State v. Clara , 2024 UT 10 ( 2024 )

2024 UT 10IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellant,
v.
JON MICHAEL CLARA,
Appellee.
No. 20220325
Heard May 8, 2023
Filed March 14, 2024
On Certification from the Court of Appeals
Third District, Salt Lake
The Honorable Todd M. Shaughnessy
No. 191912251
Attorneys:
Sean D. Reyes, Att’y Gen., Andrew F. Peterson, Deputy Solic.
Gen., Salt Lake City, for appellant
Ann M. Taliaferro, Kristin G. Wilson, Salt Lake City, for appellee
JUSTICE PETERSEN authored the opinion of the Court, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE PEARCE,
JUSTICE HAGEN, and JUSTICE POHLMAN joined.
JUSTICE PETERSEN, opinion of the Court:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 This appeal involves the dismissal of a criminal case under
the Pretrial Justification Statute. UTAH CODE § 76-2-309(3). The
Statute allows a criminal defendant who makes a claim of self-
defense to have that claim assessed by a judge at an evidentiary
hearing before trial, rather than waiting until trial to have the
matter decided by a jury. At the pretrial evidentiary hearing, the
Statute first requires the defendant to make a prima facie claim of
self-defense. If the defendant can do that, the burden then shifts to
the prosecution to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
STATE v. CLARA
Opinion of the Court
defendant’s use or threatened use of force was not justified. If the
district court concludes that the State has not met its burden, the
court will dismiss the criminal charges with prejudice. But if the
court concludes the State did meet its burden, the case proceeds,
and the defendant may still raise a claim of self-defense at trial.
¶2 In this case, defendant Jon Michael Clara was driving his
SUV in Salt Lake City when his vehicle was rear-ended and then
rammed repeatedly by a truck with a snowplow on the front of it
(snowplow). The snowplow finally started to drive away. But it
then stopped abruptly and began to turn to the right. Clara believed
the snowplow was in the process of making a U-turn to come back
and attack him or his passenger again. He fired a gun seven times
in the direction of the snowplow. None of the shots hit the
snowplow, but one bullet pierced the back window of a pickup
truck that happened to be in the area. The bullet came within inches
of hitting a young girl’s head. Clara was arrested and charged with
seven counts of felony discharge of a firearm.
¶3 Early in the criminal proceedings, Clara moved for an
evidentiary hearing under the Pretrial Justification Statute. After
the hearing, the district court ruled that Clara had made a prima
facie claim of self-defense, and that the State had not disproved the
self-defense claim by clear and convincing evidence. So the district
court dismissed the criminal charges against Clara.
¶4 The State appeals. It argues that the district court should
not have dismissed the charges against Clara because he failed to
make a prima facie claim of self-defense at the evidentiary hearing,
as required by the Pretrial Justification Statute. Specifically, the
State contends that none of the evidence adduced at the hearing
showed that Clara had a reasonable belief that the snowplow posed
an imminent threat of harm because, when Clara fired the shots,
the snowplow had not turned back around to face him.
¶5 We agree with the district court that Clara presented
evidence sufficient to make a prima facie claim of self-defense.
Clara testified that the snowplow struck his SUV four times with
increasing intensity. Then, when the snowplow finally started to
drive away, it skidded to a stop a mere fifty feet from Clara and
started turning to the right. At that point, Clara believed his SUV
was disabled and that his passenger was injured. Fearing that the
snowplow was turning around to attack them again, Clara testified
that he fired the shots as a warning to stop the snowplow driver
from returning. On these facts, we agree with the district court that
Clara presented evidence showing a reasonable belief that the
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snowplow posed an imminent threat of death or serious bodily
injury to him and his passenger. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶6 Police responded to the scene of a shooting on 900 West
just north of 100 South in Salt Lake City. A family had been driving
in their pickup truck northbound on 900 West, when a bullet
pierced the back window, travelled through the passenger cab, and
exited through the windshield. The bullet came within inches of
hitting a young girl’s head. Glass was scattered across the backseat
and the girl had glass in her hair. Thankfully, she was not
physically injured.
