OPC v. Kinikini , 2023 UT 17 ( 2023 )


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    2023 UT 17
    IN THE
    SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
    In the Matter of the Discipline of:
    AARON M. KINIKINI
    OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,
    Appellant,
    v.
    AARON M. KINIKINI,
    Appellee.
    No. 20220116
    Heard October 3, 2022
    Filed July 20, 2023
    On Direct Appeal
    Third District, Salt Lake County
    The Honorable Laura Scott
    No. 210904426
    Attorneys:
    Billy L. Walker, Emily A. Lee, Salt Lake City, for appellant
    Todd Wahlquist, Salt Lake City, for appellee
    JUSTICE PETERSEN authored the opinion of the Court, in which
    ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE PEARCE, JUSTICE HAGEN, JUSTICE
    POHLMAN, and JUDGE RENSTROM joined.
    Having recused himself, CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT does not
    participate herein; DISTRICT COURT JUDGE REUBEN J. RENSTROM sat.
    JUSTICE PETERSEN, opinion of the Court:
    INTRODUCTION
    ¶1 When a lawyer commits a crime, the lawyer faces
    criminal prosecution and punishment just as anyone else would in
    the same circumstance. But in addition to that, a lawyer faces
    professional discipline if the criminal act ―reflects adversely on
    OPC v. KINIKINI
    Opinion of the Court
    the lawyer‘s honesty, trustworthiness[,] or fitness as a lawyer in
    other respects.‖ UTAH R. PRO. CONDUCT 8.4(b). For example,
    depending on the relevant factual circumstances, the ultimate
    sanction in such a professional disciplinary proceeding could
    include suspension of the lawyer‘s license for a period of time or
    full delicensure. SUP. CT. R. PRO. PRAC. 11-584(a); 
    id.
     R. 11-583
    (2020).1
    ¶2 Where the lawyer‘s guilt has already been determined in
    a criminal case—either through a guilty plea or jury verdict—this
    court‘s Rules of Professional Practice direct that the lawyer is
    subject to immediate interim suspension from the practice of law
    if the crime of conviction is ―a felony or misdemeanor that reflects
    adversely on the [lawyer‘s] honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to
    practice law.‖ 
    Id.
     R. 11-564(c).
    ¶3 This appeal raises the question of how a district court
    should determine whether a crime reflects adversely on a lawyer‘s
    fitness to practice law when ruling upon a motion for interim
    suspension. This case involves a lawyer, Aaron Kinikini, who pled
    guilty to felony discharge of a firearm. Upon learning of the
    conviction, the Office of Professional Conduct (OPC) moved in the
    district court for Kinikini‘s immediate interim suspension. The
    OPC did not deem the offense to implicate his honesty or
    trustworthiness. Rather, it argued that interim suspension was
    required because the conviction of felony discharge of a firearm
    reflected adversely on Kinikini‘s fitness to practice law, since it is
    a crime of violence. The OPC‘s argument was premised on the
    elements of the offense.
    ¶4 Kinikini opposed the motion, arguing that it was
    insufficient for the district court to look only at the elements of the
    crime as a legal matter. He asserted that the district court must
    look at the specific factual circumstances of his criminal conduct
    and determine whether his actual conduct reflected adversely on
    his fitness to practice law.
    ¶5 The district court denied the OPC‘s motion to place
    Kinikini on interim suspension. It concluded that the OPC was
    __________________________________________________________
    1 Rule 11-584(a) went into effect on November 1, 2022, after
    oral argument was held in this case. We cite the new rule only to
    demonstrate generally the potential sanctions when a lawyer is
    convicted of a crime that reflects adversely on the lawyer‘s
    honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law.
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    Opinion of the Court
    required to show that Kinikini‘s actual criminal conduct reflected
    adversely on his fitness to practice law. And because the OPC had
    not provided any such information, the court denied its motion.
    The OPC appeals.
