15-1252, ECF 169–70 with ECF 196-2 at 9 and ECF 196-5 at 27.
    44See https://truenorthlawgroup.com/thor-hearne/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2022); Bratcher v.
    United States, No. 15-986 (Fed. Cl.) (ECF 86-3 at 2 filed Sept. 1, 2017) (Hearne Decl. attached
    to plaintiffs’ URA attorney’s fee request).
    45The billing records presented to the Court contain numerous instances of billing entries bearing
    identical or near-identical narratives. See, e.g., ECF 196-1 at 49 (Largent entries of 1.6, 1.0, and
    2.0 hours on January 24, 25, 26, 2018, respectively, with identical narrative passage with the same
    typographical errors and no associated ECF entry).
    28
    noted supra, recycled pages of identical content from plaintiffs’ previous motion
    (ECF 37 & 41). Although the researched issues were relevant to this case, given
    counsel’s claimed expertise in rails-to-trails cases and similar hours requested in
    multiple cases counsel simultaneously litigated before this Court, the Court finds
    the requested hours excessive. See, e.g., Bratcher, 136 Fed. Cl. at 797 (reducing
    excessive hours given counsel’s extensive experience and intimate familiarity with
    issues researched).
    Numerous other instances of excessive, redundant, or unnecessary entries
    further demonstrate a lack of reasonable billing judgment counsel are expected and
    ethically obligated to exercise. When Ms. Largent moved her practice to Lewis Rice,
    for example, Mr. Pafford of ArentFox billed 9.1 hours for what appears to be team
    transition work (with no associated ECF entry) 46 but was never thereafter involved
    in this case. 47 Plaintiffs’ counsel also claim over 90 hours for travel–mostly to, from,
    or within Kansas and Nebraska–to meet with landowners for business solicitation.
    See generally 196-1 at 2–23. The billing entries do not indicate any travel necessary
    to conduct or participate in in-person witness interviews or depositions. In fact,
    there was no trial or evidentiary hearing, nor were there any depositions conducted
    in this case requiring such travel and, in fact, all status conferences with the Court
    were conducted telephonically. Plus, as noted supra, the Nebraska plaintiffs
    voluntarily dismissed their claims.
    Further highlighting the unnecessary hours expended and sought to be
    reimbursed by ArentFox, counsel included in their URA application 10-plus hours
    expended on an attorney’s lien filed (and withdrawn) in this case, seeking to
    preserve the firm’s alleged claim to damages and attorney’s fees and expenses
    ultimately recovered by plaintiffs. 48 The attorney’s lien was voluntarily withdrawn
    by counsel following the Court raising sua sponte whether the filing was
    improvidently filed. 49 Similarly, counsel claims 18.9 hours ($13,540 in attorney’s
    46These include a block-billed 8.1 hours on “[r]eview[ing] file materials and outlin[ing] strategy
    re: valuation and settlement framework; discussion with T. Hearne re: crossing rights issue and
    severance damages; research re: same” and 1 hour for “[w]ork on transition issues and research
    re: joint representation in class actions; conversation with Federal Circuit clerk’s office; multiple
    calls and email exchanges with M. Shambro.” ECF 196-2 at 2. It was unclear, however, how the
    generally narrated items relate to issues litigated in this case: this matter did not involve a class
    action, nor was this case ever before the Federal Circuit.
    47 As documented in the ArentFox billing records, and consistent with the identified counsel of record
    in this case, Mr. Hulme assumed the role of lead counsel for the two plaintiffs remaining with
    ArentFox after Ms. Largent moved her practice to Lewis Rice.
    48 Compare ECF 183 and ECF 191 and Arnold ECF 174 with ECF 196-2 at 7–8, 9 and ECF 196-5
    at 25, 27.
    49 During a March 31, 2022 status conference, the Court inquired whether the attorney’s lien
    violated the Anti-Assignment Act, 
    31 U.S.C. § 3727
    , and was contrary to the law of this Circuit.
