Spencer v. Glover , 837 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 ( 2017 )


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    2017 UT App 69
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    TERRY R. SPENCER AND TR SPENCER & ASSOCIATES PC,
    Appellants,
    v.
    STEPHEN M. GLOVER,
    Appellee.
    Opinion
    No. 20150892-CA
    Filed April 20, 2017
    Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
    The Honorable L. Douglas Hogan
    No. 150903279
    Gavin V. Collier and Terry R. Spencer, Attorneys
    for Appellants
    Robert B. Cummings, Attorney for Appellee
    JUDGE KATE A. TOOMEY authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES
    J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. and JILL M. POHLMAN concurred.
    TOOMEY, Judge:
    ¶1     Attorney Terry R. Spencer and his law firm appeal the
    decision of the district court dismissing his suit under rule
    12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Spencer contends
    the court erred in determining that an online review posted by
    Stephen M. Glover was ‚mere opinion‛ and thus not actionable
    defamation. We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2     Spencer represented Glover in his divorce proceedings.
    Glover was unsatisfied with the representation and ultimately
    retained new counsel. He subsequently posted a review
    Spencer v. Glover
    regarding Spencer and his services on yelp.com, an online
    comment aggregator.1 The review stated:
    Worst ever. Had to fire him after I gave him a
    chance for well over a year. Paid him his $2,500
    retainer, then paid him another $2,500 shortly after
    . . . and I still owe him another several thousand
    dollars! . . . all for his hunt-and-peck filing typing
    b.s. while he makes me watch. I’d be willing to
    wager that he was sitting on it and running the bill
    up until I produced money that she had not gotten
    her hands on. There was none that she had not
    gotten her hands on. She admitted that she spent
    the $40k in the safe. My order is _still_ based on
    substantially higher income earned the hard way
    in the Middle East, supporting my family by
    supporting those who protect our freedom. The
    arrears [have] become astronomical and ORS is
    threatening to take my license and passport . . .
    Yelled at me once when I called to ask him about
    something his office had sent me that day. Told me
    to ‚GOOGLE IT!‛ Worst. Ever. Filed a Utah Bar
    complaint and strongly considering suing him. Just
    have to find someone to do it.
    ¶3     Spencer asked Glover to remove the review, and when
    Glover refused, Spencer filed suit against him for defamation,
    intentional infliction of emotional distress, and intentional
    1. Yelp Inc. is a company that ‚describes itself generally as an
    online networking platform that connects people with great local
    businesses by hosting user-generated reviews.‛ Curry v. Yelp
    Inc., No. 14-cv-03547-JST, 
    2015 WL 1849037
    , at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
    21, 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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    Spencer v. Glover
    interference with prospective economic relations.2 Glover moved
    to dismiss all three claims for failure to state a claim upon which
    relief could be granted.
    ¶4     The district court granted Glover’s motion to dismiss.
    Regarding the defamation claim, the court, assuming the
    statements in the review were false and resulted in damage to
    Spencer, determined the statements were ‚mere opinion‛ and
    dismissed the claim. The court next dismissed the claim for
    intentional infliction of emotional distress, stating that ‚*w+riting
    and publishing a critical online review does not amount to
    outrageous and intolerable behavior, particularly where there is
    no defamation.‛ Finally, the court dismissed the interference
    with economic relations claim because even if Glover had
    ‚intentionally interfered with Spencer’s prospective economic
    relations,‛ Spencer did not demonstrate that writing an online
    review was an ‚improper means‛ where the review was not
    defamatory and no other impropriety was apparent. Spencer
    appeals.
    2. Spencer’s complaint contained two additional causes of action:
    declaratory relief and breach of contract. The district court
    dismissed Spencer’s declaratory relief cause of action, reasoning
    that because Spencer’s other claims had failed, no ‚justiciable
    controversy‛ remained. See Miller v. Weaver, 
    2003 UT 12
    , ¶ 15, 
    66 P.3d 592
     (determining that ‚a justiciable controversy‛ is a
    necessary element to proceed with a declaratory judgment
    action). The court also dismissed the breach of contract cause of
    action, ordering the parties to arbitrate that claim. Spencer does
    not appeal the dismissal of either of these claims, and we do not
    address them further.
    20150892-CA                      3                 
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    Spencer v. Glover
    ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶5      Spencer raises three issues on appeal. First, he contends
    the district court erred in dismissing his defamation claim. When
    reviewing claims of defamation that are dismissed for failure to
    state a claim, ‚we accept as true all material allegations
    contained in the complaint,‛ West v. Thomson Newspapers, 
    872 P.2d 999
    , 1004 (Utah 1994), but we do not ‚indulge [the
    appellant] by interpreting inferences that may be reasonably
    drawn from the statements in favor of a defamatory meaning,‛
    Jacob v. Bezzant, 
    2009 UT 37
    , ¶ 18, 
    212 P.3d 535
    . Instead, we ‚look
    to the context of the allegedly defamatory statement and then, in
    a nondeferential manner, reach an independent conclusion about
    the statement’s susceptibility to a defamatory interpretation.‛ 
    Id.
    (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This
    determination is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. 
    Id.
    Additionally, whether the motion to dismiss was properly
    granted is also a question of law that we review for correctness.
    West, 872 P.2d at 1004.
    ¶6      As to his second and third issue on appeal, Spencer
    contends the court erred in dismissing both his intentional
    infliction of emotional distress claim and his intentional
    interference with prospective economic relations claim. His
    challenge to the dismissal of these claims hinges on his assertion
    that the court erroneously determined that the online review
    was not actionable defamation. Because we conclude the court’s
    decision regarding the defamation claim was correct, we need
    not address these two issues on appeal.
    ANALYSIS
    ¶7     Spencer contends the district court erred in determining
    Glover’s review was ‚mere opinion‛ and thus not defamatory.
    ‚Under Utah law, a statement is defamatory if it impeaches an
    individual’s honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation and thereby
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    Spencer v. Glover
    exposes the individual to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule.‛
    
