Miller v. United States ( 2023 )

In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 23-525
Filed: April 26, 2023
TERESA MILLER,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE UNITED STATES,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The Court interprets pro se Plaintiff Teresa Miller’s (“Ms. Miller”) Complaint, (Compl.
ECF No. 1), to allege that she was wrongfully convicted of and imprisoned for firearms offenses,
that her underlying criminal case was mishandled, and that conditions during incarceration were
less than ideal. Nothing in Ms. Miller’s Complaint discernably establishes subject-matter
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Ms. Miller’s Complaint pursuant to RCFC
12(h)(3).
The Court has “an independent obligation” to ensure subject-matter jurisdiction exists.
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). Therefore, the Court analyzes pleadings to
determine if the allegations invoke the Court’s limited jurisdiction which only extends to claims
(1) founded on an express or implied contract with the United States; (2) seeking a refund for a
payment made to the United States; or (3) arising from federal constitutional, statutory, or
regulatory law mandating payment of money by the United States. Ontario Power Generation,
Inc. v. United States, 369 F.3d 1298, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Although a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings are generally held to “less stringent standards”
than those of a lawyer, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972), leniency cannot be
extended to relieve pro se plaintiffs of their jurisdictional burden. Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of
Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Should the Court determine at any time that it
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action. RCFC 12(h)(3); Folden v.
United States, 379 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding that the court may act sua sponte
when jurisdiction is lacking).
Ms. Miller’s Complaint presents a detailed timeline of a criminal conviction that was
ultimately overturned on procedural grounds. See United States v. Miller, 54 F.4th 219, 232 (4th
Cir. 2022) (vacating conviction and sentence because extension of traffic stop was not supported
by reasonable suspicion). Ms. Miller requests $276,715.75 in damages “for wrongful
incarceration due to illegal search and seizure.” (Compl. at 15). However, Ms. Miller’s unjust
conviction claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1495 is factually unsupported. 1
Section 1495 confers jurisdiction on the United States Court of Federal Claims over
claims seeking monetary damages for unjust conviction and imprisonment but only when
plaintiffs also meet the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2513. 2 See Grayson v. United
States, 141 Ct. Cl. 866, 869 (1958) (finding that section 1495 confers jurisdiction “only in cases
where there has been conviction and in which the other conditions set out in section 2513 are
complied with”). The jurisdictional requirements of section 2513, in turn, are “strictly construed”
and place “a heavy burden . . . upon a claimant seeking relief . . . .” Humphrey v. United States,
52 Fed. Cl. 593, 596 (2002), aff’d, 60 F. App’x 292 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Section 2513 requires Ms.
Miller show that her conviction has been reversed or set aside on the ground that she is not guilty
of the offense that she was convicted for. 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a). Plaintiffs may establish
jurisdiction under section 2513 by alleging that they “did not commit any of the acts charged,”
that their conduct did not constitute “offense against the United States, or any State, Territory or
the District of Columbia,” and that their “misconduct or neglect [did not] cause or bring about
[their] own prosecution.” Id. Critically, section 2513(b) mandates that plaintiffs establish proof
of such facts by providing a certificate of innocence from the district court. See Brewer v. United
States, No. 2021-1872, 2023 WL 2233717, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 27, 2023) (holding that relief
under § 1495 cannot be granted without plaintiff having been granted a certificate of innocence).
Not only does Ms. Miller fail to affirmatively allege her innocence, she also fails to
provide the Court with a certificate of innocence. Consequently, the Court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction to review Ms. Miller’s unjust conviction claim. See Abu-Shawish v. United States,
120 Fed. Cl. 812, 813 (2015) (dismissing the Complaint because plaintiff had “not alleged that
she [had] obtained a certificate of innocence from the [district court] or that her innocence [had]
been otherwise established.”); see also Sykes v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 231, 233 (2012)
1
28 U.S.C. § 1495 provides: “The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction
to render judgment upon any claim for damages by any person unjustly convicted of an offense
against the United States and imprisoned.”
2
28 U.S.C. § 2513(a) provides that any person suing under section 1495 “must allege and prove
that:
(1) His conviction has been reversed or set aside on the ground that he is not
guilty of the offense of which he was convicted, or on new trial or
rehearing he was found not guilty of such offense, as appears from the
record or certificate of the court setting aside or reversing such
conviction, or that he has been pardoned upon the stated ground of
innocence and unjust conviction and
(2) He did not commit any of the acts charged or his acts, deeds, or omissions
in connection with such charge constituted no offense against the United
States, or any State, Territory or the District of Columbia, and he did not
by misconduct or neglect cause or bring about his own prosecution.”
