Hall v. United States ( 2020 )


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  •             In the United States Court of Federal Claims
    No. 19-463T
    Filed: April 27, 2020
    BRIAN J. HALL, and
    ROBIN A. HALL,
    Keywords: RCFC 12(b)(1);
    Plaintiffs,                                Amended Tax Return; Tax
    Refund Claim; Signature
    v.
    Requirement; Waiver;
    UNITED STATES,                                                 Informal Claim Doctrine
    Defendant.
    Kathryn Magan, Magan Law, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiffs.
    Courtney Hutson, Trial Attorney, with whom were Mary Abate, Assistant Chief, David Pincus,
    Chief, Court of Federal Claims Section, Tax Division, and Richard Zuckerman, Principal Deputy
    Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Defendant.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
    TAPP, Judge.
    In this tax refund case, Plaintiffs Brian J. Hall and Robin A. Hall (collectively “the Halls”
    or “taxpayers”) seek a $4,151 federal income tax refund for the 2014 tax year. The Halls claim
    they are entitled to the foreign earned income exclusion under 26 U.S.C. § 911 for income
    earned by Brian Hall in Australia. Defendant, the United States, now moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’
    Complaint because the Halls failed to sign the returns relevant to their claim and failed to
    properly authorize a representative to sign on their behalf.
    The Halls filed a Complaint on March 28, 2019, (ECF No. 1), which was refiled on
    March 19, 2020 with proper redactions as a Second Redacted Original Complaint (Compl., ECF
    No. 34). 1 The United States filed a Motion to Dismiss on February 10, 2020, (ECF No. 25),
    which it amended and refiled on February 14, 2020. (Def. Mot., ECF No. 26). The Halls filed
    their Response to the United States’ Motion to Dismiss on March 13, 2020. (Pls. Resp., ECF No.
    32). The United States filed its Reply on April 3, 2020. (Def. Reply, ECF No. 38).
    1
    The Court cites to Plaintiffs’ Second Redacted Original Complaint, ECF No. 34 as “Compl.” The Halls have twice
    amended their Complaint, without making substantive changes, in order to comply with this Court’s redaction rules.
    (See ECF Nos. 7, 9, 11, 27, 33]).
    This mater is now fully briefed and ripe for decision. As explained below, signing a tax
    return under penalty of perjury is a jurisdictional requirement in tax refund suits and the IRS did
    not waive this requirement. Therefore, the Court GRANTS the United States’ Motion to Dismiss
    and DISMISSES the Halls’ Complaint.
    I.     Background
    The Halls are United States citizens and taxpayers. (Compl. at 2, ECF No. 34). Brian Hall
    worked for a U.S. defense contractor near Alice Springs, Australia during the 2014 tax year.
    (Id.). The Halls filed their original federal return Form 1040 for tax year 2014 on February 23,
    2015. (Compl. at ¶ 8). In early 2018, the Halls retained Castro & Co., LLC to review this return
    and prepare an amended return to claim the foreign earned income exclusion under 26 U.S.C. §
    911. (Compl. at ¶¶ 10, 11). Thereafter, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) received three
    separate amended returns (Form 1040X) for tax year 2014: on March 12, 2018 (“First Amended
    Return”); on July 25, 2018 (“Second Amended Return”); and August 4, 2018 (“Third Amended
    Return”). (Def. Mot., Exs. 1–3). 2
    The Halls’ First Amended Return, Form 1040X, filed March 12, 2018, sought a refund of
    $4,151, claimed the foreign earned income exclusion and attached IRS Form 8833. 3 (Def. Mot.,
    Ex. 1). Form 8833 referenced an attached “Statement 4” detailing the Halls’ basis for the
    requested refund. (Def. Mot., Ex. 1 at 20). IRS Form 1040X 4 requires a signature under penalty
    of perjury with the following instruction:
    Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return and
    accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge
    and belief, they are true, correct, and complete. Declaration of preparer (other
    than taxpayer) is based on all information which preparer has any knowledge.
