In re D.G. ( 2017 )


Menu:
  •                     This opinion is subject to revision before final
    publication in the Pacific Reporter
    
    2017 UT 79
    IN THE
    SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
    R. G. and D.G., 1
    Appellants,
    v.
    STATE OF UTAH,
    Appellee.
    Nos. 20141046 and 20141047
    Filed: November 15, 2017
    On Certification from the Court of Appeals
    Third Juvenile Court
    The Honorable Kimberly K. Hornak
    Nos. 1095932 and 1095934
    Attorneys:
    Sam N. Pappas, Monica Maio, Salt Lake City, for appellants
    Sean D. Reyes, Att’y Gen., John L. Nielsen, Asst. Sol. Gen.,
    Kristin L. Zimmerman, Salt Lake City, for appellee
    JUSTICE DURHAM authored the opinion of the Court, in which
    CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE,
    JUSTICE HIMONAS, and JUSTICE PEARCE joined.
    JUSTICE DURHAM, opinion of the Court:
    INTRODUCTION
    ¶1 D.G. and R.G. were accused of aggravated sexual assault in
    juvenile court. Both D.G. and R.G. filed a motion to suppress their
    post-Miranda statements regarding the sexual assault to a detective
    during an interview at their school. The juvenile court held an
    evidentiary hearing and denied the motion to suppress the post-
    1 In re R.G. and In re D.G. have been consolidated for purposes of
    this opinion.
    R. G. and D. G. v. STATE
    Opinion of the Court
    Miranda statements. Both interviews with the detective regarding the
    sexual assault were introduced at trial. D.G. and R.G. were
    adjudicated delinquent for committing aggravated sexual assault.
    The court of appeals certified the case to this court; we have
    jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(b).
    ¶2 We hold that the juvenile court did not err in denying D.G.’s
    and R.G.’s motion to suppress their post-Miranda statements. And,
    considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding their
    waivers, we hold that D.G. and R.G. knowingly and voluntarily
    waived their Miranda rights during the interview with the detective
    at their school. 2
    BACKGROUND
    ¶3 Near the beginning of the school year in 2013, two fourteen-
    year-old boys, D.G. and R.G. went over to another male friend’s
    house after school. After receiving a phone call from R.G., the victim
    and her friend, also both fourteen years of age, took the bus and
    joined D.G. and R.G. at the friend’s house. D.G., R.G., and the third
    friend drove to the bus stop to pick up the two girls. While at the
    house, R.G. held a box cutter to the victim’s throat and engaged in
    nonconsensual sexual intercourse with the victim. D.G., the other
    2 We emphasize that although our conclusion that the waiver in
    these cases was knowing and voluntary, this holding should not be
    read to foreclose the ability of juveniles in future cases to advance
    both case-specific and general evidence and argument, including
    expert testimony, to show either that they did not knowingly and
    voluntarily waive their rights or that the test we employ to assess the
    validity of a juvenile waiver is scientifically flawed and in need of
    modification or overhaul. We recognize that the science of juvenile
    development is a rich, relevant, and rapidly evolving area that bears
    directly on the issues before us. See generally Hayley M. D. Cleary,
    Police Interviewing and Interrogation of Juvenile Suspects: A Descriptive
    Examination of Actual Cases, 38 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 271 (2014); Eric Y.
    Drogin & Richard Rogers, Juveniles and Miranda: Current Research and
    the Need to Reform How Children Are Advised of Their Rights, 29-WTR
    CRIM. JUST. 13 (2015), Jean Pierce, Note, Juvenile Miranda Waivers: A
    Reasonable Alternative to the Totality of the Circumstances Approach,
    2017 BYU L. Rev. 195. We acknowledge in these instances that these
    constitutional arguments and related evidence are not adequately
    before us. Based on the record evidence in these cases, we find no
    error in the proceedings below.
    2
    Cite as: 
    2017 UT 79
                            Opinion of the Court
    boy in the room during the sexual assault, also engaged in
    nonconsensual oral sex with the victim.
