JENCO LC v. Perkins Coie LLP ( 2016 )


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    2016 UT App 140
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    JENCO LC, DEAN GARDNER INVESTMENT LC, AND F.M. SNOW
    PROPERTIES LLC,
    Appellees,
    v.
    PERKINS COIE LLP,
    Appellant.
    Opinion
    No. 20140996-CA
    Filed July 8, 2016
    Fifth District Court, St. George Department
    The Honorable Jeffrey C. Wilcox
    No. 120500458
    James L. Ahlstrom and Barry Stratford, Attorneys
    for Appellant
    Bryan J. Pattison, Attorney for Appellees
    JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES
    STEPHEN L. ROTH and KATE A. TOOMEY concurred.
    ORME, Judge:
    ¶1     Appellees JENCO LC, Dean Gardner Investment LC, and
    F.M. Snow Properties LLC (collectively JENCO) entered into an
    agreement with Ledges Partners LLC (Ledges) in which Ledges
    agreed to purchase certain real property from JENCO. After
    Ledges defaulted on this agreement, JENCO sought judicial
    foreclosure of its trust deed given as security for Ledges’
    performance of its obligations. Ledges, which is not a party to
    this appeal, did not contest the foreclosure proceeding, and a
    default judgment was entered against it. Appellant Perkins Coie
    LLP (Perkins)—a law firm that had done work for Ledges and
    that held a junior lien on the same property—was named a
    defendant and answered JENCO’s foreclosure complaint. After
    JENCO v. Perkins Coie
    both JENCO and Perkins moved for summary judgment, the
    district court ruled against Perkins and granted summary
    judgment to JENCO. Perkins appeals from this adverse decision.
    We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2      In March 2004, JENCO and Ledges entered into an
    agreement (the Option Agreement) that reserved to Ledges an
    option to purchase certain real property that it intended to
    resell.1 The Option Agreement included a formula by which
    Ledges agreed to pay JENCO ‚for the Purchased Property.‛
    Importantly, the Option Agreement defined the capitalized term
    ‚Minimum Payment‛ as ‚*t+he amount calculated by
    multiplying the number of acres (or partial acres) in the
    Purchased Property by Forty Thousand Dollars.‛ The Option
    Agreement also required Ledges to ‚execute and deliver *to
    JENCO] . . . [a] Note and [a] Trust Deed encumbering the
    Purchased Property.‛
    ¶3     In October 2005, Ledges exercised its option to begin
    purchasing property from JENCO. In accordance with the
    Option Agreement, Ledges executed a promissory note (the
    JENCO Note), which provided that upon default ‚the entire
    unpaid principal balance of [this] Note, [shall] . . . become due
    and payable.‛ The JENCO Note further provided that, in the
    event of default, all acquired but as-yet undeveloped and unsold
    property—property that the Option Agreement defined as ‚Bulk
    Property‛—was to be appraised for fair market value and
    deemed sold at that price, with the balance due on the JENCO
    Note to be adjusted accordingly. The trust deed required Ledges
    1. Ledges’ plan was to develop the property and sell lots, but it
    also contemplated reselling undeveloped property. This appeal
    deals only with undeveloped property, referred to by the parties
    as ‚Bulk Property.‛
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    JENCO v. Perkins Coie
    ‚*t+o pay . . . all taxes and assessments affecting‛ the acquired
    property.
    ¶4     Nearly five years later, in July 2010, the parties signed
    both an amendment to the Option Agreement (First
    Amendment) and a Settlement Agreement,2 the latter being
    intended to settle, as explained by JENCO in its brief, ‚the
    various defaults that Ledges . . . had accumulated over the
    preceding five years.‛ The First Amendment modified the
    payment provision of the Option Agreement.3 Specifically,
    section 4 of the First Amendment provided—and the
    underlining is in the document—that Ledges’
    sole obligation to make payments to [JENCO] with
    respect to [acquired] Property shall be limited to:
    (i) the specific Percentage Payments stipulated in
    . . . Section 4, which amounts are payable upon the
    sale of the property; [and] (ii) such payment
    obligations as shall arise as a result of *JENCO’s+
    exercise of its enforcement rights under the Trust
    Deeds . . . .
