Ostler v. Retirement Board , 841 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 ( 2017 )


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    2017 UT App 96
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    NEAL K. OSTLER,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    RETIREMENT BOARD AND
    SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE,
    Respondents.
    Opinion
    No. 20160220-CA
    Filed June 15, 2017
    Original Proceeding in this Court
    Florence M. Vincent and Tara Pincock, Attorneys
    for Petitioner
    David B. Hansen and Erin G. Christensen, Attorneys
    for Respondent Retirement Board
    Sean D. Reyes and Erin T. Middleton, Attorneys for
    Respondent Salt Lake Community College
    JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN authored this Opinion, in
    which JUDGES J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. and DAVID N. MORTENSEN
    concurred.
    CHRISTIANSEN, Judge:
    ¶1     Neal K. Ostler petitions for judicial review of the Utah
    State Retirement Board’s order denying him pension benefits.
    He contends that the withdrawal of member contributions he
    made over the course of about 15 years should not have resulted
    in forfeiture of all 15 years of service credit he accrued. He
    further contends that the statute of limitations did not begin to
    run on his claim that he was eligible for other service credit,
    because he had not yet retired. We conclude that the Board
    correctly interpreted the forfeiture statute and that Ostler’s other
    Ostler v. Retirement Board
    claims are barred by res judicata. Consequently, we decline to
    disturb the Board’s decision.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2      The legislature enacted the Utah State Retirement and
    Insurance Benefit Act to establish and administer a state
    retirement system. See 
    Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-103
    (1)
    (LexisNexis 2015). The resulting program is known as Utah
    Retirement Systems (URS) and is governed by the Board. Id.; 
    id.
    § 49-11-201. An individual employed by a participating public
    employer may qualify to become a member of URS. Those who
    do may be eligible to participate in a defined-contribution plan
    (e.g., a 401(k)) and/or a defined-benefit plan, often referred to as
    a pension plan.
    ¶3      An employer who participates in a pension plan may
    choose between two contribution schemes. The first is a non-
    contributory defined-benefit plan where only the employer pays
    money into the plan. See, e.g., id. § 49-13-301(1). The second is a
    contributory defined-benefit plan where both the member and
    the employer deposit money into the plan. See, e.g., id. § 49-14-
    301(1).
    ¶4      Member contributions vest immediately. See, e.g., id. § 49-
    14-301(5)(c). Upon the termination of employment, the member
    may withdraw his or her member contributions (also referred to
    as “receiving a refund” from the plan) or may leave them in the
    pension plan. Id. § 49-11-501(1). When a member withdraws his
    or her personal contributions, the associated service credit is
    forfeited. Id. § 49-11-501(5); id. § 49-11-102(51) (defining “service
    credit”). But a member who is reemployed by a participating
    employer may reinstate that service credit by redepositing the
    withdrawn contributions along with any applicable interest. Id.
    § 49-11-502.
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    Ostler v. Retirement Board
    ¶5     Under either type of defined-benefit plan, members only
    qualify for pension benefits once they have accrued at least
    4 years of service credit. See, e.g., 
    id.
     § 49-13-401. The amount of a
    member’s pension benefits is dependent on his or her total
    amount of service credit.
    ¶6     During his career, Ostler was a member of both
    contributory and non-contributory retirement systems. To begin
    with, Ostler was employed by the Salt Lake County Sheriff’s
    Office and the Department of Corrections between 1972 and
    1988. By virtue of this employment, he was a member of the
    Public Safety Contributory Retirement System. Ostler made
    member contributions to the system and his employers made
    employer contributions. During this employment, he accrued
    15.167 years of service credit. In 1990, having been terminated
    from public employment, Ostler elected to receive a refund of
    his member contributions—roughly $27,000. Ostler admitted
    that he knew that he would have to redeposit the funds (plus
    interest) in order to reinstate his service credit. He did not do so.
    ¶7      Ostler was also employed at various times from 1988 to
    2004 by several other entities that participated in the Public
    Employees’ Noncontributory Retirement System, including the
    Utah Department of Commerce, the Davis Applied Technology
    Center, and Salt Lake City Corporation. In these positions, he
    accrued 3.352 years of service credit. Finally, from 1992 to 1998,
    Ostler also worked as an adjunct employee of Salt Lake
    Community College (SLCC). Because the position was
    temporary and part-time, SLCC did not consider Ostler eligible
    for retirement benefits, did not enroll him in a retirement plan,
    and did not make contributions to URS on his behalf.