    2
    The parties point to different dates for many identical filings; the Halls often cite the date of postmark or
    preparation while the United States cites to the date received. The United States provides certified records from the
    IRS, which the Court may presume are “true, accurate, and correct” for the purposes of this Motion to Dismiss. See
    H.S. & H. Ltd. of Columbia ILL v. United States, 
    18 Cl. Ct. 241
    246 (1989). The Court relies on this certified record
    throughout its discussion of this dispute.
    3
    Form 8833 is the Treaty-Based Return Position Disclosure form. On this form, line 6 requests the taxpayer
    “Explain the treaty-based position taken.” The Halls referenced an attached statement, denoted as “Statement 4,”
    wherein the taxpayers asserted the international treaty they had been taxed under had been superseded by another
    treaty, invalidating their closing agreements and entitling them to a greater tax refund. (See Compl., Ex. B at 7, 9).
    The 2014 version of Form 8833 is available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/f8833--2013.pdf.
    4
    The 2014 version of Form 1040X is available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/f1040x--2014.pdf.
    2
    (See, e.g.,
    id. at 3).
    The Halls’ First Amended Return was prepared and signed by John Anthony
    Castro but was not accompanied by a Form 2848 5 Power of Attorney authorizing his
    representation. (Id. at 3). The First Amended Return did not contain the signatures of either Brian
    or Robin Hall, and also omitted Robin Hall’s social security number. (See
    id. at 2–3;
    see also
    Declaration of Brian Hall at ¶ 5, ECF No. 32-1; Declaration of Robin Hall at ¶ 5, ECF No. 32-2).
    On May 7, 2018, the IRS issued the Halls a letter informing them the IRS could not
    consider the Halls’ First Amended Return due to lack of supporting information in Form 8833,
    Line 6. (Compl., Ex. C). In response, Castro, on behalf of the Halls, submitted the Second
    Amended Return, which updated the date next to his signature and included a Form 12203 6
    Request for Appeals Review (the “First Form 12203”) but did not make changes to Form 8833
    Line 6. (See Def. Mot., Ex. 2 at 3, 25). On the First Form 12203, to which Castro affixed his own
    signature but not those of the taxpayers, the Halls asserted that Form 8833 was complete and
    directed the IRS to Statement 4. (Id. at 25). The First Form 12203 was not accompanied by a
    Form 2848 Power of Attorney, despite its instructions. (See
    id. (“If a
    representative is signing
    this form, please attach a copy of your completed Form 2848, Power of Attorney and Declaration
    of Representative.”)).
    On August 4, 2018, the IRS received the Halls’ Third Amended Return which contained
    Robin Hall’s social security number and was, again, signed by Castro but not Brian or Robin
    Hall. (Def. Mot., Ex. 3 at 2, 4; Decl. of B. Hall at ¶ 7; Decl. of R. Hall at ¶ 7). The Third
    Amended Return, like the two previously amended returns, was filed without a Form 2848. (See
    Def. Mot., Ex. 3). The Third Amended Return also updated the explanation of changes section to
    include a reference to the attached “Statement 1.” (Id. at 4). Statement 1 provided an updated
    explanation for the amended return which referenced Forms 8833 and 8275 7 for further details.
    (Id. at 5).
    On September 12, 2018, Castro submitted a Form 2848 on behalf of the Halls, purporting
    to give John Anthony Castro authority to represent Brian Hall before the IRS for tax years 2014–
    2018. (Def. Mot., Ex. 8). Part I of this form states: “A separate Form 2848 must be completed for
    each taxpayer. Form 2848 will not be honored for any purpose other than representation before
    the IRS.” (Id.). Part I, Line 3 of Form 2848 requests the taxpayer list the acts authorized by his or
    her representative. In response to this line, Brian Hall’s form lists tax form numbers “1040,
    1040NR, 1040A, 1040EZ, etc.” (Id.). Part I, Line 5a allows the taxpayer to authorize “additional
    acts” and includes a box that can be checked to authorize the representative to sign a return on
    behalf of the taxpayer. (See id.). Brian Hall’s Form 2848 did not list any “additional acts” or
    5
    The 2014 version of IRS Form 2848 is available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/f2848--2014.pdf.
