Haggart v. United States ( 2020 )


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  •              In the United States Court of Federal Claims
    No. 09-103L
    (Filed: November 25, 2020)
    )
    DANIEL and KATHY HAGGART, et                  )      Motions for reconsideration of awards of
    al., For Themselves and As                    )      attorneys’ fees and expenses under the
    Representatives of a Class of Similarly       )      Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real
    Situated Persons,                             )      Property Acquisition Policies Act, 42
    )      U.S.C. § 4654(c); fees not awardable to
    Plaintiffs,             )      pro se litigants; fees incurred to preserve
    )      and defend settlement against effort to
    v.                                     )      overturn it; consideration of amounts paid
    )      earlier by class counsel; reasonableness of
    UNITED STATES,                                )      fees and expenses
    )
    Defendant.              )
    Thomas S. Stewart, Stewart Wald & McCulley LLC, Kansas City, Missouri, for plaintiffs
    Daniel Haggart and Kathy Haggart, et al. With him on the briefs were Elizabeth G. McCulley,
    Stewart Wald & McCulley LLC, Kansas City, Missouri, Steven M. Wald and Michael J. Smith,
    Stewart Wald & McCulley LLC, St. Louis, Missouri.
    David C. Frederick, Kellogg, Hansen, Todd, Figel & Frederick, PLLC, Washington,
    D.C., for plaintiffs Gordon A. Woodley and Denise L. Woodley.
    Mary Crego Peterson, Hillis Clark Martin & Peterson P.S., Seattle, Washington, for
    plaintiff Cleveland Square, LLC and twenty-five others.
    Richard B. Sanders, Goodstein Law Group PLLC, Tacoma, Washington, for plaintiffs
    Faramarz Ghoddoussi and Westpoint Properties, LLC.
    Lucinda J. Bach, Trial Attorney, Natural Resources Section, Environment and Natural
    Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendant.
    With her on the briefs were Jean E Williams, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Environment
    and Natural Resources Division, and Sarah Izfar, Trial Attorney, Natural Resources Section,
    Environment and Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington,
    D.C.
    OPINION AND ORDER
    LETTOW, Senior Judge.
    Pending before the court in this rails-to-trails takings class action involving hundreds of
    plaintiffs and an award of just compensation of over $100 million are four motions for
    reconsideration of the court’s opinion and order of August 12, 2020 regarding legal fees and
    expenses. These motions add to a circuitous procedural history that has generated numerous
    opinions from this court and two separate opinions from the Federal Circuit.1 The action was
    settled in 2014, but plaintiffs Denise and Gordon Woodley objected to the settlement agreement.
    They were successful on appeal and ultimately obtained an amount beyond that stated in the
    agreement. In due course, they sought to recover legal expenses for representing themselves pro
    se and for work performed on their behalf by the law firm Kellogg Hansen. See Denise Lynn
    Woodley’s Mot. for Recons. (“Pro Se Mot.”), ECF No. 392; Gordon & Denise Woodley’s Mot.
    for Partial Recons. (“Kellogg Hansen Mot.”), ECF No. 395. Westpoint Properties, Faramarz
    Ghoddoussi, Cleveland Square, and other plaintiffs who retained independent counsel also
    sought attorneys’ fees and expenses. See Faramarz Ghoddoussi & Westpoint Properties, LLC’s
    Mot. for Recons. (“Ghoddoussi Mot.”), ECF No. 394; Cleveland Square’s Mot. for Recons.
    (“Cleveland Square Mot.), ECF No. 396.
    In the opinion issued August 12, 2020, the court granted in part and denied in part the
    class’ motion for legal fees as well as the Woodleys’ motion for Kellogg Hansen’s fees and
    costs. Haggart X, 149 Fed. Cl. at 670. The court denied the Woodleys’ motion for pro se fees
    and costs, Mr. Ghoddoussi’s motion for legal fees, and Cleveland Square’s corresponding
    motion. Id. The Woodleys, Mr. Ghoddoussi, and Cleveland Square now seek reconsideration of
    the court’s decision. At issue in the motions for reconsideration is whether the Uniform
    Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 
    42 U.S.C. § 4654
    (c)
    (“the Uniform Relocation Act” or “the URA”) (i) entitles counsel for two class members (a
    married couple) to recover legal fees “for the expenditure of time and costs incurred to object to
    the settlement agreement, conduct the first appeal in the Federal Circuit, or negotiate with class
    counsel after the successful appeal,” Haggart X, 149 Fed. Cl. at 662, and (ii) entitles non-
    objecting plaintiffs to recover legal expenses incurred by independent counsel for work
    conducted prior to and after those counsel entered an appearance.
    1
    This case has been the subject of ten reported decisions, including eight from this court
    and two from the Federal Circuit. See Haggart v. United States, 
    89 Fed. Cl. 523
     (2009)
    (“Haggart I”); Haggart v. United States, 
    104 Fed. Cl. 484
     (2012) (“Haggart II”); Haggart v.