    ¶8      In 2001, Ostler filed a complaint in district court, alleging
    that SLCC had breached its contract with him by wrongfully
    failing to enroll him in a retirement plan or to otherwise provide
    him with retirement benefits. He argued, in part, that he was
    eligible for retirement benefits because he had worked more
    hours than specified in his part-time employment contract. The
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    district court noted that Ostler had not reported these extra
    hours at the time and “ha[d] no record of those hours he
    allege[d] to have worked.” Ultimately, the district court granted
    summary judgment to SLCC. Ostler attempted to challenge that
    judgment but failed to file a timely notice of appeal, resulting in
    a dismissal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Ostler v. Salt Lake
    Community College, 2004 UT App 18U, para. 7 (per curiam).
    Ostler then filed another notice of appeal which this court
    determined was also untimely. Ostler v. Salt Lake Community
    College, 2004 UT App 125U, paras. 1, 6 (per curiam).
    ¶9     Ostler applied for retirement benefits in 2013. URS
    determined that Ostler had only 3.352 years of service credit,
    short of the 4 years required for retirement benefit eligibility,
    and consequently denied his application. Ostler filed a request
    for the Board to review URS’s decision, asserting two claims.
    First, Ostler contended that, despite having withdrawn his
    member contributions, he was entitled to some or all of an
    additional 15.167 years of service credit based on his 1972–1988
    employment, to the extent of his employer’s contributions.
    Second, Ostler contended that he was entitled to additional
    service credit based on his SLCC employment because SLCC
    should have enrolled him as a retirement-eligible employee
    despite his status as a temporary and part-time employee. The
    Board determined that Ostler was not entitled to any service
    credit because he had withdrawn his member contributions and
    never redeposited them. The Board further determined that
    Ostler’s claims regarding SLCC were barred by the statute of
    limitations and the doctrine of laches. As a result, the Board
    rejected Ostler’s claims. Ostler now seeks review of the Board’s
    resolution.
    ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    ¶10 Ostler first contends that the Board erred “when it
    determined that Ostler forfeited all of his service credits, and
    therefore was not entitled to any retirement benefits, because he
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    did not re-deposit his member share of his retirement
    contributions.” (Emphasis in original). We review the Board’s
    interpretation and application of a statute for correctness.
    McLeod v. Retirement Board, 
    2011 UT App 190
    , ¶ 9, 
    257 P.3d 1090
    .
    ¶11 Ostler next contends that the Board erred “when it
    determined Ostler’s claim against Salt Lake Community College
    was barred by the statute of limitations.” We review the Board’s
    application of the statute of limitations to undisputed facts for
    correctness. See Ramsay v. Retirement Board, 
    2017 UT App 17
    , ¶ 9,
    
    391 P.3d 1069
    . Ostler also contends that the Board improperly
    applied the doctrine of laches to reach the alternate ground for
    rejecting his SLCC claims. The application of laches presents a
    mixed question of law and fact; we review the district court’s
    legal conclusions for correctness and its factual findings for clear
    error. See Johnson v. Johnson, 
    2014 UT 21
    , ¶ 8 & n.11, 
    330 P.3d 704
    .
    However, before reaching the statute of limitations and laches
    issues, we first determine whether the doctrine of res judicata
    bars Ostler’s claims against SLCC as a collateral attack; this issue
    presents a question of law. See PGM, Inc. v. Westchester Inv.
    Partners, Ltd., 
    2000 UT App 20
    , ¶ 3, 
    995 P.2d 1252
    ; see also Olsen v.
    Board of Educ., 
    571 P.2d 1336
    , 1338 (Utah 1977). Although res
    judicata was not the basis of the Board’s decision, “an appellate
    court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable
    on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record.” See Bailey
    v. Bayles, 
    2002 UT 58
    , ¶ 13, 
    52 P.3d 1158
     (emphases, citation, and
    internal quotation marks omitted).
