Farman-Rava v. Blu Auto Transport , 2021 UT App 93 ( 2021 )


Menu:
  •                          
    2021 UT App 93
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    YASSER FARMAN-RAVA,
    Appellant,
    v.
    BLU AUTO TRANSPORT LLC,
    Appellee.
    Opinion
    No. 20200250-CA
    Filed September 2, 2021
    Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
    The Honorable Su Chon
    No. 170904692
    Daniel F. Bertch, Attorney for Appellant
    JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
    JUDGES JILL M. POHLMAN and RYAN M. HARRIS concurred.
    MORTENSEN, Judge:
    ¶1     Yasser Farman-Rava was injured on the job and sued his
    employer, Blu Auto Transport LLC (Employer). He was able to
    sue Employer in court because Employer had not purchased
    workers’ compensation insurance. Two causes of action were
    tried, in a bench trial, to the district court: negligence and
    intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The court
    concluded that Farman-Rava prevailed on his negligence claim,
    but that he had failed to prove his IIED claim. Thereafter, citing
    Utah Code section 34A-2-207(4), Farman-Rava moved to collect
    attorney fees for time spent on the negligence claim. The district
    court denied his request. Farman-Rava appeals this denial of
    fees, and we reverse and remand.
    ¶2      While working for Employer, Farman-Rava lost a portion
    of his finger when his supervisor activated a piece of equipment
    Farman-Rava v. Blu Auto Transport
    that Farman-Rava was handling. Farman-Rava filed suit in
    district court, alleging that Employer’s negligence was the cause
    of his injury. He also included a claim for IIED based on
    threatening messages he received, and which he believed were
    sent by the supervisor.
    ¶3     These claims were eventually tried to the bench. The court
    found that Farman-Rava had prevailed on his negligence claim,
    but that his IIED claim failed. In finding that Farman-Rava “was
    injured due to the negligence of [Employer],” the court
    evaluated the applicability of the Workers’ Compensation Act. It
    noted that, typically, the Workers’ Compensation Act provides
    the “exclusive remedy” for an employee seeking compensation
    for an on-the-job injury (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(1)
    (LexisNexis 2019)) but concluded that this provision did not
    apply because Employer had failed to provide workers’
    compensation insurance, (citing Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-207)
    (LexisNexis 2019). Consequently, the district court concluded
    that Farman-Rava was entitled to “seek all the remedies under
    tort law,” and awarded him damages for medical bills and pain
    and suffering.
    ¶4     Thereafter, Farman-Rava moved for attorney fees
    under Utah Code section 34A-2-207(4). In evaluating the
    motion, the district court observed that Farman-Rava
    was “entitled to only the actual fees on the claim that he
    prevailed on” and was thus “not entitled to the fees for
    the claims that he did not prevail on, namely the [IIED]”
    claim. The district court did acknowledge that, in a
    supporting affidavit, Farman-Rava’s counsel explained that
    “he excluded time for work that did not materially advance
    the case and time spent on the losing claim for [IIED],”
    and, “[f]or work that was for both Negligence and [the]
    IIED claim, [he had] included only 1/2 of that time.”
    Nevertheless, the court went on to rule that the “attorney’s
    20200250-CA                    2                
    2021 UT App 93
    Farman-Rava v. Blu Auto Transport
    fees for the negligence” claim should also “be deducted.” 1 This
    was so, the district court explained, because,
    Other than the workplace insurance claim,
    [Farman-Rava’s counsel] is unable to point to a
    statute that permits him to obtain attorney’s fees as
    to the negligence claim.
    ¶5     Farman-Rava appeals the district court’s order denying
    his request for fees related to his negligence claim. Because the
    substance of this ruling was that Utah Code section 34A-2-207(4)
    simply did not apply to Farman-Rava’s negligence claim, this is
    a legal conclusion, which we review for correctness. 2 See Gilbert
    Dev. Corp. v. Wardley Corp., 
    2010 UT App 361
    , ¶ 16, 
    246 P.3d 131
    (“The question of whether a party is entitled to an award of
    attorney fees is a legal conclusion which we review for
    correctness.” (cleaned up)). And we conclude that the district
    court erred, given that section 34A-2-207(4), a provision within
    the Workers’ Compensation Act, explicitly provides for an
    award of attorney fees in this situation. See also Anderson
    & Karrenberg v. Warnick, 
    2012 UT App 275
    , ¶ 9, 
    289 P.3d 600
    (“[A]ttorney fees are recoverable only if authorized by contract
    or statute.”).
    1. Thus, the court effectively denied Farman-Rava any attorney
    fees.
    2. Employer did not file a brief or otherwise resist the
    contentions made in Farman-Rava’s moving brief. While this
    “does not amount to an automatic default and consequent
    reversal of the lower court,” it does mean that Farman-Rava
    “need only establish a prima facie showing of a plausible basis
    for reversal.” AL-IN Partners, LLC v. LifeVantage Corp., 
    2021 UT 42
    , ¶ 19 (cleaned up). “This is a lower standard than the typical
    burden of persuasion on appeal.” 
    Id. 20200250
    -CA                     3               
    2021 UT App 93
    Farman-Rava v. Blu Auto Transport
    ¶6     Pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act, an employee
    who is injured during the course of employment typically cannot
    bring a tort claim against their employer. See, e.g., Brown v.
    Williams, 
    2017 UT App 29
    , ¶ 8, 
    392 P.3d 919
    . Instead, the
    Workers’ Compensation Act provides the “exclusive remedy.”
    See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(1). This means that the
    employee must pursue compensation through the Workers’
    Compensation Act’s administrative scheme, and indeed,
    “district courts have no jurisdiction whatsoever over cases that
    fall within the purview of the Workers’ Compensation Act.” See
    Working RX, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Fund, 
    2007 UT App 376
    , ¶ 8,
    