    ¶4 A few months later, the victim reported the sexual assault
    involving D.G. and R.G. to the West Valley City police. A West
    Valley City detective conducted individual interviews with D.G. and
    R.G. at their school in the school resource officer’s office without a
    parent present for either minor. D.G. was interviewed first, and
    R.G.’s interview followed.
    ¶5 At the beginning of D.G.’s interview, the detective told D.G.
    why he was there and described his role as a detective. He asked
    D.G.: “You know what we do, right, police detectives? You know,
    we investigate things that may be crimes.” The detective told D.G., “I
    just have to let you know that you don’t have to talk to me.” He then
    recited the Miranda rights to D.G. without pausing to check for
    understanding until after the rehearsed speech. Following the
    warning, the detective informed D.G. that he could “stop answering
    questions at any time and [he could] request counsel at any time
    during questioning.” He asked D.G., “Do you understand those
    rights?” Then, the detective informed D.G. that he was not under
    arrest and he was not telling him anything to make him scared. The
    detective again asked, “Having those rights in mind, can I let you
    know [why] I’m here, you want to talk to me, tell me what is going
    on?” D.G. agreed to talk with the detective and eventually confessed
    to participating in non-consensual sex with the victim at the request
    of R.G.
    ¶6 As R.G.’s interview began, the detective said to R.G.: “The
    law makes sure and requires me to tell you what your rights are,
    okay?” The detective then recited the Miranda warning to R.G. from
    memory. His recitation was without the intonation and inflections
    that normally gives meaning and nuance in verbal speech. The
    volume of his voice lowers, and he speaks quickly in a well-
    rehearsed speech. The detective then asked R.G. the following
    questions: “Do you understand those rights?” “Having those rights
    in mind, can I talk to you?” and “Do you want to talk to me?” R.G.
    then proceeded to talk to the detective, eventually confessing to
    actions that amount to aggravated sexual assault.
    ¶7 In February 2014, the state filed a petition in juvenile court
    alleging aggravated sexual assault against D.G. and R.G. based on
    testimony from the victim and the confessions obtained in these
    interviews. D.G. and R.G. each filed a Motion to Suppress Statements
    and Request for Evidentiary Hearing, arguing that their Miranda
    waivers to the detective during the interviews at the school were not
    “made knowingly and voluntarily in violation of the Fifth and
    3
    R. G. and D. G. v. STATE
    Opinion of the Court
    Fourteenth Amendments.” Each later filed an amended motion to
    suppress.
    ¶8 The juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing regarding the
    Miranda waivers and the motion to suppress. Both of the boys’
    mothers and the detective testified at the hearing. The juvenile court
    denied D.G.’s and R.G.’s motions to suppress their testimony given
    during their interviews with the detective, and the statements were
    later introduced at trial. The juvenile court found that the detective
    asked D.G. and R.G. questions to be sure they understood their
    rights and that D.G. and R.G. were honors students capable of
    understanding their rights, and held that the Miranda rights waivers
    were valid.
    ¶9 After a bench trial, the juvenile court adjudicated both D.G.
    and R.G. delinquent for committing aggravated sexual assault.
    D.G.’s sentence included state supervised probation, completion of
    an early intervention program, a five-day detention, a Sexual
    Behavior Risk Assessment (SBRA), 150 hours of community service,
    and a requirement to provide fingerprints, a photograph, and a DNA
    specimen. R.G.’s sentence included state supervised probation, 150
    hours of community service, one day of detention, an SBRA, a
    requirement to provide fingerprints, a photograph, and a DNA
    specimen, a no-contact order with D.G., and completion of an early
    intervention program. 3 D.G. and R.G. filed motions to stay their
    sentence and timely appealed. The record is silent on the court’s
    3 In this appeal, we have not been asked to review the sentence,
    but note the difficult and multivariate facets of sentencing juvenile
    delinquents. Aggravated sexual assault is a crime that if committed
    by an adult would lead to a sentence of 15 years to life. UTAH CODE
    § 76-5-405(2)(a)(i). Juvenile courts have the difficult task of balancing
    the consequences of the adjudicated delinquents with the hope for
    rehabilitation and providing victims assurance that the court takes
    personal violations such as this seriously, realizing the likely
    significant physical and psychological harm. See infra ¶¶ 13–16. We
    also note that juveniles adjudicated delinquent based on aggravated
    sexual assault are considered “sex offenders” under Utah Code
    section 77-41-102 and will likely be required to register as sex
    offenders, which has a significant negative impact on their future
    prospects for education and employment. See UTAH CODE § 77-41-
    105; see also Marsha Levick & Riya Saha Shah, The Momentum Builds:
    Challenging Lifetime Registration of Juveniles Convicted of Sexual Offenses
    in the Post-Roper Era, N.Y.U. Review of Law & Social Change: Panel
    Series on Sex Offender Registration Laws, 40 HARBINGER 115 (2016).