    Section 4 obligated Ledges, for each resale of Bulk Property, to
    make a ‚Percentage Payment,‛ defined as ‚the Minimum
    Payment allocable to any Bulk Property, plus 25% of the excess
    2. Both Perkins’s and JENCO’s briefs on appeal state that the
    First Amendment and the Settlement Agreement were both
    signed on July 15, 2010.
    3. We refer to the Option Agreement, as amended by the First
    Amendment, as the ‚Amended Option Agreement.‛
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    Selling Price above an amount equal to the Minimum Payment
    attributable to such sale.‛4
    ¶5     The Settlement Agreement also addressed the payment
    scheme, outlined in the Amended Option Agreement. Section
    3(d) of the Settlement Agreement provided that ‚Ledges has
    paid all minimum payments due to [JENCO] under the
    Amended Option Agreement, and no additional minimum
    payments will be required thereunder.‛ Section 3(e) of the
    Settlement Agreement further clarified that ‚*t+he only amounts
    that will be payable to [JENCO] with respect to properties
    previously acquired from [JENCO] under the Amended Option
    Agreement are the amounts specifically stipulated in the First
    Amendment, including the cost of collection thereof*.+‛
    ¶6     As Ledges struggled to pay JENCO, it also fell behind on
    its payments due Perkins. As a result, Ledges granted Perkins a
    promissory note (the Perkins Note) secured by a Deed of Trust.
    Both the Perkins Note and the Deed of Trust were executed on
    July 15, 2010—the same day that the First Amendment and
    Settlement Agreement were signed. See supra note 2. Once the
    Deed of Trust in favor of Perkins was recorded, Perkins held a
    lien on the Purchased Property junior to JENCO’s trust deed.
    ¶7     Apparently unbeknownst to JENCO and not mentioned
    in the Settlement Agreement, between 2007 and 2011 Ledges had
    failed to pay any of the property taxes assessed against the
    Purchased Property. As a result, in April 2012 JENCO was
    4. The Settlement Agreement confirms that these capitalized
    terms were used as defined in the Option Agreement. Thus, as
    explained above, a Minimum Payment equals $40,000 per acre.
    See supra ¶ 2. The ‚Selling Price‛ is defined as ‚*t+he gross
    purchase price which a buyer pays in an arms-length
    transaction, before deducting any real estate commissions or
    closing costs.‛
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    forced to pay the delinquent property taxes, penalties, and
    interest owed on the property to avoid a tax sale. Given Ledges’
    default on its obligation to pay the taxes, JENCO elected to
    accelerate all amounts due under the JENCO Note and exercised
    its right to foreclose on the property.
    ¶8     Just over six months later, in November 2012, the
    manager of Ledges contacted JENCO and disclosed that Ledges
    was in negotiations with a proposed buyer. Perkins concedes
    that in the course of this discussion, JENCO informed Ledges
    that ‚to get a payoff amount for the *JENCO+ Note, *JENCO+
    would need specific acreage on what portions of the . . . Property
    Ledges was planning to sell, and [JENCO] also gave a rough
    estimate of $832,000 as a Minimum Payment.‛5 JENCO informed
    Ledges that other sums would need to be added to this amount,
    namely $197,000 as the 25% payment called for in the First
    Amendment, the now-paid property taxes, default interest, and
    attorney fees. Ledges did not challenge the payoff amount or any
    of its components but asked only for a waiver of the default
    interest. After the proposed sale fell through, JENCO continued
    the foreclosure action. Perkins, as a junior lienholder on the
    Purchased Property, was the only party to respond to JENCO’s
    complaint, and a default judgment was entered against Ledges
    in February 2013.