    ANALYSIS
    I. Forfeiture
    ¶12 Ostler first contends that “[t]he plain language of [Utah’s
    retirement act] clearly shows a member is entitled to [an]
    employer’s contributions even if the member takes a refund.” In
    his view, a member who elects to receive a refund of his or her
    member contributions “should only forfeit service credits equal
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    Ostler v. Retirement Board
    to the amount of the refund and should still be entitled to a
    retirement allowance based on the [employer] contributions that
    remain in the system.”
    ¶13 This contention requires us to analyze the meaning of
    certain provisions of the Utah State Retirement and Insurance
    Benefit Act (the Act). “Under our rules of statutory construction,
    we look first to the statute’s plain language to determine its
    meaning.” Sindt v. Retirement Board, 
    2007 UT 16
    , ¶ 8, 
    157 P.3d 797
    (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[S]tatutory
    enactments are to be so construed as to render all parts thereof
    relevant and meaningful[.]” Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp., 
    911 P.2d 1290
    , 1292 (Utah 1996) (citation and internal quotation
    marks omitted). “It is our duty to construe each act of the
    legislature so as to give it full force and effect.” Board of Educ. v.
    Sandy City Corp., 
    2004 UT 37
    , ¶ 9, 
    94 P.3d 234
     (citation and
    internal quotation marks omitted). “The meaning of a part of an
    act should harmonize with the purpose of the whole act.
    Separate parts . . . should not be construed in isolation from the
    rest of the act.” Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 
    679 P.2d 903
    , 906 (Utah 1984).
    ¶14 From 1972 to 1988, Ostler worked for employers that
    participated in the Public Safety Contributory Retirement
    System. Both Ostler and his employers made contributions to
    that system. Ostler concedes that he withdrew his member
    contributions and never redeposited them. But, in his view,
    when he elected to withdraw his member contributions from the
    system, he forfeited the service credit attributable to the member
    contributions yet retained the service credit attributable to the
    employer contributions. In other words, Ostler asserts that some
    fraction of the 15.167 years of service credit flowed only from the
    employer contributions and that he did not forfeit that portion.
    ¶15 The Board responds that the Act “shows two crucial
    principles that are dispositive here: 1) a member is only granted
    service credit if all the required retirement contributions, both
    member and employer contributions, are paid to URS; and
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    Ostler v. Retirement Board
    2) only member contributions, not employer contributions are
    vested to a member.” (Emphasis omitted). According to the
    Board, because Ostler did not redeposit his retirement
    contributions (plus interest) and because the employers’
    contributions did not vest in Ostler, he is not entitled to
    retirement benefits.
    ¶16 We agree with the Board. Ostler’s contention relies on the
    Act’s forfeiture provision: “A member who receives a refund of
    member contributions forfeits the service credit based on those
    contributions.” 
    Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-501
    (5) (LexisNexis 2015)
    (emphasis added). According to Ostler, the phrase “those
    contributions” means only the “member contributions.” On this
    basis, he asserts that withdrawal of member contributions leaves
    intact a portion of the member’s service credit based on
    employer contributions. But, as we read the Act, all service credit
    is based on member contributions. This is because the language
    of the Act unambiguously provides that both employer
    contributions and member contributions must be deposited with
    URS in order for the member to receive service credit: “In the
    accrual of service credit . . . [a] person employed and
    compensated by a participating employer who meets the
    eligibility requirements for membership in a system . . . shall
    receive service credit for the term of the employment provided
    that all required contributions are paid to [the retirement
    office].” 
    Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-401
    (3)(a) (emphasis added).
    When both contributions are received, the member receives
    service credit. But the nonpayment of either type of contribution
    results in the member receiving no service credit. In other words,
    because the award of service credit is predicated on receipt of
    both contributions, all service credit is “based on” the member
    contributions just as all service credit is also “based on” the
    employer contributions.
    ¶17 This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the Act
    makes no distinction between service credit related to member
    contributions and service credit related to employer
    contributions. Instead, there is only a single type of service
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    credit—one that is based on the payment of both employee and
    employer contributions. The Act contains no provisions for
    dividing earned service credit into a member-contribution-based
    portion and an employer-contribution-based portion. The
    absence of a mechanism or formula for splitting earned service
    credit into two such components is a clear indication that the Act
    was not designed to allow an employee to withdraw all of his or
    her member contributions yet still receive pension benefits.