    4
    Cite as: 
    2017 UT 79
                            Opinion of the Court
    decision regarding D.G.’s motion to stay. The juvenile court granted
    R.G.’s Motion to stay the SBRA, DNA sample, and fingerprinting
    pending appeal, but not the community service.
    ¶10 The issue now before this court is whether D.G. and R.G.
    knowingly and voluntarily waived their Miranda rights during the
    interview with the detective at their school. We hold that the Miranda
    warnings given to D.G. and R.G. were sufficient according to the
    standards this court and the United States Supreme Court have set,
    and that both D.G. and R.G. knowingly and voluntarily waived their
    Miranda rights. Accordingly, we hold that the juvenile court did not
    err in denying the motion to suppress their post-Miranda statements.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶11 “We review for correctness a trial court’s ultimate ruling
    regarding the validity of a Miranda waiver, while ‘granting some
    degree of discretion to the trial court because of the wide variety of
    factual settings possible.’” State v. Bybee, 
    2000 UT 43
    , ¶ 16, 
    1 P.3d 1087
    (citations omitted). The findings of fact of the trial court are
    reviewed for clear error. 
    Id. ANALYSIS ¶12
    We begin our analysis by discussing the unique purposes
    and development of the juvenile justice system. We then turn to a
    discussion of Miranda and its application to juvenile suspects.
    Finally, we analyze D.G.’s and R.G.’s rights with these sets of facts
    and under these particular circumstances.
    I. JUVENILE COURTS AND MODERN-DAY JUSTICE
    ¶13 For more than 50 years, the juvenile court system in Utah
    has been “charged . . . with the protection of other citizens and
    property from the wrongful acts of children, while recognizing the
    unique need to do all that is reasonable to salvage a child who has
    strayed from the path of acceptable behavior.” State ex rel. K.M., 
    2007 UT 93
    , ¶¶ 34–35, 
    173 P.3d 1279
    (Wilkins, A.C.J., concurring). The
    purpose of juvenile courts is to “promote public safety and
    individual accountability,” “order appropriate measures to promote
    guidance and control,” adjudicate matters, and “consistent with the
    ends of justice, act in the best interest of the minor in all cases and
    preserve and strengthen family ties.” UTAH CODE § 78A-6-102(5). 4
    Many of the juvenile justice provisions in the Utah Code were
    4
    amended in the 2017 general session and are in effect as of August 1,
    (continued . . .)
    5
    R. G. and D. G. v. STATE
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶14 The juvenile court systems across the United States have
    evolved from the idea of a grandfatherly figure (not necessarily a
    judge) providing guidance and counsel to wayward youth, to the
    use of courts that resemble adult courts in almost every aspect. In
    Utah, these reforms include the creation of the Utah Youth Court
    Diversion Act. 
    Id. § 78A-6-1201
    to -1210. This program provides
    alternative options for qualified juveniles to be referred out of the
    juvenile court system and receive varied dispositions of their case.
    See 
    Id. § 78A-6-1205.
    Furthermore, specialized judges “steeped in the
    policy and theory of juvenile justice” are tasked with “select[ing]
    from the vast array of alternatives those most likely to meet the
    multiple goals of a juvenile court proceeding.” State ex rel. K.M., 
    2007 UT 93
    , ¶ 39. The changes in the juvenile court system have led to
    improvements in constitutional protections for juveniles. But we
    acknowledge the difficult task juvenile courts face in balancing the
    need and desire to help and re-orient troubled youth with the
    demands of justice for their criminal behavior.