    ¶6 We hold that the determination of whether a lawyer‘s
    crime of conviction falls within one of the categories requiring
    interim suspension—in that it reflects adversely on the lawyer‘s
    honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law—is a legal
    question about the nature of the crime. A district court should
    make this determination based on the elements of the offense, not
    the particular factual circumstances of the respondent‘s criminal
    conduct. This is so because in a proceeding for interim suspension
    under rule 11-564 of the Supreme Court Rules of Professional
    Practice, it has necessarily already been determined in a separate
    criminal proceeding that the respondent committed the crime—in
    other words, that the lawyer‘s conduct satisfied the elements of
    the criminal offense. And where the elements of the crime of
    conviction implicate the lawyer‘s honesty, trustworthiness, or
    fitness to practice law, it damages the legal profession for the
    lawyer to continue practicing law, even as the ultimate
    professional sanction against the lawyer is being determined.
    ¶7 We reverse and remand for the district court to
    reconsider the OPC‘s motion in accordance with this opinion.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶8 Aaron Kinikini, a lawyer, pled guilty to discharge of a
    firearm, which is a third-degree felony. As explained in his plea
    statement, ―On December 18, 2020, in Salt Lake County, Mr.
    Kinikini discharged a firearm, striking the driver‘s side tires of a
    vehicle that his ex-wife was operating. He had reason to believe
    that this could have endangered her or the other occupants of the
    car.‖ The elements of the crime listed in Kinikini‘s plea statement
    were: ―Defendant did[,] [while] knowing or having reason to
    believe any person may be endangered by the discharge of a
    firearm, discharge a firearm in the direction of another person (a
    cohabitant).‖ See UTAH CODE § 76-10-508.1(1)(a) (2019) (―[A]n
    individual who discharges a firearm is guilty of a third degree
    felony . . . if: . . . the actor discharges a firearm in the direction of
    one or more individuals, knowing or having reason to believe that
    any individual may be endangered by the discharge of the firearm
    . . . .‖).
    ¶9 After learning of Kinikini‘s plea, the OPC filed a
    complaint against him in the district court. It alleged that Kinikini
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    Opinion of the Court
    had violated rule 8.4(b) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct,
    which provides that ―[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer
    to . . . commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer‘s
    honesty, trustworthiness[,] or fitness as a lawyer in other
    respects.‖ UTAH R. PRO. CONDUCT 8.4(b).
    ¶10 Simultaneously, the OPC moved under rule 11-564 of the
    Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice for Kinikini to be
    immediately suspended from the practice of law during the
    pendency of the action in the district court.2 Rule 11-564 requires a
    district court to place an attorney on interim suspension ―upon
    proof that the [attorney] has been found guilty of or has entered a
    plea to a felony or misdemeanor that reflects adversely on the
    [attorney‘s] honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law.‖
    SUP. CT. R. PRO. PRAC. 11-564(c). The OPC did not assert that
    Kinikini‘s criminal conduct reflected adversely on his honesty or
    trustworthiness. So the only issue before the district court was
    whether his conviction reflected adversely on his fitness to
    practice law.
    ¶11 The OPC argued that to make this determination, the
    court should look only at the elements of the crime and not the
    factual circumstances surrounding Kinikini‘s criminal conduct. In
    the OPC‘s view, ―evidence of aggravation and mitigation (such as
    restitution) are factors to be considered when determining the
    ultimate sanction and should not be considered when
    determining whether an interim suspension should be imposed.‖
    The OPC also argued that crimes of violence categorically reflect
    adversely on an attorney‘s fitness to practice law. To support this
    argument, the OPC cited comment 2 of rule 8.4 of the Utah Rules
    of Professional Conduct, which states, ―Although a lawyer is
    personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should
    be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of
    those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving
    violence, dishonesty, breach of trust or serious interference with
    __________________________________________________________
    2 The OPC‘s motion was also premised on a separate criminal
    incident in 2008, in which Kinikini pled guilty to two
    misdemeanors. However, the district court determined that the
    2008 conduct occurred outside the statute of limitations and ―the
    conduct that led to the 2008 conviction, standing alone, [did] not
    warrant immediate suspension.‖ Neither party appealed that
    portion of the district court‘s order, and we do not address it here.