¶7 Nearby, officers discovered an SUV with a damaged
bumper and passenger side, facing the wrong way in the
northbound lane of 900 West. Clara and a passenger were standing
near the SUV. Clara told the officers that he had been driving the
SUV when he was rammed repeatedly by a truck with a snowplow
on the front of it. He explained that the snowplow finally started to
drive away, but then stopped abruptly and appeared to be making
a U-turn to come back at them. At that point, he shot seven times
in the direction of the snowplow, hoping to warn the driver away.
¶8 Clara was arrested and charged with seven counts of
felony discharge of a firearm.
Criminal Proceedings
¶9 Early in the criminal proceedings, Clara sought to invoke
the recently enacted Pretrial Justification Statute, which allows for
a district court to assess claims of self-defense at an earlier stage in
a criminal case. See UTAH CODE § 76-2-309(3). The Statute provides
that if a criminal defendant files a motion requesting a pretrial
justification hearing, then the district court must hold an
evidentiary hearing to “determine as a matter of fact and law
whether the defendant was justified in the use or threatened use of
force.” Id. § 76-2-309(3)(a). At the evidentiary hearing, the
defendant must first “make[] a prima facie claim of justification.”
Id. § 76-2-309(3)(b). If the court determines the defendant has made
a prima facie claim, then “the state has the burden to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the defendant’s use or threatened use
of force was not justified.” Id. If the State meets this burden, the
defendant’s motion is denied, the case proceeds, and the defendant
may raise the issue of justification to the jury at trial. Id. § 76-2-
309(3)(c)(iii). But if the State fails to meet its burden, the district
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STATE v. CLARA
Opinion of the Court
court must dismiss the relevant charges against the defendant. Id.
§ 76-2-309(3)(c)(i).
¶10 Clara moved for a pretrial justification hearing in the
district court, asserting that he shot at the snowplow in self-defense
under Utah Code subsection 76-2-402(2)(b). That subsection states,
An individual is justified in using force intended or
likely to cause death or serious bodily injury only if
the individual reasonably believes that force is
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to
the individual or another individual as a result of
imminent use of unlawful force, or to prevent the
commission of a forcible felony.
Id. § 76-2-402(2)(b).
The Pretrial Justification Evidentiary Hearing
¶11 In response to Clara’s motion, the district court held an
evidentiary hearing as required by the Pretrial Justification Statute.
At the beginning of the hearing, the court explained the procedure
that it had used in a prior hearing of this type, since “the process is
new and the procedure is . . . a little bit new.” The court stated that
it had
required the parties . . . to present starting with the
defense—since the defense has an initial burden of
making [a prima facie] showing, had all the parties
put on all of their evidence, and then I simply made a
determination at the end as to—as to Step No. 1,
whether the . . . Defense met its burden of showing
that self-defense may be an issue in the case, and then
if so, making findings with respect to the State and its
burden.
The parties agreed to this procedure. And Clara’s counsel stated
that he was “ready to proceed.”
¶12 Defense counsel called Clara as the defense’s first witness,
followed by the passenger who was riding with Clara on the night
in question, and some of the responding police officers. The State
cross-examined each of Clara’s witnesses, including Clara himself.
The State did not call any witnesses of its own to testify at the
hearing.
¶13 Clara and his passenger testified about the events leading
up to the shooting. Clara had been driving his SUV eastbound on
Euclid Avenue in Salt Lake City and was about to turn north onto
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900 West. Suddenly, Clara’s vehicle was rear-ended by the driver
of a pickup truck that had a snowplow attached to its front.
Thinking this was just an accident, Clara moved his vehicle to the
side of the road.
¶14 But the snowplow struck Clara’s vehicle again—this time
with more intensity. The snowplow then hit Clara’s vehicle a third
time. The third strike caused Clara’s SUV to spin around and face
oncoming traffic. Finally, the snowplow hit the SUV a fourth time,
“t-boning” it on the passenger side and causing some airbags to
deploy.
¶15 At this point, the snowplow began driving away and Clara
got out of his SUV. Based on the damage caused by the contact,
Clara believed that his vehicle was inoperable. And due to the final
blow to the passenger side, Clara believed that his passenger might
be injured and trapped in the vehicle.
