Heslop v. Bear River Mutual Insurance Co. ( 2017 )


Menu:
  •                  This opinion is subject to revision before final
    publication in the Pacific Reporter
    
    2017 UT 5
    IN THE
    SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
    NATALIE HESLOP and BRANDON HESLOP,
    Appellants,
    v.
    BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Appellee.
    No. 20150697
    Filed January 24, 2017
    On Direct Appeal
    Third District, Salt Lake
    The Honorable William W. Barrett
    No. 150900930
    Attorneys:
    Ronald E. Dalby, John P. Lowrance, Timothy E. Pettitt, South Jordan,
    for appellants
    Kristin A. Van Orman, Jeremy G. Knight, Salt Lake City, for appellee
    JUSTICE PEARCE authored the opinion of the Court in which
    CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE,
    JUSTICE DURHAM, and JUSTICE HIMONAS joined.
    JUSTICE PEARCE, opinion of the Court:
    INTRODUCTION
    ¶1 Natalie Heslop (Heslop) rolled her truck down an
    embankment. She told the responding police officer, her family, and
    medical personnel that the accident had been a suicide attempt. Ten
    days after the crash, she told an insurance adjuster that her “mind
    wasn’t right,” she had taken “too many pills” the day before the
    crash, and that the crash was “pretty much a suicide attempt.” Her
    insurance policy provided that it would exclude coverage “to any
    injured person, if the person’s conduct contributed to his injury . . .
    by intentionally causing injury to himself.” The district court granted
    HESLOP v. BEAR RIVER
    Opinion of the Court
    summary judgment to Bear River Mutual Insurance Company (Bear
    River) as to both Natalie Heslop’s personal injury claim and her
    husband Brandon Heslop’s property damage claim. It also denied
    the Heslops’ request for a continuance to permit additional
    discovery. We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2 On Sunday, October 5, 2014, Heslop overdosed on
    prescription Ambien and Lexapro. The next day, she decided to
    drive through Ogden Canyon to “look at the leaves.” While in the
    canyon, Heslop, unseatbelted, rolled her truck down an
    embankment. She suffered a hairline fracture to her C7 vertebrae.
    She received a skin graft and stitches over her right eye. She was also
    admitted to a hospital behavioral unit for several days.
    ¶3 On October 16, a Bear River insurance adjuster called Heslop
    to question her about the accident. Heslop told the adjuster that her
    crash in the canyon “was pretty much a suicide attempt.” The
    adjuster asked, “you mean driving off the cliff was a, a suicide
    attempt?” She responded, “Yeah.” The adjuster asked Heslop,
    “Okay, and then what, you just saw an edge there and decided, you
    know, this is it?” Again she responded, “Yeah.” When the agent
    asked Heslop if she had admitted to anybody else that her crash was
    a suicide attempt, she told him, “my whole family knows . . . , I told
    the police and all the doctors knew.”
    ¶4 When the adjuster asked Heslop why she had attempted
    suicide, she responded, “I had a bad reaction to a medication”; “I
    was going to the doctors all the time, everyone was just treating me
    for anxiety and the medications weren’t fixing it”; and “without the
    medication being right my mind wasn’t right and, and I, I don’t
    know, I know it wasn’t the right choice.” She also told the insurance
    adjuster “I think it’s due to my medications not being where they
    should have been.”
    ¶5 Heslop expressed concern that admitting the crash was a
    suicide attempt would impact her coverage. Her insurance policy’s
    property damage provision covers only “accidental loss of or
    damage to [a] covered car.” And the policy’s intentional injury
    exclusion provision “does not apply . . . to any injured person, if the
    2
    Cite as: 
    2017 UT 5
                            Opinion of the Court
    person’s conduct contributed to his injury . . . by intentionally
    causing injury to himself.” 1
    ¶6 The Heslops attempted to collect from Bear River under both
    a personal injury protection (PIP) claim for Heslop’s personal
    injuries and a property damage claim for damage to the truck. But
    ten days after Heslop’s interview with the insurance adjuster, the
    Heslops received a letter from Bear River denying their claims. Bear
    River based its denial on Heslop’s admission that she intended to
    drive down the embankment. It explained that because Heslop
    “admitted to us that she was trying to use the vehicle to intentionally
    take her life by driving off the cliff, we cannot see how this can be
    considered ‘accidental’ loss.”
    ¶7 The Heslops asked Bear River to reconsider its decision. In
    support of their request, the Heslops forwarded a letter from
    Heslop’s psychiatrist, Dr. Ben Holt. Dr. Holt had begun treating
    Heslop after the incident. Dr. Holt explained that the day before the
    crash, Heslop had “overdosed on a large amount of Ambien and
    Lexapro in a suicide attempt.” Dr. Holt stated that as a result of
    ingesting the drugs, Heslop had developed “serotonin syndrome,”
    which can induce “agitated delirium” and “disorientation,” among
    other things. Dr. Holt explained that “[s]ome of the irrational
    behavior [Heslop] experienced, including driving her car off the
    road[,] could be contributed [sic] to the serotonin syndrome and
    possible agitated delirium and disorientation she experienced after
    the overdose the day prior to the incident.”
    ¶8 In February 2015, the Heslops filed a complaint against Bear
    River alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good
    faith and fair dealing, statutory relief, and intentional infliction of
    emotional distress. In April, Bear River moved for summary
    judgment. It argued that both Utah Code section 31A-22-309 and the
    terms of the insurance policy barred the Heslops’ claim. Bear River
    contended that the Heslops could not be compensated for property
    damage because the “crash was not accidental in nature, but the
    _____________________________________________________________
    1 This intentional injury exclusion provision mirrors the language
    of Utah Code section 31A-22-309(2)(a)(iii), which allows for
    exclusion of personal injury protection coverage benefits “to any
    injured person, if the person’s conduct contributed to his injury . . .
    by intentionally causing injury to himself.”
    3
    HESLOP v. BEAR RIVER
    Opinion of the Court
    result of Ms. Heslop’s intentional effort to crash her vehicle.” It
    reasoned that Dr. Holt’s letter averring that Heslop’s serotonin
    syndrome “could contribute to ‘irrational acts,’ . . . did not opine that
    it did contribute to her act, or more importantly, that [it] negated her
    intent.” Bear River argued, “there is no dispute that Ms. Heslop
    contributed to her injuries when she intentionally drove her vehicle
    off the Ogden Canyon roadway in a suicide attempt.”
    ¶9 The Heslops opposed Bear River’s motion for summary
    judgment. They contended that “[t]here is a genuine issue of
    material fact as to whether [Heslop] had the mental capacity to
    perform an intentional act.” The Heslops cited Hoffman v. Life
    Insurance Company of North America for the proposition that “mental
    disease or defect of the insured is a relevant consideration in
    determining whether an insured’s [injury] is accidental.” 
    669 P.2d 410
    , 419 (Utah 1983). They further cited Hoffman for the proposition
    that
    where the insured suffers from a mental disease or
    defect so that he is not likely to be able to appreciate
    the consequences of his conduct, or cannot control his
    conduct in light of the probable consequences, then the
    test is subjective, and [injury] may be accidental even
    though a rational person in the same circumstances
    would have expected [injury] to be the probable result
    of his conduct.
    