    173 P.3d 853
     (cleaned up); see also Thomas A. Paulsen Co. v.
    Industrial Comm'n, 
    770 P.2d 125
    , 127 (Utah 1989) (“If an
    employee is injured in an accident during the course of
    employment and the employer is properly insured, the
    employee’s sole means of obtaining redress is through the
    workers’ compensation system.”).
    ¶7     However, pursuant to section 34A-2-207, this limitation
    does not apply where the employer failed to “secure the
    payment of workers’ compensation benefits.” See Utah Code
    Ann. §§ 34A-2-201 (LexisNexis 2019), -207; see also Thomas A.
    Paulsen Co., 770 P.2d at 127 (“However, when an employer is not
    insured as required by statute, the employee has the option of
    seeking damages . . . in the courts . . . .” (cleaned up)). In such a
    scenario, section 34A-2-207 expressly empowers employees to
    pursue a “civil action” against their employer “for damages
    suffered by reason of personal injuries arising out of or in the
    course of employment caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or
    default of the employer or any of the employer’s officers, agents,
    or employees.” See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-207(1)(a). Further,
    subsections of the statute go on to provide that, in any such civil
    action, proof of the injury constitutes “prima facie evidence of
    negligence on the part of the employer” and that the employer is
    prevented from raising various affirmative defenses such as
    20200250-CA                      4                 
    2021 UT App 93
    Farman-Rava v. Blu Auto Transport
    assumption of risk or contributory negligence. See Utah Code
    Ann. § 34A-2-207(1)(b), (2). Finally, subsection (4) explicitly
    provides for an award of attorney fees:
    In any civil action permitted under this section against
    the employer, the employee shall be entitled to
    necessary costs and a reasonable attorney fee
    assessed against the employer.
    See id. § 34A-2-207(4) (emphasis added).
    ¶8     Here, the district court correctly noted that the Workers’
    Compensation Act was not Farman-Rava’s “exclusive remedy”
    because Employer had failed to secure or obtain workers’
    compensation insurance and, therefore, section 34A-2-207 was
    operative. Yet, when Farman-Rava sought attorney fees under
    subsection (4) of that same statute for fees related to his
    negligence claim, the district court denied this request.
    ¶9     In so ruling, the court concluded that Farman-Rava could
    not rely on this provision and instead had “to point to” a
    different statute to be entitled to fees for his negligence claim. See
    supra ¶ 4. This was error. Farman-Rava was entitled to an
    attorney fee award pursuant to section 34A-2-207(4) because his
    negligence claim was a “civil action permitted under” that
    statute. Id. Farman-Rava’s negligence claim, in which he sought
    compensation from his employer for an on-the-job injury, is
    paradigmatic of the claims that would typically be preempted by
    the Workers’ Compensation Act, but because his employer failed
    to secure or obtain worker’s compensation insurance, it is
    permitted by section 34A-2-207. See, e.g., Brown, 
    2017 UT App 29
    ,
    ¶ 13 (affirming dismissal of an employee’s negligence claim
    relating to an injury on the employer’s premises because
    “workers’ compensation benefits” were her “exclusive remedy”).
    Indeed, section 34A-2-207 leaves no room for ambiguity on this
    point, as it explicitly speaks in terms of negligence—it provides
    20200250-CA                      5                  
    2021 UT App 93
    Farman-Rava v. Blu Auto Transport
    that proof of injury constitutes prima facie evidence of
    negligence, and then goes on to prevent the employer from
    raising various affirmative defenses to negligence claims. See
    Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-207(1)(b), (2). The statute is clear:
    Farman-Rava is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees
    for time spent on the negligence claim.
    ¶10 Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with
    this opinion.
    20200250-CA                   6               
    2021 UT App 93
                                

Document Info

Docket Number: 20200250-CA

Citation Numbers: 2021 UT App 93

Filed Date: 9/2/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/20/2021