    ¶15 Although the juvenile court system now more closely
    resembles adult courts, some variances still exist. Recognizing the
    differences in adult and juvenile behavior and culpability, “we
    employ a slightly different system of justice” for each. 
    Id. ¶ 38.
    For
    example, juvenile courts are closed proceedings, use different
    language and terminology, and require adult intervention (either
    through parents, legal guardians, or guardians ad litem). 
    Id. ¶ 39.
    They also take age, experience, and emotional maturity into
    consideration when considering their ability to give consent, waive
    rights, and suffer consequences.
    ¶16 Because of the “significantly enhanced treatment and
    protection options, services, and reduced penalties available . . . we
    do not extend to the child all of the adult protections of our criminal
    justice system.” 
    Id. ¶ 42
    (“As a matter of state and national policy, we
    have declined to grant directly to children the full scope of criminal
    due process and other constitutional protections ordinarily afforded
    accused adults. Instead, we focus our efforts on protecting them
    from the life-long consequences of acts committed when adult
    judgment and mature experience are as yet not available to them.”).
    For example, juveniles are not entitled to a jury of their peers and
    consequences in the juvenile courts are “measure[d] in part by the
    likelihood that a child’s pattern of behavior can and will be modified
    (continued . . .)
    2017. See H.B. 239, 62d Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2017). These reforms
    are inapplicable here but may affect assessments in future cases.
    6
    Cite as: 
    2017 UT 79
                             Opinion of the Court
    in the direction of proper and acceptable behavior as a result” of the
    designated consequences. 
    Id. ¶ 35.
                     II. MIRANDA WAIVERS AND MINORS
    ¶17 In Haley v. Ohio, the Supreme Court recognized that minors
    can be “easy victim[s] of the law” and cannot be “judged by the
    more exacting standards of maturity.” 
    332 U.S. 596
    , 599 (1948). Later,
    in Fare v. Michael C., the Supreme Court imported a totality of the
    circumstances test regarding whether a minor is able to waive
    Miranda rights, constitutionalizing a standard regarding minors’
    rights to knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive their rights.
    
    442 U.S. 707
    , 724–25 (1979). 5
    ¶18 In Utah, the process of determining whether juveniles are
    capable of knowingly and voluntarily waiving their rights begins
    with Utah Rule of Juvenile Procedure 27A, which governs the
    admissibility of statements given by minors without a parent or legal
    custodian present. When the minors are under 14, the presumption
    is that they are not capable of waiving their rights without a parent
    figure present under rule 27A(a)(1). Since both minors in this case
    were at least 14, we focus on rule 27A(a)(2), which states that “if the
    minor is 14 years of age or older, the minor is presumed capable of
    knowingly and voluntarily waiving the minor’s rights without the
    benefit of having a parent, guardian, or legal custodian present
    during questioning.” 6 Only after this determination do we proceed
    5 While not raised in this case, we note that juveniles are not
    entirely “independent actors with individual rights. . . . [P]olice
    questioning of minors also threatens the rights of parents, ‘perhaps
    the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the
    Supreme] Court.’” Note, Juvenile Miranda Waiver and Parental Rights,
    126 HARV. L. REV. 2359, 2359 (2013) (third alteration in original)
    (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 
    530 U.S. 57
    , 65 (2000) (plurality opinion)).
    When government actors “threaten[] to break ‘familial bonds, [they]
    must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.’” 
    Id. (quoting Santosky
    v. Kramer, 
    455 U.S. 745
    , 754 (1982)). Interrogation
    without the presence of an interested adult “creates a substantial risk
    that children will be removed from their parents after confessing
    falsely” and may also “cause psychological harm that damages the
    parent-child relationship.” 
    Id. 6D.G. and
    R.G. argued in their briefs that the presumption in
    Utah Rule of Juvenile Procedure 27A(a)(2) is unconstitutional under
    Tague v. Louisiana, 
    444 U.S. 469
    (1980). We do not reach this issue
    because it was not preserved below. Counsel argued before this
    (continued . . .)