¶16 Once outside the vehicle, Clara noticed that the
snowplow’s brake lights were on, and he heard the snowplow
“skid on the street” roughly fifty feet away. Then, to Clara’s
dismay, he saw the snowplow begin to turn to the right into “some
business or driveway to make a U-turn.” Once the snowplow began
this maneuver, Clara believed it was turning around to hit him or
his vehicle with the passenger still inside. Fearing for his and his
passenger’s lives, Clara pulled out a gun and fired seven rounds in
the direction of the snowplow. According to video timestamps
taken from a dashcam in Clara’s SUV, only about six seconds
passed between the final strike by the snowplow and when Clara
began shooting.
¶17 When Clara fired at the snowplow, it had not turned all
the way around. It was facing in a northeast direction, generally
away from Clara and the SUV. Clara “was just aiming [toward the
snowplow] to let [the driver] know if you come back this way . . .
you’re going to get shot.” And although the snowplow was not
facing Clara when he shot, he believed he had to fire his weapon
before the snowplow had fully turned to face him because the
“snowplow thing in front . . . [would] act[] like this bulletproof
shield . . . . [T]hen I wouldn’t have been able to do anything for
myself or my passenger.”
¶18 After Clara fired, the snowplow drove a little farther up
the road, away from Clara. But it began to turn around a second
time. Because the snowplow was farther away, Clara waited to see
“what’s [the driver] going to do.” He did not shoot at the snowplow
again. And the snowplow finally drove away.
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STATE v. CLARA
Opinion of the Court
¶19 Following the hearing, the court requested briefing from
the parties regarding the application of the statute. The court
explained its conclusion that “what the statute means by a prima
facie showing is basically the showing that would be necessary to
get past a motion for a directed verdict at trial. In other words,
enough evidence that a juror acting reasonably could conclude that
self-defense applies.” The court noted that the more important
issue was likely whether the State had met its burden to “show by
clear and convincing evidence that self-defense does not apply.”
The court directed the State to file its memorandum first, and for
Clara to then respond. The court then scheduled oral argument to
be held after the memoranda were filed.
¶20 In their memoranda and at the subsequent oral argument,
the parties did not object to the district court’s description of the
applicable legal standard. And neither party disagreed with the
district court’s conclusion that the “prima facie claim” Clara had to
make at the evidentiary hearing was similar to the directed verdict
standard.
¶21 On the merits, the State’s primary argument was that there
was no evidence showing that Clara’s belief that the snowplow
posed an imminent threat of harm was objectively reasonable. The
State argued that Clara was “involved in a traffic accident that had
ended by the time he discharged his firearm.” The State contended
that by the time Clara fired at the snowplow, any threat of harm
had ended and his belief that the snowplow driver was turning
around to attack again was mere speculation—making his belief
objectively unreasonable. For his part, Clara referenced the
evidence adduced at the earlier justification hearing and argued
that when he fired at the snowplow, the threat to his safety was still
ongoing, and he “believed that the vehicle was coming back at
him.”
The District Court’s Decision
¶22 After considering the parties’ memoranda and oral
argument, as well as the evidence adduced at the hearing, the
district court ruled that Clara had made a prima facie claim of self-
defense. The court relied on a number of specific facts in arriving
at its conclusion. First, to the court, the fact that the snowplow
struck Clara’s vehicle not once, but four times, “undermine[d] the
idea that this was simply a traffic accident.” The court further noted
that “the position of the [snowplow] [and] its distance from [Clara]
. . . [were] critical factors in determining whether [Clara] acted in
self-defense.” As to the position of the snowplow when Clara fired,
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the district court highlighted Clara’s statement that the snowplow
“was either broadside to him or was facing . . . slightly away from
him.” And for the distance, the court relied on Clara’s statement
that when he fired the shots, “the [snowplow] was 50 feet away,”
or “approximately 16 yards.”
¶23 Notably, the district court stated,
If it was true that the [snowplow] was 50 feet away
and the [snowplow] was facing or turning to face the
defendant, then there would be little doubt that the
defendant would be justified in shooting at the driver
as a means to disable the [snowplow]. A vehicle could
in a matter of seconds travel 16 yards, and a vehicle
obviously could cause death or serious bodily injury
to someone in the path of that vehicle.
¶24 The district court ultimately concluded that “it’s pretty
clear that the defendant has at least made a prima facie claim of
justification in that using deadly force against the driver of the
[snowplow] may have been necessary to avoid death or serious
bodily injury to the defendant.”