    29
    fees) attributed to Ms. Albin-Riley’s “[w]ork on expert issues,” “mapping issues,”
    and reviewing documents filed in this case. No expert discovery took place in
    this case. 50 To the extent the referenced “expert” or “mapping” matters relate to
    approving engagements for land mappers and appraisers, the Court finds the
    requested time excessive and unnecessary. 51 See Bratcher, 136 Fed. Cl. at 794–95
    (finding Albin-Riley’s claimed hours excessive particularly when “the individual
    doing the work is a senior partner who performs these duties in connection with
    all of the firm’s rails-to-trails cases.”).
    Additionally, as noted supra, as of December 17, 2020, the parties reached a
    tentative settlement on the just compensation due plaintiffs. Since then, counsel
    reportedly expended over 200 hours (ArentFox: 63.2 hours; Lewis Rice: 140.5 hours)
    primarily documenting, negotiating, and litigating issues surrounding their claimed
    URA attorney’s fees and expenses. Billing entries related to the recovery of URA
    attorney’s fees also date back to the early days of this litigation. Indeed, counsel
    started billing time on general research regarding URA fees and monitoring
    caselaw development since November 16, 2015–three weeks after they filed the
    original complaint. 52 Nevertheless, plaintiffs’ attorney’s fee application reiterates
    similar arguments advanced by the same counsel in related and other rails-to-trails
    cases already rejected by this Court and repeats the same billing errors previously
    noted by the Court. See, e.g., Bratcher, 136 Fed. Cl. at 792–97 (reducing request for
    fees on various grounds); Whispell Foreign Cars, 139 Fed. Cl. at 392–402 (same).
    On this record, the Court finds the claimed hours purportedly expended on
    researching and litigating URA attorney’s fees claims unreasonable and excessive.
    See Knight v. United States, 
    982 F.2d 1573
    , 1577–78 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Tucker v. United States,
    
    7 Cl. Ct. 374
    , 375–77 (1985). See Arnold, No. 15-1252, ECF 170. The Court further questioned the
    need for the attorney’s lien given that ArentFox continued to represent two plaintiffs in the case.
    50 Notably, the billing records submitted for reimbursement reflect various entries billed by
    Ms. Largent on similar “expert” matters. See, e.g., 196-1 at 28 (entry on January 15, 2017: 2.4 hours
    for work including “[m]eetings with potential appraisal experts and other valuation experts”); id.
    at 29 (entry on January 26, 2017: 2.1 hours for work including “[m]eeting with potential appraisal
    experts”); id. at 42 (entry on July 25, 2017: 2.0 hours for “[m]eet with potential appraisal experts
    at Appraisal conference at Wichita State University”).
    51 In a previous case litigated by the same counsel, Ms. Albin-Riley claimed to be “responsible for
    retaining and managing experts in all Trails Act cases handled by [ArentFox]”; in defending similar
    billing entries (i.e., 11.4 hours), she stated those entries “involved the approval of engagements for
    the landowners’ appraisers and mapping expert, and that it was necessary for her to review the
    pleadings to ascertain the exact scope of the experts’ involvement in the case.” Bratcher, 136 Fed. Cl.
    at 794–95 (citing Albin-Riley Decl. ¶ 3).
    52 See, e.g., ECF 196-1 (various entries in early stages of this case for “Work on matters re: recovery
    of fees,” “Review new case law from Federal Circuit re: URA fee reimbursement,” “Review new filing
    in relevant Federal Circuit case re: URA reimbursement,” “Research on new case law re: interest
    30
    Counsel’s requested hours include excessive, redundant, and unnecessary
    effort that, throughout this litigation, drove up litigation costs without meaningfully
    contributing to the successful resolution of the dispute in their clients’ favor. Such
    effort, if rewarded, serves only to enlarge “the financial lot of attorneys” and departs
    from the spirit and intended purpose of the URA’s fee-shifting provision. See, e.g.,
    Delaware Valley I, 
    478 U.S. at 565
     (“[fee-shifting] statutes were not designed as a
    form of economic relief to improve the financial lot of attorneys”). Accordingly, the
    Court imposes an overall 50% reduction on the aggregate hours adjusted on the
    grounds addressed supra.
