Re Inquiry of a Judge , 443 P.3d 1228 ( 2019 )


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  •                  This opinion is subject to revision before final
    publication in the Pacific Reporter
    
    2019 UT 19
    IN THE
    SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
    In re INQUIRY OF A JUDGE:
    THE HONORABLE JUDGE MICHAEL KWAN
    No. 20171041
    Filed May 22, 2019
    Original Proceeding in this Court
    Attorneys:
    Alex G. Peterson, Salt Lake City, for Judicial Conduct Commission
    Gregory G. Skordas, Salt Lake City, for Judge Michael Kwan
    JUSTICE PEARCE authored the opinion of the Court, in which
    JUSTICE PETERSEN, JUDGE POHLMAN, JUDGE HARRIS,
    and JUDGE HAGEN joined.
    Having recused themselves, CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT,
    ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE, and JUSTICE HIMONAS
    do not participate herein.
    COURT OF APPEALS JUDGES JILL M. POHLMAN, RYAN M. HARRIS,
    and DIANA HAGEN sat.
    JUSTICE PEARCE, opinion of the Court:
    INTRODUCTION
    ¶1 This judicial discipline proceeding requires us to decide the
    appropriate sanction for a judge who has engaged in repeated
    misconduct. Judge Michael Kwan acknowledges that he violated the
    Utah Code of Judicial Conduct when he made seemingly shirty and
    politically charged comments to a defendant in his courtroom. Judge
    Kwan similarly admits that he violated the code of conduct when he
    lost his temper with a member of the court’s staff and improperly
    used his judicial authority to seek that individual’s removal from the
    premises. Moreover, in response to questions at oral argument,
    Judge Kwan conceded that an online post critical of then-presidential
    candidate Donald Trump also violated the code of conduct. But
    In re INQUIRY OF A JUDGE
    Opinion of the Court
    Judge Kwan argues that the six-month suspension the Judicial
    Conduct Commission (JCC) recommends is inappropriate. He claims
    that sanction rests, in part, on an unlawful attempt to regulate his
    constitutionally protected speech, and he asserts that a less severe
    penalty is all that is warranted.
    ¶2 Judge Kwan raises important First Amendment questions,
    but he fails to address our case law holding that a judicial
    disciplinary proceeding is an improper venue to press those
    constitutional claims. Bound by our precedent, we therefore do not
    address the constitutional questions, and we limit our consideration
    to that portion of Judge Kwan’s online speech that he concedes we
    can permissibly sanction. That statement, coupled with the other
    misconduct before us, as well as Judge Kwan’s history of prior
    discipline, convinces us that a six-month suspension without pay is
    the appropriate sanction.
    BACKGROUND
    History of Misconduct
    ¶3 Judge Kwan has served as a justice court judge for the City of
    Taylorsville for the past two decades. On multiple occasions, the JCC
    has reviewed allegations that Judge Kwan violated various
    provisions of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct. As a result of the
    JCC’s investigations into those allegations, Judge Kwan has received
    two letters of education from the JCC and two public reprimands
    from this court. The Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion
    Committee has also issued two opinions relating to Judge Kwan—
    one not expressly naming him but directed to his conduct, and
    another issued in response to his questions regarding, among other
    things, rules limiting judicial commentary on statements made by a
    candidate for political office. See Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory
    Committee, Informal Opinion 16-02 (2016); Utah State Bar Ethics
    Advisory Committee, Informal Opinion 15–01 (2015).
    ¶4 This guidance has been animated by two general concerns
    regarding Judge Kwan’s behavior: his improper use of judicial
    authority and his inappropriate political commentary. The JCC’s
    letters of education addressed Judge Kwan’s abuse of judicial
    authority, which manifested in improperly revoking probation,
    imposing jail in absentia, and ordering excessive bail. The letters
    were issued in response to complaints the presiding judge of the
    Taylorsville Justice Court lodged against Judge Kwan. The
    complaints followed multiple letters from the presiding judge to
    Judge Kwan, raising concerns about the manner in which he handled
    his cases. And in its communications, the JCC advised Judge Kwan
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    of its concerns that he had issued several warrants with excessive
    bail amounts and had not followed Utah law when revoking
    probation.
    ¶5 Our first public reprimand addressed Judge Kwan’s crass in-
    court reference to sexual conduct and a former president of the
    United States. During the underlying proceeding before the JCC
    concerning that comment, Judge Kwan acknowledged that the Utah
    Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to be patient, dignified,
    and courteous to those with whom the judge deals in an official
    capacity. See UTAH CODE JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.8(B). He also
    acknowledged that his comments violated that requirement and
    constituted conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
    ¶6 Our second public reprimand addressed political activities
    associated with Judge Kwan’s service as president of a nonprofit
    organization. The organization took public positions on a range of
    issues, criticized candidates for political office, and posted articles
    and press releases online that included Judge Kwan’s name and
    judicial title.
    ¶7 During the underlying proceeding before the JCC regarding
    that conduct, Judge Kwan again acknowledged that he had engaged
    in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and had
    violated several rules of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct. Among
    those rules were rule 1.2, which provides that “[a] judge . . . shall not
    undermine . . . public confidence in the independence, integrity, and
    impartiality of the judiciary and shall avoid impropriety and the
    appearance of impropriety,” UTAH CODE JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2,
    and Canon 4, which provides that “a judge . . . shall not engage in
    political . . . activity that is inconsistent with the independence,
    integrity, or impartiality of the judiciary,” 
    id. Canon 4.