    United States, 
    108 Fed. Cl. 70
     (2012) (“Haggart III”); Haggart v. United States, 
    116 Fed. Cl. 131
     (2014) (“Haggart IV”), vacated and remanded sub nom. Haggart v. Woodley, 
    809 F.3d 1336
    (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Haggart V”); Haggart v. United States, 
    131 Fed. Cl. 628
     (2017) (“Haggart
    VI”); Haggart v. United States, 
    133 Fed. Cl. 568
     (2017) (“Haggart VII”); Haggart v. United
    States, 
    136 Fed. Cl. 70
     (2018) (“Haggart VIII”), aff’d, Haggart v. United States, 
    943 F.3d 943
    (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Haggart IX”); Haggart v. United States, 
    149 Fed. Cl. 651
     (2020) (“Haggart
    X”).
    2
    BACKGROUND
    The class action dispute underlying the pending motions originated in the State of
    Washington, where the federal government converted land into a recreational trail pursuant to
    Section 208 of the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-11, § 208,
    
    97 Stat. 42
    , 48 (codified in relevant part at 
    16 U.S.C. § 1247
    (d)). Plaintiffs filed suit in 2009,
    alleging that the conversion constituted a taking without just compensation in violation of the
    Fifth Amendment. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 18, ECF No. 1. In 2012, the court certified a class of over 500
    members, which was subsequently split into six subclasses. See Haggart II, 104 Fed. Cl. at 491.
    Later that year, in ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the court found the
    government liable to “plaintiffs in Subclass Two and those in Subclass Four, categories A
    through D” and granted summary judgment for the government for “[c]laims falling within
    Subclass Four Category E.” Haggart III, 108 Fed. Cl. at 98.
    The parties reached a settlement in February 2014, under which 268 class members’
    claims would be dismissed without compensation and $110 million would be paid to the
    remaining 253 class members as just compensation for the alleged taking. Haggart VIII, 136
    Fed. Cl. at 73-74. After a fairness hearing, the court approved the settlement and awarded legal
    fees to class counsel under the common fund doctrine. Haggart IV, 
    116 Fed. Cl. 131
    . Mr. and
    Mrs. Woodley, however, objected to the settlement at the fairness hearing. 
    Id. at 142
    . On
    appeal, they argued that class counsel had failed to provide sufficient information in writing
    regarding the amount each plaintiff would receive from the total settlement, and that the common
    fund doctrine should not have been used to award legal fees. See Haggart V, 809 F.3d at 1346-
    47, 1352. On January 8, 2016, the Federal Circuit concluded that “class counsel withheld critical
    information not provided in the mailed notice to class members, but which had been produced
    and was readily available.” Id. at 1351. The Federal Circuit also vacated this court’s approval of
    the settlement agreement and award of attorney fees under the common fund doctrine. Id. at
    1351-59. This court then “re-opened discovery to rectify the deficiency of written notice to the
    class, enabling the Woodleys and other class members to access detailed documentation that had
    not previously been made available to them in electronic form.” Haggart X, 149 Fed. Cl. at 657
    (citing Haggart VI, 131 Fed. Cl. at 632). This period of discovery allowed the government to
    take “curative action” regarding the informational deficiency identified by the Federal Circuit
    and led this court to subsequently conclude that the settlement agreement was procedurally fair.
    Haggart VIII, 136 Fed. Cl. at 74, 77.
    In November 2016, however, the government abruptly changed its position by indicating
    “that it considered the settlement agreement itself to be invalid.” Haggart X, 149 Fed. Cl. at 657.
    The government filed a motion for reconsideration regarding the validity of the settlement
    agreement, thereby “engendering a subsequent flurry of motions and proceedings that yielded
    two additional opinions from this court and a second appeal.” Id. After rejecting the
    government’s attempt “to negate the unconditional, comprehensive [s]ettlement [a]greement that
    [it] executed with the class,” Haggart VII, 133 Fed. Cl. at 572, the court held a fairness hearing
    in which numerous class members participated, Haggart VIII, 136 Fed. Cl. at 75. No objections
    were made. The court approved the agreement and entered a partial final judgment under Rule
    54(b) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”), “effectively . . . bifurcat[ing the]
    3
    approval of the settlement agreement from any determination regarding legal fees and costs.”
    Haggart X, 149 Fed. Cl. at 657-58. On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed this court’s approval
    of the agreement and declined to address the issue of attorneys’ fees and costs under the Uniform
    Relocation Act, citing a lack of jurisdiction in the absence of a final judgment in that regard.
    Haggart IX, 943 F.3d at 951-52.
    Following the Federal Circuit’s mandate, “plaintiffs filed five separate motions,
    representing four different plaintiffs or groups of plaintiffs, seeking legal fees and costs pursuant
    to the [Uniform Relocation Act].” Haggart X, 149 Fed. Cl. at 658 (footnote omitted). The court
    concluded that neither the Woodleys nor Kellogg Hansen were entitled to legal fees “for the
    expenditure of time and costs incurred to object to the settlement agreement, conduct the first
    appeal in the Federal Circuit, or negotiate with class counsel after the successful appeal.”
