Howard v. CitiMortgage ( 2012 )


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  •                           IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    ‐‐‐‐ooOoo‐‐‐‐
    J. Mark Howard,                              )           PER CURIAM DECISION
    )
    Plaintiff and Appellant,              )             Case No. 20110772‐CA
    )
    v.                                           )
    )                    FILED
    PNC Mortgage; CitiMortgage, Inc.;            )                (January 20, 2012)
    Paul M. Halliday Jr.; and Halliday           )
    and Watkins, P.C.,                           )                 
    2012 UT App 19
    )
    Defendants and Appellee.              )
    ‐‐‐‐‐
    Fourth District, Provo Department, 100401694
    The Honorable Lynn W. Davis
    Attorneys:      J. Mark Howard, Salt Lake City, Appellant Pro Se
    Anthony C. Kaye, Angela W. Adams, and Steven D. Burt, Salt Lake
    City, for Appellee
    ‐‐‐‐‐
    Before Judges McHugh, Thorne, and Christiansen.
    ¶1     J. Mark Howard appeals the district court’s July 20, 2011 order of dismissal. This
    matter is before the court on PNC Mortgage’s motion for summary disposition on the
    basis that the grounds for review are so insubstantial as to not merit further
    proceedings and consideration by the court.1
    1
    This court also filed a sua sponte motion for summary disposition on the basis
    that this court lacked jurisdiction due to the absence of a final, appealable order. In
    (continued...)
    ¶2     We review a district court’s ruling on a motion on the pleadings for correctness.
    See MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Williams, 
    2006 UT App 432
    , ¶ 2, 
    147 P.3d 536
    . In order
    to determine whether a complaint raises a valid cause of action, the sufficiency of a
    complaint “must be determined by the facts pleaded rather than the conclusions
    stated.” Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter‐day Saints, 
    2001 UT 25
    , ¶ 26, 
    21 P.3d 198
    .
    “[M]ere conclusory allegations in a pleading, unsupported by a recitation of relevant
    surrounding facts, are insufficient to preclude” dismissal or summary judgment. Id.
    ¶ 36.
    ¶3     Howard asserts that the district court erred in dismissing several of his claims
    because PNC Mortgage could not demonstrate that it was a holder in due course of the
    note. Specifically, Howard argues that PNC Mortgage must produce the original note,
    not a photocopy, to support its claim that it is now the holder of the note. However,
    courts have generally concluded that
    where there is no evidence that photocopies of a note or
    deed of trust are not exact reproductions of the original
    instruments, a party need not present the original note or
    deed of trust and may establish that it is the holder of the
    instruments by presenting photocopies of the note or deed of
    trust.
    Dobson v. Substitute Trustee Services, Inc., 
    711 S.E.2d 728
    , 730 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011); see
    also Utah R. Evid. 1003 (“A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original”
    unless a question is raised as to the duplicate’s authenticity, or it would be unfair to
    admit the duplicate); Cadle Co. v. Errato, 
    802 A.2d 887
    , 896 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (stating
    that “the production of a photocopy of a note, rather than the original, may suffice to
    establish a plaintiff’s status as a holder in due course”); Mark v. Household Finance Corp.
    III, 
    296 S.W.3d 838
    , 842 (Tex. App. 2009) (stating that “‘a photocopy of a note attached to
    the affidavit of the holder, who swears that it is a true and correct copy of the note, is
    1
    (...continued)
    response to the court’s motion, PNC Mortgage clarified that it prepared the order
    signed by the district court. As such, Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 
    2009 UT 2
    , 
    201 P.3d 966
    , is not applicable, and the court’s motion is withdrawn.
    20110772‐CA                                   2
    sufficient as a matter of law to prove the status of owner and holder of the note absent
    controverting summary judgment evidence’”).
    ¶4      Here, there is no question of fact as to whether the note and interest in the trust
    deed had been transferred to PNC Mortgage by CitiMortgage, Inc. In fact, Howard
    admits in his complaint that CitiMortgage “assigned all of its rights, title and interest in
    the note, trust deed and subject property” to PNC Mortgage. Further, PNC Mortgage
    attached a copy of the note to its verified answer. The note contains an endorsement
    transferring it from CitiMortgage to National City Bank, which later became PNC
    Mortgage. Thus, there is no dispute as to whether the note was transferred to PNC
    Mortgage. Similarly, Howard provided no reason to doubt the authenticity of the
    duplicate note, nor has Howard raised any issue that would demonstrate it was unfair
    to rely on the duplicate. See Utah R. Evid. 1003. Accordingly, an original copy of the
    note was not required to prove whether or not PNC Mortgage was a holder in due
    course.
    ¶5      Howard next alleges that PNC Mortgage did not have the right to foreclose on
    the property because the note had been pooled within other mortgage notes and sold as
    a security. This court recently rejected a similar argument in Commonwealth Property
    Advocates, LLC v. Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc., 
    2011 UT App 232
    , 
    263 P.3d 397
    . Specifically, the court interpreted Utah law as “ensuring the basic presumption
    that ‘[a] transfer of an obligation secured by a mortgage also transfers the mortgage
    unless the parties to the transfer agree otherwise.’” Id. ¶ 13. As such, the sale of passive
    investment interests in a note secured by a trust deed does not on its own alter the
    rights, obligations, or enforceability of a trust deed. See id. ¶ 10. Therefore, because
    securitization on its own does not alter the rights, obligations, or enforceability of a trust
    deed, a litigant must plead facts specific to his case that demonstrate that the documents
    at issue in the case do not allow securitization of the note. See id. Howard failed to
    allege such specific facts in his complaint. Accordingly, the district court properly
    dismissed Howard’s claims concerning the securitization of the note.
    ¶6     Finally, Howard argues that the district court erred in dismissing his claim
    concerning the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The district court dismissed this
    claim because it was “based entirely on legal conclusions rather than supported by
    relevant, supporting facts.” Based upon our own review of the pleadings, we agree that
    Howard merely asserted broad conclusory allegations in his complaint “unsupported
    20110772‐CA                                   3
    by a recitation of relevant surrounding facts.” Franco, 
    2001 UT 25
    , ¶ 36. As such, the
    district court properly dismissed Howard’s cause of action relating to the Fair Debt
    Collection Practices Act.
    ¶7    Affirmed.
    ____________________________________
    Carolyn B. McHugh,
    Presiding Judge
    ____________________________________
    William A. Thorne Jr., Judge
    ____________________________________
    Michele M. Christiansen, Judge
    20110772‐CA                                 4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20110772-CA

Judges: Christiansen, McHUGH, Per Curiam, Thorne

Filed Date: 1/20/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/13/2024