    ¶9     Approximately a year and a half later, and two years after
    discovery opened, Perkins moved for summary judgment on the
    ground that through the Settlement Agreement, JENCO
    affirmatively waived its right to receive the contractual
    ‚Minimum Payment.‛ JENCO disputed Perkins’s interpretation
    5. The $832,000 estimate was apparently calculated using the
    Minimum Payment formula found in the Option Agreement and
    the acreage JENCO estimated was included in the proposed sale.
    See supra ¶ 2.
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    and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, which the
    district court ultimately granted. This appeal followed.
    ANALYSIS
    ¶10 When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, ‚*a+n
    appellate court reviews a trial court’s legal conclusions and
    ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness,
    and views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn
    therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.‛
    Orvis v. Johnson, 
    2008 UT 2
    , ¶ 6, 
    177 P.3d 600
     (citations and
    internal quotation marks omitted). See also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)
    (explaining that summary judgment is appropriate if ‚there is no
    genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is
    entitled to a judgment as a matter of law‛).6 Such review
    considers, ‚in addition to whether there is any genuine issue as
    to any material fact, whether the movant is entitled to judgment
    as a matter of law.‛ Stevensen v. Goodson, 
    924 P.2d 339
    , 350 (Utah
    1996). In the course of our review, ‚we grant no deference to the
    district court’s legal conclusions.‛ Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias,
    
    2005 UT 36
    , ¶ 19, 
    116 P.3d 323
     (citation and internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    I. The Plain Language of the First Amendment, in Conjunction
    with the Settlement Agreement, Unambiguously Supports
    JENCO’s Interpretation and Precludes Perkins’s Interpretation.
    ¶11 ‚The underlying purpose in construing or interpreting a
    contract is to ascertain the intentions of the parties to the
    contract.‛ WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 
    2002 UT 88
    , ¶ 17, 
    54 P.3d 1139
    . Furthermore, ‚we consider each contract
    provision . . . in relation to all of the others, with a view toward
    6. Rule 56 was reorganized effective May 1, 2016. The former
    rule 56(c) is now rule 56(a). We refer in this opinion to the rule as
    written at the time the district court granted JENCO's motion.
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    JENCO v. Perkins Coie
    giving effect to all and ignoring none.‛ Id. ¶ 18 (omission in
    original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
    Although extrinsic evidence may be considered in some
    circumstances, ordinarily ‚*i+f the language within the four
    corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties’ intentions
    are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual
    language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of
    law.‛ Id. ¶ 19 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
    ‚An ambiguity exists where the *contractual+ language is
    reasonably capable of being understood in more than one
    sense.‛ Central Florida Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 
    2002 UT 3
    ,
    ¶ 12, 
    40 P.3d 599
     (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
    ¶12 Taken alone, section 3(d) of the Settlement Agreement
    might seem to waive JENCO’s right to an additional ‚Minimum
    Payment.‛ After all, the Settlement Agreement states that
    ‚Ledges has paid all minimum payments due to [JENCO] under
    the Amended Option Agreement, and no additional minimum
    payments will be required thereunder.‛7 Thus, if the Settlement
    Agreement ended here, we would likely agree that JENCO
    waived its right to receive a portion of the Percentage Payment
    defined in the First Amendment—that is, the portion derived
    from the calculation of the Minimum Payment. Section 3(e) of
    the Settlement Agreement states, however, with our emphasis,
    that ‚*t+he only amounts that will be payable to *JENCO+ with
    7. Although the Settlement Agreement is not a model of clarity
    with respect to the intended meaning of the term ‚minimum
    payments,‛ writing this term in lower case in the Settlement
    Agreement at least suggests that it has a different meaning than
    the capitalized term as used in the Option Agreement and the
    First Amendment, especially because the Settlement Agreement
    provides that ‚*c+apitalized term*s+ . . . have the meanings given
    them in the Amended Option Agreement.‛ In any event, given
    the clarity of section 3(e), it is unnecessary to determine the
    interpretation and operation of section 3(d) read in isolation.