    Haggart X, 149 Fed. Cl. at 662. The court recognized, however, that Kellogg Hansen’s role in
    the litigation “shifted” after March 1, 2017, when the government sought to overturn the
    settlement agreement. Id. Accordingly, the court awarded the Woodleys attorneys’ fees and
    expenses for the work conducted by Kellogg Hansen in “defending . . . against the government’s
    attempts to vacate the agreement.” Id. The court also granted the class’ motion for legal fees
    and costs incurred on and after March 1, 2017, but denied the motion to the extent that it
    requested “additional fees and costs that were anticipated by the remand from the Federal Circuit
    [in Haggart V].” Id. at 661.
    The court also considered the motion for legal expenses brought by Faramarz Ghoddoussi
    and Westpoint Properties, LLC, as well as the motion brought by Cleveland Square, LLC and
    other class members who had obtained independent representation by Hillis Clark Martin &
    Peterson P.S. (“Hillis Clark”). Haggart X, 149 Fed. Cl. at 662-63. These two groups of
    plaintiffs contended that they were entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs for appearing and
    supporting the settlement agreement. See id. Counsel for Mr. Ghoddoussi and Cleveland Square
    had entered appearances after the court had ruled against the government regarding the validity
    of the settlement agreement. See id. at 663. After noting that counsel for the separately
    represented plaintiffs had not “produced a beneficial result for the class” as a whole, the court
    denied both motions. Id. at 662-63 (quoting Olden v. Gardner, 
    294 Fed. Appx. 210
    , 221 (6th
    Cir. 2008)).
    On August 31, 2020, the Woodleys moved for reconsideration of the court’s decision to
    deny their motion for legal expenses. See Pro Se Mot. This motion was followed by the three
    subsequent motions for reconsideration pending before the court. See Kellogg Hansen Mot.;
    Ghoddoussi Mot.; Cleveland Square Mot. After briefing was completed,2 the court held a
    hearing on October 23, 2020. The motions are ready for disposition.
    2
    See Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mots. For Recons. (“Def.’s Resp.”), ECF No. 401; Denise
    Lynn Woodley’s Reply to Def.’s Resp. (“Pro Se Reply”), ECF No. 402; Gordon & Denise
    Woodley’s Reply to Def.’s Resp. (“Kellogg Hansen Reply”), ECF No. 404; Faramarz
    Ghoddoussi & Westpoint Properties, LLC’s Reply to Def.’s Resp. (“Ghoddoussi Reply”), ECF
    No. 403.
    4
    STANDARDS FOR DECISION
    A. Motion for Reconsideration
    Under RCFC 59(a)(1), the court may grant a motion for reconsideration:
    (A) for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action
    at law in federal court; (B) for any reason for which a rehearing has heretofore
    been granted in a suit in equity in federal court; or (C) upon the showing of
    satisfactory evidence, cumulative or otherwise, that any fraud, wrong, or
    injustice has been done to the United States.
    RCFC 59(a)(1)(A)–(C). “In effect, the court ‘may grant a motion for reconsideration when there
    has been an intervening change in the controlling law, newly discovered evidence, or a need to
    correct clear factual or legal error or prevent manifest injustice.’” Tolliver Grp., Inc. v. United
    States, 
    148 Fed. Cl. 351
    , 354 (2020) (quoting Biery v. United States, 
    818 F.3d 704
    , 711 (Fed.
    Cir. 2016)). The decision of whether to grant reconsideration generally lies within the discretion
    of the court. Yuba Nat. Res., Inc. v. United States, 
    904 F.2d 1577
    , 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
    (citations omitted).
    “Courts must address reconsideration motions with ‘exceptional care.’” IAP Worldwide
    Servs., Inc. v. United States, 
    141 Fed. Cl. 788
    , 799 (2019) (quoting Carter v. United States, 
    207 Ct. Cl. 316
    , 318 (1975)). And, a motion for reconsideration “is not an opportunity for an
    unhappy litigant to have an ‘additional chance to sway the court.’” 1100 West Ewing Assoc. v.
    United States, 
    139 Fed. Cl. 24
    , 25 (2018) (quoting Martin v. United States, 
    101 Fed. Cl. 664
    , 671
    (2011) (additional citation omitted)). The moving party “may not merely reassert arguments that
    ‘were previously made and carefully considered by the court.’” Haggart VII, 133 Fed. Cl. at 573
    (quoting Whispell Foreign Cars, Inc. v. United States, 
    106 Fed. Cl. 777
    , 782 (2012) (additional
    citations omitted)). A motion for reconsideration is also unavailing where the moving party
    “raise[s] an issue for the first time that was available to be litigated earlier in the case.” Martin,
    101 Fed. Cl. at 671 (citing Matthews v. United States, 
    73 Fed. Cl. 524
    , 526 (2006); Gelco
    Builders & Burjay Constr. Corp. v. United States, 
    369 F.2d 992
    , 1000 n.7 (Ct. Cl. 1966)); see
    also Bannum v. United States, 
    59 Fed. Cl. 241
    , 243 (2003).