¶25 The court then addressed whether the State had met its
burden to disprove Clara’s prima facie claim of self-defense by
clear and convincing evidence. In doing so, the district court
considered some of the factors listed in Utah Code subsection 76-2-
402(5). Relevant here, that subsection states, “In determining
imminence or reasonableness . . . the trier of fact may consider:
(a) the nature of the danger; (b) the immediacy of the danger; [and]
(c) the probability that the unlawful force would result in death or
serious bodily injury.” UTAH CODE § 76-2-402(5).
¶26 The court found the nature of the danger posed by the
snowplow to be “very high” because “an automobile is capable of
causing death or serious bodily injury in a matter of seconds.” As
to the immediacy of the danger, the district court stated that “there
is less danger involved here because there is no testimony and the
defendant doesn’t claim that the [snowplow] was either traveling
toward him or was pointed toward him.” The court found that this
fact “undermine[d] . . . the imminence” of the threat posed by the
snowplow.
¶27 With these factors in mind, the court ultimately concluded
that the State failed to meet its burden to disprove Clara’s self-
defense claim by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the
district court granted Clara’s motion and dismissed the charges.
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STATE v. CLARA
Opinion of the Court
¶28 The State appeals the decision. It makes a single objection
to the district court’s ruling. The State argues that Clara failed to
show the objective reasonableness of his belief that the snowplow
posed an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to him
or his passenger. And thus, Clara did not make a prima facie claim
of self-defense at the evidentiary hearing.
¶29 We have jurisdiction under Utah Code subsection 78A-3-
102(3)(b).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶30 The only issue presented in this case is whether, in
accordance with the Pretrial Justification Statute, Clara made a
prima facie claim of self-defense at the pretrial evidentiary hearing.
We review prima facie determinations for correctness. Bair v. Axiom
Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, ¶ 13, 20 P.3d 388 (“[T]he determination
of whether a party has made out a prima facie case is a question of
law which we review for correctness, affording no deference to the
trial court’s judgment.”), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by
A.S. v. R.S., 2017 UT 77, 416 P.3d 465.
ANALYSIS
¶31 The State argues that the district court erred in ruling that
Clara made a prima facie claim of self-defense at the evidentiary
hearing. The State’s primary objection is that the district court
wrongly concluded Clara had shown that he reasonably believed
the snowplow was about to attack again—or, in the parlance of the
self-defense statute, that the snowplow was going to engage in the
“imminent use of unlawful force.” UTAH CODE § 76-2-402(2)(b). The
State argues that “Clara fired too late or too soon,” because he fired
after the snowplow ended its assault and drove up the street, but
before the snowplow made a sufficient movement indicating it was
turning back in Clara’s direction. For the reasons discussed below,
we agree with the district court’s ruling and affirm.1
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1 In describing the facts of this case, the State emphasizes that
Clara put a young girl and her family in extreme danger when he
fired seven shots up 900 West. None of the bullets hit the snowplow
that rammed Clara’s SUV. But one of the shots hit a pickup truck
carrying three people who had nothing to do with the incident, and
the bullet narrowly missed a young girl’s head. This was what
drew police officers to the scene in the first place. We agree that
Clara’s stray bullet endangered the girl and her family. But these
(continued . . .)
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The Pretrial Justification Statute
¶32 The Pretrial Justification Statute states that “[u]pon motion
of the defendant . . . , the court shall hear evidence on the issue of
justification . . . and shall determine as a matter of fact and law
whether the defendant was justified in the use or threatened use of
force.” UTAH CODE § 76-2-309(3)(a). Next, “[a]t the pretrial
justification hearing, after the defendant makes a prima facie claim
of justification, the state has the burden to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant’s use or threatened use of
force was not justified.” Id. § 76-2-309(3)(b). The State contends that
Clara failed to make out a prima facie claim of self-defense at the
evidentiary hearing, so the State should have never borne the
burden of disproving Clara’s claim by clear and convincing
evidence.