    4.      Administrative Tasks
    Hours expended on administrative, secretarial, and clerical tasks–regardless
    of whether these assignments are billed by attorneys or professional support staff–
    are generally not recoverable under the URA fee-shifting statute. See Whispell
    Foreign Cars, 139 Fed. Cl. at 395 (citing Hopi Tribe v. United States, 
    55 Fed. Cl. 81
    ,
    100 (2002)). These non-compensable tasks include assembling documents,
    calendaring, filing, mailing, photocopying, proofreading, reviewing and managing
    client data. See Bratcher, 136 Fed. Cl. at 796 (collecting cases).
    In this case, 20 legal supporting professionals billed 668.4 total hours (36%)
    included in plaintiffs’ URA attorney’s fee application. While the Court recognizes
    the necessity and critical contributions of support staff, work secretarial in nature
    is customarily and more appropriately accounted for as law firm overhead, and
    not billable to a particular client; and by extension, not properly recoverable under
    a fee-shifting statute. Review of ArentFox’s and Lewis Rice’s tendered billing
    records reveals myriad claimed hours by support staff bearing generic descriptions
    like “analyze,” “review,” “manage,” or “update” files. 53 When the case was handled
    exclusively by ArentFox, for example, paralegal Epperson billed roughly 50 hours
    rate to apply in just compensation payments,” “Review billing records . . . to determine
    reasonableness for future settlement of URA or fee application per same”).
    53 See, e.g., ECF 196-1 at 10 (May entry on March 31, 2016: 7.5 hours for “Analyze and manage
    conveyances received from Norton and Decatur Counties and correspond with client regarding
    contact information”); id. at 11 (May entry on April 8, 2016: 5.8 hours for “Analyze East and West
    maps from experts for all four counties regarding proper coding and research landowners missing
    from our list”); id. at 19 (Barney entry on August 4, 2016: 3.3 hours for “Review and manage
    database, and plaintiffs’ files. Review previously filed complaint. Review client correspondence
    regarding dismissal in preparation for second amended complaint . . .”); id. at 26 (Levin entry on
    December 21, 2016: 1.9 hours for “Recreated Dawson STB binder, correctly saving all documents
    and producing an entirely new binder”); id. at 51 (Epperson entry on May 30, 2018: 2.1 hour for
    “Research, review and analyze client data; telephone conference with client.”); ECF 196-5 at 18
    (Roland entry on December 14, 2020: 1.5 hours for “Review documents; update client files []; update
    client information []”); id. at 20–21 (Roland entries in February–March 2021: 3.3 hours for updating
    case files and “payee” information).
    31
    designated as reviewing or managing unspecified “client data” or “case data.”
    See generally 196-1. Out of the 353.8 hours billed by paralegal May, in turn, a
    significant number of entries were dedicated to “scouting locations” or other
    meeting arrangement activities, business solicitation or advertisement, maintaining
    case files or retrieving property-related documentation, monitoring deadlines, and
    requesting or forwarding documents. See generally id.
    Attorney timekeepers on this case similarly billed time dedicated to
    administrative work or work customarily performed by a supporting or more
    junior professional. For a three-sentence counsel substitution form (ECF 115),
    Mr. Hulme–a partner with over 40 years of experience claiming a significant hourly
    rate–billed 1.1 hours and another attorney billed an additional 0.1 hours. Other
    exemplary billings of Mr. Hulme include: 0.8 hours (June 9 and 23, 2020) reviewing
    two one-page orders on status conference scheduling; 1.1 hours (September 14,
    2020) to prepare a list of four attorneys attending the status conference (ECF 154)
    (another attorney billed an additional 0.3 hours for the same list); and 0.8 hours
    (September 21, 2020) “[r]eview[ing] docket notices and schedule.” Ms. Largent, in
    turn, billed 2.5 hours for work including “[s]et up meetings” on March 18, 2016, and
    additional time for “calendar[ing]” various deadlines, reviewing engagement letters
    or bills, reviewing unspecified “correspondence” and client and landowner
    information, and managing team coordination. 54
    Such billing practices depart from the billing judgment reasonably expected
    and the ethical obligation attorneys must exercise in dealing with a private
    fee-paying client. Reimbursement under the URA requires no less and does not
    operate as a vehicle for counsel to recoup time spent on administrative tasks that is
    better incorporated into overhead and operational expenses and not appropriately
    billed to a client. Based on the billing records presented, and mindful of potential
    overlapping reductions, the Court finds a 10% downward adjustment to the
    aggregate hours counsel requested is warranted.