    7
    R. G. and D. G. v. STATE
    Opinion of the Court
    to the totality of the circumstances test to determine whether
    Miranda rights were validly waived by a minor as outlined in State v.
    Bybee, 
    2000 UT 43
    , ¶ 17, 
    1 P.3d 1087
    . This includes considering the
    following factors:
    (1) Age,
    (2) Intelligence,
    (3) Education,
    (4) Experience,
    (5) The minor’s ability to comprehend the meaning and effect of
    his statement,
    (6) Whether the police used any coercive tactics in obtaining the
    waiver, and
    (7) Whether a parent, adult friend, or attorney was present.
    
    Id. (continued .
    . .)
    court that the exceptional circumstances exception to preservation
    applies because our court of appeals pointed this issue out in its
    certification to this court. But the court of appeals’ identification of
    an issue sua sponte in a certification order is not the type of “rare
    procedural anomaly” that meets the exception to preservation rule.
    In re Adoption of K.A.S., 
    2016 UT 55
    , ¶ 19, 
    390 P.3d 278
    . Additionally,
    while the juvenile court cited this rule as a factor in its analysis, it did
    not rely solely on this presumption to find that R.G. and D.G. validly
    waived their rights. Rather, it correctly weighed the elements
    outlined in Bybee. We do not decide the constitutional dimensions of
    this rule in this case, but it is within our domain to refer this rule to
    our rulemaking committee under the broader policy questions that
    exist in light of the growing body of research available on child and
    adolescent development and the ability of children to understand
    and waive their rights, and low recidivism rates. See generally Jenny
    E. Carroll, Brain Science and the Theory of Juvenile Mens Rea, 
    94 N.C. L
    .
    REV. 539 (2016); Christopher Northrop & Krisitina Rothley Rozan,
    Kids Will Be Kids: Time for a “Reasonable Child” Standard for the Proof of
    Objective Mens Rea Elements, 
    69 Me. L
    . Rev. 109 (2017); LAURENCE
    STEINBERG ET AL., U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, OFFICE JUVENILE JUSTICE &
    DELINQUENCY        PREVENTION,       PSYCHOSOCIAL      MATURITY         AND
    DESISTANCE FROM CRIME IN A SAMPLE OF SERIOUS JUVENILE OFFENDERS
    (2015); Drogin & Rogers, supra note 2. But see Terry A. Maroney, The
    False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE
    DAME L. REV. 89 (2009).
    8
    Cite as: 
    2017 UT 79
                             Opinion of the Court
    ¶19 As in all Miranda waiver cases, “the State bears the burden
    of showing that the accused gave a valid waiver of his Miranda rights
    prior to making incriminating statements during custodial
    interrogation.” State v. Dutchie, 
    969 P.2d 422
    , 427 (Utah 1998). This
    includes a consideration of “[a]ge” and [w]hether a parent, adult
    friend, or attorney was present,” regardless of the presumption
    established in Rule 27A(a)(2). Bybee, 
    2000 UT 43
    , ¶ 17.
    ¶20 However, once the State has met the burden of showing that
    the waiver was otherwise valid (knowing, voluntary, and
    intelligent), the minor, along with being able to contest all factors in
    the totality of the circumstances test, can also offer evidence to
    overcome the presumption of rule 27A “by a preponderance of the
    evidence showing the . . . inability of the minor to comprehend and
    waive the minor’s rights.” UTAH R. JUV. P. 27A(b).
    III. THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE
    MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE POST-MIRANDA STATEMENTS
    ¶21 The juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing on D.G.’s and
    R.G.’s motion to suppress their post-Miranda statements. It
    addressed each of the seven factors to be considered in the totality of
    circumstances test in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
    regarding the evidentiary hearing. We now address each factor for
    each defendant in turn.
    A. The Totality of the Circumstances Supports that D.G. Knowingly
    and Voluntarily Waived His Miranda Rights
    ¶22 First, the juvenile court found D.G. to be 15 years of age.
    There is nothing about D.G.’s age alone that overcomes his waiver.