¶33 The Statute does not define “prima facie.” However,
“prima facie” is a frequently used term of art that generally means
“[s]ufficient to establish a fact or raise a presumption unless
disproved or rebutted; based on what seems to be true on first
examination, even though it may later be proved to be untrue.” See
Prima Facie (adj.), BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The
term’s meaning is also informed by the procedural posture in
which it arises. See, e.g., Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20,
¶ 14, 20 P.3d 388, (explaining in the trial context that “[a] prima
facie case has been made when evidence has been received at trial
that, in the absence of contrary evidence, would entitle the party
having the burden of proof to judgment as a matter of law”),
abrogated on other grounds as recognized by A.S. v. R.S., 2017 UT 77,
416 P.3d 465; Blank v. Garff Enters. Inc., 2021 UT App 6, ¶ 26, 482
P.3d 258 (explaining that at the summary judgment stage, “[a]
plaintiff’s failure to present evidence that, if believed by the trier of
__________________________________________________________
facts are not part of our analysis on appeal, not because they are not
serious, but because the State has not raised an issue before us
involving Clara’s endangerment of the three uninvolved passers-
by. Although courts in other jurisdictions have addressed
circumstances where a defendant, acting in self-defense, has been
charged with recklessly injuring innocent bystanders, see, e.g., State
v. Betts, 514 P.3d 341, 349–52 (Kan. 2022), no such charges were filed
here. And the State has not raised an issue on appeal as to whether
Clara can be held criminally liable for recklessly endangering the
young girl and her family. However, the absence of these facts from
our analysis is not intended to minimize the seriousness of the
family’s experience.
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STATE v. CLARA
Opinion of the Court
fact, would establish any one of the elements of the prima facie case
justifies a grant of summary judgment to the defendant” (cleaned
up)).
¶34 The district court concluded that in this procedural
posture, the Statute’s requirement that Clara make out a prima facie
claim at the evidentiary hearing was similar to what is required to
survive a motion for a directed verdict. And neither party objected
to this.2 For a directed verdict under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
50(a), a court may dismiss a claim if the factfinder “would not have
a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that
issue.” “[A] party who moves for a directed verdict has the very
difficult burden of showing that no evidence exists that raises a
question of material fact.” Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, ¶ 18, 990
P.2d 933 (cleaned up). “Where there is any evidence that raises a
question of material fact, no matter how improbable the evidence
may appear,” a directed verdict is improper. Kleinert v. Kimball
Elevator Co., 905 P.2d 297, 299 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Thus, this
standard requires a party to clear a low bar by adducing at least
some evidence on each element of a claim.
The Elements of a Self-Defense Claim
¶35 The elements of self-defense are found in Utah Code
subsection 76-2-402(2)(b), which states, “An individual is justified
in using force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily
injury only if the individual reasonably believes that force is
[1] necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to the
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2 In their briefing, the parties provided extensive argument
regarding the procedure required for a defendant to “make[] a
prima facie claim of justification.” UTAH CODE § 76-2-309(3)(b). But
these issues were not preserved in the district court. The district
court explained to the parties how it would proceed in the
evidentiary hearing, and the parties agreed. Clara then went first at
the evidentiary hearing and put on evidence of his version of
events. There was no debate or discussion about whether this was
the correct way to proceed. Clara’s counsel agreed to this
procedure, stating, “Great. That’s all I needed to know. And then
. . . we’re ready to proceed.” Then after the hearing, when the
district court asked for briefing from the parties, it explained its
understanding of the term “prima facie claim” in the Statute. See
supra ¶¶ 11–20. Again, neither party objected to the court’s
explanation or directions. Accordingly, we do not address the
unpreserved issues raised by the parties.
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individual or another individual [2] as a result of imminent use of
unlawful force . . . .”
¶36 The key dispute in this case is whether Clara “reasonably
believe[d]” that the danger posed by the snowplow was
“imminent.” See id. We have stated that the imminence requirement
“distinguishes lawful defensive force from two forms of unlawful
force: that which comes too soon and that which comes too late.”
State v. Berriel, 2013 UT 19, ¶ 14, 299 P.3d 1133. Accordingly,
“[d]efensive force is . . . an act of emergency that is temporally and
materially confined[] with the narrow purpose of warding off the
pending threat.” Id. (cleaned up). In Berriel, we focused on common
definitions to interpret “imminence” in delineating this temporal
confinement. We noted that “imminent danger” was defined as “an
immediate, real threat to one’s safety” and as “the danger resulting
from an immediate threatened injury,” and that “imminent” was
defined “as ‘about to occur at any moment’ and as ‘impending.’”