    ¶18 Our conclusion is also reinforced when we consider the
    Act’s treatment of employer contributions. The Act is clear that
    member contributions are held by the retirement office in the
    member’s individual account, in trust for the member, and are
    vested in the member. See 
    Utah Code Ann. § 49-14-301
    (5). But
    the Act contains no similar provisions regarding employer
    contributions. Instead, the Act allows an employer’s contribution
    rate to vary depending on the demographics and predilections of
    its employees: “Contribution rates for a participating employer
    may be different than for other participating employers based on
    the participating employer’s current funding status and actuarial
    experience.” 
    Id.
     § 49-14-301(7). That is to say, an employer’s
    contribution rate is discounted based on predictions about the
    percentage of its employees who will qualify for pension benefits
    and the average amount those employees will receive. Thus, an
    employer that has made extensive contributions to the
    retirement plan and whose former employees tend to draw
    fewer and smaller pensions might not be required to contribute
    as much for each new employee enrolled as an employer whose
    expected retirement liabilities exceed the assets deposited with
    URS. But if an employer’s contribution was tied to an individual
    employee, as Ostler’s argument requires, the employer
    contribution rate would simply be a flat amount per employee; it
    would make no conceptual sense to require a lower employer
    contribution for a new employee simply because other
    employees’ individual retirement plans are properly funded. By
    allowing an employer’s per-employee contribution to “float” up
    and down based on actuarial assumptions, the Act is engineered
    to account now for the fact that some employees will receive
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    refunds of their member contributions in the future or will
    otherwise not qualify for pension benefits.
    ¶19 “A member who receives a refund of member
    contributions forfeits the service credit based on those
    contributions.” 
    Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-501
    (5). We conclude
    that, because service credit requires both types of contribution,
    all of the service credit earned during the period of member
    contributions is “based on” the member contributions. 1
    Consequently, the Board did not err in determing that Ostler’s
    decision to withdraw all of his member contributions resulted in
    the forfeiture of all of his service credit earned during that
    employment.
    II. Collateral Attack
    ¶20 Ostler next contends that the Board improperly ruled that
    his SLCC claims were barred by the statute of limitations and the
    doctrine of laches. This contention rests on his argument that
    SLCC should have enrolled him as a retirement-eligible
    employee despite his status as a temporary and part-time
    employee. In Ostler’s view, if SLCC had properly enrolled him,
    he would have earned additional service credit during his SLCC
    employment, which would have put him over the 4 year
    threshold for pension-benefit eligibility.
    1. We note that a member who receives a refund does not
    necessarily forfeit all of his or her service credit. For example, if
    an employee earns 5 years of service credit at his or her first
    employer and then a further 7 years of service credit with a
    second employer, then elects to receive a refund of his or her
    member contributions deposited during employment by the
    second employer, he or she will forfeit the 7 years of service
    credit but not the 5. This is because only the 7 years of service
    credit were “based on” the refunded member contributions.
    20160220-CA                      9                 
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    Ostler v. Retirement Board
    ¶21 The Board determined that the statute of limitations on a
    claim against an employer for retirement service credit begins to
    run at the time the employer fails to make contributions to URS.
    Utah courts have not yet definitively ruled on when the statute
    of limitations for such a claim begins to run. We see potential
    merit in the idea that the statute of limitations for an employee’s
    claim against an employer for failing to classify the employee as
    eligible to earn service credit might begin to run at a different
    point than the applicable statute of limitations for the
    employee’s claim against the Board seeking pension benefits. Cf.
    Ramsay v. Retirement Board, 
    2017 UT App 17
    , 
    391 P.3d 1069
    (discussing the application of the equitable discovery rule in the
    context of a claim for retirement benefits). But we need not and
    do not address that issue; given that Ostler’s district court case
    already challenged SLCC’s failure to contribute or consider him
    qualified to receive benefits, his specific claim in this petition for
    judicial review is barred by the issue-preclusion branch of the
    doctrine of res judicata.
    ¶22 “The general rule of law is that a judgment may not be
    drawn in question in a collateral proceeding[.]” Tolle v. Fenley,
    
    2006 UT App 78
    , ¶ 15, 
    132 P.3d 63
     (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted). “[A]n attack upon a judgment is
    regarded as collateral if made when the judgment is offered as
    the basis of a claim in a subsequent proceeding.” 
