Harris v. United States ( 2017 )


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  •                                           RIG
    Jfn tbe Wniteb $)tate.s QCourt of jfeberal QCiaim.s
    No. 17-1247C
    (Filed: September 26, 2017)
    (NOT TO BE PUBLISHED)
    **********************************
    )
    MICHAEL HARRIS,                               )
    )                                 FIL
    Plaintiff,             )
    )                                SEP 2 6 2017
    v.                                  )                               U.S. COURT OF
    )                              FEDERAL CLAIMS
    UNITED STATES,                                )
    )
    Defendant.             )
    )
    **********************************
    Michael Harris, prose, Los Angeles, California.
    Amelia R.S.H. Lister-Sobotkin, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
    Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendant.
    OPINION AND ORDER
    LETTOW, Judge.
    Plaintiff, Michael Harris, brings suit alleging violations of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1341
     ("Frauds and
    swindles") and 
    18 U.S.C. § 1701
     ("Obstruction of mails generally") by the California state courts
    or the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Office. Compl. at 1-2. 1 The crux of Mr: Harris's claims is
    that neither the California courts or the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Office have served process
    as he requested in his state civil action pending against the Los Angeles Police Department, and
    that he has received no communications by mail describing deficiencies in his filings that prevent
    service being made. This, he claims, is evidence that either the courts or the Sheriffs Office are
    violating federal law by "obstructing mails away from [him]." See Compl. at 2.
    1
    Mr. HaiTis's Complaint appends s~veral pages of photographs of other documents,
    including of a form styled "Los Angeles Police Department Complaint of Employee
    Misconduct," various receipts for documents sent via mail, and other forms related to an action
    in the California state court. Some of the photographed pages are numbered inconsistently with
    the numbering scheme of the Complaint as a whole; thus references to the Complaint in this
    opinion will be made to the pmiicular page numbers of the Complaint itself, which may at times
    differ from the number handwritten on the page cited.
    7017 1450 ODDO 1346 2595                _J
    I
    Before the court is Mr. Harris 's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant
    to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    , which motion is ready for disposition. See Pl. 's Mot. for Leave to Proceed
    In Forma Pauperis, ECF No. 4. Section 1915 permits "any comi of the United States" to allow
    parties to proceed without the payment of fees upon the filing of "an affidavit that ... the person
    is unable to pay such fees." 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    ; see also 
    28 U.S.C. § 2503
    (d). Further, among
    other things, Section 1915 calls upon the court to assess, following consideration of the affidavit
    contained within the motion to proceed in forma pauperis, whether the complaint is frivolous or
    fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)(i), (ii).
    For the reasons stated, the court grants Mr. Harris's motion to proceed informa pauperis, but
    dismisses the complaint under§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
    Rule 12(h)(3) of the Court of Federal Claims ("RCFC").
    BACKGROUND
    Mr. Harris alleges that either the California state courts or the Los Angeles County
    Sheriffs Office are "obstructing mails" in order to "prevent the defendants in the [California]
    civil action ... from being held liable for their unlawful activities." Comp!. at 2. Mr. Harris'
    complaint appears to allege wrongdoing in connection with his state civil action filed against the
    Los Angeles Police Depmiment and Wal greens arising out of an event that occurred on February
    16, 2017, in which police officers allegedly "informed the claimant that they were planning on
    obtaining a restraining order against the claimant for the purpose of banishing the claimant from
    sitting at the LAPD Hollywood Police Station." Comp!. at 4; see also Harris v. Los Angeles
    Police Dep't, No. BC665585 (Los Angeles Super. Ct. June 27, 2017). Mr. Harris alleges that the
    Los Angeles County Sheriffs Office refused to effectuate service on the defendant Los Angeles
    Police Department, at which time he states that he mailed the relevant documents to the Los
    Angeles Superior Court along with a motion seeking to have the clerk of that court effectuate
    service on the defendants. See Comp!. at 9. 2
    Mr. Harris fuiiher alleges that throughout the pendency of his civil action, and during the
    period in which he alleges that the California courts or the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Office
    failed to serve process on the defendants in his state case, no communications were mailed to
    him asse1iing deficiencies in his filings. Comp!. at 2. He alleges that this absence of
    communication has occurred because "[s]omeone is not sending or giving the claimant his mail
    2
    The Los Angeles Superior Comi and the California Courts provide various informational
    guides for individuals litigating without lawyers, see, e.g., Service of Process,
    http://www.courts.ca.gov/selfhelp-serving.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2017), which describe,
    among other things, the acceptable methods of service in California comis, one of which
    includes service effectuated by a county sheriff, id. The Los Angeles County Sheriffs Office
    similarly has a webpage describing the fees and requirements for having the Sheriffs Office
    serve process in a civil case. See Civil Process Types and Fees,
    http://civil.lasd.org/Civi1Process/cwig12.aspx (last visited Sept. 22, 2017). Mr. Harris does not
    plead facts establishing the reason why the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Office allegedly
    refused to effectuate service, but this ambiguity does not affect the disposition of his case here.