Id. (cleaned up).
¶37 Further, the imminence element has both a subjective and
an objective component. At the time defensive force is used, the
defendant must have had an actual subjective belief in the
imminence of the threat of unlawful force and the defendant’s belief
must have been objectively reasonable. Cf. State v. Sorbonne, 2022 UT
5, ¶ 42, 506 P.3d 545 (noting, in the context of the necessity element
of self-defense, that a defendant’s reasonable belief in the necessity
of defensive force has both a subjective and an objective
component). The objective component is satisfied if the proverbial
reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have also
believed that the threat of unlawful force was imminent.
¶38 We address the subjective and objective components of
Clara’s imminence showing in turn.
The Subject Belief Requirement
¶39 We conclude Clara adduced evidence sufficient to make a
prima facie showing that he had an actual, subjective belief that the
snowplow posed an imminent threat to him and his passenger.
Clara testified that once he exited his vehicle, he saw the snowplow
stop about fifty feet away and “start[] turning right, like, you know,
into like some business or driveway to make a U-turn.” (Emphasis
added.) And in response to the question, “So you believe[d] this . . .
[snowplow] was U-turning,” Clara responded, “Yes.” Clara also
testified that he thought the snowplow was “coming back to hit or
run over me . . . or hit my vehicle with my passenger . . . in it.” And
in response to being asked, “So you[] [were] concerned about your
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STATE v. CLARA
Opinion of the Court
safety and your passenger’s safety,” Clara responded,
“Absolutely.” Finally, Clara testified that he believed he had to
shoot at the snowplow before it was fully turned around and facing
him because the “snowplow thing in front of [the snowplow] . . .
acts like [a] bulletproof shield.”
¶40 The State cites a line from Clara’s testimony that it argues
demonstrates Clara did not have a subjective belief that the threat
from the snowplow was imminent. After Clara shot at the
snowplow, it drove farther away and then began to turn around a
second time. When asked why he did not shoot at the snowplow
again, Clara testified, “[T]hat’s some distance[,] [l]et me see, you
know, what’s [the snowplow driver] going to do.” For the State,
this testimony belies any subjective belief Clara claimed to have
had because he paused the second time to assess the situation, but
not the first.
¶41 We reject this argument. Whether Clara had a different
belief the second time the snowplow stopped (a greater distance
away and following the initial volley of defensive shots) does not
negate his testimony about his belief when he exercised the
defensive force. While the State may believe that it would have
been a better choice for Clara to wait to fire the first time, the
subjective component of the imminence element does not turn on
the quality of the defendant’s decision-making. Clara testified that
the first time the snowplow stopped, he believed it was turning
around and thus posed an imminent threat of harm. Accordingly,
Clara adduced evidence regarding the subjective component of the
imminence element.
The Objective, Reasonable Belief Requirement
¶42 We also agree with the district court’s finding that Clara
made a prima facie showing of the imminence element’s objective
component. The State argues that the evidence regarding the
imminence of the harm posed by the snowplow does not show that
Clara’s belief was objectively reasonable because his belief rested
entirely on prediction and speculation about what the snowplow
might do in the future. To the State, “Clara’s entire justification
defense rests on his subjective feelings, his speculation about the
driver’s future intentions, but w[as] not based on any externally
verifiable phenomena perceivable by others that would lead a
reasonable person to believe another attack was imminent.” In all,
Clara “simply guessed that another attack might come.”
¶43 The State also contends that when the district court
analyzed whether the State had disproven self-defense by clear and
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convincing evidence, the court “note[d] a total absence of evidence
on immediacy.” The district court stated that “there is no
testimony[,] and the defendant doesn’t claim that the [snowplow]
was either traveling toward him or was pointed toward him. So
that undermines . . . the imminence . . . .” To the State, “[t]hat single
fact should have been the end of Clara’s self-defense motion.”
¶44 The “reasonably believe[s]” language in Utah Code
subsections 76-2-402(2)(a) and (b) “introduces a component of
objectivity” to the self-defense analysis. State v. Sorbonne, 2022 UT
5, ¶ 28, 506 P.3d 545. In Sorbonne, which focused on the necessity
element of self-defense, we noted that “the reasonableness inquiry
is a hypothetical one, which asks [us] to decide whether a person in
the defendant’s circumstances would have reasonably believed
that a threat or use of force was necessary.” Id. ¶ 29. Although we
addressed the necessity element in Sorbonne, the same analysis
applies to the question of whether a person “reasonably believes”
the use of unlawful force against them is imminent. This inquiry is
an objective one—requiring courts to ask whether a reasonable
person in the defendant’s position would have believed they were
facing an imminent use of unlawful force.