    Id. ¶10 The
    Heslops also offered a letter from Dr. Michael
    Crookston. Dr. Crookston’s letter spoke to the likely effects of
    Ambien on Heslop the day of the crash. He did not interview
    Heslop, but he reviewed Dr. Holt’s letter. Dr. Crookston averred that
    [s]ince Ms. Heslop took an overdose of Ambien, any
    and all statements she may have made concerning
    subsequent events, including the next day, are
    immediately suspect and unreliable. Under the
    influence of an Ambien overdose it is highly likely that
    Ms. Heslop was impaired cognitively and therefore
    could not fully appreciate the consequences of her
    actions or have the ability to fully control her actions.
    ¶11 At the end of their memorandum, the Heslops asked the
    court for a continuance. The Heslops requested—citing Utah Rule of
    4
    Cite as: 
    2017 UT 5
                            Opinion of the Court
    Civil Procedure 56(f) 2—additional time to permit “further
    discovery” into Heslop’s “mental state, capacity, the effects of
    serotonin syndrome, or the effects of large amounts of Ambien and
    Lexapro to the human system.” In support of this request, the
    Heslops included a sworn affidavit of their attorney. The attorney
    stated that he believed “additional discovery is required prior to this
    matter being able to be fully adjudicated on the merits.” He opined
    that he also believed both Dr. Holt and Dr. Crookston “would testify
    under oath as to the veracity of the information and opinions
    currently contained in their letters.”
    ¶12 The district court granted Bear River’s motion for summary
    judgment. It stated that Heslop’s PIP coverage was governed by the
    Utah statute and the insurance policy’s intentional injury exclusion
    provision. The court noted a Michigan case in which the insured had
    intentionally crashed his car in a suicide attempt and had introduced
    an affidavit from a medical professional stating that he was severely
    depressed, coming off prescription drugs, and lacked the mental
    capacity to form the intent to commit suicide. Miller v. Farm Bureau
    Mut. Ins. Co., 
    553 N.W.2d 371
    , 377 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996). The Miller
    court held that the “intentional acts” clause in the policy prevented
    the insured from collecting under the policy. 
    Id. The district
    court
    adopted the Michigan case’s reasoning that “when the evidence
    unequivocally shows that the insured intended his or her actions, the
    existence of mental illness does not alter that conclusion.” 
    Id. ¶13 The
    district court further reasoned that “Dr. Holt’s [letter]
    did not opine that the Serotonin Syndrome contribute[d] to Mrs.
    Heslop’s act, or that Serotonin Syndrome negated her intent.” It
    further noted that Dr. Crookston’s letter did not opine “that [Heslop]
    was ‘sleep driving’ at the time she drove off the road, or that she
    cannot remember what she did.” In the end, the court found that the
    doctors’ equivocal statements regarding Heslop’s mental status did
    not sufficiently rebut “the undisputed facts [that] unequivocally
    show that [Heslop] intended to drive off the road in a suicide
    attempt.”
    _____________________________________________________________
    2 In 2015, rule 56(f) became rule 56(d). See UTAH R. CIV. P. 56
    (2015). We, thus, refer to the 2014 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure—
    which govern this case—and keep the reference to rule 56(f).
    5
    HESLOP v. BEAR RIVER
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶14 The district court concluded, “There is no dispute that Mrs.
    Heslop expected to be injured when she drove off the Ogden
    Canyon road or that she intended to kill herself. Accordingly, the
    intentional acts exclusion of the Policy and Utah Code . . . apply in
    this case.” It further concluded that “Brandon Heslop’s first-party
    cause of action against [Bear River] also fails as a matter of law due
    to the intentional acts exclusion,” because “he is part owner and a
    named insured of the vehicle, not a third-party victim in this
    accident” and because Utah law “does not require that Defendant
    insure itself against loss imposed by the law for damages caused by
    its named insured.” “Rather,” the court stated, “liability falls upon
    [Heslop], who is also a named insured and the one who caused the
    damage.”
    ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    ¶15 The Heslops contend that the district court erred when it
    granted summary judgment both “on the issue of Personal Injury
    Protection (PIP) coverage” and “on the issue of property damage.”
    We review a grant of summary judgment for correctness. Helf v.
    Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 
    2015 UT 81
    , ¶ 46, 
    361 P.3d 63
    . We give no
    deference to the district court’s legal conclusions and consider
    whether the court correctly decided “that no genuine issue of
    material fact existed.” 
    Id. We “review
    the facts in a light most
    favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was
    granted.” Larson v. Wycoff Co., 
    624 P.2d 1151
    , 1153 (Utah 1981).
    ¶16 The Heslops also contend that the district court abused its
    discretion when it denied their rule 56(f) motion for a continuance.
    See UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(f) (2014). We review a district court’s grant or
    denial of a rule 56(f) motion for abuse of discretion. Crossland Sav. v.
    Hatch, 
    877 P.2d 1241
    , 1243 (Utah 1994). “[W]e will not reverse unless
    the [court’s] decision exceeds the limits of reasonability.” 
    Id. ANALYSIS I.
    The District Court Appropriately Granted Summary Judgment
    to Bear River on the Personal Injury Protection Claim
    ¶17 The Heslops contend that “the district court erred in
    granting Bear River’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of
    PIP coverage” because there is a genuine issue of material fact
    concerning Heslop’s ability “to form intent at the time of her
    injuries.” The Heslops argue that both Heslop’s interview and the
    doctors’ letters raise a factual question as to Heslop’s ability to form
    6
    Cite as: 
    2017 UT 5
                             Opinion of the Court
    intent. They also contend that the district court erred by adopting the
    Michigan court’s reasoning that the existence of mental illness does
    not prevent a court from concluding that an insured’s actions are
    intentional.
    ¶18 The district court found that the intentional injury exclusion
    provision in Heslop’s policy defeated her PIP claim because Heslop
    admitted she intentionally drove her car off the road. The court
    noted that, “in determining whether an injury was accidental or
    intentional, the Utah Supreme Court has focused on whether the
    result was intended or expected.” (Citing N.M. ex rel Caleb v. Daniel
    E., 
    2008 UT 1
    , ¶ 11, 
    175 P.3d 566
    (citing Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of N.
    Am., 
    669 P.2d 410
    , 416 (Utah 1983))). But the district court also
    applied the Miller test from Michigan, explaining that “when the
    evidence unequivocally shows that the insured intended his or her
    actions, the existence of mental illness does not alter that
    conclusion.” Miller v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 
    553 N.W.2d 371
    , 377
    (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
    ¶19 In finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as
    to Heslop’s intent, the court reasoned that Dr. Holt “did not opine
    that the Serotonin Syndrome contribute[d] to [Heslop’s] act, or that
    [it] negated her intent.” It further reasoned that Dr. Crookston’s
    letter on the effects of Ambien did not opine that Heslop was “‘sleep
    driving’ at the time she drove off the road, or that she [could not]
    remember what she did.” The district court thus concluded that
    [t]he undisputed facts in this case demonstrate that
    [Heslop’s] intent was to commit suicide, regardless of
    Serotonin Syndrome, prior medication usage, or
    knowing such was a “wrong choice.” There is no
    dispute that [Heslop] expected to be injured when she
    drove off the Ogden Canyon Road or that she intended
    to kill herself.
    ¶20 “We review [a] district court’s summary judgment ruling for
    correctness, granting no deference to its legal conclusions, and
    consider whether it correctly concluded that no genuine issue of
    material fact existed.” Helf v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 
    2015 UT 81
    , ¶ 46,
    