        ¶8 During that same JCC proceeding, Judge Kwan
    acknowledged receiving guidance from the Utah State Bar Ethics
    Advisory Opinion Committee on these issues. That committee issued
    two informal opinions addressing Judge Kwan’s service as president
    of the nonprofit organization. The first opinion addressed “whether
    a full-time justice court judge may ethically serve as the national
    president of an organization dedicated to advancing the social,
    political, and economic well-being of a specific ethnic group.” Utah
    State Bar Ethics Advisory Committee, Informal Opinion 15–01 at 1
    (2015). Concluding that a judge may not, the opinion cited several
    principles regarding judicial service, including the obligation to not
    undermine public confidence in the independence and impartiality
    of the judiciary. 
    Id. at 4–5.
    The opinion tied that obligation directly to
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    Utah Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 4.1(A)(3), which provides that a
    judge shall not publicly endorse or oppose a candidate for any public
    office. 
    Id. at 4.
    The opinion then expressly advised that “[a] judge
    may not make any public statements that can be viewed as opposing
    or supporting a political candidate.” 
    Id. at 5.
        ¶9 The second informal opinion addressed the same topic,
    responding to questions Judge Kwan posed. Utah State Bar Ethics
    Advisory Committee, Informal Opinion 16-02 (2016). Among other
    things, Judge Kwan asked whether a judge may “criticize or
    commend statements made by a candidate for political office” if the
    judge does not “endorse[] or oppose[] the candidate.” 
    Id. at 1.
    The
    opinion reiterated that a judge is obligated to “uphold the integrity
    of the judiciary” and refrain from engaging in activities that would
    “undermine public confidence” in its independence and impartiality.
    
    Id. at 3.
    The opinion then responded that “[w]hen an individual is
    running for public office, a judge’s public comments either praising
    or criticizing that individual can be reasonably viewed as support or
    opposition.” 
    Id. The opinion
    thus concluded, in response to the
    question noted above, that “a judge’s comments commending or
    criticizing a political candidate . . . can reasonably be viewed as
    endorsing or opposing the candidate.” 
    Id. at 4.
                             Current Allegations
    ¶10 After the Utah State Bar issued these opinions, and shortly
    after we handed down our second public reprimand, the JCC began
    investigating additional potential misconduct. Specifically, the JCC
    investigated allegations that Judge Kwan: (1) made political
    statements in court, (2) handled a dispute with court personnel
    inappropriately, and (3) posted political comments online. During
    the investigation, Judge Kwan conceded that he had engaged in the
    behavior underlying the allegations.
    In-Court Political Statements
    ¶11 In January 2017, while presiding over a hearing, Judge
    Kwan launched into an exchange with a defendant that appeared to
    demean the defendant and included political commentary regarding
    President Trump’s immigration and tax policies:
    Judge: So, what happened with your fine payments?
    Defendant: So, I, just, live paycheck to paycheck . . . .
    Judge: Ok. So, when you set up the pay plan you were
    hoping you would have the money and it didn’t pan
    out that way?
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    Defendant: And I did not call, but I plan on when I get
    my taxes to just pay off all my court fines, because I
    cannot end up in jail again for not complying.
    Judge: You do realize that we have a new president,
    and you think we are getting any money back?
    Defendant: I hope.
    Judge: You hope?
    Defendant: I pray and I cross my fingers.
    Judge: Ok. Prayer might be the answer. ‘Cause, he just
    signed an order to start building the wall and he has no
    money to do that, and so if you think you are going to
    get taxes back this year, uh-yeah, maybe, maybe not.
    But don’t worry[,] there is a tax cut for the wealthy so if
    you make over $500,000 you’re getting a tax cut. You’re
    right[] there[,] right? Pretty close? All[]right, so do you
    have a plan? Other than just get the tax cut and pay it
    off? 1
    Dispute with Court Personnel
    ¶12 In February 2017, Judge Kwan learned that an
    administrative staff member had been promoted without his
    involvement. In response, Judge Kwan confronted the Clerk of Court
    in a manner that multiple witnesses described as “angry” and
    “screaming.” A short time later, Judge Kwan submitted a written
    notice for disciplinary action with respect to the Clerk of Court,
    threatened to put her on unpaid suspension pending termination,
    and directed her to be escorted from the premises via an email
    understood by its recipients to be a judicial order—in part because
    the email included a signature block indicating that it was a judicial
    order.2
    _____________________________________________________________
    1 Judge Kwan contends that this was intended to be funny, not
    rude. It is an immutable and universal rule that judges are not as
    funny as they think they are. If someone laughs at a judge’s joke,
    there is a decent chance that the laughter was dictated by the
    courtroom’s power dynamic and not by a genuine belief that the joke
    was funny.
    2 Judge Kwan testified before the JCC that the signature block
    was unintentionally included in the email. The JCC did not find that
    assertion credible based upon “Judge Kwan’s Stipulation, [his]
    (continued . . .)
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    Online Political Comments
    ¶13 During 2016, Judge Kwan repeatedly posted comments and
    shared articles on his Facebook and LinkedIn accounts regarding
    then-presidential candidate Donald Trump. 3 Judge Kwan continued
    to post comments and articles regarding Donald Trump following
    the presidential election. Over that same period, between mid-2016
    and early 2017, Judge Kwan posted comments or shared articles on
    several other topics including immigration, gun violence, and voter
    participation.