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    the administration of justice are in that category.‖ UTAH R. PRO.
    CONDUCT 8.4 cmt. 2.
    ¶12 Kinikini opposed the motion and requested an informal
    hearing, as permitted by rule 11-564(b). He asserted that for the
    informal hearing to be meaningful, the district court must do
    more than analyze the elements of the offense. He argued that the
    court should consider his actual offense conduct. And he asserted
    that, looking at his specific criminal conduct, the court should not
    temporarily suspend him unless it determined that his continued
    practice would pose a threat of harm to others or that the factors
    that courts consider when determining the ultimate sanction in
    disciplinary proceedings weighed in favor of a suspension. Those
    factors are: ―(a) the duty violated; (b) the Lawyer‘s mental state;
    (c) the potential or actual injury caused by the Lawyer‘s
    misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating
    factors.‖ SUP. CT. R. PRO. PRAC. 11-582 (2020).3 Kinikini asserted
    that failure to consider the factual circumstances of his offense
    ―would be a serious violation of [his] right to due process.‖
    ¶13 The district court shared Kinikini‘s concern that he would
    be deprived of due process if the court suspended his license
    without considering the circumstances of his conduct.
    Accordingly, because the OPC had presented no evidence
    regarding the factual circumstances of Kinikini‘s offense, the
    district court declined to make a finding regarding whether
    Kinikini‘s conviction implicated his fitness to practice law. And it
    denied the OPC‘s motion for interim suspension.
    ¶14 The OPC appeals. We have jurisdiction under Utah Code
    section 78A-3-102(3)(c).
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶15 The Utah Constitution gives this court ―explicit and
    exclusive‖ power to govern the practice of law. Injured Workers
    Ass’n of Utah v. State, 
    2016 UT 21
    , ¶ 14, 
    374 P.3d 14
    ; UTAH CONST.
    art. VIII, § 4. This constitutional power includes the authority to
    govern attorney disciplinary proceedings. UTAH CONST. art. VIII,
    § 4 (―The Supreme Court by rule shall govern the practice of law,
    __________________________________________________________
    3 Rule 11-582 was amended on November 1, 2022. However,
    we refer to the 2020 version of this rule here, because it was that
    version that Kinikini referenced in his argument to the district
    court and in his briefing to us, as that was the version in effect at
    the time.
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    OPC v. KINIKINI
    Opinion of the Court
    including . . . the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to
    practice law.‖). To do this, we have promulgated the Supreme
    Court Rules of Professional Practice. We review a district court‘s
    interpretation of those rules for correctness. In re Discipline of
    Sonnenreich, 
    2004 UT 3
    , ¶ 12, 
    86 P.3d 712
    .
    ANALYSIS
    ¶16 The OPC argues that the district court incorrectly denied
    its motion for interim suspension. It asserts that rule 11-564 of the
    Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice directs a court to
    consider only the elements of the crime itself when determining
    whether that crime reflects adversely on an attorney‘s honesty,
    trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law. And the OPC reasons
    that, in requiring it to provide additional evidence of Kinikini‘s
    specific conduct, the court misapplied the rule.
    ¶17 Kinikini asserts that the OPC reads the rule incorrectly.
    And he argues that the OPC‘s interpretation raises due process
    concerns because it denies him a meaningful opportunity to be
    heard.
    ¶18 We first explain why the OPC‘s reading of the rule is
    correct. We then address the due process concerns that Kinikini
    raises.