    Id. at 1008
    . ‚At its core, an action for defamation is intended to
    protect an individual’s interest in maintaining a good
    reputation.‛ 
    Id.
     The ‚guiding principle‛ in determining whether
    a statement is defamatory is ‚the statement’s tendency to injure
    a reputation in the eyes of its audience.‛ 
    Id.
     A defamatory
    statement requires ‚more than sharp criticism‛—‚*a+ publication
    is not defamatory simply because it is nettlesome or
    embarrassing to a plaintiff.‛ 
    Id. at 1009
     (citations and internal
    quotation marks omitted). To make this determination, a court
    cannot ‚view*+ individual words in isolation‛ but must
    ‚carefully examine the context in which the statement was
    made.‛ 
    Id. ¶8
         Even if a statement is defamatory, the ‚Utah Constitution
    provides an independent source of protection for expressions of
    opinion.‛ 
    Id. at 1013
    . ‚Because expressions of pure opinion fuel
    the marketplace of ideas and because such expressions are
    incapable of being verified, they cannot serve as the basis for
    defamation liability.‛ 
    Id. at 1015
    . But the Utah Supreme Court
    has noted that ‚opinions rarely stand alone, isolated from any
    factual moorings. To convince readers of the legitimacy of an
    opinion, authors typically describe the perceived factual bases
    for opinions, seeking to demonstrate that the author’s opinions
    are grounded in common sense.‛ 
    Id.
     And although the Utah
    Constitution protects expressions of opinion, this protection is
    abused ‚when the opinion states or implies facts that are false
    and defamatory. If the opinion does not state or imply such facts
    or if the underlying facts are not defamatory, an action for
    defamation is improper.‛ 
    Id.
     Thus, our inquiry is whether the
    online review is a protected expression of opinion, and whether
    the opinion states or implies underlying defamatory facts.
    ¶9      The distinction between opinion and fact is not always
    clear, and our supreme court has outlined four factors that are
    ‚useful in distinguishing fact from opinion‛:
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    Spencer v. Glover
    (i) the common usage or meaning of the words
    used; (ii) whether the statement is capable of
    being objectively verified as true or false; (iii)
    the full context of the statement—for example,
    the entire article or column—in which the
    defamatory statement is made; and (iv) the
    broader setting in which the statement appears.
    