    ¶14 On November 8, 2016, for example, Judge Kwan wrote a
    lengthy post on voter participation, which opened, “Dear Generation
    X and Millennial Voters, So many people have tried to convince you
    of the importance of your participation in this year’s election. . . . Let
    me join in the effort . . . by giving you the cold, hard truth: You have
    to vote to stop your elders from screwing up your future!” Judge
    Kwan continued, “What kind of future do you want? Want help
    with your student loan debt? Want affordable tuition? Affordable
    health insurance? . . . Grab a friend and Go Vote.”
    ¶15 With respect to Donald Trump, Judge Kwan’s postings
    were laden with blunt, and sometimes indelicate, criticism. In July
    2016, for example, Judge Kwan posted an article entitled “Ghazala
    Khan: Trump criticized my silence. He knows nothing about true
    sacrifice.” Above the article’s headline, Judge Kwan added,
    “Checkmate.”
    ¶16 On September 26, 2016, the night of the first presidential
    debate between candidates Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton,
    Judge Kwan wrote:
    answers during his testimony, and [his] demeanor during
    testimony.” Judge Kwan has not challenged this finding, and we see
    no reason to disagree with it.
    3 Judge Kwan’s Facebook account was “private,” but Judge Kwan
    does not assert that this exempts those comments from regulation
    under the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct. In addition, Judge Kwan
    has not elaborated on the “limited number of friends” allegedly
    given access to his Facebook account or suggested that those
    individuals would not share his comments or postings more widely.
    Instead, Judge Kwan has acknowledged that “his posts [might] be
    reposted by his friends.”
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    Contradictory: person who got rich by not paying
    people for their work but complains about NATO not
    paying their fair share.
    Food for thought: If a person tries to show their ties to
    a community by talking about their investments and
    properties and not about the people of the
    community, it speaks to that person’s priorities.
    Quick question: Is the fact that the IRS has audited
    you almost every year when your peers hardly ever
    or never have been, something to be proud of? What
    does that say . . . about your business practices?
    Wish she said: “Donald, I’m used to having a man
    interrupt and dismiss me when I speak because
    egotistical men hav[e] been trying to do that to me for
    my entire career.”
    ¶17 On November 11, 2016, three days after the presidential
    election, Judge Kwan remarked, “Think I’ll go to the shelter to adopt
    a cat before the President-Elect grabs them all . . . .”
    ¶18 On January 20, 2017, the day President Trump was
    inaugurated, Judge Kwan commented, “Welcome to governing. Will
    you dig your heels in and spend the next four years undermining
    our country’s reputation and standing in the world? . . . Will you
    continue to demonstrate your inability to govern and political
    incompetence?”
    ¶19 On February 13, 2017, Judge Kwan posted, “Welcome to
    the beginning of the fascist takeover.” He continued, “[W]e need to
    . . . be diligent in questioning Congressional Republicans if they are
    going to be the American Reichstag and refuse to stand up for the
    Constitution, refuse to uphold their oath of office and enable the
    tyrants to consolidate their power.”
    ¶20 Again,      these   are   illustrative examples—not     a
    comprehensive recitation—of the comments and articles shared
    online by Judge Kwan that referenced Donald Trump and a range of
    other topics between mid-2016 and early 2017.
    Proceeding Before the JCC
    ¶21 The JCC brought formal charges against Judge Kwan,
    alleging that his conduct was “prejudicial to the administration of
    justice.” See UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 13 (authorizing the sanction of
    judicial “conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which
    brings a judicial office into disrepute”). The JCC also alleged that
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    Judge Kwan’s conduct violated various provisions of the Utah Code
    of Judicial Conduct.
    ¶22 In particular, the JCC alleged that Judge Kwan’s in-court
    political statements violated rules 1.2, 2.8, and 4.1. See UTAH CODE
    JUD. CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2017) (“A judge . . . shall not undermine . . .
    public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of
    the judiciary and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
    impropriety.”); 
    id. 2.8(B) (“A
    judge shall be patient, dignified, and
    courteous to litigants, . . . court staff, . . . and others with whom the
    judge deals in an official capacity . . . .”); 
    id. 4.1(A)(10) (“Except
    as
    permitted in this Canon, a judge . . . shall not . . . make any statement
    that would reasonably be expected to affect the outcome or impair
    the fairness of a matter pending or impending in any court . . . .”).
    ¶23 With respect to the dispute with court personnel, the JCC
    alleged that Judge Kwan violated rules 1.1, 1.3, and 2.8. See 
    id. 1.1 (“A
    judge shall comply with the law.”); 
    id. 1.3 (“A
    judge shall not
    abuse the prestige of judicial office to advance the personal or
    economic interests of the judge . . . .”); 
    id. 2.8(B). ¶24
    And based on the online postings, the JCC alleged that
    Judge Kwan violated rules 1.2, 3.1, 4.1(A)(3), and 4.1(A)(10). See 
    id. 1.2; id.