    2
    from the California state court, of which the correspondence should be ongoing through to the
    conclusion of the case." Comp!. at 3. 3
    As a remedy for the alleged violations of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 1341
     and 1701, Mr. Harris seeks
    damages in the amount of the higher of either $5,000,000 or the "cmTent day value of the
    Adamson House Museum located in Malibu, California." Comp!. at 3. 4 Mr. Harris additionally
    seeks an order "directing the postal police to investigate the violations ofU.S.C. Title 18 section
    1341and1701 and turn their findings over to the U.S. Attorney for convening a federal grand
    jury for their findings of indictment or dismissal or the charges." Comp!. at 3. 5
    STANDARDS FOR DECISION
    As plaintiff, Mr. Harris has the burden of establishing jurisdiction. See Reynolds v. Army
    & Air Force Exch. Serv., 
    846 F.2d 746
    , 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The leniency afforded to a prose
    litigant with respect to formalities does not relieve such a litigant from satisfying jurisdictional
    requirements. Kelley v. Secretary, United States Dep 't ofLabor, 
    812 F.2d 1378
    , 1380 (Fed. Cir.
    1987). Under the Tucker Act, this court has jurisdiction over "any claim against the United
    States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an
    executive depattment, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for
    liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in t01t." 
    28 U.S.C. § 1491
    (a)(l)
    (emphasis added); see also Moore v. Public Defender's Office, 
    76 Fed. Cl. 617
    , 620 (2007)
    ("When a plaintiffs complaint names private patties, or local, county, or state agencies, rather
    than federal agencies, this court has no jurisdiction to hear those allegations.").
    The Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity and allows a plaintiff to sue the United
    States for money damages, United States v. Mitchell, 
    463 U.S. 206
    , 212 (1983), but it does not
    provide a plaintiff with any substantive rights, United States v. Testan, 
    424 U.S. 392
    , 398 (1976).
    3 The  summary report for Mr. Harris' s pending case in California state court indicates that
    a hearing is currently scheduled in that case on October 27, 2017, regarding potential dismissal
    of the state case "for failure to file proof of service and for failure to appear on 9/15/17 ." See
    Harris, No. BC665585, Case Summary available at http://www.lacomt.org/casesummary/ui (last
    visited Sept. 22, 2017).
    4
    The Adamson House Museum is a National Historic Site and a California Historic
    Landmark that, in addition to being located on "one of the most beautiful beach locations in
    Southern California," is renowned for featuring "world-famous Malibu Tile ... [and] hand-
    carved teakwood doors, hand-painted murals, molded ceilings, hand-wrought [filigree] ironwork
    and lead-framed bottle glass windows." See Adamson House,
    http://www.parks.ca.gov/?page_id=672 (last visited Sept. 22, 2017). Mr. Harris does not
    indicate why he believes the valuation of the Adamson House Museum bears a relationship to
    the amount of damages he seeks here.
    5Mr.  Harris presumably seeks an order directing the United States Postal Inspection
    Service to commence the investigation he seeks. See Mission Statement,
    https://www.postalinspectors.uspis.gov/aboutus/mission.aspx (last visited Sept. 22, 2017).
    3
    To establish jurisdiction, "a plaintiff must identify a separate source of substantive law that
    creates the right to money damages." Fisher v. United States, 
    402 F.3d 1167
    , 1172 (Fed. Cir.
    2005) (en bane in relevant part) (citing Mitchell, 
    463 U.S. at 216
    ; Testan, 
    424 U.S. at 398
    ).
    Criminal statutes such as 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 1341
     and 1701 are outside the scope of this
    court's jurisdiction. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1491
    ; Joshua v. United States, 
    17 F.3d 378
    , 379 (Fed. Cir.
    1994) ("The [C]ourt [of Federal Claims) has no jurisdiction to adjudicate any claims whatsoever
    under the federal criminal code.").
    As well, this comi lacks the power to award injunctive relief absent specific statutory
    authorization. See United States v. King, 
    395 U.S. 1
    , 2-3 (1969) (citing United States v. Alire, 73
    U.S. (6 Wall.) 573, 575 (1867); United States v. Jones, 131U.S.1, 9 (1889); Glidden Co. v.
    Zdanok, 
    370 U.S. 530
    , 557 (1962)); see also Halim v. United States, 
    106 Fed. Cl. 677
    , 684-85
    (2012) (citing National Air Traffic Controllers Ass 'n v. United States, 
    160 F.3d 714
    , 716-17
    (Fed. Cir. 1998)) ("This court has never been afforded the general authority to issue declaratory
    judgments or to grant injunctive relief."). More specifically, "[t]he Tucker Act does not provide
    independent jurisdiction over ... claims for equitable relief." Taylor v. United States, 
    113 Fed. Cl. 171
    , 173 (2013).