    B. The Uniform Relocation Act and RCFC 23
    The parties agree that this dispute is governed by the Uniform Relocation Act. See
    Haggart X, 149 Fed. Cl. at 660 (“Jurisdiction derives from the same sources that it has
    throughout the protracted pendency of this litigation: the Tucker Act and the Uniform Relocation
    Moreover, the movants also filed notices of appeal regarding their motions for
    reconsideration. See ECF Nos. 405, 407. The Federal Circuit deactivated these appeals, noting
    that the motions for reconsideration were still outstanding. See U.S. Court of Appeals for the
    Federal Circuit Order of October 20, 2020, ECF No. 411; U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
    Circuit Order of October 20, 2020, ECF No. 412.
    5
    Act.”). The Uniform Relocation Act waives federal sovereign immunity with respect to legal
    fees and costs in takings cases and mandates that when awarding a plaintiff compensation for a
    taking by a federal agency, the court shall “reimburse such plaintiff for his reasonable costs,
    disbursements, and expenses, including reasonable attorney, appraisal, and engineering fees,
    actually incurred because of such proceeding.” 
    42 U.S.C. § 4654
    (c) (emphasis added).
    RCFC 23 also applies to the pending motions, as the court certified the class of plaintiffs
    and subsequently designated six separate subclasses. See Haggart II, 104 Fed. Cl. at 491. Rule
    23(h) permits the court to award “reasonable attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that are
    authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement” in certified class actions. RCFC 23(h).
    Given that the Federal Circuit declined to address the issue of attorneys’ fees and costs on
    jurisdictional grounds in the most recent appeal, Haggart IX, 943 F.3d at 951-52, and it
    subsequently has deactivated plaintiffs’ premature appeals of their motions for reconsideration,
    see ECF Nos. 411-12, this court has the authority to consider plaintiffs’ motions. Cf. Rocky
    Mountain Helium v. United States, 
    145 Fed. Cl. 662
    , 665 (2019) (concluding that the court had
    the juridical power to consider the government’s motion for reconsideration).
    ANALYSIS
    A. The Woodleys’ Pro Se Expenses
    The Woodleys request reconsideration of the court’s denial of their motion for pro se
    litigation expenses. See Pro Se Mot. They assert that the court incorrectly designated them as
    pro se litigants, 
    id. at 13
    , and that Washington law entitles them to 12% interest on these
    expenses, 
    id. at 19-21
    . The government counters that the law of the Federal Circuit, not the law
    of the State of Washington, applies to the case. Def.’s Resp. at 9.
    Contrary to the Woodleys’ position, this court is bound by the law of the Federal Circuit,
    not the law of the State of Washington. See Bywaters v. United States, 
    670 F.3d 1221
    , 1228
    (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“In light of ‘the evident congressional desire for uniform adjudication of Little
    Tucker Act claims’ and Tucker Act claims . . . we hold that our law, rather than the law of the
    regional circuit, should apply to an award of attorneys’ fees under section 4654(c).”) (citing
    United States v. Hohri, 
    482 U.S. 64
    , 73 (1987)). The Woodleys themselves acknowledge that
    the law of the Federal Circuit is “the law of the case.” Pro Se Mot. at 15. The State of
    Washington’s approach, therefore, has no persuasive force regarding whether the Woodleys may
    be reimbursed under the Uniform Relocation Act for the cost of representing themselves.
    Again, the court recognizes that the Haggarts have previously characterized themselves
    as pro se litigants. See, e.g., Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 199 (referring to themselves as “Pro Se
    Objecting Class[]Claimants”). “Moreover, any attempt to describe the relationship . . . as an
    attorney-client relationship necessarily elevates form over substance because their underlying
    claim concerns property jointly owned by them.” Haggart X, 149 Fed. Cl. at 662. The
    Woodleys’ claim for reimbursement of fees and expenses incurred by Mr. Woodley’s work thus
    must be considered a claim for pro se fees and expenses.
    6
    Granting reconsideration for the Woodleys’ pro se fees and expenses would be contrary
    to binding precedent of the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, which have denied such
    reimbursement in similar circumstances. See Kay v. Ehrler, 
    499 U.S. 432
    , 435-38 (1991)
    (holding that an attorney could not recover legal fees under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1988
     for representing
    himself after noting that “it seems likely that Congress contemplated an attorney-client
    relationship as the predicate for an award”); May v. United States, 
    534 Fed. Appx. 930
    , 936 (Fed.
    Cir. 2013) (“Pro se litigants are not entitled to recover attorney fees under either [
    28 U.S.C. § 2412
     or 
    42 U.S.C. § 1988
    ].”) (citations omitted); Phillips v. General Servs. Admin., 
    924 F.2d 1577
    , 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that 
    28 U.S.C. § 2412
     “does not contemplate that a fee
    award may be made to a party to be retained”); Naekel v. Department of Transp., 
    845 F.2d 976
    ,
    980 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Payment to the pro se litigant for his/her own time expended on his/her
    own behalf does not serve an additional public purpose, and it can not be assumed that Congress
    intended such payment.”). The court declines to award the Woodleys their pro se legal fees and
    expenses, as doing so would be against the preclusive effect of these cases.