    3.1 (“[W]hen engaging in extrajudicial activities, a judge shall
    not: (A) participate in activities that will interfere with the proper
    performance of the judge’s judicial duties; (B) participate in activities
    that will lead to unreasonably frequent disqualification of the judge;
    [or] (C) participate in activities that would appear to a reasonable
    person to undermine the judge’s independence, integrity, or
    impartiality . . . .”); 
    id. 4.1(A)(3) (“Except
    as permitted in this Canon,
    a judge . . . shall not . . . publicly endorse or oppose a candidate for
    any public office . . . .”); 
    id. 4.1(A)(10). ¶25
    As noted above, Judge Kwan acknowledged engaging in
    the conduct, and he also conceded that some of that conduct violated
    the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct. He characterized his in-court
    political statements as an inappropriate attempt at humor, and he
    admitted that the statements violated rules 1.2 and 2.8. Similarly,
    regarding his dispute with court personnel, Judge Kwan noted that
    his conduct was improper and agreed that it violated rule 2.8.
    ¶26 But with respect to his online political commentary, Judge
    Kwan raised a constitutional challenge. He asserted that, under the
    First Amendment, his “comments on social media about elected
    officials’ policies and social and political issues” were
    “constitutionally protected speech.” Judge Kwan claimed that
    restrictions on social commentary or political dialogue “must survive
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    a strict scrutiny analysis, i.e., [the restrictions] must be narrowly
    tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.” Under that standard,
    Judge Kwan argued that the JCC could not constitutionally regulate
    speech addressing social or political issues or “public officials in
    general,” but only speech addressing “candidates for public office,”
    if that speech “expressly criticizes or praises [the] individual political
    candidate.”
    ¶27 In Judge Kwan’s view, his statements leading up to the
    presidential election were largely “social commentary or humor.” He
    asserted that while some of those statements could be “construed” as
    applying to then-presidential candidate Donald Trump, none were
    “expressly” critical of him. On that basis, Judge Kwan argued that
    sanctioning him for those statements would violate his First
    Amendment rights.
    ¶28 Judge Kwan characterized his post-election statements as
    “more direct, critical, and strident” with respect to Donald Trump,
    but contended those comments did not address a candidate for office
    and were “synonymous with [Judge Kwan’s] views on issues such as
    racism, civil rights, the plight of refugees, and constitutional limits
    on the executive branch.” Thus, he claimed, his post-election
    statements were also “protected under the First Amendment.”
    ¶29 Following a hearing, the JCC entered findings of fact and
    conclusions of law and determined that Judge Kwan’s conduct was
    prejudicial to the administration of justice. In addition, the JCC
    concluded that Judge Kwan’s in-court political statements violated
    Utah Code of Judicial Conduct Rules 1.2, 2.8, and 4.1(A)(10); his
    conduct stemming from the dispute with court personnel violated
    rules 1.3 and 2.8; and his online postings violated rules 1.2, 3.1,
    4.1(A)(3), and 4.1(A)(10).
    ¶30 The JCC did not weigh in on the constitutional issues. The
    JCC opined that “making conclusions of law about the degree to
    which the requirements of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct must
    yield to, or be reconciled with, the First Amendment, is beyond the
    scope of the [JCC’s] authority.” The JCC recognized, however, that
    Judge Kwan had “acknowledge[d] in his arguments that judicial
    speech which endorse[s] political candidates may be prohibited.”
    And the JCC limited its consideration to online postings by Judge
    Kwan that it concluded could be “viewed as endorsing or opposing”
    Donald Trump, during the period in which Donald Trump was a
    presidential candidate.
    ¶31 To determine the appropriate sanction, the JCC considered
    a number of factors, including the public and private forums in
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    which the conduct occurred, the deliberate (as opposed to
    spontaneous) nature of the online postings, the appearance of
    impropriety and actual impropriety that occurred, the historical
    pattern of misconduct, the prior guidance issued and prior sanctions
    imposed, and “the potential and actual harm to the public’s
    perception of fairness and impartiality in Utah’s judicial system.”
    ¶32 After “considering all of these factors,” the JCC determined
    that “six months suspension without pay is the most appropriate
    sanction for [Judge Kwan’s] violations of the Utah Code of Judicial
    Conduct.” The JCC issued an order providing that Judge Kwan be
    suspended without pay for six months.
    Proceeding Before This Court
    ¶33 An order of the JCC does not become effective until this
    court reviews and implements it. UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 13. Before
    us, Judge Kwan takes many of the same positions he maintained
    before the JCC. He concedes that his in-court political statement
    violated Utah Code of Judicial Conduct Rules 1.2 and 2.8. Likewise,
    he agrees that his handling of his dispute with court personnel was
    improper and violated rule 2.8.
    ¶34 Judge Kwan also reiterates the constitutional challenge he
    raised before the JCC regarding his online commentary. Without
    tailoring his arguments to the specific speech underlying the JCC’s
    order, Judge Kwan addresses his numerous online postings and
    asserts that his “comments on social media about elected officials’
    policies and social and political issues are constitutionally protected
    speech.” Judge Kwan claims strict scrutiny applies and, under that
    standard, speech that might be “construed” as critical of a candidate
    is protected, while “[s]peech that expressly criticizes or praises an
    individual candidate” may constitutionally be barred.
    ¶35 Judge Kwan thus designates “the independence and
    impartiality of the judiciary” as “a compelling state interest,” and
    stipulates that restricting speech regarding political candidates,
    “partisan politics and public elections is [a] narrowly focused” and
    constitutional practice. As he puts it, “[s]peech regarding political or
    social issues is protected,” but “speech that is reasonably and
    objectively a partisan political statement for or against a political
    candidate is not.”
    ¶36 In that vein, Judge Kwan fervently defends his asserted
    right to speak on political or social issues, particularly those of
    personal interest to him. Accordingly, he argues the JCC must make
    “an objective assessment of [his] comments to determine if [they] fall
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    within the narrow scope of speech that is not protected because it
    endorses or opposes a political candidate for office,” under the
    express endorsement or opposition standard he has articulated.