    6
    IRS Form 12203 is available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f12203.pdf.
    7
    From 8275 is available at https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-8275 (“Taxpayers and tax return preparers
    use this form to disclose items or positions that are not otherwise adequately disclosed on a tax return to avoid
    certain penalties.”).
    3
    check the box to allow Castro to sign his return. (See id.). The IRS did not receive a Form 2848
    from Robin Hall authorizing anyone to represent her before the IRS. (Def. Mot. at 11).
    On September 18, 2018, the Halls received two letters from the IRS; the first stating the
    Halls’ claim was being disallowed because it was untimely, (Compl., Ex. D), and the second
    stating the Halls’ claim would be reviewed by the Area Office. (Id., Ex. E). The first letter, Letter
    105C, stated the Halls’ claim was being disallowed because they “filed [their] original tax return
    more than 3 years after the due date,” referencing the First Amended Return received on August
    4, 2018. (Id., Ex. D).
    On November 15, 2018, the Halls, through Castro, filed a second Form 12203 Request
    for Appeals Review (the “Second Form 12203”). (Def. Mot., Ex. 10). In the Second Form 12203,
    the Halls disagreed that the amended returns were untimely and cited to the First Amended
    Return received by the IRS as filed on March 12, 2018. (Id.). The Second Form 12203 contended
    the Second Amended Return and Third Amended Return contained “procedural correction[s].”
    (Id.). Castro, but not Brian or Robin Hall, signed the Second Form 12203 but failed to provide an
    accompanying Form 2848, despite instructions to do so. (Id.).
    On February 14, 2019, in a letter from Appeals Officer Nick Lang (“Lang”), the IRS
    scheduled a telephone conference and requested the Halls provide support for their position that
    the Third Amended Return was timely. (Id., Ex 11). The letter acknowledged that, upon
    preliminary review, the Halls’ First Amended Return was denied and returned as unable to
    process because the supporting information was incomplete. (Id.). The letter also noted the Halls
    made payment on April 15, 2015, 8 and therefore, the three-year statutes of limitation under 26
    U.S.C. § 6511(a) ran on April 15, 2018. (Id.). Consequently, the IRS reasoned that the present
    claim, submitted August 4, 2018, was untimely. (Id.). In response, on February 24, 2019, the
    Halls emailed Lang an unsigned “file copy” of the 2014 First Amended Return. (Compl. at ¶ 21;
    Def. Mot., Ex. 12).
    During the March 11, 2019 telephone conference, Lang communicated that the IRS was
    focused on the incomplete Form 8833, and that Statement 4 was insufficient so the IRS could not
    assess tax liability. (Compl. at ¶ 23). On March 28, 2019, the Halls filed a complaint in the Court
    of Federal Claims. (ECF No. 1). On June 14, 2019, in Letter 2681, the IRS notified the Halls
    “[t]he information [they] submitted provided no basis to allow any part of [their] claim.” (Pls.
    Resp., Ex. 1 at 15).
    8
    The Halls assert their original return for tax year 2014 was filed February 23, 2015. (Compl. at ¶ 8). The United
    States asserts that return was filed April 15, 2015. (Def. Reply at 7). Even accepting the United States’ date as true
    (as it is the date most favorable to plaintiffs), the three-year window in which the Halls could file a return for the tax
    year 2014 closed on April 15, 2018. See 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a) (“Claim for credit or refund of an overpayment of any
    tax imposed by this title in respect of which tax the taxpayer is required to file a return shall be filed by the taxpayer
    within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such
    periods expires the later”). The timeliness of the return is not before the Court, but rather, whether the IRS
    considered the merits of the claimed foreign earned income exclusion.