    361 P.3d 63
    (alteration in original). In determining whether a factual
    dispute exists, we apply “an objective standard.” Clegg v. Wasatch
    Cty., 
    2010 UT 5
    , ¶ 15, 
    227 P.3d 1243
    . The objective standard asks
    “whether reasonable jurors, properly instructed, would be able to
    come to only one conclusion, or if they might come to different
    7
    HESLOP v. BEAR RIVER
    Opinion of the Court
    conclusions, thereby making summary judgment inappropriate.” 
    Id. But “where
    there could be no reasonable difference of opinion on [a
    question of fact] in light of the available evidence, ‘the decision is
    one of law for the trial judge or for an appellate court.’” AMS Salt
    Indus., Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of Am., 
    942 P.2d 315
    , 320 (Utah 1997)
    (citation omitted).
    ¶21 In the summary judgment context, “[t]he word ‘genuine’
    indicates that a district court is not required to draw every possible
    inference of fact, no matter how remote or improbable, in favor of
    the nonmoving party.” IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc.,
    
    2008 UT 73
    , ¶ 19, 
    196 P.3d 588
    . “Instead, it is required to draw all
    reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” 
    Id. (emphasis in
    original). And although circumstantial evidence may sometimes
    raise an inference strong enough to create a genuine issue of material
    fact on summary judgment, to be reasonable, the inference must
    present something more than pure speculation. See USA Power, LLC
    v. PacifiCorp, 
    2016 UT 20
    , ¶ 137, 
    372 P.3d 629
    ; State v. Hester, 2000 UT
    App 159, ¶ 16, 
    3 P.3d 725
    (noting the difference between drawing a
    reasonable inference and “merely speculating about possibilities”).
    ¶22 In distinguishing between a reasonable inference and
    speculation, an “inference is a deduction as to the existence of a fact
    which human experience teaches us can reasonably and logically be
    drawn from proof of other facts.” Manchester v. Dugan, 
    247 A.2d 827
    ,
    829 (Me. 1968). Speculation, on the other hand, is the “act or practice
    of theorizing about matters over which there is no certain
    knowledge.” Speculation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
    Of course, “there is no black line between inference and
    speculation.” Hester, 
    2000 UT App 159
    , ¶ 17. But a reasonable
    inference exists when “there is at least a foundation in the evidence
    upon which the ultimate conclusion is based,” while “in the case of
    speculation, there is no underlying evidence to support the
    conclusion.” Harding v. Atlas Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 
    2012 UT App 236
    ,
    ¶ 7, 
    285 P.3d 1260
    .
    ¶23 “A single sworn statement is sufficient to create an issue of
    fact.” Webster v. Sill, 
    675 P.2d 1170
    , 1172 (Utah 1983). But
    an affidavit must do more than reflect the affiant’s
    opinions and conclusions. The affidavit must ‘set forth
    specific facts’ showing there is a genuine issue for trial.
    The mere assertion that an issue of fact exists without a
    proper evidentiary foundation to support that assertion
    8
    Cite as: 
    2017 UT 5
                               Opinion of the Court
    is insufficient to preclude the granting of a summary
    judgment motion.
    