    Judge Kwan claims the JCC failed to engage in this type of analysis
    and, as a result, ordered a sanction “wholly disproportionate” to his
    conduct.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶37 The Utah Constitution provides that “[p]rior to the
    implementation of any” JCC order, this court “shall review the
    [JCC’s] proceedings as to both law and fact. [This] court may also
    permit the introduction of additional evidence. After its review, [this
    court] shall, as it finds just and proper, issue its order implementing,
    rejecting, or modifying the [JCC’s] order.” UTAH CONST. art. VIII,
    § 13. Under this framework, the JCC “acts in a role more akin to an
    independent advisory committee” than to “an independent body
    with the power to impose consequences on a judge.” In re Anderson,
    
    2004 UT 7
    , ¶ 10, 
    82 P.3d 1134
    (per curiam). Accordingly, the JCC’s
    findings of fact and conclusions of law are not binding on this court,
    
    id. ¶ 11,
    and the JCC’s recommended sanction receives no deference,
    In re Worthen, 
    926 P.2d 853
    , 865 (Utah 1996).
    ¶38 We recognize and appreciate, however, the significant
    contributions of the JCC’s investigatory proceedings and accord its
    findings, conclusions, and recommendations a “significant degree of
    respect.” In re Anderson, 
    2004 UT 7
    , ¶ 11. But, in the end, the
    constitutional responsibility to impose discipline rests with this
    court.
    ANALYSIS
    I. The Constitutional Questions
    ¶39 Judge Kwan raises a number of interesting and important
    constitutional issues—questions that, under our precedent, we
    cannot resolve in this action. Although neither the JCC nor Judge
    Kwan addresses the matter, we have repeatedly held that a judge
    may not raise a constitutional challenge for the first time in a judicial
    disciplinary proceeding. E.g., In re Christensen, 
    2013 UT 30
    , ¶¶ 8–10,
    
    304 P.3d 835
    ; In re Anderson, 
    2004 UT 7
    , ¶¶ 63–67, 
    82 P.3d 1134
    . We
    have stated that
    the appropriate standard of behavior for a judge is to
    observe the law as it exists at the time, and if he seeks
    to challenge it, to set forth his reasoning in a record of
    decision in a case before him or to bring an action
    seeking a declaratory judgment at the time the law’s
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    requirements allegedly infringe on his constitutional
    rights.
    In re Anderson, 
    2004 UT 7
    , ¶ 66.
    ¶40 When applying this principle, we have reviewed the record
    for evidence of a constitutional objection contemporaneous with the
    alleged infraction. E.g., In re Christensen, 
    2013 UT 30
    , ¶ 10 (“Before
    disciplinary proceedings commenced, Judge Christensen did not
    allege formally or informally that the [law] was unconstitutional.
    Nor do the record or the briefs suggest that Judge Christensen’s
    violation of the statute was causally related to or even temporally
    correlated with his belief that the law was unconstitutional.”); In re
    Anderson, 
    2004 UT 7
    , ¶ 65 (“[B]y failing to record his constitutional
    objection . . . in the cases before him, or in an action for declaratory
    judgment, Judge Anderson has failed to register his objection in any
    way contemporaneous with his refusal to observe the statutory
    requirements. He has therefore given us no reason to believe that
    constitutional principle motivated that refusal.”).
    ¶41 Absent such evidence, we have concluded that a judge has
    “no recourse” to raise the constitutional objection in the disciplinary
    proceeding. In re Anderson, 
    2004 UT 7
    , ¶¶ 64–67 (“Judge Anderson
    cannot . . . excuse his failure to obey the statute’s requirements after
    the fact by applying a rationale attacking those deadlines when that
    rationale plainly played no role in his refusal to observe the statutory
    deadlines for adjudicating cases.”); see also In re Christensen, 
    2013 UT 30
    , ¶¶ 8–10 (“[T]he record and the briefs suggest that only after the
    JCC issued formal charges against Judge Christensen did he
    formulate a constitutional justification for his actions. This is
    unacceptable behavior for a judge.”).
    ¶42 We have applied this rule in an effort to maintain public
    confidence in the integrity of our judges and our system of law. As
    we noted in In re Christensen, “The public’s respect for the judiciary is
    a necessary element of the rule of law,” and “[w]hen judges ignore
    the law with no apparent justification, they undermine public
    confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.” 
    2013 UT 30
    , ¶ 9 (citation
    omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Judges are accordingly
    held to a higher standard of compliance with the law than is the
    general public.” 
    Id. We have
    therefore required judges to raise
    constitutional objections at the time a violation occurs if they want to
    challenge the constitutionality of the regulation before us.
    ¶43 In other words, we have required judges who fail to abide
    by laws or rules to put the public on notice that their violation is
    based on a principled contention that the law or rule is, itself,
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                             Opinion of the Court
    unlawful. Without such notice, a judge may appear to violate laws or
    rules at will, in disregard of the legal system they are charged with
    administering. And when judges appear to consider themselves
    above the law, public confidence in the fairness and impartiality of
    our judicial and legal systems diminishes.