    I. RULE 11-564 DIRECTS A DISTRICT COURT TO DETERMINE,
    AS A MATTER OF LAW, WHETHER THE CRIME OF
    CONVICTION WARRANTS INTERIM SUSPENSION
    ¶19 To determine the meaning of rule 11-564, we first look to
    the text of the rule itself. Our analysis begins by ―interpret[ing]
    [the] court rule in accordance with its plain meaning‖ and seeking
    ―to give effect to the intent of the body that promulgated it.‖ In re
    Discipline of Brussow, 
    2012 UT 53
    , ¶ 14, 
    286 P.3d 1246
     (cleaned up).
    However, ―[b]ecause this court is the body that promulgate[d]
    these rules, the constitutional considerations that require us to
    take a purely textual approach to statutory enactments may not
    apply with equal force here.‖ In re Discipline of Dahlquist,
    
    2019 UT 15
    , ¶ 21, 
    443 P.3d 1205
    .
    ¶20 Broadly speaking, rule 11-564 lays out a process to
    address the specific circumstance where an attorney has been
    convicted of a crime. First, if a lawyer is convicted of any crime,
    other than ―misdemeanor traffic offenses or traffic ordinance
    violations not involving the use of alcohol or drugs,‖ both the
    lawyer and the criminal court must notify the OPC. SUP. CT. R.
    PRO. PRAC. 11-564(a).
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    ¶21 Upon learning that a lawyer has been convicted of ―a
    felony or misdemeanor that reflects adversely on the [lawyer‘s]
    honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law,‖ 
    id.
     R. 11-
    564(b), the ―OPC must determine whether the crime warrants
    interim suspension.‖ 
    Id.
     If it determines that it does, the OPC
    ―must file an Action‖ in the district court and ―concurrently file a
    motion for immediate interim suspension.‖4 
    Id.
    ¶22 Notably, this is different from the process for most other
    disciplinary proceedings against lawyers. Most often, a
    disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer commences because a
    complaint is filed with the OPC alleging that the lawyer has
    engaged in unprofessional conduct. See 
    id.
     R. 11-530. At that point,
    the factual circumstances of the complaint have not been
    determined, nor has it been determined whether those facts
    provide grounds to discipline the lawyer under rule 11-560. See 
    id.
    R. 11-560. To make such determinations, the Supreme Court Rules
    of Professional Practice establish a process for screening panels to
    investigate and review complaints. 
    Id.
     R. 11-531–534. The panels
    then recommend how the complaint should be handled, including
    appropriate sanctions. 
    Id.
     R. 11-534. If the screening panel ―finds
    probable cause to believe there are grounds for public discipline
    that merit filing an Action,‖ then ―the OPC will file an Action in
    district court.‖ 
    Id.
     R. 11-536(a).
    ¶23 But in a circumstance like the one here, the fact that the
    lawyer has been convicted of a crime itself constitutes professional
    misconduct warranting discipline, if the crime is of a certain type.
    See UTAH R. PRO. CONDUCT 8.4(b); SUP. CT. R. PRO. PRAC. 11-564(a).
    And the fact that the lawyer committed a crime has already been
    established in a criminal proceeding. SUP. CT. R. PRO. PRAC. R. 11-
    564(e) (―[D]ocumentation that the [lawyer] has been found guilty
    of or has entered a plea to a crime constitutes conclusive evidence
    that the [lawyer] committed the crime.‖). So, unlike in other
    disciplinary proceedings, the facts relevant to whether discipline
    is warranted have already been established—specifically, the
    lawyer committed a crime. And all that remains is to determine
    whether the conviction provides grounds to discipline the lawyer,
    __________________________________________________________
    4 As defined by rule 11-502, ―‗Action‘ means a lawsuit filed by
    the OPC in district court alleging Lawyer misconduct or seeking
    to transfer a Lawyer to disability status.‖ SUP. CT. R. PRO. PRAC.
    11-502(a).