    Additionally, D.G. affirmed that he understood his rights when
    asked by the detective. The court further found that there was “no
    evidence that [D.G.] did not understand the Detective,” nor was
    there any evidence that “he was confused or scared.” D.G. did not
    provide any evidence to rebut his affirmative statement that he
    understood his rights.
    ¶23 Second, as to D.G.’s intelligence, the juvenile court found
    that D.G. had “straight A’s in school [and was] an honor student.”
    The court also found that D.G. was of “above average intelligence.”
    Nothing from these findings weighs against D.G.s ability to
    intelligently waive his rights.
    ¶24 Third, when considering education, the juvenile court found
    that D.G.’s education level was “appropriate for his age” and there
    was no evidence that “he ha[d] any learning or mental disabilities.”
    D.G. also “read at a ninth grade or even higher level.” These facts do
    not give any cause for concern regarding D.G.’s education that
    9
    R. G. and D. G. v. STATE
    Opinion of the Court
    would weigh against his ability to knowingly waive his rights under
    the totality of the circumstances test.
    ¶25 Fourth, the juvenile court found that D.G. had no prior
    experience with law enforcement or the court system. While this
    weighs against his ability to knowingly waive his rights, this factor
    alone is not enough to overcome the weight of the other factors that
    indicate a valid waiver.
    ¶26 Fifth, as to D.G.’s ability to comprehend the meaning and
    effect of his statements, the juvenile court also found that D.G.
    “understood his rights.” Additionally, there is no evidence that
    during the interview D.G. was scared or confused or felt intimidated
    in any way so as to impair his comprehension.
    ¶27 Sixth, no coercive tactics were used by the officer during the
    interview. The juvenile court found that the detective asked D.G.
    questions to be sure he understood his rights. Specifically, the
    detective asked D.G. “Do you understand those rights?” “Does that
    make sense?” “Can I let you know why I’m here? You want to talk to
    me, tell me what is going on?” The detective also informed D.G. that
    he could stop answering questions at any time and request an
    attorney at any time during the interview. Additionally, the
    detective told D.G. that he was not telling him his rights “to make
    him scared” and that he was not under arrest. We find no evidence
    in the record that any intimidation tactics or coercion by the
    detective would invalidate D.G.’s waiver. The interview was
    relatively short and occurred at a place that was familiar to D.G. 7
    There was no evidence of any threats or promises in exchange for
    speaking to the detective.
    ¶28 Last, we consider the fact that D.G. did not have a parent,
    legal guardian, or attorney present during the interview with the
    detective. D.G. did not ask for a parent or attorney to be present
    during the interview even though D.G. was informed he could have
    an attorney present. As we have previously stated, “while the
    7 We do not address the issue of custody or determine whether “a
    reasonable [student would] have felt he or she was at liberty to
    terminate the interrogation and leave.” J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 
    564 U.S. 261
    , 270 (2011) (citation omitted). However, in the future there
    may be an “opportunity to address the need to alter the custody
    analysis for interrogations taking place in the school setting.” Kelli L.
    Ceraolo, Note, Custody of the Confined: Consideration of the School
    Setting in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 91 NEB. L. REV. 979, 980 (2013).
    10
    Cite as: 
    2017 UT 79
                               Opinion of the Court
    presence of a parent or an attorney is a factor that should be
    considered by the court, it is not determinative, and the lack thereof
    does not make the waiver invalid per se.” State v. Dutchie, 
    969 P.2d 422
    , 429 (Utah 1998).8 This is only one factor to consider among the
    other factors.
    ¶29 The state met its burden of showing that the waiver was
    knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily given in this case. D.G. did
    not offer adequate evidence that would counter a finding that he
    knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights. Considering the
    totality of the circumstances including D.G.’s age, intelligence, ability
    to comprehend the questions asked by the detective after giving the
    Miranda warnings, and lack of coercive tactics used by the detective,
    we hold that the Miranda warnings were sufficient.