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(“[A]n unjust conviction and imprisonment claim must be established by either a certificate
granted by the court of conviction or a pardon.”).
When her pleading is liberally construed, Ms. Miller’s alleges a host of other claims,
including mishandling by the judicial system in West Virginia, tortious actions from the West
Virginia prison system, and harassment by local law enforcement. (See generally Compl.). For
instance, Ms. Miller alleges that while she was incarcerated, she “[f]ell due to water leaking from
the hot water machine on the floor no wet floor signs.” (Id. at 9). Ms. Miller alleges that, as a
result of her “unjust conviction,” she suffered “loss of liberty, emotional distress, negative health
consequences, wrongful solitary confinement, and loss of the companionship [, and] [l]oss of
time with family.” (Id. at 14). As relief, she requests: “[r]emedy process filed on 2255 but unable
to receive an answer due to the fact that I have an attorney and direct appeal file. Interference
with my patent work. Health conditions and continued deterioration. Pre[-]existing conditions
that after injury from accident and COVID have worsened.” (Id. at 15). No remaining claim or
requested relief invokes the Court’s jurisdiction.
Ms. Miller overlooks the fact that the Tucker Act only provides the Court with
jurisdiction over claims against the United States. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588
(1941). The Court of Federal Claims may not “review the decisions of state courts, federal
bankruptcy courts, federal district courts, or federal circuit courts of appeals.” McLarnon v.
United States, 154 Fed. Cl. 459, 462 (2021) (internal citations omitted). Thus, any grievances
Ms. Miller may have with the judicial process to this point are not subject to review by this
Court. Further, any allegations regarding the behavior of government officials, whether it be
prison employees or local law enforcement, are also beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.
Anderson v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 330, 331 (2014) (“This court does not have jurisdiction
over any claims alleged against states, localities, state and local government entities, or state and
local government officials and employees”); Cato v. United States, 141 Fed. Cl. 140, 143 (2018)
(finding that the Court “cannot hear plaintiff’s claims raised against the State of Texas, the City
of Houston, the City of Houston Police Department, and the arresting officer”). Even when the
Court assumes the facts Ms. Miller alleges are true, it is also well-established that this Court
lacks jurisdiction to hear any allegations which sound in tort. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); see also
Sanchez v. United States, No. 19-1729, 2020 WL 201727 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 13, 2020) (dismissing
claims of theft, trespass, and financial losses pursuant to the Tucker Act).
Finally, Ms. Miller alleges that her business “SMUTHCENTZ LLC” lost revenue and “IP
Rights from her patent on candles.” (Compl. at 14). This claim fails for two reasons. First,
pursuant to RCFC 83.1(a)(3), an individual who is not an attorney may not represent a
corporation before this Court. See Talasila, Inc. v. United States, 240 F.3d 1064, 1066 (Fed. Cir.)
(holding that corporate entity must be represented by counsel to pursue its claim against the
United States.). To the extent Ms. Miller is attempting to represent her business in a pro se
capacity, she is prohibited from doing so. Second, the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction
over patent cases where the United States government uses, makes, or sells a patented invention
without the permission of the patent holder. 28 U.S.C. § 1498. Ms. Miller’s claims related to her
“patent papers,” (Compl. at 9), appear to stem from interference with her mail during
incarceration, and she does not identify any sort of involvement from the United States. Because
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of such deficiencies, claims related to Ms. Miller’s patent must be dismissed. See Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007) (requiring pleading to provide “factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged”).
For the stated reasons, Ms. Miller’s Complaint, (ECF No. 1), is DISMISSED for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction under RCFC 12(h)(3), and Ms. Miller’s Motion for Leave to Proceed
in forma pauperis, (ECF No. 7), is GRANTED. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment accordingly.
The Court CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this Order
would not be taken in good faith because, as alleged, Plaintiff's claims are outside the jurisdiction
of this Court and incurable. The Clerk is DIRECTED TO REJECT any future submissions in
this case unless they comply with this Court’s rules regarding post-dismissal submissions.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
David A. Tapp
DAVID A. TAPP, Judge
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