    ¶44 Judge Kwan has not pointed to any behavior putting the
    public on notice that his violation of the code of conduct was, in fact,
    a principled one. In particular, Judge Kwan does not assert that, at
    the time he posted his online comments, he raised a constitutional
    challenge to any provision of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct that
    might regulate his speech, such as rules 1.2, 3.1, or 4.1. See, e.g., UTAH
    CODE JUD. CONDUCT R. 1.2 (“A judge . . . shall not undermine . . .
    public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of
    the judiciary and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
    impropriety.”); 
    id. 3.1 (“[W]hen
    engaging in extrajudicial activities, a
    judge shall not . . . participate in activities that would appear to a
    reasonable person to undermine the judge’s independence, integrity,
    or impartiality . . . .”); 
    id. 4.1(A)(3) (“Except
    as permitted in this
    Canon, a judge . . . shall not . . . publicly endorse or oppose a
    candidate for any public office . . . .”); 
    id. 4.1(A)(10) (“Except
    as
    permitted in this Canon, a judge . . . shall not . . . make any statement
    that would reasonably be expected to affect the outcome or impair
    the fairness of a matter pending or impending in any court . . . .”).
    ¶45 Judge Kwan’s online postings thus give the appearance
    that Judge Kwan considered himself unfettered by the Utah Code of
    Judicial Conduct. That Judge Kwan engaged in this conduct in the
    face of, and contrary to, the guidance he sought, only amplifies the
    perception that Judge Kwan acted as if the rules did not apply to
    him. Because Judge Kwan did not challenge the application of the
    rules to him at the time he violated them, he is barred from asserting,
    in this proceeding, that we cannot constitutionally sanction judicial
    speech on social or political issues unless the speech expressly
    criticizes or praises a political candidate for office.
    ¶46 Still, we are mindful of the weighty implications of
    foreclosing arguments regarding a rule’s unconstitutionality in a
    proceeding in which the rule is being applied. And we can foresee
    potential quandaries that may arise in requiring judges to adhere to
    such a rule. A violation of the code of conduct might be the product
    of an off-the-cuff remark or a spontaneous interaction,
    unaccompanied by the foresight to quickly exclaim constitutional
    principles, in case a disciplinary proceeding might follow. And
    judges acting with greater intention and foresight may be forced to
    put a public spotlight on private activities or interests, when
    13
    In re INQUIRY OF A JUDGE
    Opinion of the Court
    engaging in conduct that appears to be constitutionally protected, on
    the off-chance the JCC might consider it sanctionable. 4
    ¶47 But this is our law, and Judge Kwan has not asked that In re
    Christensen and In re Anderson be overturned. We therefore leave for
    another day whether, applying the principles set forth in Eldridge v.
    Johndrow, 
    2015 UT 21
    , ¶ 22, 
    345 P.3d 553
    , our contemporaneous
    constitutional objection requirement should be reconsidered. And
    we do not reach the merits of Judge Kwan’s constitutional
    arguments.
    ¶48 Nevertheless, even if we were to accept Judge Kwan’s
    constitutional contentions, a favorable decision on those arguments
    would not alter the outcome of this proceeding. In In re Anderson and
    In re Christensen we considered conduct that violated the law as part
    of the judicial disciplinary proceeding, despite the judge’s arguments
    that those laws were unconstitutional. See In re Christensen, 
    2013 UT 30
    , ¶¶ 11–20; In re Anderson, 
    2004 UT 7
    , ¶¶ 75–91. We need not do
    that here. Because even if we only include the statement Judge Kwan
    concedes can be constitutionally regulated, the record before us
    merits a six-month suspension without pay. Infra ¶¶ 51–63.
    ¶49 Judge Kwan has repeatedly stated that judges may, in his
    view, constitutionally be prohibited from endorsing or opposing
    candidates for office. See UTAH CODE JUD. CONDUCT R. 4.1(A)(3)
    (“Except as permitted in this Canon, a judge . . . shall not . . . publicly
    endorse or oppose a candidate for any public office . . . .”). Judge
    Kwan initially coupled his concession with an assertion that to run
    afoul of rule 4.1(A)(3), a judge’s statement must expressly name a
    political candidate. During the hearing before this court, however,
    _____________________________________________________________
    4 We also note the unconventional nature of this rule, which we
    articulated and applied without citation to precedent in In re
    Christensen and In re Anderson. See In re Christensen, 
    2013 UT 30
    ,
    ¶¶ 8–10; In re Anderson, 
    2004 UT 7
    , ¶¶ 63–67. A review of other
    jurisdictions’ decisions suggests that, as a matter of course,
    constitutional challenges are considered in judicial disciplinary
    proceedings without any similar requirement. See, e.g., Inquiry
    Concerning a Judge No.14-488 re: Shepard, 
    217 So. 3d 71
    , 77–80 (Fla.
    2017); In re Chmura, 
    608 N.W.2d 31
    , 38–43 (Mich. 2000); In re Hill, 
    8 S.W.3d 578
    , 582–83 (Mo. 2000) (en banc); In re Vincent, 
    172 P.3d 605
    ,
    606–11 (N.M. 2007); In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against O’Toole,
    
    24 N.E.3d 1114
    , 1120–28 (Ohio 2014); In re Neely, 
    390 P.3d 728
    , 735–47
    (Wyo. 2017).
    14
    Cite as: 
    2019 UT 19
                             Opinion of the Court
    Judge Kwan addressed a September 26, 2016 posting, in which he
    implicitly referenced then-presidential candidate Donald Trump: “Is
    the fact that the IRS has audited you almost every year when your
    peers hardly ever or never have been, something to be proud of?