    ¶30 Further, D.G. did not “overcome by a preponderance of the
    evidence” the presumption in rule 27A that D.G. is “capable of
    knowingly and voluntarily waiving [his] rights without the benefit
    of having a parent, guardian, or legal custodian present during
    questioning.” UTAH R. JUV. P. 27A. The juvenile court did not err in
    denying D.G.’s motion to suppress his post-Miranda statements to
    the detective.
    B. The Totality of the Circumstances Support that R.G. Knowingly
    and Voluntarily Waived His Miranda Rights
    ¶31 First, the juvenile court found that R.G. was 15 years of age,
    and that “the law clearly provides that a juvenile 14 or older can be
    interviewed without a parent,” (citing State v. Bybee, 
    2000 UT 43
    , 
    1 P.3d 1087
    ). Accordingly, without further evidence to the contrary,
    R.G.’s age by itself does not overcome the finding by the juvenile
    court that his Miranda waiver was valid.
    ¶32 Second, as to R.G.’s intelligence, “all the evidence would
    indicate that R.G. is of average intelligence.” No evidence was
    presented to indicate that he had any learning disabilities or was
    8 Although not a decisive factor in this case, we note that neither
    the school nor the detective called D.G.’s nor R.G.’s parents to inform
    them that the interviews were taking place. This is concerning. This
    is a particular problem in school settings. Police officers in urban
    areas who interview juvenile suspects at school are less likely to
    contact the parents of juveniles than police officers in suburban
    areas. Note, Juvenile Miranda Waiver and Parental Rights, 126 HARV. L.
    REV. 2359, 2372–73 & nn. 150–52 (2013).
    11
    R. G. and D. G. v. STATE
    Opinion of the Court
    failing any classes. Nothing about R.G.’s intelligence weighs in favor
    of invalidating his Miranda waiver.
    ¶33 Third, we consider R.G.’s education. All evidence indicates
    that he has the “appropriate education level of a fifteen-year-old.”
    There is nothing in the record to indicate that he is in any resource or
    special classes or that there is any cause for concern regarding his
    education level.
    ¶34 The fourth factor is R.G.’s experience with law enforcement
    or the court system. R.G. has had no prior experience with law
    enforcement or the court system. However, this alone does not
    outweigh the other factors that favor a holding of validity.
    ¶35 Fifth, as to R.G.’s ability to comprehend the meaning and
    effect of his statements, the juvenile court found that R.G.
    “understood his rights.” There is no evidence that R.G. was confused
    or scared during the interview. As the juvenile court found, R.G.
    answered the detective’s questions affirmatively, that he understood
    his rights, and that he indicated that he wished to speak with the
    detective.
    ¶36 Sixth, no coercive tactics were used by the officer during the
    interview. The juvenile court found that the detective asked R.G.
    four questions to be sure he understood his rights. Specifically, the
    detective told R.G.
    The law makes sure and requires me to tell you what
    your rights are, okay? Not to scare you. It doesn’t mean
    you’re under arrest. You’re not going anywhere. The
    law just says if I want to talk to you, I just have to tell
    you that, I’m required to do that. So that’s what I’m
    going to do first, okay?
    Then after giving the Miranda warning, the detective asked, “Do you
    understand those rights?” “Having those rights in mind, can I talk to
    you?” “Do you want to talk to me?” Nothing in the record indicates
    that the detective threatened R.G. in any way.
    ¶37 Seventh, we consider the fact that R.G. did not have a
    parent, legal guardian, or attorney present during the interview with
    detective. R.G. did not ask for a parent or attorney to be present
    during the interview even though R.G. was informed he could have
    an attorney present. The state also met its burden of showing that the
    waiver was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily given in R.G.’s
    case. R.G. did not provide evidence that would counter a finding
    that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights. Considering
    the totality of the circumstances including R.G.’s age, intelligence,
    ability to comprehend the questions asked by the detective after
    12
    Cite as: 
    2017 UT 79
                             Opinion of the Court
    giving the Miranda warnings, and lack of coercive tactics used by the
    detective, we hold that the Miranda warnings were sufficient.