    4
    II.     Standard of Review
    The burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction rests with the plaintiff, who must
    do so by a preponderance of the evidence. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
    504 U.S. 555
    , 561
    (1992); Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 
    846 F.2d 746
    , 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988). This
    Court’s jurisdiction to entertain claims and grant relief depends on the extent to which the United
    States has waived sovereign immunity. United States v. Testan, 
    424 U.S. 392
    , 399 (1976). The
    waiver of sovereign immunity found in 28 U.S.C. § 1346 vests this Court with concurrent
    original jurisdiction over civil actions “against the United States for the recovery of any internal-
    revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected[.]”
    RCFC 8, the counterpart in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, requires that a pleading contain “a short
    and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” RCFC 8(a)(2).
    Pursuant to RCFC Rule 12(b)(6), the Court will grant a motion to dismiss if it finds the party has
    failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In considering a motion to dismiss for
    failure to state a claim, the Court “must accept as true all of the allegations in the [pleading]” and
    “must indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant.” Sommers Oil Co. v. United
    States, 
    241 F.3d 1375
    , 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
    For a claim to be properly stated, the pleading “must contain sufficient factual matter,
    accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009). “[O]nly a [pleading] that states a plausible claim for relief survives a
    motion to dismiss.”
    Id. “Generally, an
    amended pleading supersedes the original for all
    purposes.” Nolen v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 
    466 Fed. Appx. 895
    , 898 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
    III.   Discussion
    The United States seeks dismissal of the Halls’ Complaint on the grounds that this Court
    lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim. (Def. Mot. at 1). In support, the United States
    submits that because the Halls failed to sign their 2014 amended tax returns, it was not “duly
    filed,” which is a necessary requirement for jurisdiction in this Court. (Id.). The Halls concede
    that they did not sign their 2014 returns, but argue the United States waived the signature
    requirement when it considered and disallowed the Halls’ 2014 returns on the merits. (Pls. Resp.
    at 1, 4). Alternatively, the Halls seek a declaratory judgment that their claim complies with the
    informal claims doctrine and can be perfected by later amendment. (Pls. Resp. at 10). The United
    States counters that the IRS did not evaluate the merits of the Halls’ refund claim and issued a
    disallowance based on procedural grounds such that the waiver doctrine does not apply. (Def.
    Reply at 2–3). Further, the United States argues the Halls are not entitled to a declaratory order
    because a formal claim was not filed to perfect the informal claim. Thus, according to the United
    States, the informal claims doctrine does not apply, and the Court does not have jurisdiction to
    issue such an order. (Id. at 13–14).
    As explained below, the Court agrees that the waiver doctrine does not apply because the
    IRS disallowed the Halls’ claim on the grounds that it was untimely, a procedural basis, and did
    not evaluate the merits of the Halls’ eligibility for the foreign earned income exclusion. Further,
    the informal claims doctrine does not apply because the Halls did not submit a formal claim to
    5
    perfect their informal one, and the Court is without jurisdiction to issue a declarative judgment
    before a formal claim has been filed.
    A. Requirements to Bring a Tax Refund Claim
    To bring suit to recover an erroneous tax refund assessment, “the taxpayer must comply
    with the tax refund scheme established in the [Internal Revenue] Code.” United States v.
    Clintwood Elkhorn Min. Co., 
    553 U.S. 1
    , 4 (2008). To comply with the tax scheme established in
    the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), the taxpayer first must wait six months from the filing of his
    claim with the IRS:
    No suit or proceeding under section 7422(a) for the recovery of any internal
    revenue tax, penalty, or other sum, shall be begun before the expiration of 6
    months from the date of filing the claim required under such section unless
    the Secretary renders a decision thereon within that time[.]