    Finally, for plaintiffs proceeding or seeking to proceed in forma pauperis under Section
    1915, the court may screen their complaint and dismiss it if "the court determines that ... the
    action or appeal--is frivolous or ... fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B).
    In sum, "[i)f a comi lacks jurisdiction to decide the merits of a case, dismissal is required
    as a matter of law." Gray v. United States, 
    69 Fed. Cl. 95
    , 98 (2005) (citing Ex parte McCardle,
    74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868); Thoenv. United States, 765F.2d1110, 1116 (Fed. Cir.
    1985)); see also RCFC 12(h)(3) ("If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
    jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.") (emphasis added). In a case in which the
    plaintiff has moved to appear in forma pauperis, Section 1915 requires the comi to dismiss the
    case "[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid," where
    the comi dete1mines that it is frivolous or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2).
    ·ANALYSIS
    Mr. Hanis asserts claims for money damages arising out of alleged fraud and obstruction
    of mail by two state entities: the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office and the California state
    courts. He also appears to seek an injunction directing the United States Postal Inspection
    Service to investigate the criminal activity he alleges and directing an unspecified United States
    Attorney to prosecute that criminal activity.
    4
    A. Claims for Money Damages
    Mr. Harris's does not allege any wrongdoing by the United States that entitles him to
    compensation. All of the conduct of which he complains was allegedly committed by state
    actors. See United States v. Sherwood, 
    312 U.S. 584
    , 588 (1941) ("[I]f the relief sought is
    against others than the United States the suit as to them must be ignored as beyond the
    jurisdiction of the [Court of Federal Claims]"); see also Moore, 76 Fed. Cl. at 620 ("When a
    plaintiffs complaint names private parties, or local, county, or state agencies, rather than federal
    agencies, this court has no jurisdiction to hear those allegations."). His complaint also asserts
    violations of two criminal statutes, which this court lacks power to hear. See Joshua, 
    17 F.3d at 379
     ("The [C]ou1i [of Federal Claims] has no jurisdiction to adjudicate any claims whatsoever
    under the federal criminal code."). Because this court lacks jurisdiction over any claims against
    the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Office and the California state courts and over any claims
    asserted under the criminal laws of the United States, Mr. Harris's claims for monetary damages
    must be dismissed as outside this court's subject matter jurisdiction. See RCFC 12(h)(3) ("If the
    court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the
    action.").
    Independently, Mr. Harris' claims lack an arguable basis in law before this comi; in
    sh01i, their "disposition is obvious." Neitzke v. Williams, 
    490 U.S. 319
    , 325 (1989) ("[A]
    complaint, containing as it does both factual allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous where
    it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact."); Taylor v. United States, 
    568 Fed. Appx. 890
    ,
    891 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Galloway Farms, Inc. v. United States, 
    834 F.2d 998
    , 1000 (Fed.
    Cir. 1987)) ("A frivolous claim is one 'whose disposition is obvious."'). Mr. Harris's belief that
    there is irregularity in connection with his requests for service of process in his pending state
    case may be sincerely held, but "[i]n the language of courts, frivolity does not imply levity, and
    is not inconsistent with a litigant's belief that he has been wronged and ought to have a remedy."
    Galloway Farms, 
    834 F.2d at 1001
    . There is no arguable basis for the asse1iion that this court
    has the power to adjudicate claims arising under the criminal laws of the United States against
    state entities. See Nietzke, 
    490 U.S. at 319
    ; Joshua, 
    17 F.3d at 378
    ; Moore, 76 Fed. Cl. at 617.
    These claims must be dismissed.
    B. Claims for Injunctive Relief
    Mr. Harris's claims for injunctive relief ask the court to compel the United States Postal
    Inspection Service to investigate, and an United States Attomey to prosecute, his allegations of
    criminal conduct. This court has been authorized to provide equitable forms of relief in
    particular, statutorily-defined circumstances, but the Tucker Act itself does not confer general
    authority to issue such relief. The injunction Mr. Harris apparently seeks does not fall within any
    of the statutorily-defined instances in which this court can order equitable remedies. See, e.g., 28
    U.S.C. § 149l(a)(2) (providing authority for specific forms of equitable relief"as an incident of
    and collateral to any such judgment [for money damages].");§ 149l(b)(l)-(2) (allowing for
    equitable relief in the context of bid protest actions);§ 1507 (allowing for declaratory judgments
    in ce1iain tax actions). In sum, Mr. Harris' claims for equitable relief fall outside the scope of
    this court's jurisdiction and must be dismissed.
    5
    CONCLUSION
    For good cause shown, Mr. Harris's motion to proceed informapauperis is GRANTED.
    Nevertheless, the comt has determined that Mr. Harris's claims are outside this court's subject
    matter jurisdiction and raise unmeritorious questions of law, and thus the court must DISMISS
    his complaint. The clerk shall enter judgment in accord with this disposition.
    No costs.
    It is so ORDERED.
    Cha~
    Judge
    6