    5.      Vague Entries
    Adjustments to requested hours are justified where time entries lack
    sufficient detail to permit an effective review of their reasonableness. See, e.g.,
    McCarty v. United States, 
    142 Fed. Cl. 616
    , 628 (2019) (“Billing entries must
    54 See, e.g., 196-1 at 10 (entry on April 1, 2016: 0.3 hours for “Review C. May memo re: client
    conversation. Draft and send response to same”); 
    id. at 18
     (entry on July 13, 2016: 0.3 hours for
    “Memo to C. May to provide case status memo to A. Barney for taking over case responsibilities and
    outstanding discovery tasks”); 
    id. at 47
     (multiple entries for “Final review of correspondence to
    clients”); 
    id. at 52
     (entry on June 26, 2018: 0.6 hours for “Review revised status conference order.
    Re-calendar same. Review expert bills. Memo re: same. Review and revise case status update memo
    to T. Hearne.”); 
    id. at 56
     (entry on September 4, 2018: 0.2 hours for “Review order scheduling status
    conference and calendar same”).
    32
    contain sufficient detail to permit this Court to effectively review the claimed fees.”);
    Whispell Foreign Cars, 139 Fed. Cl. at 395 (discussing court’s discretion in adjusting
    requested hours based on vague entries). Despite the Court’s March 31, 2022
    directive that counsel include “[s]pecific citations to ECF No(s). for the claimed
    hours and expenses[,]” see Arnold, No. 15-1252, ECF 170, the billing records
    submitted in support of plaintiffs’ URA fee application are replete with entries
    bearing generic, vague descriptions as to the substance of work performed as well as
    block-billed entries for multiple (compensable, questionable, and non-compensable)
    tasks. Accordingly, a further reduction is warranted.
    Of the 1,834.4 total hours claimed by plaintiffs’ counsel, over 240 hours
    (13%) are not associated with an ECF entry; many of these hours were billed
    for unspecified client correspondence, file management, unspecified communication
    (internally and with counsel in related cases), or general research. 55 For entries
    where counsel identified relevant ECF entries, many nevertheless suffer similar
    deficiencies and include little detail enabling effective review of the claimed work. 56
    Based on the record presented, the Court finds an additional 10% reduction to the
    adjusted hours warranted to account for the vague or block-billed entries submitted,
    despite the Court’s express directive, due to plaintiffs’ failure to meet their burden
    to demonstrate reasonableness.
    6.      Minimal Success
    “[T]he significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff[s] in relation
    to the hours reasonably expended”–also denoted as “the degree of success
    obtained”–is “the most critical factor” in determining reasonable attorney’s fees.
    Hensley, 
    461 U.S. at
    435–36. Nonetheless, courts may not mechanically reduce
    claimed billable hours or proffered rates solely on the basis of the degree of success
    55See, e.g., 196-1 at 17 (Largent entry on June 9, 2016: 1.0 hours for “Work on revising
    correspondence to landowners and landowners [sic] representatives”); id. at 19 (Barney entry on
    August 8, 2016: 1.4 hours “Research pleading documents”); id. at 44 (Payne entry on August 24,
    2017: 3.7 hours for “Managed pleadings”); id. at 49 (Largent entry on February 22, 2018: 0.3 hours
    for “Call with D. Edwards”); id. at 57 (Epperson entry on September 26, 2018: 3.1 hours for “Work on
    declarations of landowners”); id. at 58 (Largent entry on October 5, 2018: 0.5 hours for “Review
    transcripts of oral argument and analysis of Supreme Court case re: inverse condemnation cases and
    possible changes in substantive law re: same”); ECF 196-5 at 27 (Roland entry on March 8, 2022:
    1.6 hours for “Prepare correspondence re client update; update case files”).