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    which is the case if the crime of conviction ―reflects adversely on
    the lawyer‘s honesty, trustworthiness[,] or fitness as a lawyer in
    other respects.‖ UTAH R. PRO. CONDUCT 8.4(b). And that is a legal
    question.5
    ¶24 Accordingly, when an attorney has been convicted of a
    crime that the OPC concludes falls within the ambit of rule 11-564,
    the case does not go through the screening panel process. Rather,
    the OPC goes straight to the district court, where it commences an
    action and simultaneously moves for interim suspension. SUP. CT.
    R. PRO. PRAC. 11-564(b).
    ¶25 Although the fact of a criminal conviction has already
    been established, there is still a necessary determination to be
    made in the district court before interim suspension—or
    discipline—can be imposed. That is the legal question of whether
    the crime of conviction warrants interim suspension because it
    falls within one of the categories identified in rule 11-564—and
    subsequently, the related question of whether the crime
    constitutes attorney misconduct warranting professional
    discipline because it falls within the similar categories identified
    in rule 8.4(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
    ¶26 Because of the narrow issue remaining, rule 11-564 limits
    the manner and substance of the challenges that a lawyer may
    raise in opposing interim suspension. The attorney ―may assert
    any jurisdictional deficiency establishing that the interim
    suspension may not properly be ordered,‖ which the rule
    identifies as defenses such as mistaken identity or that the crime
    does not fall within one of the categories identified in the rule. 
    Id.
    R. 11-564(b). Importantly, this list does not encompass factual
    challenges to the propriety of a suspension based upon the
    specific circumstances of the criminal conduct.
    ¶27 Indeed, rule 11-564(b) explicitly provides that the
    attorney is ―not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.‖ 
    Id.
     The
    respondent may request only an ―informal hearing.‖ 
    Id.
     And the
    rule limits the scope of that hearing, stating that it is ―solely to
    determine whether the finding of guilt or plea was for a felony or
    __________________________________________________________
    5 Additional facts may be adduced and considered when it
    comes time to determine an appropriate sanction. But here we are
    discussing only the facts relevant to determining whether
    discipline should be imposed in the first instance.
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    misdemeanor that reflects adversely on the [lawyer‘s] honesty,
    trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law.‖ 
    Id.
    ¶28 We conclude that the plain language of the rule shows
    that the question of whether the crime of conviction reflects
    adversely on a lawyer‘s fitness to practice law (or honesty or
    trustworthiness) is a legal question regarding the nature of the
    crime itself. A district court should make this determination based
    on the elements of the crime of conviction.
    ¶29 Once it has been shown that the lawyer has been
    convicted of the crime, see 
    id.
     R. 11-564(e), and the district court
    has determined that the crime falls within one of the categories
    identified in rule 11-564, the court must place the lawyer on
    interim suspension. 
    Id.
     R. 11-564(c). Conversely, if the court denies
    the motion, ―the OPC must dismiss the Action and will process
    the matter as it does any other information coming to the OPC‘s
    attention.‖ 
    Id.
     R. 11-564(b).
    ¶30 We now address Kinikini‘s arguments that the rule
    required the district court to analyze his specific offense conduct
    to determine whether that conduct—and not the legal nature of
    the crime of felony discharge of a firearm—reflected adversely on
    his fitness to practice law.
    ¶31 We reject Kinikini‘s argument first because it conflicts
    with the language of rule 11-564. His reading would require the
    district court to receive evidence in order to develop the factual
    circumstances of Kinikini‘s criminal conduct. But the rule
    explicitly precludes an evidentiary hearing. 
    Id.
    ¶32 Further, Kinikini‘s interpretation of the rule would
    permit him to argue that his specific conduct does not reflect
    adversely on his fitness to practice law. But such factual
    argumentation far exceeds the defenses the rule allows him to
    raise. 
    Id.
    ¶33 In support of his argument that the district court should
    conduct a factual analysis of the circumstances of the crime,
    Kinikini looks outside of rule 11-564 and draws upon two other
    rules that he contends must be harmonized with it. First, he notes
    that ―interim suspension‖ is considered a ―sanction‖ because it is
    included in rule 11-581, which identifies the available sanctions in
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    disciplinary proceedings.6 
    Id.