    What does that say . . . about your business practices?” In response
    to questions from the bench, Judge Kwan characterized the posting
    as “an inappropriate comment on a political candidate,” and stated
    that rule 4.1 could constitutionally be applied to restrict that speech. 5
    ¶50 Simply stated, we do not reach the merits of Judge Kwan’s
    constitutional arguments, as they are not properly before us under
    our unchallenged precedent. But Judge Kwan’s inability to press
    those claims does not have any bearing on the discipline he will
    receive. For the reasons discussed below, the single online posting
    regarding then–presidential candidate Donald Trump, together with
    the other conduct Judge Kwan admits violated the rules, viewed in
    light of Judge Kwan’s history of judicial discipline, amply justify the
    sanction the JCC ordered and we implement.
    II. The Appropriate Sanction
    ¶51 As noted above, Judge Kwan’s main opposition to
    implementation of the JCC’s six-month suspension order is his
    assertion that the order reflects an unconstitutional attempt to
    regulate protected speech. As also noted above, that argument is not
    before us. Judge Kwan is left with his secondary argument that a
    _____________________________________________________________
    5 During the hearing, Judge Hagen referenced the September 26,
    2016 posting and asked, “How is that not a comment on a particular
    candidate for political office?” Judge Kwan’s counsel replied, “It is a
    comment on a political candidate. And it’s an inappropriate
    comment on a political candidate . . . . When you talk about a
    candidate not paying his taxes, yes, that’s a statement that’s critical
    of that candidate.” Justice Pearce followed up, asking, “You believe
    that even if this September 26 statement is found to violate the rule,
    [it] would violate the judge’s constitutional rights to speak?”
    Counsel replied, “No. . . . [T]hat was an inappropriate comment by a
    judge . . . that violated the rule.” Counsel also agreed that the “rule
    could constitutionally be applied to the judge in this instance.” And
    when Judge Harris confirmed, “I think I perceive you conceding that
    there is at least one violation of the code whose constitutionality you
    are not challenging with regard to this September 26, 2016
    comment,” Counsel again replied, “Correct.”
    15
    In re INQUIRY OF A JUDGE
    Opinion of the Court
    lesser penalty, such as probation, would be a more appropriate
    incremental step-up in the sanctioning process.
    ¶52 Suspension without pay is a particularly significant penalty
    that carries substantial consequences. But given the record before us,
    it is the appropriate penalty. And six months is an appropriate term.
    A lesser period would fail to adequately address the degree to which
    Judge Kwan has varied from our judicial code, the repeat nature of
    Judge Kwan’s conduct, his disregard of the specific guidance and
    former discipline he has received, and the importance of the
    principles his conduct has trampled.
    ¶53 The confidence the public places in our state judicial
    system, and the respect afforded our rulings, turns in large part on
    our collective credibility. Thus, “[i]nherent in all the [r]ules
    contained in [the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct] are the precepts
    that judges, individually and collectively, must respect and honor
    the judicial office as a public trust and strive to maintain and
    enhance confidence in the legal system.” UTAH CODE JUD. CONDUCT
    Preamble [1]. And “[c]onduct that compromises or appears to
    compromise the independence, integrity, and impartiality of a judge
    undermines public confidence in the judiciary.” 
    Id. 1.2 cmt.
    3. In
    other words, every time a judicial officer engages in misconduct, he
    or she spends the goodwill of the judiciary as a whole.
    ¶54 Here, we readily conclude that Judge Kwan has been
    spending our goodwill. As Judge Kwan admits, his in-court political
    comment regarding President Donald Trump violated Utah Code of
    Judicial Conduct Rules 1.2 and 2.8. See UTAH CODE JUD. CONDUCT R.
    1.2 (“A judge . . . shall not undermine . . . public confidence in the
    independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary and shall
    avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”); 
    id. 2.8(B) (“A
    judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, . . .
    court staff, . . . and others with whom the judge deals in an official
    capacity . . . .”). 6 This comment continues a pattern of behavior that
    led to our first public reprimand of Judge Kwan, following his in-
    _____________________________________________________________
    6 Because it is unnecessary to the resolution of this proceeding,
    we do not resolve whether the comments also violated rule 4.1, as
    the JCC concluded. See UTAH CODE JUD. CONDUCT R. 4.1(A)(10)
    (“Except as permitted in this Canon, a judge . . . shall not . . . make
    any statement that would reasonably be expected to affect the
    outcome or impair the fairness of a matter pending or impending in
    any court . . . .”).
    16
    Cite as: 
    2019 UT 19
                             Opinion of the Court
    court reference to sexual conduct and a former president of the
    United States. And it demonstrates an ongoing failure to exercise
    appropriate judgment and restraint when making statements during
    judicial proceedings.
    ¶55 Moreover, as Judge Kwan concedes, his handling of his
    dispute with court personnel—regarding an administrative matter
    undertaken without his involvement—violated rule 2.8. See UTAH
    CODE JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.8(B). We recognize there may be instances
    in which a judge, attempting his or her best efforts, might
    nevertheless fail to handle an administrative matter with the highest
    degree of patience and courtesy. And not “every transgression” of
    the high standards to which judges are held is meant to “result in the
    imposition of discipline.” 
    Id. Scope [6].
    But this proceeding does not
    involve an intraoffice disagreement in which a judge’s conduct fell
    just short of the ideal. Rather, Judge Kwan’s interactions with court
    personnel were well outside the bounds of any acceptable range of
    behavior.