    Id. (citations omitted).
         ¶24 In sum, we will “affirm a grant of summary judgment only
    if there are no disputed issues of material fact and, with the facts and
    all reasonable inferences viewed in the light most favorable to the
    nonmoving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law.” Jensen ex rel. Jensen v. Cunningham, 
    2011 UT 17
    , ¶ 36,
    
    250 P.3d 465
    .
    A. A district court may consider an insured’s mental disease or
    defect when determining whether injuries are accidental or intentional
    ¶25 The district court correctly noted that “in determining
    whether an injury was accidental or intentional, the Utah Supreme
    Court has focused on whether the result was intended or expected.”
    Relying on Miller, the district court also concluded that, “when the
    evidence unequivocally shows that the insured intended his or her
    actions, the existence of mental illness does not alter that
    conclusion.” Miller v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 
    553 N.W.2d 371
    , 377
    (Mich. Ct. App. 1996). The Heslops contend that the Miller test
    stands “in direct opposition to Utah Law.”
    ¶26 Although “direct opposition” overstates the point, we
    generally agree with the Heslops that Miller’s standard does not
    accurately reflect the way Utah courts have approached the question.
    Instead, we recognize that the effects of mental illness can impact the
    ability of an insured to intend her actions. In Hoffman v. Life Insurance
    Company of North America, we stated that in Utah, “[t]he law is firmly
    established that the mental disease or defect of the insured is a
    relevant consideration in determining whether an insured’s death is
    accidental.” 
    669 P.2d 410
    , 419 (Utah 1983).
    ¶27 In the insurance context, we have defined “accident” as
    descriptive of means [that] produce effects [that] are
    not their natural and probable consequences. . . . The
    [natural and] probable consequence of the use of given
    means is the consequence [that] is more likely to follow
    from their use than it is to fail to follow.
    N.M. ex rel. Caleb v. Daniel E., 
    2008 UT 1
    , ¶ 6, 
    175 P.3d 566
    (citing
    Richards v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 
    200 P. 1017
    , 1023 (Utah 1921)
    (omission in original). If a result is “the natural and probable
    9
    HESLOP v. BEAR RIVER
    Opinion of the Court
    consequence of an act or course of action,” it is not accidental. N.M.,
    
    2008 UT 1
    , ¶ 6.
    ¶28 We determine “what is natural and probable from the
    insured’s perspective.” 
    Id. ¶ 9.
    But we assume, unless the evidence
    demonstrates otherwise, that the insured is an average person who
    will understand the natural and probable consequences of her
    actions. See 
    id. (“[W]e apply
    ‘an objective test unless the evidence
    shows that the insured is not an “average individual.”’” (citation
    omitted)). In other words, “[e]ach individual may be considered the
    average individual unless the facts disclose that in reality he is not.”
    
    Hoffman, 669 P.2d at 419
    (citation omitted). “[W]hen the facts do so
    show, then the question of the accidental nature of the result must be
    measured by this knowledge.” 
    Id. ¶29 For
    example, in N.M., we acknowledged that an eight-year-
    old child was not the average insured because “eight–year-old
    children lack the experience, maturity and reasoning skills of
    adults.” 
    2008 UT 1
    , ¶ 9. Similarly, in Hoffman, we suggested that the
    insured’s mental delusions likely prevented him from understanding
    the consequences of his actions in the same way the average person
    