    Id. at 1018
    .
    ¶10 First, we analyze the online review under these four
    factors to determine whether it was an opinion, identifying any
    potentially defamatory statements in the review. Because we
    conclude the online review was an opinion, we next determine
    whether it stated or implied any underlying facts, and decide
    whether those underlying facts were defamatory.
    I. The Online Review Was an Expression of Opinion.
    A.     Whether the Statements Are Capable of Being Objectively
    Verified
    ¶11 As we begin our analysis, we employ the ‚common usage
    or meaning of the words‛ to determine ‚whether the statement
    is capable of being objectively verified as true or false.‛ See West
    v. Thomson Newspapers, 
    872 P.2d 999
    , 1018 (Utah 1994). Glover
    made six potentially defamatory statements in the online review:
    (1) ‚Worst ever‛; (2) ‚Had to fire him after I gave him a chance
    for well over a year‛; (3) ‚all for his hunt-and-peck filing typing
    b.s. while he makes me watch‛; (4) ‚I’d be willing to wager that
    he was sitting on it and running the bill up until I produced
    money that she had not gotten her hands on‛; (5) ‚Yelled at me
    once when I called to ask him about something his office had
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    Spencer v. Glover
    sent me that day. Told me to ‘GOOGLE IT!’‛; (6) ‚Filed a Utah
    Bar complaint and strongly considering suing him.‛3
    ¶12 The first statement, ‚*w+orst ever,‛4 is not subject to
    objective verification. The word ‚worst‛ is a superlative, and can
    mean the ‚most bad, evil,‛ the ‚most unfavorable, unpleasant,‛
    the ‚most unsuitable, faulty,‛ the ‚least skilled or efficient‛ or
    the ‚most wanting in quality.‛ Worst, Webster’s Third New
    International Dictionary (1968). There are no objective criteria
    from which to determine whether someone is the ‚worst.‛
    ‚Ever‛ is ‚used as an intensive with a superlative‛ and means
    ‚through all time.‛ Ever, Webster’s Third New International
    Dictionary (1968). The phrase ‚worst ever‛ expresses Glover’s
    subjective belief and ‚amounts to rhetorical hyperbole.‛ Cf.
    Seaton v. TripAdvisor LLC, 
    728 F.3d 592
    , 598 (6th Cir. 2013)
    (concluding that ‚‘*d+irtiest’ is a loose, hyperbolic term because
    it is the superlative of an adjective that conveys an inherently
    subjective concept‛).
    ¶13 Spencer argues it is possible to demonstrate the phrase
    ‚worst ever‛ is false because he has twenty-five years of
    experience as an attorney and has never been disciplined by the
    Utah State Bar. He therefore cannot be the ‚worst‛ attorney,
    3. In the review, Glover also complained that ‚[t]he arrears
    *have+ become astronomical.‛ This appeared after Glover stated
    ‚*t+here was *no money+ that *his ex-spouse] had not gotten her
    hands on,‛ and ‚*m+y order is _still_ based on substantially
    higher income earned the hard way in the Middle East.‛ Given
    this context, Glover’s complaint about astronomical arrears is
    not directed toward Spencer, and so is not a potentially
    defamatory statement.
    4. Glover repeated this language later in the online review, with
    additional punctuation for emphasis: ‚Worst. Ever.‛
    20150892-CA                     7               
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    Spencer v. Glover
    because others, who have received professional discipline, must
    be worse than he is. Thus, he reasons, the phrase ‚worst ever‛
    can be objectively determined to be true or false. This argument
    makes sense if a reader would likely understand the phrase
    ‚worst ever‛ in a strictly literal sense. But no reader would.
    ‚Worst ever‛ is a common colloquial phrase used to express a
    strong negative opinion. When a person declares that he or she
    just went on the worst date ever, no reasonable listener would
    understand that statement as a claim that the speaker
    exhaustively researched all the dates in the history of dating,
    developed objective scoring criteria, and determined as a matter
    of fact that last night’s date was worse than dates that ended in
    death, violence, or vomiting in a restaurant. Likewise, if a person
    declares that his doctor is the worst ever, no reasonable listener
    would understand the statement to mean that the doctor was
    worse than Dr. Josef Mengele. Similarly, no reasonable reader
    would have read Glover’s comment, especially in context, as an
    assertion of fact rather than an assertion of opinion.
    ¶14 The second statement is also not capable of objective
    verification. Glover wrote that he ‚*h+ad to fire *Spencer+ after
    giving him a chance for well over a year.‛ We agree with
    Spencer that the common usage of ‚had to‛ in this context
    suggests that Glover was forced to, or had no choice but to fire
    Spencer. But whether Glover believed he had no choice but to
    fire Spencer ‚is something only *Glover+ himself knows, not
    something that is subject to objective verification.‛ See West, 872
    P.2d at 1019 (noting that whether a mayor ‚intended to dupe
    voters into electing him mayor by misrepresenting his position‛
    is something only the mayor himself could know, and not
    ‚subject to objective verification‛). Furthermore, whether Glover
    gave Spencer ‚a chance for well over a year‛ is Glover’s
    subjective assessment, and is something only Glover himself
    could know. It cannot be shown to be true or false.
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    Spencer v. Glover
    ¶15 As for the third and fourth statements—‚the ‘hunt-and-
    peck’ comment and the ‘running up the bill’ comment‛—
    Spencer acknowledges in his brief that they are also not capable
    of objective verification.
    ¶16 A portion of the fifth statement, on the other hand, can be
    objectively demonstrated to be true or false. The online review
    stated that Spencer ‚yelled‛ at Glover and told him to google5
    something. To yell is to ‚utter a loud cry, scream, or shout.‛ Yell,
    Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1968). Whether a
    person yelled depends at least to some extent on the hearer—
    what qualifies as a yell to some may not be understood as such
    by others. But whether Spencer told Glover to google something
    can be objectively verified.