    26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)(1). Second, the taxpayer’s return must have been “duly filed” according to
    the IRC and relevant Treasury Regulations:
    No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any
    internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or
    collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority,
    or of any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully
    collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the
    Secretary, according to the provisions of law in that regard, and the
    regulations of the Secretary established in pursuance thereof.
    26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) (emphasis added). For a refund claim to be “duly filed,” it:
    [M]ust set forth in detail each ground upon which a credit or refund is claimed
    and facts sufficient to apprise the Commissioner of the exact basis thereof.
    The statement of the grounds and facts must be verified by a written
    declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury. A claim which does
    not comply with this paragraph will not be considered for any purpose as a
    claim for refund or credit.
    Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(b)(1) (emphasis added). This is not a trivial requirement, as “[t]he
    perjury charge based on a false return has been deemed ‘one of the principal sanctions available
    to assure that honest returns are filed.’” Borgeson v. United States, 
    757 F.2d 1071
    , 1073 (10th
    Cir. 1985) (quoting Vaira v. Commissioner, 
    52 T.C. 986
    , 1005, rev’d on other grounds, 
    444 F.2d 770
    (3d Cir. 1971)).
    The only exception to this requirement is when a legal representative certifies the claim
    and attaches evidence of a valid power of attorney. Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(e). The power of
    attorney must contain certain identifying information, including a “[d]escription of the matter(s)
    for which representation is authorized,” and “[a] clear expression of the taxpayer’s intention
    6
    concerning the scope of authority granted to the recognized representative(s).” Treas. Reg. §
    601.503(a).
    The Halls concede that their 2014 amended tax returns 9 failed to comply with Treasury
    Regulations § 301.6402-2(b)(1) in that they did not contain a signed declaration of validity under
    penalty of perjury. (Pls. Resp. at 4; Decl. of R. Hall at ¶¶ 5, 7; Decl. of B. Hall at ¶¶ 5, 7). The
    Halls further concede that Form 2848 was ineffective and thus did not authorize Castro to sign
    the 2014 amended tax returns on their behalf. (Pls. Resp. at 4). Therefore, the Court only has
    jurisdiction to hear this suit if the IRS waived these requirements.
    B. The Waiver Doctrine
    The Halls argue that, notwithstanding their failure to comply with Treasury Regulations
    mandating that “duly filed” tax returns include a valid signature under penalty of perjury, the IRS
    waived those requirements by considering the merits of their tax refund claim. (Id.). The basis
    for a “claim of waiver is that the Commissioner through his agents dispensed with the formal
    requirements of a claim by investigating its merits.” Angelus Milling Co. v. C.I.R., 
    325 U.S. 293
    ,
    296 (1945). The United States argues the IRS did not waive the signature requirement because it
    did not investigate the merits of the Halls’ claim and was not aware of the signature issue when it
    denied the Halls’ claim as untimely. (Def. Mot. at 3, 4, 9). The Court agrees with the United
    States that the IRS did not waive the signature requirements with respect to the Halls’ 2014 tax
    refund claim.
    While compliance with intricacies of the treasury regulations may seem burdensome,
    uniformity is essential to perform the colossal mission of processing literally hundreds of
    millions of tax forms per year. 10 See Stoller v. United States, 
    444 F.2d 1391
    , 1393 (4th Cir.
    1971) (“The Commissioner does not possess the time or resources to perform extensive
    investigations into the precise reasons and facts supporting every taxpayer’s claim for a
    refund.”). The IRS retains the power to “demand information in a particular form” and “is
    entitled to insist that the form be observed so as to advise [it] expeditiously and accurately of the
    true nature of the claim.” Angelus 
    Milling, 325 U.S. at 299
    . However, the power to make these
    regulation and insistence on compliance is “for self-protection, and not for self-imprisonment.”
    Id. at 297.
    The IRS can choose “not to stand on [its] own formal or detailed requirements” and
    proceed to investigate the merits of a claim.
    Id. Allowing the
    IRS to invoke technical objections
    after evaluating the claim would render these safeguards “an empty abstraction.”