¶45 We conclude there is evidence in the record supporting the
district court’s finding that Clara reasonably believed another
attack by the snowplow was imminent. First, the snowplow had
already rammed Clara’s SUV four times, with the intensity of the
strikes increasing in degree. Second, Clara testified that after the
fourth hit, some airbags in the vehicle deployed. He believed his
SUV was inoperable and that his passenger might be injured and
unable to get out. Third, after the snowplow finally started to drive
away, it almost immediately came to an abrupt stop. Within
seconds of driving away, Clara saw the snowplow’s brake lights
come on, and he heard it “skid on the street” and come to a stop
about fifty feet away. And fourth, Clara saw the snowplow begin
to make a right turn either into a business or a driveway of some
sort. It was at this point that Clara fired his gun.
¶46 The State argues that Clara’s belief was unreasonable
unless “the [snowplow] was in fact pointed more south than
north,” or at least “east-southeast.” So in the State’s view, the fact
that the snowplow was facing “north or northeast made [Clara’s
showing] insufficient” to make a prima facie claim as to imminence.
The State provided the following example at oral argument:
This morning I was crossing the street . . . and I saw a
car on State Street make a U-turn at the left turn
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STATE v. CLARA
Opinion of the Court
light. . . . And it occurred to me, if I was behind that
car . . . and I watched that car make a U-turn, at what
point in his U-turn would I have been able to perceive
as an objectively verifiable phenomenon that this was
a U-turn and not a left turn? And the only way to tell,
the only difference . . . to the observer is once the
driver reverses orientation, goes beyond the left turn
to something more like a reverse orientation.
In other words, the State contends that for Clara’s belief that he was
in imminent danger to have been objectively reasonable, the
snowplow would “have [had] to cross the east orientation and go
something south of east in his orientation.”
¶47 But this hypothetical highlights the importance of the
surrounding circumstances that informed Clara’s belief. The
person observing the car in the hypothetical could reasonably
perceive the car’s intentions differently if, like Clara’s experience,
the car making the turn had just hit the person four times. And
then, as the person watched with relief as the car finally started to
drive away, it would seem reasonable for the person to be fear-
stricken if the car stopped abruptly within seconds of departing
and began to make a turn.
¶48 The law does not expect the hypothetical reasonable
person in such a fraught scenario to perceive, in a split second,
whether a vehicle has turned just enough to indicate it is making a
U-turn. The reasonable person we look to in making such objective
inquiries is not an infallible individual who has the benefit of
hindsight or plentiful time to contemplate the imminence of a given
threat of harm in the moment. “Detached reflection cannot be
demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife.” Brown v. United
States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921) (Holmes, J.).
¶49 And when we apply this understanding of the reasonable
person standard here, we are persuaded that a reasonable person
in Clara’s shoes could have believed that the snowplow was an
imminent threat. Clara had just been inside an SUV that was
rammed four times by the snowplow. When the snowplow finally
began to drive up the road, it skidded to a stop within seconds and
began to turn right into a business on the side of the road. In this
moment, a reasonable person could believe that the demonstrably
violent snowplow driver had reengaged and was going to attack
again. And Clara did not know if he could get his passenger out of
the snowplow’s way in time, considering the state of his SUV and
the passenger.
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Cite as: 2024 UT 10Opinion of the Court
¶50 The State points out the district court’s observation that
there was no evidence showing the snowplow turned all the way
around to face Clara. And we agree that this weighs against a
finding of imminence when determining whether the State
disproved that Clara acted in self-defense. But viewed in factual
context, and in light of the prima facie standard, this deficiency
does not negate all the evidence that cuts in the other direction. And
that evidence suffices to make a prima facie showing that Clara
reasonably believed the snowplow posed an imminent threat.
CONCLUSION
¶51 We conclude that the district court did not err in ruling
that Clara made a prima facie claim of self-defense at the
evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
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