    would. 669 P.2d at 420
    . Thus, “when the actual state of mind of the
    insured can be established, the probability of [injury] resulting from
    certain conduct should be judged in light of that state of mind.” 
    Id. at 419.
        ¶30 This is not to say, however, that the existence of mental
    illness leads inexorably to the conclusion that the insured did not
    understand the natural and probable consequences of her actions.
    On the contrary, “if the insured actually knows that his or her
    [injury] is more likely than not to occur, the [injury] is not
    accidental.” 
    Id. Hoffman instructs
    the court to consider whether the
    insured “subjectively expect[ed]” her conduct to cause the likely
    consequences of her actions. 
    Id. Thus, “if
    the insured cannot
    subjectively expect [her] conduct will produce [her injury] because of
    a mental disease or defect, the [injury] is accidental.” 
    Id. Where mental
    illness is concerned, Hoffman instructs that it is only where
    (1) the insured “is not likely to be able to appreciate the
    consequences of [her] conduct” or (2) “cannot control [her] conduct
    in light of the probable consequences” that the court should consider
    an occurrence to be accidental, “even though a rational person in the
    same circumstances would have expected [injury] to be the probable
    result of [her] conduct.” 
    Id. 10 Cite
    as: 
    2017 UT 5
                              Opinion of the Court
    ¶30 The Heslops’ appeal thus turns upon whether the evidence
    they forward to defeat summary judgment creates a genuine issue of
    material fact on the questions of whether Heslop (1) could appreciate
    the consequences of driving down the embankment or (2) could
    control herself from driving off the road even in light of likely injury
    or death. 3
    B. Heslop did not provide evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue
    of material fact on the questions of whether she could appreciate the
    consequences of her actions and whether she could control her actions
    in light of their probable consequences
    ¶31 The Heslops relied on two doctors’ letters to show that
    “there is a genuine issue of material fact” as to whether Heslop had
    “the mental capacity to ‘intentionally cause [. . .] injury to [her]self.’”
    ¶32 Dr. Holt’s letter opined on a condition known as “serotonin
    syndrome”:
    Some of the irrational behavior [Heslop] experienced,
    including driving her car off the road[,] could be
    contributed [sic] to the serotonin syndrome and possible
    agitated delirium and disorientation she experienced
    after the overdose the day prior to the incident.
    (Emphases added.) Dr. Crookston’s letter opined on the effects of
    Ambien in the system:
    [I]t is highly likely that Ms. Heslop was impaired
    cognitively and therefore could not fully appreciate the
    consequences of her actions or have the ability to fully
    control her actions.
    (Emphases added.)
    ¶33 But neither letter supports the conclusion that Heslop failed
    “to appreciate the consequences of [her] conduct.” 
    Hoffman, 669 P.2d at 419
    . To be clear, under Hoffman, evidence supporting a reasonable
    inference that Heslop failed to appreciate the consequences of her
    _____________________________________________________________
    3 For purposes of this analysis, we assume without concluding
    that Heslop forwarded sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue
    of material fact on the existence of a mental illness that would permit
    the court to analyze whether she subjectively understood the
    consequences of her actions.
    11
    HESLOP v. BEAR RIVER
    Opinion of the Court
    conduct did not require Drs. Holt and Crookston to repeat verbatim
    the Hoffman test. But for Heslop to defeat summary judgment, the
    doctors needed to provide testimony that would allow a jury to
    draw a reasonable inference about Heslop’s inability to appreciate
    the consequences of her actions. A party does not create a genuine
    issue of material fact when she submits evidence that simply invites
    the jury to speculate as to what happened. See USA Power, 
    2016 UT 20
    , ¶ 137. But that is what Heslop did here.
    ¶31 Dr. Crookston’s letter provides the only evidence the jury
    could rely upon to conclude that Heslop could not appreciate the
    consequences of her actions. That letter stated that “it is highly likely
    that Ms. Heslop was impaired cognitively and therefore could not
    fully appreciate the consequences of her actions.” Dr. Crookston’s
    letter uses language similar to Hoffman’s, but Dr. Crookston tempers
    his conclusion with the qualification “fully.” Thus, instead of an
    opinion that Heslop could not appreciate her actions, Dr.
    Crookston’s letter describes a high likelihood that she could not
    “fully appreciate” the consequences of those actions.
    ¶32 This qualified opinion did not provide the jury a basis to do
    anything other than speculate as to whether one of the consequences
    Dr. Crookston suggests Heslop may not have fully understood is the
    consequence at the heart of this matter—that driving a car off the
    road can result in injury or death. A car accident may have many
    consequences. The more obvious consequences involve damage to
    the car and injury to the driver. The less obvious consequences might
    include distress to those who observe the crash and the need to
    deploy emergency services to respond. To create a genuine issue of
    material fact, Dr. Crookston’s letter needed to provide a reasonable
    basis for a jury to infer that Heslop did not comprehend that death
    or injury would be the consequence she would suffer if she drove off
    the road. Instead, Dr. Crookston’s letter invites the jury to speculate
    as to what behavior was included and excluded by the phrase “fully
    appreciate.” Without more specificity from Dr. Crookston, a trier of
    fact would be left to speculate about whether Dr. Crookston’s
    opinion spoke to an inability to understand the seemingly obvious
    consequences of Heslop’s actions. In other words, Dr. Crookston’s
    opinion by itself is insufficient to support a reasonable inference that,
    because of Heslop’s mental state, she did not understand that she
    would likely be hurt if she drove her car off the road. To create a
    genuine issue of material fact, Heslop needed to provide either a
    more specific opinion from Dr. Crookston or place other evidence in
    12
    Cite as: 
    2017 UT 5
                            Opinion of the Court
    the record that would allow a jury to infer that one of the
    consequences Dr. Crookston’s statement referenced was injury or
    death. 4
    ¶34 Moreover, the jury’s ability to reasonably infer that Dr.
    Crookston’s opinion referred to Heslop’s ability to understand the
    consequences of leaving the road is undone by the overwhelming
    evidence before the district court—including Heslop’s own
    statements—that supports a finding that Heslop did in fact
    appreciate that harm would result from driving off the road. Heslop
    told Bear River’s insurance adjuster that “driving off the cliff” “was
    pretty much a suicide attempt.” When the adjuster then asked, “and
    then what, you just saw an edge there and decided, you know, this is
    it?” Heslop replied, “Yeah.” And when the adjuster asked Heslop if
    she had admitted to anybody else that her crash was a suicide
    attempt, Heslop told him, “my whole family knows . . . , I told the
    police[,] and all the doctors knew.” Unfortunately, the evidence
    firmly establishes that Heslop understood that the natural and
    probable consequences of driving off the road would be death or
    _____________________________________________________________
    4  The Heslops also contend that the district court unfairly
    dismissed Dr. Crookston’s letter because the court noted that the
    source of his opinion came from reading Dr. Holt’s letter rather than
    examining Heslop himself. See, e.g., Willey v. Bugden, 
    2013 UT App 297
    , ¶ 28, 
    318 P.3d 757
    (“‘[W]eighing credibility and assigning
    weight to conflicting evidence’ is not appropriate at the summary
    judgment stage.” (Citation omitted)). The district court noted that
    Dr. Crookston “reviewed Dr. Holt’s letter” and opined on the effects
    of Ambien. But the district court did not weigh evidence or dismiss
    Dr. Crookston’s letter. Rather, it commented on the source of the
    doctor’s knowledge—Dr. Holt’s letter—just as it commented on the
    source of Dr. Holt’s knowledge—Heslop’s psychiatric interviews.
    But noting the foundational basis of a witness’s knowledge is not
    weighing evidence or assessing credibility. And ultimately, the
    district court did not rule against the Heslops because it found that
    the doctor’s testimony lacked credibility; it ruled that the doctors
    had not provided the evidence needed to create a genuine issue of
    material fact on the relevant questions.
    13
    HESLOP v. BEAR RIVER
    Opinion of the Court
    injury, and Dr. Crookston’s vague opinion was insufficient to permit
    a jury to infer otherwise. 5
    ¶35 The Heslops next contend that “the possibility alone” that
    serotonin syndrome did, in fact, contribute to or cause irrational
    behavior “is enough to defeat a motion for summary judgment
    because a reasonable jury could find that serotonin syndrome did
    contribute to her behavior.” Thus, they seem to argue that Heslop
    could not control her actions, even if she could appreciate them. But
    this claim fails for similar reasons.
    ¶36 In support of this contention, the Heslops again offer Dr.
    Crookston’s letter. But in discussing Heslop’s ability to control her
    actions on the day of the crash, Dr. Crookston’s letter again
    equivocates. Thus, instead of a statement claiming that Heslop could
    not control her actions, Dr. Crookston’s letter suggests a high
    likelihood that she could not “fully control” them. And again, this
    equivocal statement, standing alone, does not provide the jury with a
    reasonable basis to infer that Heslop could not in fact stop herself
    from driving off the road even though she knew she would be
    injured or killed.
    ¶37 The Heslops also contend that Dr. Holt’s letter, “in and of
    itself, creates a genuine issue of material fact.” They believe his letter
    “makes clear that [Heslop’s] behavior was not only irrational, but
    that the serotonin syndrome could have contributed to her behavior.”
    _____________________________________________________________
    5 The Heslops suggest that Heslop’s admission to Bear River’s
    insurance adjuster is suspect because Heslop was under the
    influence of medication at the time of the incident and because “her
    prescription medications played a role in her behavior.” But
    Heslop’s statement to Bear River was made ten days after the crash,
    when Heslop had the benefits of sobriety and hindsight. What’s
    more, none of Heslop’s experts opined that her statement to Bear
    River was unreliable. The Heslops further argue that Heslop’s
    statement that she “just wanted to take a drive up the canyon . . . to
    look at the leaves” also calls her admission into question. But
    Heslop’s statement that she took a drive up the canyon to look at the
    leaves is not necessarily inconsistent with her later decision to drive
    her truck off the road, nor was it suspect for any reason Heslop
    forwards.
    14
    Cite as: 
    2017 UT 5
                             Opinion of the Court
    (Emphasis added.) But while Dr. Holt’s letter unequivocally states
    that Heslop developed serotonin syndrome and that she was
    experiencing its effects the day after her accident, it suffers from the
    same defect as Dr. Crookston’s letter: it does not opine or otherwise
    support a reasonable inference that Heslop could not control her
    actions despite their consequences when she drove off the
    embankment. Rather, Dr. Holt writes that “[s]ome” of Heslop’s
    irrational behavior “could be” attributed to “possible” effects of
    serotonin syndrome. (Emphases added.) An expert opinion that a
    medication could have contributed to an unspecified “some of” a
    person’s behavior does not, by itself, allow a reasonable jury to infer
    that that person could not in fact control herself from engaging in a
    specific behavior. Dr. Holt’s opinion standing alone did not provide
    evidence that would allow a jury to do anything more than speculate
    as to the effect of the medication and whether one of those effects
    was Heslop’s inability to stop herself from driving off the road.
    ¶38 By contrast, in Hoffman, Hoffman’s doctor “testified that on
    the day of his death, Hoffman ‘was psychotic and at that time not
    able to make sound rational judgments.’” 
    Hoffman, 669 P.2d at 415
    (emphasis added). He also testified that “because of the highly
    unstable nature of [Hoffman’s] whole emotional state at that time,
    any unexpected, intense, or threatening incident would have caused
    a reaction of unreasonable magnitude, an unpredictable reaction.” 
    Id. He opined
    that such a reaction “was a product of Hoffman’s mental
    illness.” 
    Id. This court
    concluded that
    on the basis of the evidence [before it,] the trial court
    could have found that Hoffman was suffering from a
    mental disease or defect that prevented him from
    appreciating the consequences of his conduct or
    controlling his conduct in light of the circumstances.
    [Hoffman’s doctor] testified that, at the time of his
    death, Hoffman was unable to appreciate the
    consequences of his actions, i.e., he was unable to make
    sound rational judgments; could not control his
    conduct in light of the consequences; and any
    unreasonable and unpredictable action by Hoffman
    under the circumstances was a product of his mental
    illness.
    