    56See, e.g., ECF 196-1 at 44 (Largent entry on August 28, 2017: 0.6 hours for “Call with D. Edwards.
    Review email from same. Memo to S. David re: research for reply. Confer with T. Hearne re. same”);
    id. at 52 (Payne entry on June 15, 2018: 1.5 hours for “Researched and retrieved pleadings and JSR
    from previous cases”); id. at 53 (Epperson entry on July 18, 2018: 2.5 hours for “Review joint status
    reports; review and analyze client data”); ECF 192-2 at 8 (Woodruff entry on November 1, 2021:
    3.3 hours for “Searching through hard copy files for a document, per S. Kessler”); id. at 9 (Kessler
    entry on December 22, 2021: 1.4 hours for “Retrieve filed lien from docket; review and search
    through imanage [sic] spaces for fully executed engagement letter; emails re same”).
    33
    counsel ultimately achieved. See Bywaters I, 670 F.3d at 1231 (“The mere fact
    that the recovery is small in amount is not a circumstance justifying a reduced fee
    award.”). Where minimal recovery is obtained, reductions normally can be reflected
    in determining the reasonable hours expended rather than as an independent basis
    for adjusting the overall lodestar calculation. See id. “[A]djustments to the lodestar
    figure ‘are proper only in certain “rare” and “exceptional” cases, supported by both
    “specific evidence” on the record and detailed findings by the lower courts.’” Id. at
    1229 (quoting Delaware Valley I, 
    478 U.S. at 565
    ); accord Perdue, 
    559 U.S. at 553
    .
    This is such a case.
    Weeks before the STB issued the subject NITU, counsel began billing in this
    matter while soliciting business in the geographic areas near the subject railroad.
    As detailed supra, the contingent-fee arrangement executed with all 19 eventual
    plaintiffs committed the law firm to advance all costs and be compensated only on
    “successful” claims and based on either a percentage of total damages recovered or
    a URA application. Of the 19 putative owners of 25 tracts of land involved in this
    case, 13 plaintiffs (i.e., owners of 17 parcels) ultimately settled for an aggregate
    amount of $7,595.17 in just compensation. Recoveries for individual claims ranged
    from $6.59 to $2,109.45, of which: only 2 exceeded $1,000, 14 were for less than
    $500, 7 were for less than $100, and 4 were for less than $20. See ECF 192 at 2.
    Plaintiffs’ counsel now seek to recover nearly $800,000 in attorney’s fees,
    plus expenses, based upon a claimed over 1,800 hours billed to this case over the
    course of 7 years after staffing the matter with 34 legal professionals. This case
    did not involve any novel legal issues; discovery was minimal; no depositions were
    conducted; court proceedings were limited to telephonic status conferences; and
    no evidentiary hearings or trials were held. Although the subject NITU and
    disputed lands were different, counsel–the same attorneys who have and continue
    to litigate similar rails-to-trails cases before this Court–recycled similar pleadings,
    motions, and briefs from other cases. 57 In the end, all title issues regarding the
    17 successful claims were resolved through stipulation as opposed to litigation.
    Issues of liability and just compensation were, in turn, resolved by awaiting
    guidance from the Federal Circuit in Caquelin II and the parties’ negotiations.
    In arguing their entitlement to the requested attorney’s fees despite the
    minimal just compensation awarded to the landowners, plaintiffs cite Cloverport
    Sand & Gravel Co. Inc. v. United States, 
    10 Cl. Ct. 121
     (1986), see ECF 189 at 19,
    where this Court’s predecessor awarded $9,190 in just compensation and $76,767.77
    57During the pendency of this litigation, counsel litigated a number of other rails-to-trails cases in
    this Court. See, e.g., Campbell v. United States, No. 13-324 (Fed. Cl. filed May 8, 2013); McCarty v.
