1 v. United States ( 2021 )


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  •            In the United States Court of Federal Claims
    )
    PLAINTIFF NO. 1, et al.,                          )
    )
    Plaintiffs,                )
    )
    v.                                                )         No. 21-1220C
    )         (Filed: July 14, 2021)
    THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                     )
    )
    Defendant.                 )
    )
    Linda Lipsett, Bernstein & Lipsett, P.C., Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs. Jules Bernstein,
    Bernstein & Lipsett, P.C., Washington, DC, Of Counsel. Daniel M. Rosenthal and Alice Hwang,
    James & Hoffman, P.C., Washington, DC, Of Counsel.
    Rafique O. Anderson, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S.
    Department of Justice, Washington, DC, with whom were Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant
    Attorney General, Martin A. Hockey, Jr., Acting Director, and Deborah A. Bynum, Assistant
    Director, for Defendant.
    OPINION AND ORDER
    Currently before the Court is the government’s motion to dismiss both the complaint in
    this case, ECF No. 1, and Plaintiffs’ request for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”), ECF No.
    2. See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Pls.’ Req. for a TRO and Compl. for Lack of Jurisdiction and Mot.
    to Vacate the Ct.’s April 26, 2021 Order (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 22. The government seeks
    dismissal on the grounds that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the case because the complaint,
    alleging a breach of the parties’ settlement agreement, requested only equitable relief, and not
    money damages. Id. at 5–6.
    Also before the Court is the government’s motion under Rule 60(b)(4) and (b)(6) of the
    Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”) asking that the Court vacate the Order it issued
    in this case on April 26, 2021 (“April 26 Order”). Id. at 7–8. In that Order, the Court directed the
    government to provide Plaintiffs with IRS Form W-2s, Wage and Tax Statements, as required by
    an earlier settlement agreement that was reached in Plaintiff No. 1, et al. v. United States, Case
    Nos. 18-393C, 19-242C, 19-813C (Consolidated). Order at 1, ECF No. 15. The Court issued the
    Order after it learned that, despite the representations counsel made to the Court during a status
    conference held on April 19, 2021 (a few days after the complaint in this case was filed), the
    government had not yet sent the form W-2s to the Plaintiffs. See ECF Nos. 14 & 15.
    The government has complied with the Court’s April 26 Order, and Plaintiffs withdrew
    their request for a TRO as moot on May 24, 2021. ECF No. 19; see also Order, ECF No. 20 (July
    6, 2021 Order denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for at TRO as moot and staying case at parties’ request
    to permit settlement discussions). In addition, on July 8, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of
    Dismissal with prejudice pursuant to RCFC 41(a)(1)(A)(i). ECF No. 21.
    Plaintiffs filed their notice of dismissal before the government had “serve[d] an answer, a
    motion for summary judgment, or a motion for judgment on the administrative record.” RCFC
    41(a)(1)(A)(i). It is well established that the filing of such notice “is immediately” effective to
    terminate the litigation and divest the Court of jurisdiction. Qureshi v. United States, 
    600 F.3d 523
    , 525 (5th Cir. 2010) (explaining that a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) motion “is immediately self-
    effectuating” and that the Court “is divested of jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the
    notice of dismissal itself”); see also Ilaw v. United States, 632 F. App’x 614, 619 (Fed. Cir.
    2015). Therefore, the government’s motion to dismiss the complaint in accordance with RCFC
    12(b)(1) is denied as moot. Its motion to dismiss the request for a TRO is similarly moot as the
    Plaintiffs already withdrew the request, ECF No. 19, and the Court in any event formally denied
    it based on mootness, ECF No. 20.
    As noted, the government has also requested that the Court vacate its April 26 Order
    under RCFC 60(b)(4), which provides that “the court may relieve a party . . . from a final
    judgment, order, or proceeding” where “the judgment is void.” This provision is inapplicable
    because the Court never entered any judgment in this case. There is therefore no void judgment
    on which relief from an order may be based. Further, as noted, the case has been dismissed with
    prejudice through the Plaintiffs’ notice discussed above, and, in any case, the government has
    already complied with the Court’s April 26 Order. See ECF No. 19.
    In its motion, the government also cites RCFC 60(b)(6), which allows the Court to
    “relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” based on
    “any other reason that justifies relief.” Def.’s Mot. at 7. But that provision is reserved for
    “exceptional or extraordinary circumstances.” Louisville Bedding Co. v. Pillowtex Corp., 
    455 F.3d 1377
    , 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006). And the government provides no argument based on RCFC
    60(b)(6) to explain why relief is justified, beyond the reason that the Court has found insufficient
    to justify relief under RCFC 60(b)(4).
    Finally, the Court notes that, during the telephonic status conference held on the motion
    today, counsel for the government stated that the government filed its motion because it did not
    want plaintiffs in other cases to cite this case as precedent for what the government argues is an
    improper exercise of jurisdiction by the Court of Federal Claims. This sort of potential “harm”
    does not provide grounds for relief under Rule 60(b) and, in any case, the government’s fears are
    misplaced. Until it filed the pending motions, the government had not raised any objections to
    the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over this case. In addition, the case moved quickly because
    the government agreed almost immediately to take the actions Plaintiffs were requesting in their
    complaint. As a result, the Court never made any decision regarding the jurisdictional issues the
    government raises in its pending motions. It would be a mistake, therefore, for any party to cite
    this case as saying anything at all about the Court’s jurisdiction in this or any other case.
    Pursuant to the foregoing, the government’s motion, ECF No. 22, to dismiss the
    complaint in accordance with RCFC 12(b)(1) is DENIED as moot, and its motion for relief
    pursuant to RCFC 60(b)(4) and/or RCFC 60(b)(6) is also DENIED.
    2
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    s/ Elaine D. Kaplan
    ELAINE D. KAPLAN
    Chief Judge
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-1220

Judges: Elaine D. Kaplan

Filed Date: 7/14/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 7/15/2021