    Moreover, the Woodleys’ request for interest on attorneys’ fees is similarly contradicted
    by precedent. “Under the no-interest rule, recovery of interest on an award of attorney fees is
    barred unless an award of interest is ‘expressly and unambiguously authorized by statute.’”
    Biery, 818 F.3d at 714 (quoting Chiu v. United States, 
    948 F.2d 711
    , 719 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
    Absent such authorization in the Uniform Relocation Act, the Woodleys’ claim for interest on an
    award of attorneys’ fees is not viable. The federal case upon which the Woodleys rely, Seaboard
    Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 
    261 U.S. 299
     (1923), authorizes the award of interest “as will
    produce the full equivalent of [the] value [of the property] paid contemporaneously with the
    taking.” 
    Id. at 306
    . The Supreme Court determined in that case that interest was available on an
    award of just compensation for a taking, not on an award of attorneys’ fees. Therefore, even if
    the Woodleys were entitled to pro se litigation fees and expenses, an award of interest in this
    scenario would be inappropriate.
    B. The Woodleys’ Legal Expenses for Kellogg Hansen
    The Woodleys also ask for reconsideration of the court’s judgment denying their motion
    for legal fees and expenses incurred by Kellogg Hansen prior to March 1, 2017. See Haggart X,
    149 Fed. Cl. at 662. They contend that the court’s denial of reimbursement for these fees and
    expenses contravenes the URA and RCFC 23(h). Kellogg Hansen Mot. at 6-8. The government
    responds that “any reimbursement for [these] fees should come from the $2.58 million paid to
    [c]lass [c]ounsel pursuant to the Settlement Agreement,” and that the Woodleys “have advanced
    no basis for reconsideration.” Def.’s Resp. at 5.
    The Uniform Relocation Act requires a court “awarding compensation for the taking of
    property by a Federal agency . . . [to] reimburse such plaintiff for his reasonable costs,
    disbursements, and expenses . . . actually incurred because of such proceeding.” 
    42 U.S.C. § 4654
    (c). In the immediately preceding opinion, this court concluded that the Woodleys’
    “success in obtaining amounts beyond those specified in the agreement” precluded recovery of
    attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred prior to March 1, 2017, the date the government first filed
    to overturn the settlement agreement. Haggart X, 149 Fed. Cl. at 662. However, the Uniform
    7
    Relocation Act does not prevent objecting plaintiffs from recovering reasonable attorneys’ fees
    when they are successful on appeal. Cf. Cloverport Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v. United States, 
    10 Cl. Ct. 121
    , 127 (1986) (“Since the Uniform Relocation Act mandates the award of reasonable
    attorneys’ fees and expenses in the event this [c]ourt finds the [g]overnment liable for a taking of
    private property, and awards compensation for the taking, the [c]ourt has no alternative but to
    award the plaintiff an amount sufficient to cover . . . reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses.”);
    White v. Auerbach, 
    500 F.2d 822
    , 828 (2d Cir. 1974) (approving attorneys’ fees and expenses
    where “the settlement was improved as a result of these efforts”); In re Petrobras Sec. Litig., 
    786 Fed. Appx. 274
    , 277-78 (2d Cir. 2019) (same); In re MetLife Demutualization Litig., 
    689 F. Supp. 2d 297
    , 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (same). Therefore, the Woodleys are entitled to reasonable
    attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred by Kellogg Hansen prior to March 1, 2017.
    The reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees and expenses sought by the Woodleys before
    March 1, 2017 is at issue. The court begins this analysis by noting that “[f]ees incurred and paid
    by a client at an agreed rate . . . are presumptively reasonable because ‘[i]n reaching agreement,
    lawyer and client have already considered and weighed all the relevant factors.’” Haggart X,
    149 Fed. Cl. at 659 (quoting Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 
    9 Cl. Ct. 285
    , 290
    (1985)). While “[t]he fee applicants have the burden of production,” the Woodleys have
    satisfied their burden by submitting “time details, fee invoices, and expense records, along with
    declarations from counsel knowledgeable of rate practices in pertinent areas.” 
    Id. at 658-59
    .
    Kellogg Hansen seeks to recover legal fees and expenses amounting to $592,727.14 for the work
    it performed prior to March 1, 2017, specifically, $331,244.29 for fees and expenses incurred
    “from the beginning of the [firm’s] representation through the date before the Federal Circuit’s
    first opinion in this case,” and $261,482.85 for fees and expenses incurred between January 7,
    2016 through February 28, 2017. See Kellogg Hansen Mot., Decl. of David C. Frederick ¶ 7,
    ECF No. 395-1.