    United States, No. 14-316 (Fed. Cl. filed Apr. 18, 2014); BHL Properties, LLC v. United States, No.
    15-179 (Fed. Cl. filed Feb. 26, 2015); Kelley v. United States, No. 15-924 (Fed. Cl. filed Aug. 24, 2015);
    Bratcher v. United States, No. 15-986 (Fed. Cl. filed Sept. 4, 2015); Banks v. United States,
    No. 16-1633 (Fed. Cl. filed Dec. 12, 2016).
    34
    in URA fees (i.e., $69,997.06 in attorney’s fees and $6,700.71 in expenses).
    Cloverport, 
    10 Cl. Ct. at
    127–28 (“In this Court’s judgment, this case represents
    a clear example of the potential for de minimis liability awards in taking cases,
    accompanied by disproportionate and substantial awards of attorneys’ fees.”). As
    the United States Claims Court explained in awarding reasonable attorney’s fees
    more than eight times the amount of the damages award, 95.5% percent of the
    attorney’s fee awarded (i.e., $66,866.85) was for work performed during the trial
    phase of the case, including a 5-day trial on damages. 
    Id.
     at 124–26.
    Readily distinguishable from Cloverport, no trial took place in this case.
    More starkly, plaintiff’s counsel in this case seek attorney’s fees ($794,577.50)
    nearly 105 times the amount of total damages recovered by all of their clients
    combined ($7,595.17). The Court’s canvass of fee-shifting cases finds no precedent
    with a similar damages award to attorney’s fee award ratio particularly where,
    as here, the case was not complex, discovery was minimal, there was no trial, and
    title, liability, and damages issues were amicably resolved through negotiations–
    protracted in large measure due to plaintiffs’ demands for excessive attorney’s fees.
    On the record presented, the Court finds an additional adjustment to the
    requested hours is warranted. As noted at the outset of this section, the Court
    believes this case falls into the “rare and exceptional cases” category meriting a
    downward adjustment to the lodestar figure. However, given the various reductions
    already taken into account, and mindful of potential “double counting” concerns,
    the Court imposes an additional 20% hours-adjustment rather than further
    adjusting the hourly rates awarded. See, e.g., Blum, 
    465 U.S. at
    899–900
    (adjustment to lodestar figure constituted double counting based on the same
    factors used to assess reasonable hours and proffered rates).
    Compensable Attorney’s Fees
    As captured in the table below, with the foregoing adjustments to the
    proffered rates and claimed hours, the Court awards plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees in the
    amount of $100,282.47 ($65,911.87 for ArentFox and $34,370.60 for Lewis Rice) as
    follows:
    35
    Timekeeper              Requested     Adjusted         Requested       Adjusted       Adjusted
    Rate          Rate             Hours          Hours           Fees
    Partner
    Albin-Riley, Debra       $670–$795/hour $500/hour            18.9         2.224908       $1,112.45
    Hearne II, Mark F.       $555–$645/hour $500/hour            158.9       21.774744      $10,887.37
    Hulme, James H.         $835–$955/hour $500/hour             78          22.36896      $11,184.48
    Largent, Meghan S.       $415–$660/hour $450/hour            626.2       110.136024     $49,561.21
    Brinton, Lindsay S.      $395–$660/hour $450/hour            89.9        11.214612       $5,046.58
    Hart, Kirsten A.          $480/hour     $400/hour            5.1          0.74358        $297.43
    Of Counsel
    Pafford, Abram J.       $600–$670/hour $350/hour             59.8          9.1611       $3,206.39
    Associate
    Davis, Stephen S.       $395–$480/hour $300/hour             49.4         7.26084       $2,178.25
    Armstrong, Michael       $395–$495/hour $300/hour             21.9         6.82344       $2,047.03
    LaMontagne, Laurel       $380–$485/hour $275/hour             18.7         6.01992       $1,655.48
    Pankow, Morgan R.        $395–$515/hour $275/hour             12.6         3.58992        $987.23
    White, Sarah L.          $250/hour     $250/hour            11.5          2.2356        $558.90