    ¶17 The sixth statement also can be objectively verified.
    Whether Glover actually filed a complaint against Spencer is
    demonstrable true or false, as is whether Glover was considering
    suing Spencer.
    ¶18 In sum, three statements in the online review are subject
    to objective verification: (1) whether Spencer told Glover to
    google something, (2) whether Glover filed a complaint with the
    Utah State Bar against Spencer, and (3) whether Glover was
    considering suing Spencer. The rest of the statements in the
    online review cannot be objectively verified and weigh in favor
    of a determination that the review expressed an opinion.
    5. To ‚google‛ means ‚to use the Google search engine to obtain
    information about (as a person) on the World Wide Web.‛
    Google, Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2007).
    20150892-CA                     9                 
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    Spencer v. Glover
    B.    The Broader Setting in Which the Statements Appear and
    the Full Context of the Statements
    ¶19 Next, we consider the broader setting in which the
    statements were made and the full context of the statements.
    Glover’s review was posted on yelp.com, a website where
    people post business reviews, commenting on their experiences
    and degrees of satisfaction with particular businesses. The
    district court determined that ‚a necessarily subjective online
    review of a particular business, published in the review section
    of a website commonly used by customers to rank their
    experiences with businesses of all kinds,‛ indicates that the
    statements were an expression of opinion. We agree with the
    district court. In West, our supreme court determined that an
    article was a protected opinion, in part because it was published
    in a weekly editorial column. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 
    872 P.2d 999
    , 1020 (Utah 1994). The article’s publication in that
    setting was enough to indicate to readers that the statements
    were not ‚hard news‛ and argued ‚strongly in favor of finding
    the statements to be protected opinion.‛ 
    Id.
     (internal quotation
    marks omitted). There is a similar situation here. Online reviews
    communicate a person’s experience with and opinion of a
    business. ‚Some types of writing or speech by custom or
    convention signal to readers or listeners that what is being read
    or heard is likely to be opinion, not fact.‛ 
    Id.
     (citation and
    internal quotation marks omitted). The presence of Glover’s
    objectionable statements in an online review platform signals to
    readers that he was communicating his negative opinion about
    Spencer.
    ¶20 Additionally, given the full context of Glover’s
    statements, it is apparent that Glover was in the midst of an
    acrimonious divorce and that he was upset about the money he
    owed to Spencer and the division of marital assets in the divorce
    proceedings. Glover used hyperbolic phrases throughout the
    review. Given this context, ‚[i]t is unlikely that any reader
    20150892-CA                   10                
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    Spencer v. Glover
    would take [the review] at face value,‛ because ‚most readers
    would view it as exaggerated commentary expressing *Glover’s+
    frustration.‛ See 
    id. at 1010
    . For example, readers are unlikely to
    take literally Glover’s statement that Spencer was the ‚*w+orst
    ever,‛ but rather would interpret it as conveying Glover’s
    general dissatisfaction with Spencer’s performance. For these
    reasons, the full context of the online review reveals it as an
    expression of opinion.6
    ¶21 In sum, after considering Glover’s statements in light of
    the factors identified in West, we conclude that the online review
    constituted an expression of opinion, which is protected by the
    6. The district court stated that the ‚context of the review also
    shows that the statements were made by a biased, and therefore
    potentially unreliable, individual.‛ In his brief, Spencer alleges
    that the court relied on ‚external ‘mental-health related facts or
    claims’‛ in determining that the context of the online review
    demonstrated it was an expression of opinion. Spencer also
    claims that the district court focused on ‚Glover’s questionable
    mental health‛ in classifying the review as an opinion, and he
    argues that Glover’s ‚biased and diminished state of mind‛
    should not determine whether the review was an opinion,
    because an average reader could not ‚objectively conclude that
    Glover is biased, unreliable or mentally ill‛ based only on his
    comments. Having located no reference to Glover’s mental
    health in the district court’s order, this court during oral
    argument inquired about Spencer’s comments. Spencer
    responded that the court’s statement concerning Glover’s bias
    and potential unreliability indicated that Glover suffered from
    mental illness. Spencer added that he did not ‚know how else to
    read‛ the court’s statement. On the contrary, we do not believe
    that any impartial observer could read the court’s statement as
    Spencer does.
    20150892-CA                    11                
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    Spencer v. Glover
    Utah Constitution unless the opinion states or implies
    underlying defamatory facts.
    II. The Underlying Facts Were Not Defamatory.
    ¶22 Our next inquiry is whether the review states or implies
    underlying facts, and whether these facts were defamatory. If the
    facts are not defamatory, there is no basis for a defamation
    lawsuit. See West v. Thomson Newspapers, 
    872 P.2d 999
    , 1015 (Utah
    1994).
    ¶23 The review states several facts: (1) that Glover paid
    Spencer thousands of dollars and owed more, (2) that Spencer,
    instead of answering Glover’s inquiry, told him to ‚GOOGLE
    IT!,‛ (3) that Glover filed a complaint against Spencer with the
    Utah State Bar, and (4) that Glover was considering suing
    Spencer.
    ¶24 Again, a defamatory statement ‚impeaches an
    individual’s honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation and thereby
    exposes the individual to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule.‛
    