    Similar to the court’s conclusion in its opinion and order of August 12, 2020, a detailed
    review of the time sheets and descriptions for the period between the onset of Kellogg Hansen’s
    representation of the Woodleys to the date of the Federal Circuit’s remand reveals that the time
    expended was reasonable and necessary. Haggart X, 149 Fed. Cl. at 668. Furthermore, “the fact
    that the firm billed and the Woodleys actually paid” Kellogg Hansen’s rates and costs to litigate
    the case supports the conclusion that the rates charged were reasonable. Id. at 669-70; see also
    Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 
    135 Fed. Cl. 92
    , 96 (2017) (noting that the “[plaintiff] does
    not seek an upward adjustment in rates but rather a reimbursement for fees actually paid”). The
    court thus concludes that the Woodleys are entitled to $331,244.29, the entirety of the legal fees
    and expenses incurred from the onset of the Kellogg Hansen’s representation of the Woodleys to
    January 7, 2016, the date of the Federal Circuit’s remand.
    The reasonableness of the legal fees and expenses incurred from the date of remand to
    March 1, 2017, however, requires separate attention. Courts consider “a number of factors” in
    determining the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees. Hubbard v. United States, 
    480 F.3d 1327
    ,
    1332 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 
    461 U.S. 424
    , 436 (1983)). “[T]he most
    critical factor,” however, and the threshold inquiry to determine if all legal fees and expenses
    may be reimbursed, “is the degree of success obtained.” Hensley, 
    461 U.S. at 436
    . The
    8
    Woodleys were not entirely successful with the legal positions they took during this period, and
    some of the tactics employed were counterproductive. See, e.g., Order of August 26, 2016, ECF
    No. 222 (granting in part and denying in part the Woodleys’ motion to substitute class counsel);
    Woodleys’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 239; Haggart VI, 131 Fed. Cl. at 633 (denying
    the Woodleys’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment as moot).
    In addition, the government objects to any payment of fees by it to the Woodleys
    regarding Kellogg Hansen’s representation on the ground that any such fees should be paid by
    class counsel, not the government, See Def.’s Resp. at 7 (citing, inter alia, In re Horizon/CMS
    Healthcare Corp. Sec. Litig., 
    3 F. Supp. 2d 1208
    , 1215 (D.N.M. 1998) (reducing lead counsel’s
    fees to pay objector’s fees); In re MetLife Demutualization Litig. 
    689 F. Supp. 2d 297
     (same)).
    This argument ignores, and does not take into account, the fact that class counsel has already
    paid the Woodleys $742,743.64, apart from the settlement. See Class Counsel’s Notice, ECF
    No. 415. In effect, class counsel has performed as the government has demanded.3 This
    circumstance must be taken into account.
    Overall, given the mixed success during the relevant period and the payment the
    Woodleys have already received, the court awards the Woodleys $169,963.85, i.e. 65% of the
    legal fees and expenses incurred from January 7, 2016 to March 1, 2017, for a total of
    $501,208.14 in legal fees and expenses for Kellogg Hansen’s representation for the period before
    March 1, 2017. This amount should be added to the amount previously awarded for the period
    after March 1, 2017, $497,441.00, for a total of $998,649.14.
    C. The Legal Expenses of Mr. Ghoddoussi and Westpoint
    Mr. Ghoddoussi and Westpoint Properties, LLC request reconsideration of the court’s
    refusal to award $143,044 regarding their contingent fee agreement with Goodstein Law Group
    PLLC (“Goodstein”), as well as $69,035 for “out of pocket expenses of litigation” and “services”
    provided by Mr. Ghoddoussi to Goodstein. See Faramarz Ghoddoussi’s & Westpoint Properties’
    Mot. for Att’y Fees & Costs Under the Uniform Relocation Act (“Ghoddoussi Mot. for Att’y
    Fees”) at 4, ECF No. 356. The government argues that Mr. Ghoddoussi’s motion for
    reconsideration “falls far short of satisfying” the required standard in failing to identify any legal
    error. Def.’s Resp. at 12.
    In its opinion of August 12, 2020, the court denied Mr. Ghoddoussi and Westpoint
    Properties’ motion for attorneys’ fees and expenses after stating that “fees and costs may only be
    awarded if they provided a benefit to the entire class.” Haggart X, 149 Fed. Cl. at 663 (citing
    Olden, 294 Fed. Appx. at 221). However, while Olden provides a relevant requirement for
    awarding attorneys’ fees under a common fund approach, the Federal Circuit clarified that “[t]he
    URA . . . forecloses application of the common fund doctrine” in this dispute. Haggart V, 809
    F.3d at 1359; see also City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, 
    451 U.S. 304
    , 314 (1981)
    (“[W]hen Congress addresses a question previously governed by a decision rested on federal
    3
    The gross amount of this payment has not been allocated between the Woodleys’
    property and the Woodleys’ fees and expenses.
    9
    common law[,] the need for such an unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal courts
    disappears.”). Therefore, the fact that the legal fees and expenses incurred by Goodstein may not
    have benefited the class as a whole does not preclude recovery under the Uniform Relocation
    Act.