     R. 11-581(d) (2020). Kinikini then
    asserts that before imposing a ―sanction,‖ a court must consider
    the factors listed in rule 11-582: ―(a) the duty violated; (b) the
    Lawyer‘s mental state; (c) the potential or actual injury caused by
    the Lawyer‘s misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or
    mitigating factors.‖ 
    Id.
     R. 11-582 (2020). Thus, Kinikini reasons,
    before imposing the ―sanction‖ of interim suspension, the court
    must consider the rule 11-582 factors. And to do this, the court
    must consider the factual circumstances of the offense.
    ¶34 We reject this argument, however, because rule 11-581
    specifically directs that interim suspension ―may be imposed as
    set forth in [rule] . . . 11-564.‖ 
    Id.
     R. 11-581(d) (2020). This
    statement renders the factors in rule 11-582 inapplicable at this
    stage of the proceedings because rule 11-581 directs courts back to
    rule 11-564 when considering whether to impose an interim
    suspension. Importantly, a district court may consider any of the
    relevant factors in rule 11-582 at the time it determines the
    ultimate sanction in this type of case—but that comes later, not
    while the court is addressing the propriety of an interim
    suspension.
    ¶35 Further, if a district court were to consider the factors in
    11-582, that would necessitate an evidentiary hearing during
    which the facts of the criminal conduct were adduced. And since
    the text of 11-564 expressly states that a lawyer is not entitled to
    an evidentiary hearing, 
    id.
     R. 11-564(b), Kinikini‘s interpretation
    creates a conflict between rules 11-564 and 11-582.
    ¶36 Kinikini next argues that a district court should not
    impose an interim suspension without first considering whether
    an attorney‘s continued practice would pose a threat of harm. As
    there is no explicit mention of threat of harm in rule 11-564,
    Kinikini argues that consideration of a threat of harm is implicit in
    the rule and ―a finding that an attorney does not pose a threat is
    essentially a finding the attorney is fit to practice.‖
    ¶37 But this conflates rule 11-564 with a separate rule, rule 11-
    563, which explicitly addresses circumstances in which interim
    suspension is necessary to protect the public from a threat of harm
    posed by an attorney‘s continued practice of law. 
    Id.
     R. 11-563(a),
    __________________________________________________________
    6 Rule 11-581 was amended on November 1, 2022. We refer to
    the 2020 version of the rule because that is the rule Kinikini relies
    upon in his argument. See supra ¶ 12 n.3.
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    (b) (requiring the OPC to file a petition for interim discipline
    when an attorney ―poses a threat of serious harm to the public‖
    and allowing the district court to ―enter an order immediately
    suspending‖ the attorney).
    ¶38 We decline to read a threat-of-harm requirement into rule
    11-564 when those words do not appear in the rule. Rule 11-564
    provides its own basis for interim suspension, which is separate
    and distinct from the rationale behind rule 11-563. Rule 11-564
    reflects this court‘s judgment that when a lawyer has been
    convicted of a crime that adversely reflects on their honesty,
    trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law, it damages the
    profession for that attorney to continue practicing as a lawyer
    while a disciplinary proceeding is pending. And where a crime
    involves violence, as the OPC argues is the case with felony
    discharge of a firearm, it impugns the lawyer‘s fitness to practice
    law because the lawyer has engaged in conduct that endangered
    the physical safety of others.
    ¶39 In sum, rule 11-564 requires district courts to determine,
    as a matter of law, whether the crime of conviction reflects
    adversely on the lawyer‘s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to
    practice law based on the elements of the offense. This is a
    categorical finding that does not take into account the factual
    circumstances surrounding the particular criminal conduct at
    issue. Where a lawyer has been convicted of a crime, it necessarily
    has been determined that the lawyer‘s conduct fell within the
    elements of the offense of conviction. Accordingly, the district
    court should determine whether the elements of the crime of
    conviction implicate rule 11-564.