    Id.
     (citation and
    internal quotation marks omitted). “Where a judgment is
    attacked in other ways than by proceedings in the original action
    to have it vacated or revised or modified or by a proceeding in
    equity to prevent its enforcement, the attack is a ‘Collateral
    Attack.’” Olsen v. Board of Educ., 
    571 P.2d 1336
    , 1338 (Utah 1977)
    (citation and additional internal quotation marks omitted).
    ¶23 “Collateral estoppel, otherwise known as issue
    preclusion, prevents parties or their privies from relitigating
    facts and issues in the second suit that were fully litigated in the
    first suit.” Moss v. Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless, 
    2012 UT 42
    , ¶ 23, 
    285 P.3d 1157
     (emphasis, citation, and internal
    quotation marks omitted). “Issue preclusion applies only when
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    Ostler v. Retirement Board
    the following four elements are satisfied: (i) the party against
    whom issue preclusion is asserted was a party to or in privity
    with a party to the prior adjudication; (ii) the issue decided in
    the prior adjudication was identical to the one presented in the
    instant action; (iii) the issue in the first action was completely,
    fully, and fairly litigated; and (iv) the first suit resulted in a final
    judgment on the merits.” 
    Id.
     (citation and internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    ¶24 As noted above, Ostler filed a complaint in 2001 in district
    court, alleging that SLCC had breached its employment contract
    with him by wrongfully failing to enroll him in a retirement plan
    during his employment with SLCC from 1992 to 1998. In that
    suit, Ostler challenged the determination made by SLCC that, as
    a part-time and temporary employee, he was not eligible for
    enrollment into a retirement plan. The district court ruled
    against Ostler in 2003, and Ostler failed to bring a timely appeal.
    See Ostler v. Salt Lake Community College, 2004 UT App 18U (per
    curiam); Ostler v. Salt Lake Community College, 2004 UT App 125U
    (per curiam). In 2013, when Ostler applied for retirement
    benefits, was rejected, and petitioned the Board for review, he
    argued to the Board that he should have been granted service
    credit for the time he was employed by SLCC. The Board
    rejected those claims, as do we. We conclude that this claim is a
    collateral attack upon the 2003 final judgment by the district
    court.
    ¶25 The first element of issue preclusion is whether “the party
    against whom issue preclusion is asserted was a party to or in
    privity with a party to the prior adjudication.” Moss, 
    2012 UT 42
    ,
    ¶ 23 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the
    party against whom issue preclusion applies is Ostler, who
    brought both suits. Thus, the first element is satisfied.
    ¶26 The second element of issue preclusion is whether “the
    issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical to the one
    presented in the instant action.” 
    Id.
     (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted). The question before the Board was
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    whether Ostler should have received service credit for his
    employment by SLCC. Ostler had not received such credit,
    because the district court had determined that SLCC properly
    decided Ostler was not eligible for enrollment in a retirement
    plan. Put another way, SLCC made a status determination that
    Ostler was not eligible for a retirement plan, the district court
    upheld that status determination, and Ostler now seeks
    retroactive enrollment in the retirement plan in contravention of
    the district court’s ruling. Although now framed as an attack on
    the Board’s failure to pay retirement benefits, the underlying
    issue is identical: whether Ostler’s employment at SLCC
    qualified him for enrollment in a retirement plan. Consequently,
    the second element is satisfied.
    ¶27 The third element of issue preclusion is whether “the
    issue in the first action was completely, fully, and fairly
    litigated.” 
    Id.
     (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). An
    issue is completely, fully, and fairly litigated when it is properly
    raised, submitted for determination, and actually determined.
    See Fowler v. Teynor, 
    2014 UT App 66
    , ¶ 24, 
    323 P.3d 594
    . In the
    present case, Ostler argues that he should have earned service
    credit while employed by SLCC because he was a retirement-
    eligible employee. The issue raised in the district court case was
    whether SLCC was obligated to enroll Ostler as a retirement-
    eligible employee, which would have allowed him to earn
    service credit, despite his status as a part-time and temporary
    employee. During the resolution of that case, Ostler had a full
    and fair opportunity advance his arguments regarding his
    employment status. And by granting summary judgment in
    favor of SLCC, the district court determined that there was “no
    genuine dispute as to any material fact” and that, under the
    undisputed facts, SLCC was “entitled to judgment as a matter of
    law.” See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a). Because the core issue in the
    district court case was whether Ostler’s SLCC employment
    qualified him to earn service credit, and because the district
    court actually determined that it did not, we conclude that issue
    was completely, fully, and fairly litigated. See Fowler, 
    2014 UT App 66
    , ¶¶ 24–26. The third element is therefore satisfied.