    ¶56 Witnesses reported that Judge Kwan’s outburst was
    intense. And as the JCC concluded, it was followed by an
    inappropriate attempt to use the judicial office to impose severe
    consequences—including a threat of suspension and attempted
    removal from the premises—on a court employee, in violation of
    rule 1.3. See 
    id. 1.3 (“A
    judge shall not abuse the prestige of judicial
    office to advance the personal or economic interests of the judge
    . . . .”).
    ¶57 Finally, Judge Kwan concedes that he posted online
    commentary in violation of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct. As
    Judge Kwan acknowledged before this court, at least one of his
    online comments criticized then-presidential candidate Donald
    Trump in violation of rule 4.1(A)(3). See 
    id. 4.1(A)(3) (“Except
    as
    permitted in this Canon, a judge . . . shall not . . . publicly endorse or
    oppose a candidate for any public office . . . .”).
    ¶58 “An independent, fair and impartial judiciary is
    indispensable to our system of justice.” 
    Id. Preamble [1].
    By
    criticizing a political candidate for office, Judge Kwan engaged in
    conduct that would appear to a reasonable person to undermine his
    independence or impartiality, in violation of rules 1.2 and 3.1. See 
    id. 1.2; id.
    3.1(C) (“[W]hen engaging in extrajudicial activities, a judge
    shall not . . . participate in activities that would appear to a
    reasonable person to undermine the judge’s independence, integrity,
    17
    In re INQUIRY OF A JUDGE
    Opinion of the Court
    or impartiality . . . .”). 7 While Judge Kwan’s comments addressed a
    candidate for national political office, and Judge Kwan may not
    decide national-scale issues as a justice court judge, those issues may
    still bear, or appear to bear, in some respects on questions that arise
    in his courtroom. Or cause those who disagree with Judge Kwan’s
    politics to believe that they will not receive a fair shake when they
    appear before him.
    ¶59 But the problem here is not primarily a concern that Judge
    Kwan has voiced his views on a range of political issues via his
    criticisms of Donald Trump. Far more importantly, Judge Kwan has
    implicitly used the esteem associated with his judicial office as a
    platform from which to criticize a candidate for elected office.
    Fulfillment of judicial duties does not come without personal
    sacrifice of some opportunities and privileges available to the public
    at large. And as a person the public entrusts to decide issues with
    utmost fairness, independence, and impartiality, a judge must at
    times set aside the power of his or her voice—which becomes
    inextricably tied to his or her position—as a tool to publicly influence
    the results of a local, regional, or national election.
    ¶60 Judge Kwan’s postings continue a pattern of inappropriate
    political commentary, as previously addressed in our second public
    reprimand, following Judge Kwan’s service as president of a
    national organization that, among other things, criticized candidates
    for political office. What’s more, the Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory
    Opinion Committee offered substantial guidance to Judge Kwan on
    this topic. Judge Kwan nevertheless engaged in behavior that
    violates our code of conduct, despite the prior attempts to dissuade
    him from that path.
    ¶61 We thus conclude, as did the JCC, that Judge Kwan has
    violated several rules of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct. And he
    has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice
    which brings a judicial office into disrepute. See UTAH CONST. art.
    VIII, § 13.
    _____________________________________________________________
    7  Again, because it is unnecessary to the resolution of this
    proceeding, we do not address whether Judge Kwan’s online
    postings also violated rule 4.1(A)(10), as the JCC concluded. For the
    same reason, we do not determine whether Judge Kwan’s numerous
    other online postings violated any provisions of the Utah Code of
    Judicial Conduct.
    18
    Cite as: 
    2019 UT 19
                            Opinion of the Court
    ¶62 Whether to impose discipline, and the type of discipline to
    be imposed, depends on several factors such as the seriousness of the
    improper activity, “the extent of any pattern of improper activity,
    whether there have been previous violations, and the effect of the
    improper activity upon the judicial system or others.” UTAH CODE
    JUD. CONDUCT Scope [6]. Taking these factors into account, we
    conclude, as did the JCC, that a six-month suspension is the
    appropriate sanction.
    ¶63 We give significant weight to the fact that Judge Kwan has
    been the subject of prior discipline and the recipient of prior
    guidance. We note that previous endeavors to help Judge Kwan
    correct this behavior have not been successful. And we regretfully
    conclude that a sanction less severe than suspension without pay
    will suffer the same fate as our prior attempts. Repeated instances of
    misconduct are serious matters, which may render a judge not only
    subject to suspension, but also to removal from office. Judge Kwan’s
    behavior denigrates his reputation as an impartial, independent,
    dignified, and courteous jurist who takes no advantage of the office
    in which he serves. And it diminishes the reputation of our entire
    judiciary. For these reasons, we implement the JCC’s order without
    modification.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶64 We implement the JCC’s order. We do not reach the
    constitutional questions Judge Kwan raises regarding his social
    media postings, and we limit our review to the online statement that
    Judge Kwan admits can be constitutionally restricted. Based on that
    speech, the other misconduct at issue here, as well as Judge Kwan’s
    history before the JCC and before this court, we conclude that a six-
    month suspension without pay is the appropriate sanction.
    19
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Case No. 20171041

Citation Numbers: 2019 UT 19, 443 P.3d 1228

Judges: Pearce, Petersen, Pohlman, Harris, Hagen, Having, Durrant, Lee, Himonas

Filed Date: 5/22/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024