    Id. at 420.
    While Hoffman’s doctor spoke in unequivocal terms
    regarding Hoffman’s mental state, Heslop’s doctors do not. Indeed,
    this seemed to be the district court’s concern when it noted that the
    15
    HESLOP v. BEAR RIVER
    Opinion of the Court
    doctors’ letters failed to state “that [Heslop] was ‘sleep driving’ at
    the time she drove off the road, or that she [could not] remember
    what she did.”
    ¶39 In the end, neither letter does the work it needed to do:
    provide the jury with a basis to conclude that Heslop did not
    understand that driving off the road would result in injury or that,
    even in light of that expectation, Heslop could not control herself
    from driving off the embankment. See 
    Hoffman, 669 P.2d at 419
    .
    ¶40 The Heslops correctly argue that the test the district court
    needed to apply is the one Hoffman articulates. But the Heslops bore
    the burden of forwarding evidence that Heslop did not understand
    the consequences of her actions or that she could not control her
    actions. The evidence they offer, in the form of letters from Drs.
    Crookston and Holt, fails to create a genuine issue of material fact on
    either of those issues.
    II. The District Court Appropriately Granted Summary
    Judgment to Bear River on the Property Damage Claim
    ¶41 The Heslops also contend that “the district court erred in
    granting Bear River’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of
    property damage coverage.”
    ¶42 The property damage provision in the Heslops’ policy
    provides compensation for “each direct and accidental loss of or
    damage to your covered car.” The Heslops advance two arguments
    that the district court improperly granted summary judgment on this
    claim. First, they argue that the exclusion did not apply “for the
    same reasons [stated] above”—i.e., that the district court should
    have acknowledged a genuine issue of fact on the question of
    whether the crash was accidental. And we dispose of this argument
    on the grounds articulated above.
    ¶43 Second, the Heslops argue that Brandon Helsop should
    recover for damages to his truck because he “should be considered
    an accident victim.” Unfortunately, this argument is inadequately
    briefed. “It is well established that a reviewing court will not address
    arguments that are not adequately briefed.” State v. Thomas, 
    961 P.2d 299
    , 304 (Utah 1998); State v. Wareham, 
    772 P.2d 960
    , 966 (Utah 1989)
    (declining to rule on issue where defendant’s brief “wholly lack[ed]
    legal analysis and authority to support his argument”); State v.
    Amicone, 
    689 P.2d 1341
    , 1344 (Utah 1984) (declining to rule on
    16
    Cite as: 
    2017 UT 5
                             Opinion of the Court
    separation of powers argument where argument was not supported
    “by any legal analysis or authority”).
    ¶44 “In deciding whether an argument has been adequately
    briefed, we look to the standard set forth in rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah
    Rules of Appellate Procedure.” 
    Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305
    . “This rule
    states that the argument in the appellant’s brief ‘shall contain the
    contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues
    presented . . . with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of
    the record relied on.’” 
    Id. (citation omitted)
    (omission in original).
    “Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority
    but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on
    that authority.” 
    Id. We have
    stated—and repeated—that appellate
    courts “[are] not . . . depositor[ies] in which the appealing party may
    dump the burden of argument and research.” 
    Id. ¶45 In
    State v. Thomas, we upheld the court of appeals’ decision
    not to consider an inadequately briefed argument. 
    Id. In Thomas,
    the
    appellant’s argument cited legal authority, including two
    amendments to the United States Constitution and one Utah case,
    but contained no reasoned analysis or reference to controlling cases.
    