    To recover any attorneys’ fees and expenses, Mr. Ghoddoussi must demonstrate that
    these expenditures were reasonable. The party seeking fees “bears the burden of . . .
    documenting the appropriate hours expended and the hourly rates” and exercising “billing
    judgment” in doing so. Rumsey v. Department of Justice, 
    866 F.3d 1375
    , 1379-80 (Fed. Cir.
    2017). As previously noted, “[f]ees incurred and paid by a client at an agreed rate are
    presumptively reasonable,” Haggart X, 149 Fed. Cl. at 659, but a key date in determining
    reasonableness in the present case is June 16, 2017, the date Mr. Ghoddoussi and Westpoint
    Properties first filed for separate representation. See Mot. to Substitute Att’y, ECF No. 281;
    Haggart X, 149 Fed. Cl. at 663 (noting that Goodstein first filed “43 days after the court had
    ordered that the settlement agreement was enforceable” (emphasis in original)).4
    The court “should not award attorneys’ fees unless the prevailing party presents
    sufficiently detailed records that the time expended and the need for the services are clearly
    established.” White v. City of Richmond, 
    713 F.2d 458
    , 461 (9th Cir. 1983) (disapproved on other
    grounds by Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clear Air, 
    483 U.S. 711
    (1987)). While expenses will undoubtedly be incurred before filing for separate representation, a
    significant amount of expenditures combined with a lack of documentation raises the specter of
    unreasonableness. See Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 
    100 Fed. Cl. 750
    , 766-67 (2011) (finding that due to lack of documentation, “the court [was] unable to
    determine whether the cost of the appraisals was reasonable, [and] the court declines to make an
    award.”) (citing Cobell v. Norton, 
    407 F. Supp. 2d 140
    , 163 (D.D.C. 2005) (finding that because
    certain time entries were “inadequately documented [] it [was] impossible for the [c]ourt to
    determine with a high degree of certainty that such hours were actually and reasonably
    expended”) (citation and internal quotations omitted)).
    Prior to June 16, 2017, Mr. Ghoddoussi incurred $7,500 in “[a]ppraisal” expenses and
    $2,200 in services rendered to Goodstein. See Ghoddoussi Mot. for Att’y Fees, Decl. of
    Faramarz Ghoddoussi (“Ghoddoussi Decl.”), ECF No. 356-2.5 Additionally, Ghoddousi’s
    counsel, Mr. Sanders, states that Goodstein incurred $327.70 in copying charges prior to the date
    of filing. See Ghoddoussi Mot. for Att’y Fees, Decl. of Richard B. Sanders, ECF No. 356-1.
    Some expenses will undoubtedly be incurred prior to filing for separate representation, but
    collecting $10,027.70 in appraisals, copying charges, and services to assist Goodstein prior to the
    first filing appears excessive. Consequently, the court will award 50% of the requested amount
    4
    The motion for independent representation had been denied on procedural grounds but
    it then was successfully renewed promptly thereafter. See Haggart X, 149 Fed. Cl. at 663 n.12.
    Earlier, unavailing “Notices” had been filed. See Notices, ECF Nos. 206, 207.
    5
    Mr. Ghoddoussi spent 20 hours “assisting” Goodstein between April 28, 2017 and June
    15, 2017, and requests a reimbursement rate of $110/hour. See Ghoddoussi Decl. that request
    for reimbursement is not allowed.
    10
    of expenses incurred prior to June 16, 2017. Mr. Ghoddoussi and Westpoint Properties are
    awarded $5,013.85 of these expenses.
    The legal fees as well as the expenses incurred after June 16, 2017, are more reasonable
    given Goodstein’s role, but some line items still suggest a lack of the “billing judgment” required
    to recover the entire amount requested. See Rumsey, 866 F.3d at 1379-80. For example, Mr.
    Ghoddoussi lists an additional $7,500 in appraisal expenses, $4,931.40 in surveying expenses
    incurred in 2017, and $4,302 in “Title Company Research.” See Ghoddoussi Decl. The court
    also takes into account the fact that the Ghoddoussi plaintiffs received $300,000 in a direct
    payment from class counsel. See Class Counsel’s Notice, ECF No. 415. Here also, the
    government argues that any fees and expenses awarded to the Ghoddoussi plaintiffs should be
    paid by class counsel. See Def.’s Resp. at 12. But, the Ghoddoussi plaintiffs, who were not
    objectors but rather plaintiffs granted separate representation, have been paid a significant
    amount by class counsel. In all the circumstances, the court thus concludes that an award of 50%
    of the legal fees and expenses requested is proper. Mr. Ghoddoussi and Westpoint Properties are
    awarded $112,259.71 for attorneys’ fees and for the expenses incurred after June 16, 2017,
    bringing their total award to $117,273.56 in legal fees and expenses under the Uniform
    Relocation Act.