    ¶38 The State met its burden of showing that the waiver was
    knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily given in this case. R.G. did
    not offer adequate evidence to counter a finding that he knowingly
    and voluntarily waived his rights. Considering the totality of the
    circumstances including R.G.’s age, intelligence, ability to
    comprehend the questions asked by the detective after giving the
    Miranda warnings, and the lack of coercive tactics used by the
    detective, we hold that the Miranda warnings were sufficient.
    ¶39 Further, R.G. did not “overcome by a preponderance of the
    evidence” the presumption in rule 27A that R.G. is “capable of
    knowingly and voluntarily waiving [his] rights without the benefit
    of having a parent, guardian, or legal custodian present during
    questioning.” UTAH R. JUV. P. 27A. The juvenile court also did not err
    in denying R.G.’s motion to suppress his post-Miranda statements to
    the detective.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶40 Although the interviews conducted by the detective might
    not be a model of best practices regarding the delivery of the Miranda
    warnings to a minor and the inquiry into the juvenile’s
    understanding of his rights, 9 we hold that under the totality of the
    9 Best practices might include notifying a parent or guardian of
    the minor before he or she is interviewed; having a parent or
    guardian present during an interview; videotaping of interviews;
    providing the Miranda warning in “language comprehensi[ble] to a
    juvenile,” as well as stopping to check for understanding after each
    right is explained, having the juvenile repeat each right in his own
    words; and interviewing the juvenile in a setting that is perceived as
    non-custodial (where the juvenile would feel free to leave) rather
    than in a setting where free movement of students is implicitly
    constricted, like a school setting. Ceraolo, supra note 7, at 991–96; see
    also Drogin & Rogers, supra note 2. R.G.’s and D.G.’s arguments
    appear to push this court to adopt a per se rule that these best
    practices must be followed for a juvenile to validly waive his
    Miranda rights. While these may be best practices that would make it
    much easier to find a valid waiver, the constitution does not
    mandate that these procedures be strictly followed in every case. The
    constitution only mandates that the juvenile knowingly, intelligently,
    and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights given the totality of the
    circumstances. See Fare v. Michael C., 
    442 U.S. 707
    , 724–25 (1979).
    13
    R. G. and D. G. v. STATE
    Opinion of the Court
    circumstances including the Miranda warnings were sufficient in
    these cases. The juvenile court did not err in denying D.G’s or R.G.’s
    motions to suppress their post-Miranda statements to the detective.10
    The evidence surrounding the totality of the circumstances shows
    that both D.G. and R.G. knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
    waived their Miranda rights during their interviews with the
    detective at their school.
    10   We note the problematic balance of affording a juvenile
    delinquent the benefits of rehabilitation—individualized assessment,
    adjudication, and consequences—with the demands of due process,
    particularly in the case of Miranda warnings. From a policy
    standpoint, it might be that encouragement of confession in the
    confines of a juvenile court is in the best interest of both the juvenile
    and society, upholding the ideal of supporting troubled youth who
    are more amenable to rehabilitation. See supra ¶ 13; see also LAURENCE
    STEINBERG ET AL., supra note 6. Parents also seem to agree with this
    stance, more often than not encouraging their child to confess. See
    Pierce, supra note 2, at 219. However, antithetical policy issues arise
    when juveniles are bound over to criminal court and tried as adults
    or receive consequences that last beyond their juvenile years (such as
    mandatory sex offender status). See UTAH CODE §§ 78A-6-602(3), -701
    through -704 (describing when juveniles may be or must be removed
    from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and transferred to a district
    court in Utah); 
    id. § 77-41-102(17)(f)
    (describing juveniles who qualify
    as “[s]ex offender[s]”). Without the protective umbrella of the
    juvenile court in these cases especially, “admissions and confessions
    of juveniles require special caution,” because “a mere child” is “an
    easy victim of the law.” In re Gault, 
    387 U.S. 1
    , 45 (1967) (citation
    omitted). See also Pierce, supra note 2, at 205–11, 217 (noting the
    research supporting the inability of children to voluntarily,
    knowingly, and intelligently waive their Miranda rights and
    advocating for “a fixed procedural requirement that juveniles must
    first consult with an attorney before making a valid waiver”).
    14