    Id. “Analysis of
    what this authority requires and of how the facts of
    Thomas’s case satisfy these requirements was wholly lacking.” 
    Id. There, we
    stated that, “[w]hile failure to cite to pertinent authority
    may not always render an issue inadequately briefed, it does so
    when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the
    burden of research and argument to the reviewing court.” 
    Id. ¶46 In
    similar fashion, the Heslops’ argument refers this court to
    one case, Speros v. Fricke, 
    2004 UT 69
    , 
    98 P.3d 28
    , and abruptly ends.
    The Heslops do not explain why Speros applies here or how Brandon
    Heslop qualifies as a victim under Speros. The argument also fails to
    identify certain material facts, for example whether Natalie Heslop
    was a co-owner of the truck or a co-insured on the policy. It entirely
    “dump[s] the burden of argument and research” upon this court to
    make its argument for it. See 
    Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305
    .
    ¶47 While this court will not lightly toss aside partially briefed
    but still discernable arguments, we are limited by the practical
    considerations that an unbriefed argument presents. Here, we cannot
    determine the merits of the Heslops’ claim that Brandon Heslop was
    a victim of his wife’s car crash and is entitled to recover under the
    damages provision of the insurance policy. While there is no bright
    line between adequate and inadequate briefing, the Heslops have
    17
    HESLOP v. BEAR RIVER
    Opinion of the Court
    not developed an argument sufficient to carry their burden of
    persuasion. See Bank of America v. Adamson, 
    2017 UT 2
    , ¶ 12, ___ P.3d
    ___ (“an appellant who fails to adequately brief an issue ‘will almost
    certainly fail to carry its burden of persuasion on appeal’”) (citation
    omitted). As such, we cannot say that the district court erred by
    granting summary judgment on that claim.
    III. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion when
    It Denied Heslop’s Rule 56(f) Motion for a Continuance
    ¶48 The Heslops also contend that the district court abused its
    discretion when it denied their rule 56(f) motion for a continuance to
    permit additional discovery. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(f) (2014). We
    review a district court’s grant or denial of a rule 56(f) motion for
    abuse of discretion. Crossland Sav. v. Hatch, 
    877 P.2d 1241
    , 1243 (Utah
    1994). “[W]e will not reverse unless the [court’s] decision exceeds the
    limits of reasonability.” 
    Id. ¶49 “Rule
    56(f) allows the opposing party to submit an affidavit
    stating the reasons ‘[she] is presently unable to present evidentiary
    affidavits essential to support [her] opposition to summary
    judgment.’” Aspenwood, L.L.C. v. C.A.T., L.L.C., 
    2003 UT App 28
    , ¶ 19,
    