    Jefferson, Evan P.        $225/hour     $225/hour            13.7          4.4388        $998.73
    McWherter, Katherine G.      $215/hour     $215/hour             1.4         0.27216         $58.51
    Other
    Paralegal/Specialist     $115–$380/hour $150/hour            640.2        66.752424     $10,012.86
    Project Assistant       $155–$185/hour $100/hour            28.2          4.89564       $489.56
    Total: $100,282.47
    IV.    Expenses
    Under the URA, in addition to reasonable attorney’s fees, successful plaintiffs
    are entitled to the reimbursement of reasonable expenses incurred in the course of
    the litigation. Bratcher, 136 Fed. Cl. at 801. To recover litigation expenses,
    however, plaintiffs must demonstrate the costs incurred were “reasonable and
    necessary” in furtherance of the case and produce adequate proof to facilitate the
    Court’s review. Id. (quoting Oliveira v. United States, 
    827 F.2d 735
    , 744 (Fed. Cir.
    1987)).
    Plaintiffs request $74,007.37 in litigation expenses. The claimed expenses
    suffer from the same defects as their attorney’s fee application in that they include
    costs attributable to soliciting clients and business development, unnecessary
    travel, unsuccessful claims, and are replete with vague entries depriving the Court
    of a meaningful review. Additionally, the claimed expenses include items typically
    associated with overhead and other non-reimbursable costs; and they lack invoices
    and receipts documenting the scope of work performed and proof of actual payment.
    Plaintiffs’ expense reimbursement request–seeking nearly 10 times the amount of
    recovered damages–stands in stark contrast to the minimal success achieved.
    36
    A significant portion of plaintiffs’ claimed expenses ($51,163.25) is attributed
    to the purported cost of retaining Stantec Consulting Services, Inc. (Stantec) to map
    properties along designated areas of the NKCR railroad corridor. These services
    supposedly began in or about November 2015 and continued through in or about
    November 2018. See ECF 196-3. Presumably, plaintiffs’ counsel received invoices
    documenting the actual scope of services performed as well as receipts for the
    amounts paid. Neither accompany plaintiffs’ reimbursement application.
    Moreover, the accompanying “Narrative” in ArentFox’s billing records shows
    that the claimed expense includes professional services performed in furtherance
    of unsuccessful claims, including mapping the properties of the five Nebraska
    plaintiffs who voluntarily dismissed their claims. 58 Accordingly, the Court must
    reduce plaintiffs’ reimbursement request on this line item by at least 32% to reflect
    claims associated with the 8 of 25 tracts of land that received no recovery. Rather
    than disallow reimbursement entirely due to plaintiff’s failure to properly document
    the alleged expense as it related to successful claims, the Court will further reduce
    the claimed reimbursement by an additional 25% to account for the uncertainty
    surrounding the expense likely incurred to some (unquantified and undocumented)
    relevant extent.
    Plaintiffs’ claimed travel expenses ($4,208.75), see 
    id.,
     are unrecoverable for
    several reasons. First, at least initially, the claimed travel expenses are attributed
    to counsel’s business development and client solicitation trips to both Kansas and
    Nebraska. Second, as addressed supra, no travel was necessary in litigating this
    case as no depositions were taken and all court proceedings (i.e., status conferences)
    were conducted by telephone. Plaintiffs have not met their burden to demonstrate
    otherwise. Finally, some of counsel’s claimed travel expenses relate to travel
    to meet with potential experts, but there was no expert discovery in this case.
    Similarly, plaintiffs request reimbursement of meals ($331.98), lodging ($649.65),
    and conference room rentals ($170) related to counsel’s client solicitation trips and
    meetings with experts. These claimed expenses, totaling $1,151.63, are also not
    recoverable.