    II. RULE 11-564 PROVIDES A RESPONDENT WITH A
    MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD ON THE
    MATTERS THAT ARE AT ISSUE
    ¶40 Kinikini next contends that the OPC‘s interpretation of
    rule 11-564 raises due process concerns. To be clear, Kinikini does
    not argue that the rule is unconstitutional because it violates his
    right to due process. Instead, he argues that we should adopt his
    interpretation of the rule over the OPC‘s because the OPC‘s
    interpretation gives rise to due process concerns. Specifically, he
    asserts that the OPC‘s reading of the rule ―remove[s] any
    ‗meaningfulness‘ from the [informal] hearing to which Mr.
    Kinikini is entitled under the rule.‖
    ¶41 This argument is a form of statutory construction. When
    faced with ―two plausible constructions of a statute,‖ the canon of
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    constitutional avoidance allows courts to reject one construction
    ―on the ground that it would raise grave doubts as to the statute‘s
    constitutionality.‖ Castro v. Lemus, 
    2019 UT 71
    , ¶ 54, 
    456 P.3d 750
    (cleaned up). But in light of the rule‘s explicit prohibition on
    evidentiary hearings, we cannot conclude that Kinikini has
    offered an alternative, plausible interpretation of the rule. And as
    Kinikini has not otherwise argued that the rule is
    unconstitutional, his due process argument fails.
    ¶42 We appreciate the district court‘s attention to ensuring
    that Kinikini had a sufficient opportunity to be heard in this
    proceeding. And we reaffirm that, just like parties in other types
    of cases, lawyers are entitled to a ―meaningful opportunity to be
    heard‖ in attorney discipline cases. In re Discipline of Steffensen,
    
    2016 UT 18
    , ¶ 7, 
    373 P.3d 186
    . This remains true in interim
    suspension proceedings under rule 11-564. However, these cases
    proceed differently than other disciplinary actions because much
    of the process the lawyer is due has already taken place in a prior
    criminal proceeding. See SUP. CT. R. PRO. PRAC. 11-564(b) (noting
    that the rule applies where an attorney has already been ―found
    guilty of or has entered a plea of guilty or no contest‖ to certain
    crimes).
    ¶43 This circumstance is similar to others in which a criminal
    conviction results in a collateral consequence outside of the
    criminal proceeding. For example, the United States Code has an
    analogous provision that requires any federal law enforcement
    officer to be removed from employment if they are convicted of a
    felony. 
    5 U.S.C. § 7371
    (b). Like rule 11-564, section 7371 limits the
    manner and substance of how employees may challenge their
    removal. Under section 7371, employees may contest their
    removal only with respect to whether ―(A) the employee is a law
    enforcement officer; (B) the employee was convicted of a felony;
    or (C) the conviction was overturned on appeal.‖ 
    Id.
     § 7371(e)(2).
    ¶44 In these circumstances, the policy behind the disciplinary
    rule is that the fact of the criminal conviction itself warrants the
    professional sanction. In the context of rule 11-564, once the fact of
    conviction has been established, the only remaining question is a
    legal one as to whether the crime of conviction falls within the
    ambit of the rule. Because this is a legal question, the process
    available to a respondent under 11-564 is generally limited to legal
    rather than factual challenges. This provides a respondent with a
    meaningful opportunity to be heard on those matters that are at
    issue in the proceeding at hand.
    12
    Cite as: 
    2023 UT 17
    Opinion of the Court
    CONCLUSION
    ¶45 When the OPC brings a motion for interim suspension
    under rule 11-564, it must establish the fact of conviction and that
    the crime of conviction falls within the rule in that it reflects
    adversely on the attorney‘s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to
    practice law. This is a legal question that should be determined
    based on the elements of the crime of conviction. Accordingly, we
    reverse and remand to the district court to reconsider the OPC‘s
    motion in accordance with this opinion.
    13