    73 P.3d 947
    (citation omitted). That explanation “must present facts
    in proper form. . . . And the opposing party’s facts must be material
    and of a substantial nature.’” Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 
    745 P.2d 838
    , 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (omission in original) (citation
    omitted). “If the court finds the reasons to be adequate [it may] . . .
    order that further discovery be conducted and continue the
    summary judgment motion.” Aspenwood, 
    2003 UT App 28
    , ¶ 19
    (omission in original) (emphasis added).
    ¶50 A district court does not abuse its discretion in denying
    such a motion where “the reasons . . . articulated in its affidavit
    would produce only cumulative evidence.” Sandy City v. Salt Lake
    Cty., 
    794 P.2d 482
    , 490 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), rev’d in part on other
    grounds by Sandy City v. Salt Lake Cty., 
    827 P.2d 212
    (Utah 1992). A
    district court may deny a rule 56(f) motion for a continuance when
    that motion is “dilatory or lacking merit.” Price Dev. Co., L.P. v. Orem
    City, 
    2000 UT 26
    , ¶ 30, 
    995 P.2d 1237
    .
    ¶51 Moreover, conclusory claims do not sufficiently support a
    motion to continue. Thus, the party opposing summary judgment
    must “explain how the continuance will aid [her] opposition to
    summary judgment.” 
    Callioux, 745 P.2d at 841
    (Utah Ct. App. 1987);
    Robinson v. Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough, PC, 
    2016 UT App 34
    ,
    18
    Cite as: 
    2017 UT 5
                             Opinion of the Court
    ¶ 19, 
    369 P.3d 119
    (“A district court may refuse further discovery
    where the plaintiff ‘fail[s] to explain in [her] affidavit how additional
    discovery would aid [her] opposition to summary judgment.’”
    (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). Otherwise, overly broad
    areas of inquiry may suggest to a court that a party is involved in a
    “fishing expedition” rather than a sincere opportunity to provide the
    court with information that will defeat summary judgment. See
    Nelson v. Target Corp., 
    2014 UT App 205
    , ¶ 29, 
    334 P.3d 1010
    (stating
    that relevant factors in determining whether a rule 56(f) motion is
    warranted include “if the party requesting discovery is simply on a
    ‘fishing expedition’” (citation omitted)).
    ¶52 The Heslops did not file a separate rule 56(f) motion.
    Instead, the “motion” consists of a five-sentence paragraph tacked
    onto the end of their memorandum in opposition to Bear River’s
    motion for summary judgment. The motion fails to explain in any
    detail what information the Heslops wished to discover, whom they
    wished to depose, or what their doctors would say in addition to
    what they had already said. Instead, it petitions the district court
    broadly to grant a rule 56(f) motion for further discovery into
    Heslop’s “mental state, capacity, the effects of serotonin syndrome,
    or the effects of large amounts of Ambien and Lexapro to the human
    system.” From this request, it is unclear what specific information
    the Heslops believed additional time would allow them to discover.
    ¶53 Nothing in the Heslops’ rule 56(f) motion mandated the
    conclusion that upon further discovery a genuine issue of material
    fact would arise. The breadth of the Heslops’ request without an
    accompanying statement explaining how the continuance would aid
    them in opposing summary judgment suggests that the Heslops
    would not be able to present the district court with further evidence
    that would defeat summary judgment. At the very least, given the
    paucity of information the Heslops provided the district court about
    its need for additional discovery, we cannot say that the district
    court’s denial of the rule 56(f) motion was an abuse of discretion or
    that its decision exceeded the “limits of reasonability.” See Crossland
    
    Sav., 877 P.2d at 1243
    (citation omitted).
    CONCLUSION
    ¶54 The district court appropriately granted Bear River’s motion
    for summary judgment on the personal injury claims. The district
    court correctly noted that Heslop admitted that she intentionally
    drove her truck off the road. The Heslops failed to provide the
    19
    HESLOP v. BEAR RIVER
    Opinion of the Court
    district court with sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to
    conclude that Heslop either did not understand the natural and
    probable consequences of driving off the road or that she was unable
    to control her actions. For the same reason, the district court did not
    err in granting summary judgment on Heslops’ property damages
    claim that was premised on the same argument. The Heslops’ claim
    that Brandon Heslop should be considered a victim and permitted to
    recover property damages is insufficiently briefed. Furthermore, the
    rule 56(f) motion before the district court made only conclusory
    claims and suggested only cumulative evidence for further
    discovery. We thus cannot say the district court abused its discretion
    in refusing to grant a continuance. We affirm the district court’s
    grant of summary judgment.
    20
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Case No. 20150697

Judges: Durrant, Pearce

Filed Date: 1/24/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/26/2023

Authorities (24)

Miller v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance ( 1996 )

AMS Salt Industries, Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of America ( 1997 )

Crossland Savings v. Hatch ( 1994 )

State v. Wareham ( 1989 )

Jensen v. Cunningham ( 2011 )

State v. Thomas ( 1998 )

Sandy City v. Salt Lake County ( 1992 )

Speros v. Fricke ( 2004 )

Jensen Ex Rel. Jensen v. Cunningham ( 2011 )

Helf v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. ( 2015 )

Bank of America v. Adamson ( 2017 )

Heslop v. Bear River ( 2017 )

Hoffman v. Life Insurance Co. of North America ( 1983 )

NM on Behalf of Caleb v. Daniel E. ( 2008 )

Price Development Co., LP v. Orem City ( 2000 )

Webster v. Sill ( 1983 )

State v. Amicone ( 1984 )

Larson v. Wycoff Co. ( 1981 )

Clegg v. WASATCH COUNTY ( 2010 )

IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K MANAGEMENT, INC. ( 2008 )

View All Authorities »

Cited By (27)

Smith v. Return Development ( 2021 )

Shree Ganesh v. Weston Logan ( 2021 )

Feasel v. Tracker Marine ( 2021 )

Heslop v. Bear River ( 2017 )

Maa Prospector Motor Lodge, LLC v. Palmer ( 2017 )

Steamships v. Ihc Health Servs., Inc. ( 2018 )

Bear v. Lifemap Assurance ( 2021 )

Brimhall v. Ditech Financial ( 2021 )

Equine Holdings v. Auburn Woods ( 2021 )

Jessup v. Five Star Franchising ( 2022 )

Kuchcinski v. Box Elder County ( 2019 )

Ipsen v. Diamond Tree Experts ( 2020 )

Carter v. State ( 2019 )

Cochegrus v. Herriman City ( 2020 )

Airstar v. Keystone Aviation ( 2022 )

Far West Bank v. Robertson ( 2017 )

Heartwood Home v. Huber ( 2020 )

Larson v. Stauffer ( 2022 )

Legal Tender Services v. Bank of American Fork ( 2022 )

Stein Eriksen Lodge v. MX Technologies ( 2022 )

View All Citing Opinions »