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    JENCO v. Perkins Coie
    respect to properties previously acquired from [JENCO] under
    the Amended Option Agreement are the amounts specifically
    stipulated in the First Amendment.‛ Thus, Perkins’s attempt to
    read out the Minimum Payment provision—itself a part of the
    ‚amounts specifically stipulated in the First Amendment‛—is
    unavailing.
    ¶13 There are several additional points worth noting. First, it
    is instructive that both the First Amendment and the Settlement
    Agreement were signed on the same day. See supra note 2. It is
    unlikely that JENCO, having negotiated a favorable term, would
    agree to have that term rescinded a few minutes later. Second,
    Ledges, the actual obligor, has never disputed JENCO’s
    calculation of the amount due and owing to JENCO. Third,
    Perkins’s reading of section 3(d) would render section 3(e)—not
    to mention the payment provisions of the First Amendment—
    entirely superfluous.8 We read the contract to say exactly what it
    unambiguously, if somewhat cumbersomely, expresses: the only
    8. As the district court correctly observed, ‚*i+f Ledges . . . and
    [JENCO] had understood the amount of the Minimum Payment
    portion to be zero, as Perkins . . . claims, then it makes no sense
    that they would have included the term ‘plus’ on top of zero to
    determine the amount due and payable.‛ Whatever the truth of
    the stereotype that legal professionals are bad at math, see Arden
    Rowell & Jessica Bragant, Numeracy and Legal Decision Making,
    
    46 Ariz. St. L.J. 191
    , 193 (2014), we assume that all parties to the
    suit knew that the sum of zero plus any number is equal to that
    number, see Properties of Zero, Basic-Mathematics.com,
    http://www.basic-mathematics.com/properties-of-zero.html (last
    visited July 5, 2016) [https://perma.cc/J2TS-AWYK] (noting that
    ‚a number does not change when adding or subtracting zero
    from that number‛). Thus, we agree with the district court that
    the terms of the Settlement Agreement ‚make*+ no sense‛ if
    Perkins’s interpretation of those terms is adopted.
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    payments Ledges owes to JENCO are the ‚amounts specifically
    stipulated in the First Amendment,‛ i.e., the ‚Minimum
    Payment, . . . plus 25% of the excess Selling Price.‛ 9 Because the
    contract is unambiguous, ‚the language within the four corners
    of the contract‛ makes Perkins’s alternative interpretation
    untenable. See WebBank, 
    2002 UT 88
    , ¶ 19 (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the district court did not
    err in interpreting the contract as it did, ‚as a matter of law.‛ 
    Id.
    (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
    II. The District Court Properly Considered the Admissible
    Evidence That Was Presented to It and Did Not Improperly
    Weigh the Evidence.
    ¶14 Perkins’s main argument, treated above, is that while the
    key agreements are clear and unambiguous, they should have
    been interpreted, in Perkins’s favor, as a matter of law. Its
    fallback position is that if the agreements are not interpreted in
    9. As we read the Settlement Agreement, sections 3(b)–(d) refer
    primarily to Ledges’ settlement of its outstanding dispute with
    JENCO over certain funds that were placed in escrow to be
    delivered to JENCO after the sale of several residential lots but
    that were returned to Ledges instead (the Missed Payment
    Amount). It would appear, then, that while section 3(d) refers to
    ‚all minimum payments due,‛ it is not referring to the term
    ‚Minimum Payment‛ as defined in the First Amendment.
    Instead, it simply means that when the Settlement Agreement
    was signed, Ledges owed JENCO no payments aside from the
    Missed Payment Amount. Our reading is bolstered by Ledges’
    further acknowledgment in section 3(e) that, as future lots were
    (or were not) sold, it would incur additional liability ‚with
    respect to properties previously acquired from *JENCO+.‛ Such
    liability was to be determined according to the terms of the First
    Amendment.