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    ¶28     The fourth element of issue preclusion is whether “the
    first suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits.” Moss, 
    2012 UT 42
    , ¶ 23 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). All
    of the claims raised in Ostler’s district court case were disposed
    of by summary judgment. Ostler, 2004 UT App 125U, para. 5 (per
    curiam) (“In granting SLCC’s motion for summary judgment,
    the district court necessarily denied Ostler’s cross-motion for
    summary judgment.”) A summary judgment that disposes of all
    of the claims amounts to a final judgment on the merits. See
    American Estate Mgmt. Corp. v. International Inv. & Dev. Corp.,
    
    1999 UT App 232
    , ¶¶ 15–17, 
    986 P.2d 765
    ; see also Scholzen
    Products Co. v. Palmer, 2000 UT App 191U, para. 6 (noting that a
    “suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits when the trial
    court granted [the defendants’] motion for summary
    judgment”). Consequently, the fourth element is also satisfied.
    ¶29 Ostler’s claim that he is entitled to additional service
    credit based on his employment by SLCC is predicated on the
    assumption that SLCC improperly deemed him ineligible for
    enrollment in a pension plan. Because the propriety of SLCC’s
    determination was fully and fairly litigated and culminated in
    the district court’s 2003 final order, all four elements of issue
    preclusion are satisfied, and Ostler is barred from collaterally
    attacking that order nearly a decade after its entry.2
    2. The Board’s final order adopted the Hearing Officer’s written
    decision. The Hearing Officer’s written decision contains a
    cryptic footnote stating that “the hearing officer in this matter
    has ruled that the Third District Court did not have jurisdiction
    to hear the relevant claims in [the 2003 action].” Neither the
    Board nor the Hearing Officer explained the reasoning for this
    statement, and we are unaware of any authority of the Board to
    rule on a district court’s jurisdiction. Cf. Utah R. Civ. P. 60
    (describing the procedure by which a court may set aside a
    judgment or order for, inter alia, lack of jurisdiction). At oral
    argument, counsel suggested that the footnote may reference
    Ostler’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies before
    (continued…)
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    CONCLUSION
    ¶30 We conclude that all 15.167 years of service credit Ostler
    earned while participating in the Public Safety Contributory
    Retirement System were “based on” his member contributions;
    consequently, the Board did not err in determining that Ostler
    forfeited 15.167 years of service credit when he elected to receive
    a refund of 15.167 years’ worth of his member contributions. We
    further conclude that Ostler’s attempt to establish additional
    service credit within the Public Employees’ Noncontributory
    Retirement System based on his employment with SLCC is a
    collateral attack on the 2003 district court determination (that
    SLCC had correctly deemed Ostler’s position ineligible for
    enrollment in that system); consequently, this issue is barred by
    the issue preclusion branch of res judicata.
    ¶31 For the foregoing reasons, we decline to disturb the
    Board’s decision.
    (…continued)
    filing suit in district court. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-401
    (LexisNexis 2016) (discussing the exhaustion requirement). This
    argument was never properly raised in the district court
    proceeding. And even if it had been raised and found
    meritorious so as to nullify the district court’s summary
    judgment, it would simply establish that Ostler should have
    begun administrative proceedings within three years after, at the
    latest, his alleged discovery of the claims underlying his 2001
    complaint. See id. § 78B-2-305(4) (2012) (prescribing a three-year
    statute of limitations for “a liability created by the statutes of this
    state”).
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Document Info

Docket Number: 20160220-CA

Citation Numbers: 2017 UT App 96, 400 P.3d 1099, 841 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 2017 WL 2610041, 2017 Utah App. LEXIS 96

Judges: Christiansen, Voros, Mortensen

Filed Date: 6/15/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024