    Plaintiffs’ request for expense reimbursement also includes $16,152.94 in
    alleged costs reportedly incurred for: Westlaw ($4,320.29) and Pacer ($150.80)
    research as well as unspecified copying ($6,324.85), printing ($3,543.35), and
    postage ($1,813.65). See id. The prevailing and customary industry practice is that
    law firms pay a flat fee or rate for research services like Westlaw, LexisNexis, and
    Pacer regardless of actual use. See Bratcher, 136 Fed. Cl. at 802 (citing cases).
    Plaintiffs do not contend, and nothing in the record indicates, that ArentFox is or
    58The timing and descriptive language in the law firm’s billing records suggest that the mapping
    performed extended beyond the eventual 25 tracts of land involved in this case. Indeed, the
    narrative generally refers to the “rail-trail corridor” in four Kansas and Nebraska counties during
    the time ArentFox was soliciting clients.
    37
    was charged for these research services per session or per search. In fact, according
    to Mr. Hulme, “overhead and expenses necessary to provide the legal services to
    our clients” are factored into the hourly rates established for attorneys at ArentFox.
    See ECF 196-4 at ¶ 4. In the absence of any representation or evidence to the
    contrary, the Court similarly finds that the claimed reimbursements for copying,
    printing, and postage fall within the ambit of unrecoverable overhead included in
    plaintiffs’ claimed attorney hourly rates. Otay Mesa Prop., 
    124 Fed. Cl. 141
    , 148
    (2015) (“Generally, costs associated with administrative services ‘are more
    appropriately charged to overhead’ and should therefore be included within an
    attorney’s hourly rate.”). Counsel’s failure to attribute these generic expenses to a
    specific successful claim or litigative purpose underscores the Court’s decision to
    deem them non-compensable.
    Plaintiffs also seek reimbursement of the following costs in the aggregate
    amount of $964.80 reportedly incurred in the course of this litigation: court filing
    fees and fees to obtain copies of transcripts or deeds ($659.80); and fees for
    deed searches and retrievals ($305.00). Although the claimed expenses similarly
    lack documentary proof in the form of invoices or receipts, and the deed research
    is not directly linked to specific (successful) claims, the Court finds these nominal
    expenses are reasonably related to the litigation of this case and, as such, they are
    compensable.
    As captured in the table below, with the foregoing deductions, the Court
    awards plaintiffs reasonable litigation expenses in the amount of $27,424.06
    (i.e., $27,164.26 for ArentFox and $259.80 for Lewis Rice):
    Deduction                                     Amount
    Overhead/General Legal Services Expenses                             ($16,152.94)
    Unnecessary Travel                                                    ($4,208.75)
    Meals, Lodging, Conference Rentals for Client Solicitation            ($1,151.63)
    Mapping Expenses—Unsuccessful Claims                                 ($16,372.24)
    Mapping Expenses—Uncertainty re: Scope of Work                        ($8,697.75)
    Total Deductions           ($46,583.31)
    Total Adjusted Expenses                $27,424.06
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees and expenses
    is GRANTED–IN–PART and DENIED–IN–PART. Specifically, plaintiffs are
    awarded attorney’s fees in the aggregate amount of $100,282.47. and litigation
    expenses in the total amount of $27,424.06. Accordingly,
    38
    (1) The Clerk is directed to UNCONSOLIDATE Dawson v. United States,
    No. 15-1268 (Fed. Cl.), from Arnold v. United States, No. 15-1252 (Fed. Cl.).
    (2) Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees and expenses (No. 15-1268L, ECF 196)
    is GRANTED–IN–PART and DENIED–IN–PART. Plaintiffs are awarded
    attorney’s fees in the aggregate amount of $100,282.47 and litigation expenses
    in the total amount of $27,424.06.
    (3) Once unconsolidated, the Clerk is directed to enter JUDGMENT accordingly
    in Dawson v. United States, No. 15-1268 (Fed. Cl.).
    It is so ORDERED.
    __________________
    Armando O. Bonilla
    39