    Mr. Ghoddoussi and Westpoint Properties ask for post-judgment interest on any award
    they receive. See Ghoddoussi Mot. at 4. However, the court declines to award such interest for
    the same reasons it refused such an award to the Woodleys. See supra at 7; Biery, 818 F.3d at
    714 (“Under the no-interest rule, recovery of interest on an award of attorney fees is barred
    unless an award of interest is ‘expressly and unambiguously authorized by statute.’”) (quoting
    Chiu v. United States, 
    948 F.2d 711
    , 719 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
    D. The Legal Expenses of the Cleveland Square Group
    Cleveland Square, LLC and other plaintiffs (collectively “Cleveland Square”), who
    sought and were granted independent representation by Hillis Clark, request reconsideration of
    the court’s decision to deny their motion for $244,372 of attorneys’ fees and $4,243.92 of
    expenses. See Cleveland Square Mot. The court denied Cleveland Square’s initial motion for
    the same reason it denied Mr. Ghoddoussi’s motion, namely that counsel did not “show that
    [retention of independent counsel] provided a benefit to the class as a whole.” Haggart X, 149
    Fed. Cl. at 663. In its motion for reconsideration, Cleveland Square argues that producing a
    beneficial result for the class as a whole is not required for an award of attorneys’ fees under the
    Uniform Relocation Act. Cleveland Square Mot. at 3. Here also, the government objects to any
    award and argues that Cleveland Square has failed to prove that its fees “were both actually
    incurred and reasonable.” Def.’s Resp. at 11.
    As noted regarding Mr. Ghoddoussi’s and Westpoint Properties’ motion for
    reconsideration, a benefit to the class as a whole is required when awarding attorneys’ fees under
    a common fund approach. See Olden, 294 Fed. Appx. at 221. Nonetheless, because plaintiffs
    seek attorneys’ fees under the Uniform Relocation Act, Olden does not impose a barrier to
    recovery.
    11
    Also, similar to the analysis of attorneys’ fees and expenses sought by Mr. Ghoddoussi
    and Westpoint Properties, is the importance of the date the parties first filed for separate
    representation. Hillis Clark may have commenced its representation of the group on February
    29, 2016, see Cleveland Square Mot. for Att’y Fees at 1, ECF No. 357, but “counsel for the
    Cleveland Square group did not seek to enter [a separate representation] in the litigation until
    July 14, 2017.” Haggart X, 149 Fed. Cl. at 663. Counsel for Cleveland Square expended a total
    of 585.6 hours for their clients, 459.15 of which occurred between the onset of representation
    and July 14, 2017. See Decl. of Mary Crego Preston Ex. 1, ECF No. 359-1. Hillis Clark billed
    Cleveland Square $192,450.50 in attorneys’ fees and $3,327.23 in expenses for this time period.6
    See id. While some legal fees and expenses would have been necessary prior to filing for
    separate representation, 78.4% of Hillis Clark’s requested attorneys’ fees were allegedly incurred
    prior to this filing. See id. Given what appears to be a lack of “billing judgment,” cf. Rumsey,
    866 F.3d at 1379-80, the court will award 50% of the requested attorneys’ fees and expenses
    from the beginning of Hillis Clark’s representation to July 14, 2017. Cleveland Square is thus
    awarded $96,224.25 in attorneys’ fees and $1,663.61 in expenses for this time period.
    Echoing the reasonableness analysis for Mr. Ghoddoussi and Westpoint Properties, the
    court finds that the fees and expenses incurred after counsel for Cleveland Square filed for
    separate representation are more reasonable due to counsel’s role. After reviewing the time
    sheets provided by counsel, the court concludes that Cleveland Square is entitled to 80% of the
    fees and expenses incurred from July 14, 2017 onward. The court awards Cleveland Square
    $41,537.20 in attorneys’ fees and $733.35 in expenses for this time period, bringing the group’s
    total award to $137,761.45 in attorneys’ fees and $2,396.96 in expenses.
    6
    While counsel for Cleveland Square provided timesheets detailing the hours billed for
    legal work, see Decl. of Mary Crego Peterson Ex. 1, the exhibit failed to note when expenses
    such as photocopying were incurred during the course of this dispute. Given that Hillis Clark
    attributed 78.4% of the total hours expended to the time period before the first filing for separate
    representation, 78.4% of the $4,243.92 in requested expenses will be allocated to this period as
    well.
    12
    CONCLUSION
    The court GRANTS IN PART the motions for reconsideration filed by the Woodleys
    insofar as representation by Kellogg Hansen is concerned, as well as the motions filed by the
    Ghoddousi plaintiffs and the Cleveland Square group of plaintiffs. The motion for
    reconsideration filed by the Woodleys pro se is DENIED. Taking also into account the court’s
    immediately prior opinion, the court awards attorneys’ fees and allowable expenses as follows:
    Class Counsel (Stewart Wald)                     $2,389,527.13
    Class Counsel (Sidley Austin)                      $576,240.12
    The Woodleys (Kellogg Hansen)                      $998,649.14
    The Ghoddousi Plaintiffs (Goodstein)               $117,273.56
    The Cleveland Square Plaintiffs (Hillis Clark)     $140,158.41
    The judgment entered on August 12, 2020 shall be amended by the Clerk to accord with
    this revised disposition.
    No further costs.
    It is so ORDERED.
    s/ Charles F. Lettow
    Charles F. Lettow
    Senior Judge
    13