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    JENCO v. Perkins Coie
    the manner Perkins urges, then they were at least ambiguous
    enough to render summary judgment in JENCO’s favor
    improper.10 There is nothing illogical with this two-pronged
    approach. As we previously explained,
    Cross-motions for summary judgment do not ipso
    facto dissipate factual issues, even though both
    parties contend . . . that they are entitled to prevail
    because there are no material issues of fact. Rather,
    cross-motions may be viewed as involving a
    contention by each movant that no genuine issue of
    fact exists under the theory it advances, but not as
    10. While Perkins is not responsible for the drafting of the
    Option Agreement or the JENCO Note and trust deed, Perkins
    acknowledges that the interpretation of ‚its own work‛ is at the
    heart of this appeal. Thus, although we decide this issue on other
    grounds, given that Perkins drafted the First Amendment and
    Settlement Agreement—for its then-client, Ledges— it is peculiar
    that Perkins now suggests that its own drafting is ambiguous. For
    one thing, clients do not engage lawyers to draft ambiguous
    contracts, and Perkins should not benefit from ambiguity in its
    own drafting. Moreover, an ambiguous contract is interpreted
    against the drafter. See, e.g., Sears v. Riemersma, 
    655 P.2d 1105
    ,
    1107 (Utah 1982) (‚*A+ny uncertainty with respect to
    construction of a contract should be resolved against the party
    who *drafted+ the agreement.‛); Parks Enters., Inc. v. New Century
    Realty, Inc., 
    652 P.2d 918
    , 920 (Utah 1982) (‚It is also settled law
    that a contract will be construed against its drafter.‛). As the
    doctrine is regularly applied to a party to a contract, even
    though it is often that party’s counsel who is responsible for
    drafting the contract, see Sears, 655 P.2d at 1107 (applying the
    doctrine against the party whose counsel had drafted the
    contract), it is even more appropriate to apply it directly against
    that counsel on the rare occasion when the opportunity presents
    itself.
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    a concession that no dispute remains under the
    theory advanced by its adversary. In effect, each
    cross-movant implicitly contends that it is entitled
    to judgment as a matter of law, but that if the court
    determines otherwise, factual disputes exist which
    preclude judgment as a matter of law in favor of
    the other side.
    Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 
    780 P.2d 821
    , 824–25 (Utah Ct. App.
    1989) (omission in original) (citations and internal quotation
    marks omitted). But the alternative argument is unavailing in
    this case.
    ¶15 On summary judgment, the district court may neither
    weigh credibility nor assign weight ‚to conflicting evidence.‛
    Martin v. Lauder, 
    2010 UT App 216
    , ¶ 14, 
    239 P.3d 519
    . Thus, to
    qualify for summary judgment, a party must demonstrate that
    no dispute exists concerning material facts. 
    Id.
     ¶¶ 14–15. And
    while an appellant who is challenging a summary judgment
    entered against it ‚is ‘entitled to all favorable inferences, *it+ is
    not entitled to build a case on the gossamer threads of whimsy,
    speculation and conjecture.’‛ Ladd v. Bowers Trucking, Inc., 
    2011 UT App 355
    , ¶ 7, 
    264 P.3d 752
     (quoting Manganaro v. Delaval
    Separator Co., 
    309 F.2d 389
    , 393 (1st Cir. 1962)). In essence, ‚the
    parties must submit admissible evidence‛ ‚*t+o present an issue
    of material fact,‛ Ladd, 
    2011 UT App 355
    , ¶ 7, and
    ‚unsubstantiated conclusions and opinions are inadmissible,‛
    Martin, 
    2010 UT App 216
    , ¶ 6 n.4 (citation and internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    ¶16 As the district court noted, ‚*t+he facts as set forth *by
    JENCO were+ . . . undisputed.‛ This was true even after two
    years of discovery, during which Perkins apparently did not
    turn up any evidence contradicting JENCO’s evidence or
    JENCO’s interpretation of the legal effect of that evidence.