    Id. 9 As
    discussed supra
    , the Halls filed three separate amended 2014 returns, yet none contained the Halls’ signatures
    under penalty of perjury. Therefore, the Court discusses these returns collectively as “the 2014 amended tax
    returns.”
    10
    Last year, the IRS processed approximately 155,611,000 tax returns and made 111,811,000 refunds averaging
    $2,689. See IRS, Filing Season Statistics for Week Ending December 27, 2019, available at
    www.irs.gov/newsroom/filing-season-statistics-for-week-ending-december-27-2019 (last visited April 27, 2020).
    During tax year 2018, the IRS processed over 250 million tax returns and other forms. See IRS, SOI Tax Stats - IRS
    Data Book, available at https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-irs-data-book (last visited April 27, 2020).
    7
    The waiver doctrine applies only where it is “unmistakable that the Commissioner has in
    fact been fit to dispense with his formal requirements and to examine the merits of the claim.”
    Id. Examination of
    the claim on its merits requires more than a cursory review of the documents
    submitted, the evidence must be clear that the IRS understood the claim submitted and its
    attention was “focused on the merits of the particular dispute.”
    Id. Although not
    conclusive, such
    evidence might include substantive responses to the taxpayers claims, Goulding v. United States,
    
    929 F.2d 329
    , 333 (7th Cir. 1991), and, of course, notice of a final decision on the merits.
    Cencast Servs., L.P. v. United States, 
    729 F.3d 1352
    , 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
    Here, the IRS never considered the Halls’ claim of entitlement to the foreign earned
    income exclusion on the merits. On May 7, 2018, the IRS notified the Halls that their First
    Amended Return lacked sufficient supporting information for the merits of their foreign income
    exclusion claim to be considered. (Compl., Ex. C). The Halls’ Second Amended Return, which
    was substantively identical to the First Amended Return, elicited no action from the IRS. (Def.
    Mot., Ex. 2 at 3, 25). The Halls’ Third Amended Return, submitted August 4, 2018, was
    disallowed as untimely. (Pls. Resp., Ex. 1 at 4 (stating the Halls’ claim was being disallowed
    because it was filed “more than 3 years after the due date.”)). Acknowledging the IRS’s
    disallowance was based on timeliness, Castro submitted the Second Form 12203, requesting the
    Appeals Office review the timeliness of the Halls’ 2014 refund claim. (Def. Mot., Ex. 10) (noting
    the “disagreed item” was rejection of the Third Amended Return “on the basis that the statute of
    limitations under Section 6511 appl[ied]”).
    Further confirming that timeliness—not the foreign earned income exclusion—was being
    reviewed, the IRS letter dispatched on February 14, 2019 stated the review focused on whether a
    “complete Form 1040X” was filed within the three-year statute of limitation. (Def. Mot., Ex. 11).
    Thus, as IRS Officer Lang explained, the only issue examined by the IRS was whether the
    1040X submitted on March 12, 2018 (the First Amended Return) was complete. (Id.). Likewise,
    Letter 2681 explained that there was “no basis” to allow any part of the Halls’ claim, making no
    mention of the claim’s merits. (Pls. Resp., Ex. 1 at 15).
    With all the focus on whether the Halls’ 2014 amended returns contained sufficient
    information for processing, the United States submits, there could be no waiver of the signature
    requirement because the IRS was unaware that regulations was being violated. (See Def. Mot. at
    9). The Halls contend that the IRS could have “easily” detected the signature defect but “chose to
    forego the requirement” of having a taxpayer signature on either the return, or a valid Form
    2848. (See Pls. Resp. at 4). This contention finds no support in the law or the record.
    In general, “waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
    known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 
    304 U.S. 458
    , 464 (1938) (emphasis added).