    Id. at 1008
    . We conclude that none of these statements is
    defamatory.
    ¶25 First, Glover alleged he paid Spencer five thousand
    dollars and owed him thousands more. But the review also
    indicated that Spencer represented Glover in his divorce
    proceedings for more than one year. Although Glover was
    dissatisfied with the representation, the fact that Spencer
    charged Glover for services rendered would not injure Spencer’s
    reputation in the eyes of the public. See 
    id. ¶26
     Second, Glover alleged that when he asked Spencer a
    question, Spencer told him to ‚GOOGLE IT!,‛ essentially telling
    Glover to find the answer to his question himself. This also is not
    defamatory. Although it might portray Spencer in a negative
    light for being curt with a client, this type of behavior would not
    20150892-CA                    12                
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    Spencer v. Glover
    expose an attorney ‚to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule.‛ See
    
    id. ¶27
     Third, the fact that Glover filed a complaint against
    Spencer cannot support a defamation claim. Spencer concedes in
    his brief that Glover filed a complaint against him, and ‚*i+n this
    state, truth is an absolute defense to an action for defamation.‛
    Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 
    812 P.2d 49
    , 57 (Utah 1991).
    ¶28 Finally, Glover alleged that he was considering suing
    Spencer. Although this indicates Glover was dissatisfied with
    Spencer’s representation, the fact that a person might be
    contemplating a lawsuit against another doesn’t injure his
    reputation to the point that he is exposed to hatred, contempt, or
    ridicule. A statement that a person is ‚strongly considering
    suing‛ another is not defamatory.
    ¶29 For these reasons, we conclude that none of the
    underlying facts of the online review is defamatory. Because
    they are not defamatory, the district court correctly dismissed
    Spencer’s suit. See West, 872 P.2d at 1015.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶30 The district court correctly dismissed Spencer’s
    defamation claim because the review was an expression of
    opinion protected by the Utah Constitution and because the
    underlying facts stated in the review are not defamatory.
    20150892-CA                    13                
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Document Info

Docket Number: 20150892-CA

Citation Numbers: 2017 UT App 69, 397 P.3d 780, 837 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 2017 Utah App. LEXIS 68, 2017 WL 1422981

Judges: Toomey, Voros, Pohlman

Filed Date: 4/20/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024