    Indeed, Perkins chose not to depose any of Ledges’ executives or
    employees. In JENCO’s words, Perkins ‚instead stood on its
    20140996-CA                     11               
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    summary judgment papers without a single sworn statement
    contradicting or explaining any of Ledges’ actions and conduct.‛
    And Perkins’s contention that Ledges’ former executives
    ‚might‛ dispute JENCO’s interpretation of the agreements was
    simply supposition that Perkins could not rely upon to avoid
    summary judgment in favor of JENCO. See Ladd, 
    2011 UT App 355
    , ¶ 7; Martin, 
    2010 UT App 216
    , ¶ 6 n.4. Accordingly, there
    was no evidence before the district court from which it could
    have inferred that a dispute of material fact existed that bore on
    the interpretation of key terms in the agreement between the
    parties to the agreement, and therefore, it properly granted
    summary judgment to JENCO. See Evans v. Huber, 
    2016 UT App 17
    , ¶¶ 13–16, 
    366 P.3d 862
     (noting that where a party’s
    ‚opposition to summary judgment merely rested on allegations
    in *its+ complaint,‛ ‚failed to refute the facts *as+ set forth in *the
    opposing party’s+ motion[,] and did not provide or cite any
    evidentiary support‛ for its position, the district court was right
    to conclude that there was no ‚genuine issue of material fact‛
    and to grant summary judgment to the opposing party).
    ¶17 Furthermore, as noted, ‚*t+he underlying purpose in
    construing or interpreting a contract is to ascertain the intentions
    of the parties to the contract.‛ WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity
    Serv. Corp., 
    2002 UT 88
    , ¶ 17, 
    54 P.3d 1139
     (emphasis added).
    Perkins is not now, and never has been, a party to the
    agreements between JENCO and Ledges. Thus, Perkins’s
    ‚intentions‛ with respect to those agreements are irrelevant. See
    
    id.
    III. JENCO Is Entitled to Augment Its Judgment with the
    Amount of Attorney Fees Reasonably Incurred on Appeal.
    ¶18 Although no agreement addressing attorney fees exists
    between JENCO and Perkins, the JENCO Note and trust deed
    both authorized JENCO to collect attorney fees, among other
    costs, from Ledges in the event that an enforcement action
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    proved necessary. The JENCO Note provides, with our
    emphasis, that Ledges
    shall pay all costs and expenses incurred by
    [JENCO] in connection with the collection and
    enforcement of this Note (regardless of the
    particular nature of such costs and expenses and
    whether incurred before or after the initiation of
    suit or before or after judgment), including, without
    limitation, court costs and . . . attorneys’ fees and
    costs.
    JENCO thus contends that fees it incurred in connection with the
    instant appeal are recoverable as against Ledges, and it seeks to
    have its judgment augmented accordingly. Perkins does not
    oppose the request in its reply brief, and the request appears to
    be in order. Accordingly, we remand the case to the district court
    for the calculation of JENCO’s attorney fees reasonably incurred
    on appeal and augmentation of its judgment as appropriate. See
    Department of Soc. Servs. v. Adams, 
    806 P.2d 1193
    , 1197–98 (Utah
    Ct. App. 1991).
    CONCLUSION
    ¶19 The district court properly granted summary judgment to
    JENCO. The plain language of the agreements is unambiguous
    and forecloses Perkins’s alternative interpretation. Perkins
    presented no admissible evidence to the district court disputing
    the factual context against which the court interpreted the
    agreement. The court properly accepted the facts JENCO
    presented as undisputed because Perkins did not dispute them.
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment in all
    respects, remanding to the district court only for the calculation
    of JENCO’s fees reasonably incurred on appeal and for
    augmentation of its judgment as appropriate.
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