    Because the Treasury Regulations are promulgated “for the protection of the revenue,” the IRS
    must at least be aware a violation has occurred before it can intentionally dispense with its own
    regulations. See Angelus 
    Milling, 325 U.S. at 297
    . While it was examining the sufficiency of
    information contained in Plaintiffs’ 2014 amended return, the IRS was entitled to rely on the fact
    that someone had signed the return under penalty of perjury. See 26 U.S.C. § 6064 (“The fact
    that an individual’s name is signed to a return, statement, or other document shall be prima facie
    evidence for all purposes that the return, statement, or other document was actually signed by
    him [or her].”). Further, no Form 2848 was filed to alert the IRS that the signature on Plaintiffs’
    8
    First Amended Return was not the taxpayers’. The Halls’ admission in this case that their 2014
    amended returns were invalid because they failed to comply with the signature requirements
    cannot now form the basis for their assertion the IRS waived these requirements. Since “the tight
    net which the Treasury Regulations fashion is for the protection of the revenue, courts should not
    unduly help disobedient refund claimants to slip through it.” Angelus 
    Milling, 325 U.S. at 297
    .
    The 2014 amended returns were never signed by the taxpayers nor accompanied by a
    power of attorney, thus were not “duly filed” in compliance with Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(b)(1).
    The IRS did not waive this signature requirement because the focus of its review was on the
    sufficiency of information provided and thus the timeliness of the claim. In any case, the IRS
    was never made aware the Halls’ 2014 amended returns lacked the signature necessary to make
    them valid. Therefore, the waiver doctrine is inapplicable, and the Halls have, self-admittedly,
    failed to “duly file” a tax return necessary to maintain their tax refund claim under 26 U.S.C. §
    7422(a).
    C. The Informal Claims Doctrine
    The Halls request that, if the Court grants the United States’ Motion to Dismiss, the Court
    enter a declaratory judgment that the Halls have submitted an informal claim that can be
    perfected upon later amendment to cure all defects. (Pls. Resp. at 10). The United States asserts
    that the informal claims doctrine is inapplicable, and the Court lacks jurisdiction to issue such an
    order. (Def. Reply at 13–14). The Court agrees with the United States on both counts.
    The informal claims doctrine allows the Court to consider a claim rejected by the IRS
    where an out-of-time amendment remedies its defect. United States v. Kales, 
    314 U.S. 186
    , 194
    (1941). The “informal claim” can be “perfected” by amendment and considered by the Court
    notwithstanding a lapse of the statute of limitation before the amendment was filed. United
    States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 
    288 U.S. 62
    , 66, 72 (1933).
    However, “the IRS’s jurisdiction over the claim necessarily terminates on the date a
    refund suit is filed.” Computervision Corp. v. United States, 
    445 F.3d 1355
    , 1372 (Fed. Cir.),
    adhered to on denial of reh'g, 
    467 F.3d 1322
    (Fed. Cir. 2006). This suit was brought before the
    claim was perfected, and termination of the IRS’s jurisdiction precludes any future attempt to do
    so.
    Id. Therefore, the
    informal claims doctrine is inapplicable. Moreover, the invalidity of the
    Halls’ claim as discussed above precludes this Court from exercising jurisdiction to enter the
    declaratory order the Halls request. See 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a); Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(b)(1).
    Thus, the informal claims doctrine provides the Halls no relief, and, even if it were applicable,
    the Court lacks jurisdiction to issue a declaratory order.
    9
    IV.    Conclusion
    A signature under penalty of perjury is a jurisdictional requirement in tax refund suits.
    The Halls concede that their 2014 amended returns did not contain a valid signature and thus
    were not “duly filed.” As the IRS did not waive these signature requirements, and the informal
    claims doctrine is inapplicable to cure defects in the Halls’ 2014 tax refund claim, the Court
    lacks jurisdiction to hear the Halls’ suit. Therefore, the Court GRANTS the United States’
    Motion to Dismiss and DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ Complaint.
    The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    s/   David A. Tapp
    DAVID A. TAPP, Judge
    10